# THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 17, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

Admiral George W. Anderson Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The President has asked that I express to you his thanks for your ideas on ways the Intelligence Community can substantially improve the quality of the intelligence product while achieving improved efficiency.

To that let me add my own appreciation for your memorandum to me on your conversation with Director Schlesinger. I agree with you that he is showing admirable enthusiasm for his new task and I am confident that there will be genuine improvement in the performance of the Intelligence Community.

In regard to your statement to Director Schlesinger regarding the Board's human intelligence study, I believe you should make known to him your conclusions and recommendations as soon as possible. They should be of great assistance to him.

#

Henry A. Kissinger

NSC review completed.

<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>

#### CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION
March 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY. A. KISSINGER

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

Memorandum for Admiral Anderson

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to Admiral Anderson thanking him for his 21 February 1973 memorandum to you on his first conversation with Director Schlesinger. Per your instructions, your memorandum also informs the Admiral that he should provide the DCI with the conclusions of the Board's human intelligence study.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo at Tab A.

CONFIDENTIAL

### TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION February 22, 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

TOM LATIMER

SUBJECT:

Memoranda From Admiral Anderson to the President

and to HAK

#### Attached are:

-- A memo from you to HAK covering a memo (Tab B) to him from George Anderson on a 20 February conversation he had with Jim Schlesinger and,

- -- a memo from Admiral Anderson to the President (Tab A), and,
- -- a memo from HAK to the President (Tab 1) informing him of the points made by George Anderson in his memo to the President.

## TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

Memoranda From Admiral Anderson for the President

and You

At Tab B is a memorandum from George Anderson to you concerning his 20 February discussion with Director Schlesinger on a variet of matters relating to intelligence. Some of the Admiral's ideas are interesting and you might want to glance through his two-page memo.

At Tab A is a memorandum from George Anderson to the President on the progress that has been make in implementing the President's November 5, 1971, directive on the intelligence community. He also suggests certain improvements which are the same as the mentions in his memo to you.

If you wish to forward Admiral Anderson's memo to the President, a memo for your signature is at Tab 1.

SECRET

TL:1rh:2/2/2/73

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/04/17: LOC-HAK-538-1-4-9

**MEMORANDUM** 

SECRET

## THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

21 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

Yesterday afternoon I met with Dr. Schlesinger in his office at CIA, the first opportunity I have had to call on him since he assumed his new responsibilities. I endeavored to convey to him my impressions of the intelligence community based on four years as a member of the PFIAB and almost three as Chairman.

The first point I made was that the effective implementation of the reorganization of the foreign intelligence community, based upon the 5 November 1971 directive of the President, is dependent upon two principal factors:

- a) The dynamic leadership of the individual occupying the post of the DCI.
- b) The full cooperation of the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants in view of the fact that some 75 to 80% of the personnel and resources involved in foreign intelligence are a direct or an executive agent responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.

My feeling is that with the change of personalities accelerated progress in implementing the spirit of the President's directive should now be possible.

I also mentioned to him the regret of the PFIAB that for understandable reasons the NSCIC has not been able to meet frequently or regularly during the past year. I suggested that he raise with you the question of your designating a vice chairman who could convene this committee in the event that you personally were otherwise engaged in travels abroad.

I explained to him that the staff of the DCI needed a broader base and less of an image of just another echelon of the CIA. Otherwise, other parts of the intelligence community would feel that they were just being subordinated to the Agency rather than to the DCI in his superior role. In this connection, I emphasized the need for him to have someone of stature on the DCI staff who could travel to the various important countries around the world and look at the total US intelligence activities in each of the countries. In the past, of the PFIAB.



I suggested to him that he review carefully the composition and the functioning of the Board of National Estimates. In our opinion this needs rejuvenation in order for it to be more effective. In this connection, I believe that you and the President and the DCI should select an individual in whom you have absolute confidence, who could arrange for a properly screened input to the Board of National Estimates of your own discussions with the Soviets, Chinese, North Vietnamese, etc. (perhaps Gen. Dick Walters might serve this purpose most effectively).

I informed Dr. Schlesinger that the comprehensive study on human intelligence conducted by the Board over the past seven months had been completed and the report submitted through you to the President. I told him that if and when I was released to do so, I would make known to him our pertinent conclusions and recommendations. I did emphasize the urgent importance of full cooperation between the CIA and the FBI. He assured me that steps in this direction had already been initiated.

I told him that the extent of progress in establishing the Central Cryptologic System under NSA left something to be desired as of this time and that Dr. Baker, a member of the PFTAB, would be available to talk to Dr. Schlesinger and his people at any time of mutual convenience.

With regard to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), I stated that it was the opinion of the PFIAB that there was a need for promulgation of a NSCID, delineating the role, functions and relationships of the NRO, similar to those promulgated for the other major components of the intelligence community.

I informed him that it was my opinion there had to be a greater appreciation of the importance of foreign intelligence within the State Department among the various Ambassadors and particularly on the part of the members of the Foreign Service. If the Foreign Service at home and abroad participate to their full potential, it can then permit members of the CIA to concentrate on those areas beyond the normal capacity of the Foreign Service, especially in matters involving clandestine collection of intelligence.

It is clear to me that Dr. Schlesinger is embarking on his new duties with enthusiasm and that there is a genuine opportunity to achieve in the short term future substantial improvements in effectiveness of the total intelligence community, provided that there is the necessary degree of cooperation on the part of the Secretary of Defense and those senior officers and officials under the Secretary of Defense who are involved with foreign intelligence and the utilization of the product. Dr. Schlesinger feels that he will receive this cooperation.

> George W. Anderson, Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Chairman



### SECRET

#### INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Memorandum From Admiral

Anderson

George Anderson, Chairman of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, has written you a memorandum on the implementation of your November 5, 1971 directive on the organization and management of the intelligence community.

-- He notes that progress has been made and that U.S. intelligence resources are beginning to be treated as a whole.

Admiral Anderson also points to certain areas where there will have to be further concentrated efforts made in order to bring to fruition the two principal goals which you established for the intelligence community, namely, substantially improved quality of the intelligence product and maximum efficiency in the utilization of intelligence resources.

Among the areas where improvements can still be made, Admiral Anderson lists the following:

- -- More dynamic leadership on the part of the DCI, particularly in respect to the intelligence programs in the Department of Defense:
- -- A greater willingness on the part of the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants to recognize the enhanced role which you have assigned to the DCI;
- -- Clarification of the national, or supra-departmental, character of the National Reconnaissance Office;

#### SECRET

SECRET

2

- -- Continued monitoring of the effort to achieve an economical and effective national Signals Intelligence effort, and finally;
- -- A more active role for the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

SECRET

BYE #12000/73

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1973

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has been monitoring the implementation of your November 5, 1971, directive on the organization and management of the Intelligence Community. We believe that progress has been made and that U. S. intelligence resources are beginning to be treated as a whole, as evidenced by the DCI's National Intelligence Program Memorandum for FY 74 and the National Intelligence Community Planning Guidance 1975-1980. However, in the year ahead there will have to be further concentrated efforts made in order to bring to fruition the two principal goals which you established for the Community, namely, substantially improved quality of the intelligence product and maximum efficiency in the utilization of intelligence resources. The following are some of the areas on which concentration should be placed:

- (a) There is, first of all, the necessity for more dynamic leadership on the part of the DCI particularly in respect to the intelligence programs in the Department of Defense.
- (b) There must be a greater willingness on the part of the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants to recognize the enhanced role which you have assigned to the DCI. A reluctance in Defense to accept his pre-eminent position in the Community has impeded an adequate assessment of certain programs, made difficult an examination of possible cross-program trade-offs, and hindered the DCI's ability properly to evaluate the allocation of resources against requirements.
- (c) There should be more frequent meetings of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, even though this may require the designation of a vice-chairman to convene

meetings when the frequent travels abroad and the other heavy demands on your Assistant for National Security Affairs preclude his attendance. As you will recall, this Committee was established to fill a void in the important area of direction and guidance to the Community on national substantive intelligence needs and evaluation of product from the standpoint of U.S. policy-makers.

- The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) should be (d) rechartered under a separate National Security Council Intelligence Directive. Since its initial establishment. the NRO has been operating without such a charter under the executive agency of the Secretary of Defense. We believe that the issuances of a NSCID will serve to clarify and preserve the national, or supra-departmental, character of the NRO.
- Another national intelligence asset for which the Secretary of Defense is executive agent is the National Security Agency (NSA). Your November 1971 directive resulted in the establishment of a Central Security Service (CSS) for the purpose of consolidating the activities of the military service cryptologic agencies under the Director of NSA. A close scrutiny of the status of the CSS will be necessary to determine whether it is evolving along the course calculated to achieve your objective of an economical and effective national Signals Intelligence effort.

The Board will continue to monitor the implementation of your directive to assure compliance with its spirit as well as its letter. We expect to submit to you recommendations for corrective action as specific deficiencies are observed.

Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board