

July 1971

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: AL HAIG

SUBJECT: Recent Zumwalt Ideas

As you know, Admiral Zumwalt left several papers for you in Paris outlining his concerns and suggestions on a variety of issues following his recent trip abroad. The following is a brief summary of his observations and suggestions.

1. NATO Northern Flank. In the papers at Tab A Admiral Zumwalt provides an interesting political/military comparison of Scandinavian perceptions and stresses that:

- Norway sees itself as increasingly isolated because of intensified Soviet fleet exercises, the decreasing Finnish independence from the Soviet Union, and Sweden's move toward a USSR-biased neutrality.
- The important strategic position of Iceland. (See maps at Tab B.)

He recommends inter alia:

- Strong efforts to reverse the drift of Iceland.
- Measures to convince the Faeroe Islanders to take a more pro NATO posture. (See map at Tab B.)
- Greater NATO infrastructure expenditures in Northern Norway as a sign of NATO resolve, more frequent exercises off Norway and basing of U.S. ships in the UK and Netherlands.

Comment: Admiral Zumwalt has identified an important trend of erosion in the northern flank which needs careful examination. I have the following recommendations:

NSS, DOS, OSD,  
JCS reviews  
completed

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--Although we have a NSSM on Iceland, the problem of reversing the political situation in Iceland and the Faroes should be given early imaginative consideration in the 40 Committee.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

--I have asked Hal Sonnenfeldt to evaluate the possibility of a NSSM to examine political/military trends in Scandinavia with particular emphasis on the growing isolation and vulnerability of Norway. The NSSM should consider the value of increased fleet exercises, U.S. basing and other measures which could be taken to shore up Norway.

2. JCS Views on FY-1973 Budget (Tab C). Admiral Zumwalt reports that the private view of the JCS is that the U.S. has lost both strategic and conventional military superiority to the Soviet Union. He recommends that the President talk to the Joint Chiefs while he is considering the Defense budget for FY-73.

Comment: As you know this is a serious issue, with important political as well as security aspects, and I strongly recommend that the President give the Joint Chiefs a hearing while budget issues are being considered rather than in a cosmetic meeting after he has already made the Defense budget decisions. I do not believe that the depth of our examination of budget issues thus far or assessment of the threat justifies ignoring the Joint Chiefs and it would be valuable for the President to have their views.

3. SALT (Tab D). Admiral Zumwalt cautions that in working toward an offensive freeze we must maintain "freedom to mix." He suggests, *inter alia*, an automatic provision to occur two years after an interim agreement.

Comment: As you know, we are now seeking a simple freeze and have not made a detailed assessment of "freedom to mix" provisions which pose a difficult verification problem. I will ask Smith/Sonnenfeldt to give you a detailed assessment of this issue.

4. Indian Ocean (Tab E). Admiral Zumwalt reports that the Australian, New Zealand, UK and U.S. Navies have agreed to exchange information about visits to the Indian Ocean so that there will be more continuous, friendly coverage of the Indian Ocean.


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Comment: This is a useful development.

5. Moroccan Revolution (Tab F). Admiral Zumwalt feels Libya's immediate support for the Moroccan coup attempts may reflect the Soviet hand. He suggests a sophisticated campaign to exploit the possible Soviet/Libyan role as part of our save Malta policy.

Comment: Malta should receive early 40 Committee consideration.



Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

6. Rules of Engagement in DMZ (Tab G). Admiral Zumwalt indicates that General Abrams and JCS requests for authorities to operate within and above the DMZ are not being approved.

Comment: I am unaware of any current great JCS dissatisfaction with the rules of engagement. As you know Admiral Welender is looking into DMZ authorities. When JCS submitted their request for authorities beyond April 30, 1971 there were three denials associated with operations above the DMZ:

--pre-emptive strikes against SAM/AAA installations within 19 miles of border

--retaliation for up to 72 hours against a SAM site which actually fires a missile

--attack any enemy aircraft operating below 20 degrees North.

I will review this whole situation quietly with Admiral Welender.

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: HAL SONNENFELDT  
FROM: AL HAIG  
SUBJECT: Norway and Scandinavia

There have been reports recently concerning the increasing strategic vulnerability of Norway due to political developments in Sweden, Finland and Iceland and the increasing Soviet Naval operations off the coast of Germany. It may be time to take a long-range look at trends in Scandinavia with particular emphasis on possible political and military erosion of the NATO Northern Flank. Would you please give me your views on whether you believe a NSSM on this subject might be worthwhile.

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JCS VIEWS ON FY-73 BUDGET

1. Problem. The private view of the JCS is that the U.S. has lost both strategic and conventional military superiority to the Soviet Union. The significant new factors are that the Soviet ground forces and Air Forces, which have probably always been superior in Europe, are now joined by superior strategic nuclear forces (with resultant psychological advantage, albeit little useful military advantage) and by maritime superiority as a result of the reductions in the FY-72 budget which will be imposed by the Congress.
2. Recommendations: As part of making a judgment as to how much influence he shall put into holding the line on the FY-72 DOD budget and on the size of the FY-73 DOD budget, the President ought to see personally and hear the views of the JCS.

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SALT

1. The President should be aware that a freeze on offensive systems without "freedom to mix" means that current invulnerability of POLARIS and POSEIDON boats will disappear, after Soviet nuclear attack submarines, being built at the rate of 10 to 12 per year, become progressively quieter. They will be able constantly to trail POLARIS/POSEIDON boats, something they have not been able to do to date and the long invulnerability of the maritime part of the triad will end.

2. Recommendations:

a. "Walk back the cat" on "freedom to mix" in terms of reference for SALT.

b. This can be done by providing for "freedom to mix" as an automatic feature to occur within two years from the time of the interim agreement, if a permanent agreement has not been achieved which protects the invulnerability of the sea based deterrent.

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**INDIAN OCEAN**

1. The Australian, New Zealand, UK and U.S. Navies have agreed informally to exchange information about visits to the Indian Ocean in order to make it possible to spread the coverage of the ships of their several navies more appropriately throughout each year.

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ATTEMPTED MORROCOAN REVOLUTION

1. Saturday's attempted assassination of the King of Morocco revealed the continued pattern of Soviet indirect exploitation of the Arab revolution to penetrate the south littoral of the Mediterranean.
2. Libya's almost immediately announced support marks her complicity.
3. Libyan financial support of MINTOFF in the recent Malta election is becoming generally well known, may have been subsidized by the USSR, and certainly was encouraged by the USSR.
4. Recommendations: A czar should be set up to propose for Presidential approval a "Save Malta" policy and have authority to marshal governmental and private resources for a sophisticated campaign rapidly to seize the opportunity to exploit with MINTOFF the nature of the game that Libya abbetted by the Soviet Union is playing--"He who lies down with lions."

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN DMZ

1. Problem: General Abrams' requested authorities to operate within and above the DMZ in order to contain the growing NVN threat in I Corps are not being approved. Failure to do so will, in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have a serious impact on the prospects for successful Vietnamization, in I Corps at least. Similarly, through various devices, the amount of tactical air support and B-52 support requested by General Abrams as part of his requirement for supporting the current troop withdrawals are being eroded in various ways.
2. Recommendation: Obtain a full report on the status of all authorities requested for DMZ, NVN, Laos and on DOD plans for the continuation of air support requested by General Abrams.

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