

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION
October 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER RODMAN PWR
SUBJECT: Who Invited Whom?

The attached chronology gives the full record of public and private statements relevant to the question of which side took the initiative to propose a Presidential visit to China. The record suggests that the invitation evolved out of initiatives on both sides:

- The U.S. took the initiative and pressed for the idea of sending a U.S. special representative to Peking or receiving a Chinese special envoy in Washington. (This began in the Warsaw talks in January 1970, and we later raised it in special channels. The Chinese responded positively on December 9, 1970.)
- Aside from a casual comment by the President in an October 1970 TIME interview, the first mention of a Presidential visit came from the Chinese on January 11, 1971. (They repeated it on April 21, 1971, following the President's public remark about his daughter's honeymoon.)
- Chou En-lai's message of May 29, 1971, treats the idea of a Presidential visit as Mao's "suggestion" which the President "accepts."
- Chinese ploymanship about our seeking the invitation seems to have begun in Chou's talks with you in Peking. (Chou told you the President's honeymoon remark in April prompted the invitation.) He has been getting the sequence wrong, too. Last week he told a group of Americans that the special-envoy idea was agreed to after the Presidential-visit idea was broached.

MORI/CDF Pages
1-6 per C03318090

State review completed,
pgs 1-6

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The key steps in the process are marked in red on the attached chronology.

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WHO INVITED WHOM?

Date

Jan. 20, 1970

Amb. Stoessel at Warsaw meeting tells PRC Charge' that U.S. "would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions . . . or receiving a representative from your Government in Washington." PRC Charge' expresses interest. (Tab 1)

Feb. 20, 1970

At next Warsaw meeting, PRC Charge' states that "if the USG wishes to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy of the U.S. President to Peking for further exploration of questions of fundamental principle between China and the United States, the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him." (Tab 2)

May 3, 1970

U.S. assures Chinese following Cambodia operation (thru Winter and Walters in Paris) that U.S. has no aggressive intentions, and that "Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the Communist Chinese side if this can be done secretly. (Tab 3)

June 15, 1970

U.S. (thru Walters) suggests creation of a regular channel thru Walters, and states our readiness "to send a high-level personal representative of the President to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location, for direct talks on U.S. -Chinese relations." (Tab 4)

Oct. 5, 1970

President, in TIME interview following Jordanian crisis, says: "If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't, I want my children to." (Tab 5)

Oct. 25, 1970

President asks Yahya in Washington to tell Chinese in Peking that U.S. is willing to send high-level personal representative (e.g., Murphy, Dewey, or HAK) to Peking or other convenient capital to open direct secret communications. (Tab 6)

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Oct. 26, 1970

Ceausescu tells President he believes PRC wants to improve relations with U.S. President declares U.S. readiness for talks with PRC and exchange of high-level special representatives. (Tab 7)

Dec. 9, 1970

PRC replies to oral message delivered by Yahya: Chou En-lai, after coordinating with Mao and Lin Piao, states that "in order to discuss this subject [U.S. vacating Taiwan], a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking." Chou notes that this was first U.S. message sent "from a Head thru a Head to a Head," and Chinese attach importance to it because Pakistan is a great friend of China. (Tab 8)

Dec. 16, 1970

U.S. replies thru Pakistani channel welcoming Chinese willingness (as expressed at Feb. 20, 1970 Warsaw meeting) to receive U.S. representative to discuss outstanding issues. U.S. therefore "believes it would be useful" to begin discussions at an early convenient moment on bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. (Tab 9)

Dec. 24, 1970

HAK, in end-of-year backgrounder, says: "We remain prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to talk to the Communist Chinese about differences that divide us." (Tab 10)

Jan. 11, 1971

Amb. Bogdan delivers message from Chou En-lai declaring that "if the U.S. has a desire to settle the [Taiwan] issue and a proposal for its solution, the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking." Chou added the comment that since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking. (Tab 11)

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- April 16, 1971 President tells American Society of Newspaper Editors of a recent conversation he had had with his daughters on the possibility of their going to China someday. "I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope sometime I do." (Tab 13)
- April 21, 1971 Message from Chou En-lai delivered April 27 "reaffirms [PRC] willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U. S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U. S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U. S. himself for direct meeting and discussions." (Tab 14)
- April 27, 1971 U. S. message dispatched via Walters proposes setting up reliable channel and says that HAK would be prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on U. S. - Chinese relations." (This message dispatched before receipt of above; received by Chinese April 29.) (Tab 15)
- April 29, 1971 President in news conference says: "I hope, and, as a matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China sometime in some capacity -- I don't know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long term." (Tab 16)
- April 30, 1971 LIFE publishes Edgar Snow report of Dec. 18, 1970, interview with Mao. The PRC foreign ministry, Mao had said, was considering the matter of admitting Americans, including the President, to China. "He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U. S. A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President." (Tab 17)
- May 10, 1971 President, replying thru Pakistani channel to Chou's message of April 21, says he "is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China." President proposes preliminary secret meeting between HAK and Chou to exchange views and explore possibility of Presidential visit. (Received by Chinese May 17) (Tab 18)

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May 20, 1971

U. S., in note informing PRC of May 20 SALT announcement and pledging to make no agreement directed against PRC, suggests arms control as agenda item for proposed preliminary secret meeting. (Received by Chinese May 22) (Tab 19)

May 29, 1971

Chou En-lai, in formal response (received June 2), says he "has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit . . . Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U. S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high-level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking." (Tab 20)

June 4, 1971

President, in reply, says he "looks forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meeting and discussions with the leaders of the People's Republic of China," and he "appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou En-lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger." (Tab 21)

July 9-11, 1971

Chou En-lai tells HAK in Peking that "from the very beginning, [the President] took the attitude that he was willing to come to Peking." He says President's remark about daughter's honeymoon prompted invitation. HAK tells Chou that "this idea resulted first from your initiative which we are happy to accept." (Excerpts from Peking MemCons, Tab 22)

July 15, 1971

Joint announcement of Peking summit: "Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC, Premier Chou En-lai . . . has extended an invitation to President Nixon . . . [who] has accepted this invitation with pleasure." (Tab 23)

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July 16, 1971

HAK, asked at San Clemente backgrounder if he knew before his trip that President would be invited, replies: "Essentially, yes. I knew, and of course the President knew that there was an interest, a mutual interest in a visit." (Tab 24)

July 19, 1971

Chou En-lai, in interview with delegation from Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, explains Nixon visit by saying that "at the present date, in contacting your government to normalize relations we must contact those who are in authority in your country. But in your country, your system is that you have a president, and your president said that he wishes to move towards friendship and he also has said that he hopes to visit China. And of course, naturally we can invite him . . ." (Tab 25)

August 5, 1971

Chou En-lai tells James Reston, in interview published August 10: "He [the President] expressed a desire to come and we have invited him to come." (Tab 26)


October 5, 1971

Julian Schuman, in UPI dispatch from Peking, quotes Chou En-lai as saying: "He [the President] publicly expressed his willingness to come to China and negotiate. We had made no response. It would not have been proper for a state so antagonistic. Therefore we agreed to Kissinger's coming." (Tab 2)

Document Separator Sheet

Central Intelligence Agency

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MEMORANDUM

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WASHINGTON

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June 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY

FROM: WINSTON LORD/JOHN NEGROPONTE ^W ^{JN}

SUBJECT: President's May 24 Evening at the Soviet Dacha

Attached is the full record of the atmosphere at the President's May 24 evening with the Soviet leaders in the country Dacha. You will note that we have incorporated the earlier June 13 material so as to make this a self-contained piece. Also, as indicated, we have on file separately the sensitive full transcript of the substantive meeting itself.

Frankly, we have not appreciated being badgered on almost a daily basis with phone calls and memos about this subject. As has been explained on several occasions, we have both been travelling continuously since Moscow (Tokyo, Peking, and Saigon) and have been swamped not only by the travel, but getting ready for the various meetings and the follow-up on them, in addition to the usual business press of time-sensitive work such as the President's press conference. Despite this recent schedule, we sent you the June 13 memo which we acknowledged was incomplete but was pegged to the original request we received to give impressions of the Soviet leaders, not details of the dinner.

I hope the attached finally closes out this project. We recognize the importance of having a good historical record. On the other hand, there are sometimes even more urgent items of business which have to do with the making of history which has to take precedence over the recording of history.

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