

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.  
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.  
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO  
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.  
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.  
GALE W. MCGEE, WYO.  
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE  
GEORGE MCGOVERN, S. DAK.  
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.

GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.  
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.  
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.  
HUGH SCOTT, PA.  
JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.  
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.  
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 2, 1973

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIEF CLERK

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger  
Executive Assistant to  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Larry:

In response to Marshall Wright's request of November 1, the Committee agreed to send a copy of Secretary Kissinger's testimony of October 31 to you for the personal use of the Secretary. This copy is to be returned to the Committee within ten days, no copies are to be made of the transcript, and it is not to be circulated within the Department.

I was instructed to send the transcript directly to you.

I would be glad to explain the reasons for the Committee's sensitivity in sending copies of its executive transcripts outside the Committee if you feel that necessary.

Sincerely yours,



Carl Marcy

DOS and DOE reviews completed.

CM:mmm

Enclosure

CC: The Honorable Marshall Wright  
Assistant Secretary of State  
for Congressional Relations  
Washington, D. C.

# The United States Senate

CS-16-1173

---

## Report of Proceedings 3 OF 3

---

Hearing held before

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

---

Wednesday, October 31, 1973

98/4

Washington, D. C.

---

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

**WARD & PAUL**  
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

**TOP SECRET**

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENT OF

PAGE

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,  
The Secretary of State

46

BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

---  
Wednesday, October 31, 1973  
---

United States Senate,  
Committee on Foreign Relations,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., in Room S-116, The Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, Symington, Pell, Muskie, McGovern, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy and Griffin.

Also present: Senators Johnston, Huddleston, Nelson, Haskell, Abourezk and Hathaway.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones and Mr. Dockery and Mrs. McLaughlin of the Committee Staff.

TOP SECRET

1 The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

2 We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary  
3 of State to commune with us about his recent activities.

4 Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Secretary?

5 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A.

6 KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

7 Secretary Kissinger. I don't have a statement, Mr.  
8 Chairman; I leave it entirely up to you whether you want me to  
9 make a few informal remarks or whether you propose to ask  
10 questions.

11 The Chairman. Perhaps the best way is to give us an  
12 informal background, and I wish to pursue a subject, we all  
13 have subjects we wish for a few minutes. There will be a lot  
14 more here, they are all tardy.

15 Secretary Kissinger. If the Chairman and gentlemen  
16 will let me discuss briefly some of the principles we have  
17 followed and where we are and where we expect to go from here.

18 You gentlemen remember the meeting at the end of the  
19 first week of the crisis, and, therefore, I won't go over the  
20 events of that week in detail except to sum up again what the  
21 basic principles were which we tried to follow throughout the  
22 events of the last two and a half weeks.

23 First, we wanted to bring about cessation of hostilities  
24 as rapidly as possible.

25 Secondly, we wanted to bring cessation about under

1 conditions in which we would have the maximum opportunity to  
2 play a constructive role after the cease fire in the move  
3 towards a durable and lasting peace.

4 Three. We wanted to maintain and use constructively the  
5 relationships on which we believe the peace of the world will  
6 ultimately depend, which is on the one hand our relationship  
7 with our European allies and on the other hand our relation-  
8 ship with the other great nuclear power, and we wanted to  
9 avoid events from sliding towards a confrontation that might  
10 have incalculable consequences.

11 Finally, we have always been committed to the survival of  
12 Israel and to the maintenance of its security. These were  
13 the principles we followed throughout the crisis.

14 During the first week we were confronted with a situation  
15 of a beginning Soviet airlift into the area. That began on  
16 Wednesday of that week. Some initial Arab successes of the tide  
17 of battle turned on the Syrian front and a sort of stalemate  
18 developed on the Sinai front.

19 We made major efforts during the first week to bring about  
20 a cease fire in place and we thought this -- I presume this is  
21 an executive session.

22 The Chairman. This is an executive session, everybody  
23 understands that.

24 Secretary Kissinger. We had made an arrangement, we had  
25 negotiated with the Soviets about a cease fire in place in

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

which some other countries in the United Nations would put a security council, would put forward the cease fire to the Soviet Union, we would abstain and the majority vote would develop and we had been given to understand that the Egyptians would then accept the cease fire. This was at the time that I met you gentlemen on the Friday of that week. This is what we thought would happen on Saturday.

While this was going on we were very restrained in our supplies to Israel. We just permitted a few planes to come here to pick up really token equipment because, as you know, Senator, passenger planes can't really carry a great deal of equipment. I think there were only three plane loads that went during that first week.

On the Saturday of that week, that is the day after I met with this committee, the cease fire which we thought we had arranged fell apart for a variety of reasons, one of which was the refusal of the British to introduce the resolution.

Another one was the refusal of the Egyptians to go along with it.

The Israelies were prepared to go along with it at that point.

Senator Case. Which one was this?

Secretary Kissinger. A cease fire in place of resolution

October 13.

10 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

1 Senator Case. The thing they are hasseling about going  
2 back to the line now?

3 Secretary Kissinger. That was not the case then. In  
4 fact, at that time we were in the fortunate position there was  
5 a straight line on every front. At that point we were faced  
6 with a continuing massive Soviet airlift into the area and  
7 an inability to bring about a cease fire, and the Israeles  
8 running out of amunition to a point where their airplanes were  
9 ordered to land with unexpended amunition, testifying that  
10 bombs were more important than airplanes and, therefore, we  
11 felt we had no choice except to start a substantial airlift  
12 of our own.

13 During this whole period we were in constant touch with,  
14 as I told you at our last session with each of the Arab  
15 capitals, with the Soviet Union, with our West European  
16 allies, despite the stories that are now being spread, which  
17 I will come to in a minute, and with the Soviet Union.

18 Our reasoning in starting the airlift was it was an  
19 absolute necessity. Without the airlift Israel probably would  
20 have collapsed, and because it was running out of amunition.

21 Secondly, since we could not get the agreement either  
22 of the Egyptians, the Soviets or the West European allies to  
23 promote a cease fire in the United Nations under the condi-  
24 tions that existed, we felt that until a military balance  
25 was re-established no one would talk to us and we, therefore,



No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6  
tried to bring about a restoration of the military situation  
as rapidly as we could, offering constantly to the Soviet  
Union and to our West European allies our readiness to support  
a cease fire in the United Nations as soon as a consensus could  
be developed in the United Nations.

Throughout this crises we made a great effort to use the  
Security Council as the forum where the settlement would take  
place, and the only reason, as I told you when we met last  
time, why we did not introduce a resolution of our own was  
because we did not want to get a crystalization of lines before  
there was any consensus that had formed, but every day we  
talked to the Secretary General and to the key members to see  
whether we could crystalize a consensus behind the Security  
Council resolution.

I had a very long conversation with Dobrynin on Saturday  
night, the 13th, when we started the airlift, and said we  
were really coming to a critical point, that if we could not  
work together on bringing this war to a conclusion, then  
Soviet-American relations would, the whole concept of detonate  
would be difficult and then we would be driven step by step  
by the rivalries in the area into confrontations which could  
not be in the interest of world peace or in the interest of our  
two countries or in the interest of the area. And Dobrynin  
said to me at that time that he considered that conversation  
so important that he reported it verbatim to Moscow.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Chairman, with whom I tried to stay in the closest contact during this --

The Chairman. You did.

Secretary Kissinger. -- crisis, and to whom I gave almost I would say daily reports, sometimes several times a day, took the important step of himself calling Dobrynin with a similar message, without endorsing individual steps, but simply pointing out that we were at an important point.

As a result of this the Soviet leaders on Monday morning -- that would have been October 15 -- informed us that they were going to make another effort to bring the war to a conclusion and they were sending Kosygin to Cairo, they said they would not beat the propaganda drum about our airlift and they asked us not to justify it on anti-Soviet grounds in order to keep the temperature down while they were engaged in an airlift -- which we did.

Kosygin left for Cairo on the morning of October 16 and stayed there for three days. I won't go through all of the exchanges that took place during that week between ourselves, our allies, the Arabs and Israel, and our theme to the Arabs daily was please remember you will need to deal with us after the war is over and, therefore, keep yourself from taking irrevocable steps, and on the whole the Arabs, while they put on certain oil embargos did not engage in the sort of anti-American campaign throughout the Arab world that

TOP SECRET

happened in the 1967 crisis.

Now, of course, we were in the closest contact with the Israelies. The battle turned about the 17th or 18th. Kosygin returned to Moscow on the evening of the 18th. On the evening of the 18th we received a Soviet proposition which, however, was not yet acceptable. It called for a cease fire, it did not call for negotiations, and it called for an Israelie withdrawal to the 1967 borders, which was pretty much the program.

We told the Soviets that we would have a counter proposal within 24 hours and we would let them know by Friday evening what our response would be.

I am being very detailed and I hope we can keep the secrecy.

During the day on Friday, we received a letter from Brezhnev which said we are at the point of having to make some irrevocable decision and we have to decide whether to go one way or another and my colleagues would, therefore, appreciate it very much, it is addressed to the President, if you could send the Secretary of State to Moscow for urgent consultations designed to speed an end of the war.

We asked whether Gromyko could instead come here. We were told no, they had to make these decisions collectively, that Kosygin was just back from Cairo and they would appreciate it if we came to Moscow.

Under those conditions the President then decided to

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6  
send me to Moscow where I had very extensive --

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true or is it true that it was so urgent that it was stated that it was not a matter of days but a matter of hours?

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct, that is exactly right, Senator. It said it is not just a question of days, we have to make our decisions in a question of hours.

We knew that some of the airborne divisions were on alert and we felt after again close consultation with the Israeli government, we felt that we should respond and the President therefore sent me. I left at midnight that night, arrived in Moscow the following evening, Moscow time, immediately went into a five-hour session with Brezhnev, which was extremely emotional on his side. We met again the next day for six hours and came up with the Security Council resolution 338 which had the following three parts.

One, immediate cease fire in place.

Two, a call for the implementation of Security Council 242, which had been accepted by all of the parties six years earlier.

And, three, call for the immediate negotiation between the parties under appropriate auspices to bring about a just and durable peace.

Of those three provisions, only the first are really operative provisions. The first for cease fire in place and

**TOP SECRET**

the third for negotiations among the parties.

Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted in 1967 precisely because it could be interpreted by each party in its own way. It calls in effect for a just and durable peace in secure and recognized borders and anyone can interpret exactly what it means. He does better than anyone has yet been able to do in the history of these negotiations. But it is a sort of a code word on which all parties could unite.

The most significant part was the third part of that resolution. For 25 years the Arabs had refused to sit down with the Israelis in face to face negotiations. Even the road settlement which established the State of Israel was achieved by indirect negotiations in which Ralph Bunche moved between the parties and in the same group but they never met face to face.

Now, the Arabs will be committed to face to face negotiations with the Israelis under appropriate auspices, which probably we believe will be under UN sponsorship with the United States and Soviets playing the principal role. The reason being that this is the sponsorship that is most acceptable to all of the parties. If we had the whole Security Council, the Chinese will move to the left of the Russians, the British and French will move between us and the Russians, and the permanent members are going to spend more of their time fighting among each other than making a constructive contribution,

**TOP SECRET**

and by the consent of everybody so far there have been no dissents. We and the Soviet Union are going to provide the auspices for this negotiation.

That has been a very significant step forward.

Now, then, what about the event since then? If this war had ended the way normal wars end, all of the attention would then have moved from the cease fire to the implementation of the third part of the resolution, that is to say, to the direct negotiations. Unfortunately what happened was that the Israelis had broken through the center part of the Egyptian line and had captured a big slice of the West Bank so that the war ended with the Israeli-Egyptian armies toward the line of communication of each other.

On October 22, after the cease fire went into effect, after the cease fire went into effect, the cease fire was broken for reasons which we can no longer determine, each side claiming the other side had broken it, but there is no dispute about the fact that it was the Israelis who scored the major gains after the cease fire was broken and the major gain consisted of the Israelis cutting the last line of communication of the Egyptian third army on the East Bank of the Sinai so that 30,000 Egyptians found themselves in a trap which was completed after the cease fire went into effect, and last week almost all of the maneuvering that went on last week concerned the fate of the third army and the attempts to induce

1 the Israelis to go back to the line of October 22, wherever  
2 that line might have been, but wherever the line was it was not  
3 across the last road.

4 We took the position that in principle the cease fire  
5 should be re-established, that it was hard to determine where  
6 the line was but we could not refuse a Security Council call  
7 for restoration of a cease fire line that we had been instru-  
8 mental in establishing.

9 During the week we were deluged with increasingly menacing  
10 Soviet notes, including one, there were a number of other  
11 indicators. Seven out of eight of the Soviet airborne divi-  
12 sions were put on alert. An airborne command post was  
13 established in Southern Russia. The number of ships in the  
14 Mediterranean went up, the Soviet ships went up to 98. A  
15 naval flotilla was heading for Egypt. Then we received an  
16 extremely menacing letter on Wednesday night. It was in these  
17 circumstances that we felt a menacing letter that had a dead-  
18 line on it, unfortunately, that we felt we had to take certain  
19 precautionary military measures.

20 This situation was resolved the next day when the Soviet  
21 Union agreed that military contingents of the major countries  
22 should not be sent to Egypt. Since then we have stood down  
23 the alert and we are back to trying to promote the cease fire.

24 We have started in the meantime very actively diplomacy  
25 with all of the parties.

1 As you know, Golda Meir is coming here tomorrow. The  
2 Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt has been here for three days.  
3 I have had extensive conversations with him on two problems.  
4 One, how to make effective the cease fire that was established  
5 and how to bring about a solution to what has become the  
6 Egyptian third army problem.

7 Secondly, how to begin the process of negotiations to  
8 lead to a permanent settlement.

9 This morning we will announce that next week on my way  
10 to Peking I will stop in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,  
11 Iran and Pakistan, in order to begin the American participation  
12 in the diplomatic effort to bring about a just and durable  
13 peace.

14 I must say I will go into this in somewhat greater length  
15 in response to your questions. We have had rather good talks  
16 with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, which are not yet com-  
17 pleted, by which showed some awareness of the fact of the  
18 Israeli problem with respect to the third army and some willing-  
19 ness to work it out and on a realistic basis.

20 We have not completed these talks yet but so far they have  
21 gone well.

22 Let me make a few fundamental points.

23 First, where are we in the Mid East, where are we in  
24 relation with the Soviet Union and where are with relation to  
25 Western Europe?



1 First , where are we in the Middle East? We have, of  
2 course, this nerve racking problem of the third army and of the  
3 maintenance of the cease fire. I say the nerve-racking problem  
4 because unfortunately when the Middle Easterns wake up it is  
5 just after midnight in the United States and they all seem to  
6 have an enormous compulsion to communicate with us at this  
7 precise moment and it is the Middle East torture test because  
8 it comes every 25 minutes. Just as you begin to doze off  
9 somebody else will come in with a message or telephone call  
10 each of which is characterized by total inability to see any-  
11 body else's point of view except his own. But what these phone  
12 calls illustrate is something of great political and strategic  
13 significance for the United States.

14 We have come out of this war with all of the agony and  
15 anguish as the only country in touch with all of the parties.  
16 We have come out of this war as the only country that can  
17 bring about a permanent solution to the Middle East and all  
18 of the participants in the Middle East, whether they like us  
19 or hate us, have realized the elemental fact that they must  
20 deal with us and, therefore, there is not one faction in the  
21 Middle East right now from the most radical to the most con-  
22 servative that has not sent emissaries or messages to us and  
23 that is not willing to listen to us. This gives us a great  
24 responsibility and a great opportunity, a responsibility which  
25 is somewhat complicated by the fact that the Arabs are not

1 looking for active policy but for a miracle, and they con-  
2 stantly ask us to deliver their ultimate aim as the first  
3 stage in the process, but this is tactics in terms of the  
4 opportunity we have. It is an unusually fluid situation in  
5 which we are expected for the sake of everybody to play a  
6 major role and, therefore, with all of the agony that is going  
7 on right now about the cease fire, we believe that we can  
8 move into a very constructive place.

9 In fact, one of the difficulties in this situation is  
10 that the Soviets realize that the Arab perception of what has  
11 happened must be that the Soviets can get the hardware but  
12 only we can get them a solution and, therefore, the Soviets  
13 have a tendency to try to piggy back on what we may be doing  
14 anyway.

15 On the other hand, they are a great power and we must  
16 not give them the sense that we are squeezing them and beyond  
17 out of the area because then they will do more drastic things.

18 So in terms of the Middle East situation we have a great  
19 opportunity if there is statesmanship on all sides and if  
20 the Israelis and Arabs realize that there must be a compro-  
21 mise, that it is impossible to have a lasting peace if every-  
22 body insists on the satisfaction.

23 As this diplomacy develops I would appreciate the oppor-  
24 tunity to meet with you gentlemen because we will need a great  
25 deal of public support to manage this.

1 Now, about relationships with the Soviet Union.

2 There was a great eagerness on the part of many commen-  
3 tators to announce the end of detonate to see this in terms  
4 of a permanent confrontation. I think we have to look at the  
5 situation in terms of the lasting interests of the world.

6 Why is detonate with the Soviet Union important. Not  
7 because we are friends, not because we have compatible politi-  
8 cal systems, not because we have parallel interests, precisely  
9 because we have incompatible ideologies, precisely because we  
10 have different political interests, but because we are the  
11 possessors of nuclear arsenals that can destroy humanity and  
12 we have an obligation to this generation and to future genera-  
13 tions so to manage our relationships that we can lift from  
14 the world to the greatest extent possible the danger of a  
15 nuclear confrontation. So it is precisely because we have  
16 different interests and precisely because they have a different  
17 political system that the need for detonate becomes important.

18 When this crisis started the Chairman and I happened to  
19 appear on the same platform and I spoke before he lacerated  
20 me and I pointed out that the United States objectives in the  
21 detonate were the ones that I have indicated here, that we  
22 would resist foreign policy of the Soviet Union or attempting  
23 to use the detonate for weakening our alliances or exacerbating  
24 tensions, but that there were limits beyond which we could not  
25 go, including the manipulation of its domestic structure.

1 But this is a discussion you will probably wish to have  
2 with me at some other time.

3 Now, in the Middle East the fact is that we were allied  
4 indirectly, not formally, but in effect to Israel. The  
5 Soviet Union had vested interests and vested friendships with  
6 the radical Arab countries. They were no more willing to give  
7 up those interests than we were willing to give up our interests  
8 with relation to Israel. So the question is not did the Soviet  
9 Union do things to exacerbate the radical Arabs, the question  
10 is did they and we manage our relations through most of this  
11 period in such a way as to avoid confrontation to use our  
12 influence to cool matters and, finally, to bring matters to a  
13 conclusion.

14 I would have to say that we did and it was the detonate  
15 that brought it about.

16 Now, last week, what last week proved is that there is  
17 a point beyond which detonate as yet does not contain matters  
18 and that when the Soviets saw an Egyptian army trapped and being  
19 pushed into surrender under conditions of a cease fire that  
20 they helped to arrange, they lost their cool and they then  
21 made threats they should not have made and took military  
22 measures they should not have made and we responded so strongly  
23 because we felt our only chance was to get this thing under  
24 control very quickly and that we could not measure our response  
25 with an eye dropper under those conditions. But what we have

1 to be careful now is not to take the events of one night or  
2 one day and make them the pattern of relationships with the  
3 Soviet Union.

4 The President, Dobrynin and I met yesterday evening and  
5 we all agreed that we have to, that what happened last week,  
6 however it happened, should be treated as an aberration and  
7 that we should try to work again cooperatively towards a peace-  
8 ful solution. We believe very strongly, as I said in my press  
9 conference, that if for any reason this Administration does  
10 not solve the problem the next one will have to settle it or  
11 the one after that. We cannot accumulate nuclear arsenals on  
12 both sides without attempting to bring peace and this is what  
13 our view of the detonate is about. It has no illusions about  
14 Soviet purposes. We will resist Soviet aggressive moves but  
15 we will also seize every opportunity to work constructively  
16 with them.

17 Now about Europe. In the relationship with our West  
18 European allies we went through a rather dramatic period and  
19 it would be comforting if we could say the Administration  
20 made five or six definable mistakes. I would say it would  
21 be comforting because we could remedy those mistakes and deal  
22 with them. But such has not been the case.

23 As you gentlemen know, we have attempted for six months  
24 to get a joint statement of principle with our European  
25 allies whose primary motive was not to get a great negotiating

1 asset but to get some emotional content to the Atlantic  
2 relationship 25 years after it was established under one set  
3 of conditions and try to adapt it to conditions which would  
4 no longer be so primarily military in nature. That process  
5 has gone much more slowly than we had hoped and has taken some  
6 odd forms in which the Europeans, for example, would refuse to  
7 put the word partnership in an Atlantic declaration which is  
8 almost inconceivable to us.

9 I will be prepared to go into that in detail with you  
10 some other time.

11 What was our problem with the Europeans during this  
12 crisis? Our problem had nothing to do with the alert. Our  
13 problem had to do with the fact that once the war started,  
14 one of the big problems was to strengthen those elements  
15 in the Soviet Union who were looking for a peaceful evolution  
16 and not those who thought there were opportunities for adventures.  
17 It was in the common interest to prevent an outcome in which  
18 the radical Arab states would be so strengthened that they  
19 would undermine all of the moderate states and that, therefore,  
20 the oil supply to the non-Communist world would be controlled  
21 by the most radical elements in the Arab world. It had  
22 nothing to do anymore at that point with the details of where  
23 the borders of Israel and the Arab States were. The Euro-  
24 peans were infinitely more vulnerable to these pressures than  
25 we were and at that point whatever mistakes we might have made

1 before 1973, a rapid outcome of the war followed by a rapid  
2 negotiation, was at least as much in the European interest as  
3 in ours.

4 Now, it is said that we did not consult adequately with  
5 the Europeans, and I don't want to waste time here, but I have  
6 a 12-page memorandum which just lists all of the consultations  
7 we had with the Europeans. Now whether that was absolutely  
8 enough I don't want to argue.

9 We had a three-day session at the NATO Council on the  
10 Middle East crisis. We informed the NATO Council of every key  
11 decision we made.

12 I have here just the telephone calls I made to Lord  
13 Cromer and they were never less than one a day and sometimes  
14 as many as three a day during this crisis. And the major  
15 difficulty was shown by the fact that, for example, when we  
16 tried to get the British to put forward a cease fire resolu-  
17 tion in the UN they would not do it on the ground that the  
18 Arabs might not like it. All we were asking them to do was  
19 a simple cease fire resolution which at that time would have  
20 kept both sides of the Canal in Egyptian hands, so it was not  
21 unfavorable to the Arabs and the Israelis told us they would  
22 accept it. This we could not get out of them. We had long  
23 talks with the French and each European country with the  
24 exception I regret to say of Portugal, when the airlift  
25 started, refused us over flight rights, refused us the use of

1 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6 with what  
2 was after all an extremely risky effort for us.

3 It is not true that we did not tell the Europeans about  
4 the alert. We were faced with a problem that we received the  
5 Brezhnev letter at 10:30 at night, we thought that in the  
6 light of all of the alerts that the Soviets themselves had  
7 taken during the day if they were going to act they were going  
8 to act in the morning Middle East time, so we had very little  
9 time to react on our own to head them off.

10 We immediately informed the British on the theory that  
11 they could help us in the NATO Council. We informed the NATO  
12 Council at the precise hour that we responded to the Soviets.  
13 We informed the military committee of NATO and we informed their  
14 ambassadors here then during the day.

15 Now it was an emergency situation and there could not be  
16 detailed consultation about what we would do ahead of time.

17 Now I don't want to castigate the Europeans because I  
18 would like to stress that it is the Administration's view and  
19 remains the Administration's view that the Atlantic Alliance  
20 remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy and we still  
21 believe that if the Democracies can not develop a unified policy  
22 in the face of the challenges they now confront then perhaps  
23 the Western World is going to go the way of the Greek City  
24 states. It is not a question of resisting military threats  
25 primarily, it is a question of looking at the world which we

**TOP SECRET**



approaches rather than to consume ourselves in every crisis  
in these desperate attempts to gain any little advantages which  
are to the disadvantage of everyone, and we decided I must say  
with a bleeding heart and not with any anger to point out  
to the Europeans that it was important for all of us to face  
the fact that this sort of behavior on either side of the  
Atlantic was simply not adequate anymore.

We had to be able to define for each other what we all  
wanted in the Middle East and that when one of the allies thinks  
that when we acted in what we thought was the common interest,  
that a little more understanding of our position was called  
for. This is the basis for our complaint.

I do not draw from this conclusion that the Atlantic  
Alliance is dead, that it should be altered. We do call, how-  
ever, attention to the fact that the dialogue which we asked  
for earlier this year is urgently necessary and that both sides  
of the Atlantic have the responsibility in overcoming the short  
term and asking themselves where it is that the democratic  
nations really want to go.

We believe that this dialogue can go forward, we will  
encourage it and we will do it as one of our principal foreign  
policy objectives in the months ahead.

So this is where we are in our relations with the principal  
parts of the world and I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, I have spoken

**TOP SECRET**

1 a little longer than I had planned.

2 The Chairman. No.

3 Secretary Kissinger. I will be delighted to answer any  
4 questions.

5 The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I think you have given a  
6 very enlightening analysis, particularly the last part of it,  
7 an explanation of your objectives.

8 I propose that we will limit it to the ten minutes. I  
9 will start and then we will go around to the membership.

10 If you would enlarge a little bit on the importance of the  
11 detonate which you have talked so much about. The reason  
12 I concentrate on this, I know others will ask other questions,  
13 is I think it is in this area that the Congress either has  
14 been or maybe may create difficulties for you in working  
15 out the settlement, the permanent settlement.

16 As I understand it, your next objective is this negotia-  
17 tion for a permanent settlement somewhere along the lines  
18 of the principles of the '67 resolution, if I understand you  
19 correctly.

20 Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

21 The Chairman. And I think I have noted a disposition  
22 to, as you have stated, not only by commentators but members  
23 of Congress to assume that you cannot with the Russians. If  
24 you would pursue that a little bit for the moment the impor-  
25 tance of that and hopefully give us some indications as to

1 what you think. I know the Executive takes the views it is  
 2 not your business to tell Congress what to do, but I don't ask  
 3 it in this spirit but simply an explanation of the fact, and  
 4 let us draw our own conclusions as to what our action should  
 5 be. But I feel there is a misapprehension about this particu-  
 6 lar aspect of it and I think, if I understand you correctly,  
 7 it is fundamental to a successful negotiation, you will need  
 8 in a negotiation the continued cooperative attitude on the  
 9 part of the Soviet Union if the negotiations are to succeed.

10 Would you elaborate a bit on that because I think it does  
 11 bear upon the attitude of the Congress.

12 Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

13 First, let us go back to the period before the outbreak  
 14 of the war. We had developed over a period of years, after  
 15 about two and a half years of confrontation with the Soviet  
 16 Union, we had moved into a more cooperative relationship which  
 17 for a long time had wide bipartisan support. This support  
 18 began to be weakened not so much on a partisan basis but  
 19 I will be very frank, through a curious coalition of individuals  
 20 of some of the radical liberal elements joining forces with  
 21 the conservatives being supported on specific issues by the  
 22 Jewish community, especially on the issue of immigration,  
 23 and on some other issues by labor. So that you had for the  
 24 first time a consensus, an opposition going across the whole  
 25 spectrum not in a uniform manner but still in a rather wide

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 way of the most desperate motives. Now, this consensus could  
2 only be held together in a way by raising all sorts of issues  
3 and by almost trading off each group's grievances against the  
4 others so that a broad scale attack developed and Dobrynin  
5 at a lunch with me a week before this crisis started said  
6 look at our position in Moscow, we are supposed to be in a  
7 period of detonate and yet we are now receiving more criticism  
8 in the United States than we ever have at the height of the  
9 cold war because the newspapers and the groups that use to  
10 oppose the cold war are now attacking us and there is almost  
11 no counter weight to this developing pressure. And this is  
12 a very real problem.

13 There was I must tell you candidly in my view a tendency  
14 to take the stemming stability so much for granted people  
15 were beginning to try to draw interest on it and start pressing  
16 on issues that were important but not central to the question  
17 of nuclear war such as the fate of particular individuals  
18 in the Soviet Union.

19 That was the atmosphere that existed. Nevertheless,  
20 from the beginning of the Middle East crisis there were  
21 exchanges between us and the Soviet Union, which even though  
22 they did not necessarily bear fruit immediately, which were  
23 of a comprehensiveness and detail that I did not think were  
24 possible, they never happened in any previous Administration.

25 Secondly, the Soviet press and propaganda during this

24

TOP SECRET

whole period never attacked the United States.

Now, if the Soviet propaganda organs had been unleashed against the United States we could have had riots in every Arab capitol around the world and American interests could have been jeporadized far beyond what they are today.

Thirdly, in the United Nations we managed to maintain an atmosphere in which even up to now, even with this whatever it was last week, confrontation, test, or whatever you want to call it, even then there has never been any invective of either side against the other. And, fourthly, it will be impossible to get a settlement in the Middle East if the Soviet Union takes the position, most radical position they will be able to prevent a settlement in the Middle East because no Arab country can be less Arabic than Moscow and Soviet cooperation is absolutely essential, because if you ask yourself what is the intellectual structure of a peace settlement in the Middle East, it will have to be the Israelis will have to give up some on their insistence on security. They cannot hold every square inch of territory they have conquered over the last 25 years, but the Arabs cannot insist on getting an entrance price into the negotiation their total demand handed over to them as a question of principle and there have to be garantees developed and adjustments made in which hopefully we will use our influence with the Israelis, Soviets will use their influence with the Arabs, and both

1000 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 of us together with whoever else is willing will guarantee  
2 the outcome.

3 If the Soviets move into a position of hostility toward  
4 us in this, it is not so much toward us, it can keep that pot  
5 boiling until there is no solution at all and, therefore, we  
6 do attach great importance to maintaining a civil relation-  
7 ship with the Soviet Union during this crisis. There is a  
8 price neither country has been willing to pay. We are not  
9 willing to give up Israel, the Soviet is not willing to give  
10 up its position in the Arab world and, therefore, within these  
11 constraints we have been drawn into opposing views. They have  
12 to be mitigated. But we believe that detonate must be  
13 re-established, if it has been weakened, and we believe that  
14 really those of you gentlemen who have expressed some concerns  
15 about it, that we have been unilaterally victims of detonate  
16 should really be carefully examined. Except if you ask your-  
17 selves what exactly have we paid for the detonate? We managed  
18 to end the war in Vietnam, whatever you may think about it,  
19 under the conditions that we set, and we do not have to debate  
20 whether those are adequate conditions. We settled most of the  
21 European problems. We have made a beginning towards arms con-  
22 trol. We are now in negotiations on mutual force reductions  
23 in Europe. All of these are in the mutual benefit. The wheat  
24 deal, which is often mentioned, has nothing to do with detonate.  
25 The wheat deal has to do with a total misconception on the

1 part of United States about its position, about how much wheat  
2 we had. The conviction of the Agricultural Department that we  
3 could never sell enough wheat and the nature of our domestic  
4 market in which the companies were not exchanging information,  
5 so that we had no idea of the scale of the exchange. As a  
6 matter of fact, wheat was never discussed at the Moscow summit  
7 in 1972.

8 I go into this so we get in perspective who paid what for  
9 the detonate.

10 I think the wheat deal was a horrible mistake but not for  
11 detonate reason, maybe for the political reasons, maybe for a  
12 lot of other reasons, but not for detonate reasons.

13 And what has been created from this I think is really  
14 in the interests of the long term peace of the world and, as  
15 I said on a number of occasions, it is essential if we are  
16 going to have peace in the Middle East, and it is essential  
17 if we are going to prevent all of the world's trouble spots  
18 from being exacerbated. If the Soviets do not play that game  
19 then we will resist them, but it will be to nobody's benefit  
20 and sooner or later some generation will have to come along  
21 hopefully before it is too late and solve that problem.

22 The Chairman. Could I just summarize, is it fair to say  
23 you think this negotiation is in the interest of Israel as  
24 much as anybody else?

25 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.

1 The Chairman. If it succeeds. And since it is under  
2 the Security Council it will revitalize the UN. That would  
3 seem to be the conclusion that you could draw.

4 Secretary Kissinger. First about Israel. Israel has  
5 gone through a traumatic experience. They live with the  
6 belief in total military supremacy. They have emerged mili-  
7 tarily victorious but at an enormous price. They have had casu-  
8 alties which transposed to the American scene would be equiva-  
9 lent to something like five to six hundred thousand in the  
10 two-week period and they face the prospect any renewal of the  
11 war, even if they win it, will from now on be a war of attrition  
12 rather than the spectacular victories they gained in '56 and  
13 '67. That in my view is going to be intolerable for Israel  
14 in the long term. Whether they have yet realized this shock  
15 of war and the eminence of an election I am not prepared to  
16 say, but it is in long term interests of Israel to achieve  
17 legitimacy or security through legitimacy and through inter-  
18 national guarantees and we believe that we can bring about  
19 this realization in Israel over a period of time in its own  
20 interests.

21 The Chairman. Don't you think using the United Nations  
22 is the beginning to restore it as a vehicle that the Soviet  
23 Union and others can use?

24 Secretary Kissinger. I must say I had not in my academic  
25 writing been a total supporter of the United Nations, as you



1 know, but I cannot imagine how we would have gotten through  
2 the crisis of the last three weeks without the forum of the  
3 United Nations. With all of its weaknesses, with many of  
4 the self righteousness of the non-aligned nations, for example,  
5 nevertheless it provided the buffer and legitimacy and pro-  
6 vided the possibility, for example, of getting an expedition  
7 and emergency force in their observers in there. We worked  
8 very closely with the Secretary General. Take, for example,  
9 this rather minor case of the Soviet Union informing us on  
10 Thursday that they had sent 70 observers into the Middle East  
11 and demanded that we also send 70 observers. The whole UN  
12 observer force is only 280. That would have meant 50 percent  
13 of the observer force would have been Soviet-American and we  
14 have had introduced all of the great powers rivalries right  
15 into the UN observer force.

16 The Soviets tried to pressure us to go along with this.  
17 We said, finally we said whatever the Secretary General does,  
18 we do what the Secretary General asks us to do, we won't  
19 follow, just because you send 70 people in there does not  
20 oblige us, let's get the Secretary General to ask for a force.  
21 The Secretary General finally decided he would not accept  
22 more from any of the super powers than the largest single  
23 contingent if any other country in the UN force, which comes  
24 out to about 30, and that is the compromise that is now being  
25 developed. There was no way of solving this as a direct US-

1 Soviet confrontation and you accumulate these over a period of  
2 time, so I have become really the UN I believe has played a  
3 very important role in this.

4 The Chairman. Senator Sparkman.

5 Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, you have certainly  
6 given us a very fine review. We tried our best to keep up with  
7 it in the newspapers as we were going along.

8 I felt that it was a very fine accomplishment. I was  
9 particularly pleased when I learned of the cooperation between  
10 the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in those  
11 resolutions in the United Nations. I found that most encour-  
12 aging and I have felt very strongly that if that kind of  
13 cooperative effort can be maintained we might be on the eve  
14 of a peaceful arrangement, at least in the Middle East, and  
15 I want to commend you for the tremendous job that you have  
16 done in connection with that.

17 Secretary Kissinger. Thank you very much. There is one  
18 thing about the UN cooperation. To the best of my information,  
19 last week is the first time that the Soviet Union voted for a  
20 United Nations emergency force. They have abstained on a  
21 number of occasions and permitted it to happen but this is  
22 the first time that they actively worked with the Secretary  
23 General on a charter for an emergency force in a crisis area.

24 The Chairman. Hopefully they will help pay for it.

25 Secretary Kissinger. They will help pay for it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Senator Sparkman. That excluded personnel from the Soviet  
2 Union?

3 Secretary Kissinger. That is right.

4 Senator Sparkman. As well as from the United States?

5 Secretary Kissinger. That is right.

6 The Chairman. Senator Case.

7 Senator Case. You have done a great job, including the  
8 whole business of what we heard and all the rest. I said so  
9 at the time and I am enormously happy about it as it has gone  
10 so far. I only hope that your energy and your ability survive  
11 the period in which you had this responsibility.

12 I share also your perception of the United Nation's use-  
13 fulness and its limitations. Again this leads me to my first  
14 point.

15 You obviously are more than an activist in this situation,  
16 as has been true of our foreign policy people, State Depart-  
17 ment and otherwise, for sometime, and I know you believe in  
18 this kind of necessity for us to take a more active role in  
19 bringing about a settlement. That requires, of course, an  
20 enormous responsibility for seeing that basic terms of the  
21 it make sense. All I can say is this rather obvious thing,  
22 that I hope in spite of all the aspirations of everybody that  
23 when Israel's borders are finally settled they are such that  
24 she can maintain her own defense because in the past she would  
25 have been wiped out three times if she had not done this and

1 I say this not because I think we are bound to do anything  
2 more, but I think this is an obligation in the interest not  
3 only of Israel but in the interest of humanity. This is not  
4 something that we can leave to the will of the United Nations  
5 peace keeping operation or of the future Security Council  
6 willingness to go along, this is a very specific thing and I  
7 don't mean adjustments do not have to be made, I know they  
8 have. I wish you would comment on that.

9 Secretary Kissinger. We have not stated our view and we  
10 do not now have a fixed view as to exactly where Israel's  
11 borders should be. The Security Council resolution 242 pro-  
12 vides for secure and recognized borders without giving any  
13 criteria as to what a secure border is. But we certainly  
14 believe that the borders of Israel should be secure.

15 Now how do you achieve security? This is what the negotia-  
16 tions will depend upon. Absolute security for one country  
17 means absolute insecurity for other countries, so there  
18 always has to be a balance between the security needs of every-  
19 body.

20 Secondly, the security depends in part on the location of  
21 the frontiers, in part on how these frontiers, what the  
22 military arrangements on these frontiers are, and, thirdly,  
23 in part on what guarantees are given. For example, wherever  
24 the frontiers are, I must tell you candidly the frontiers  
25 have to be back a considerable distance from where they were

~~TOP SECRET~~

when the war started, they cannot be on the Suez Canal and Sinai. Where exactly they should be, this is a question that the parties out to negotiate among each other. But if for example, there were on the Arab side of the frontier substantial demilitarized zones so that before the Arabs could launch any attack they would have to violate the demilitarized zone, that is one of the security features that has to be considered. Why, for example, did the Israelis lose control of the East Bank of the Canal? It is because the Arabs, because the Egyptians had accumulated so many surface to air missiles on their side of the Canal that the Israel air force could not operate and really could not operate in that area for about eleven days of the war. If there had been a substantial demilitarized zone along the Canal or along the Border, wherever that is, there would not have been surface to air missiles and, therefore, curiously enough the defense would have been easier, aggression would have been more difficult. These are the considerations.

We have no doctrinary view about pushing anybody to any particular frontier.

Senator Sparkman. Neither do I. I just want to make the point and I see you understand fully what I have in mind.

There are just two other things I would like to leave with you. One, it seems to me that it is maybe a blessing in disguise we have been faced with this energy crisis. I think

1 it has been insane we have allowed ourselves and the Western  
2 World, even more the rest of the Western World even more to  
3 get to the point where we are going to be dependent upon the  
4 Middle East for energy and that the Israel-Arab conflict,  
5 entirely apart, we should have come to a decision we were  
6 not going to do this anymore, the idea of pouring billions of  
7 dollars in the area, so as to be unable to spend it to do  
8 anything with it as a means of our going ahead with our tech-  
9 nology. It seems to me something we had to deal with and  
10 we should make this occasion for that rather than in any sense  
11 letting oil be an instrument for affecting American policy  
12 as far as that goes. That is one point.

13 The second is, again I want detonate as we all do, but  
14 again quite apart from that, the whole question of Jews treat-  
15 ment in Russia and all the rest, it seems to me very, very  
16 important for us to accept the broad proposition and to work  
17 on it, that we are never going to get permanent peace with the  
18 totalitarian power that is going to be something we can rest  
19 with unless inside that power there is some real ferment  
20 itself among the intellectuals, among the academicians, among  
21 the people in general who are capable of leadership roles,  
22 if they are permitted to take it, and, therefore, for us to  
23 let detonate be a means by which Russia expresses whatever  
24 beginning of an opening there may be within Russia for this  
25 kind of ferment and intellectual activity would be a very great

1 mistake on our part. Specifically we ought not to give  
2 them technology, credits or anything else if it means that  
3 they therefore have less need for reliance upon their own  
4 resources as Solzhenitsyn and the other people have recently  
5 written. It seems to me this general proposition makes great  
6 sense and we ought to go very slow.

7 On the wheat deal, I think you are absolutely right, it  
8 was a stupid mistake, it did not happen to be related to the  
9 State Department view of its relationship with Russia, but it  
10 was awfully stupid any way.

11 Secretary Kissinger. No question.

12 Senator Sparkman. But on these other matters of long  
13 term credits, of technology, and of encouragement of this,  
14 in circumstances that permit the Russians to express their  
15 own intellectual resources and people, and clamp down harder  
16 at home, it seems to me this very great question in the long  
17 run whether we are serving any useful purpose.

18 Perhaps you would like to comment.

19 Secretary Kissinger. This, of course, is a very complex  
20 issue.

21 Senator Sparkman. Of course.

22 Secretary Kissinger. Which the Chairman and I had promised  
23 ourselves we would discuss once formally before the committee.  
24 This is, of course, a question whether the detonate leads to  
25 an acceleration of repression in the Soviet Union. You can

1 make a case for the proposition that 20 years ago Sahkarov  
2 and Solzhenitsyn would have been shot. Ten years ago Sahkarov  
3 and Solzhenitsyn would never have been heard. Now Sahkarov  
4 and Solzhenitsyn make long distance telephone calls to foreign  
5 newspapers and state their opposition to the regime and  
6 Solzhenitsyn claims about not being permitted to live in  
7 Moscow but lives in Moscow without a permit now. It would be  
8 better if he lived there with a permit but, nevertheless, lives  
9 in Moscow. So you could make a case for the proposition that  
10 a system which is oppressive, anyone who has been in Moscow  
11 knows it is palatably oppressive, nevertheless, I think you  
12 could make a better case for the proposition that its ferment  
13 is increasing rather than decreasing and instead you can use  
14 Sahkarov and Solzhenitsyn as symptoms of the inevitable pro-  
15 cess which the ruling group in the Soviet Union will yield  
16 to very reluctantly and very graciously.

17 Senator Sparkman. They will never do it voluntarily.

18 Secretary Kissinger. That is right. But one could make  
19 a better case for the proposition as used to be made generally,  
20 that under conditions of detonate that process is more likely  
21 to accelerate than under conditions of foreign danger of  
22 international conflict where the foreign danger can be used  
23 as an excuse for international repression.

24 Now, on the relationship, but the long term credits  
25 will really reduce the reliance of the Soviet system on its



1 own technologists. I think we should have a session sometime  
2 of the committee on this whole problem.

3 Senator Sparkman. And there are other facets, too.

4 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, it is a very important issue.  
5 Our view has been that there are two separate problems related  
6 but not identical. First, is to moderate the foreign policy  
7 confrontations that exist in the world and reduce the dangers  
8 of nuclear war.

9 Secondly, to move from them to a more stable international  
10 order in which it is not that we are mitigating confrontations  
11 but making them more and more unthinkable.

12 For that second one, a greater combatant of domestic  
13 structures is probably useful and maybe even essential, but  
14 how to get this without ruining the first is the big issue.

15 The Chairman. Senator Mansfield.

16 Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take  
17 too much time except to commend the Secretary and the Admini-  
18 stration for its success in bringing about at least a tentative  
19 cease fire and the possibility of further negotiations, and I  
20 think a great deal of credit must be given for what has been  
21 done and be given publicly as far as I am concerned, because  
22 it made it possible for the nation, this nation, to avoid a  
23 difficult choice and made it possible for some of us to avoid  
24 a difficult personal choice. So I have nothing but words of  
25 commendation and I am glad things have turned out the way they  
have and I yield back the rest of my ten minutes.

The Chairman. Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend the Secretary who I think behaved brilliantly, and whatever may be the other troubles of the President, perhaps as we expect the President of the United States to behave in great international crises, taking great risk, but very prudent, I do not believe the United States over-reacted. I do not believe -- I think the Secretary put it correctly when he said you cannot measure that out with an eye dropper.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask you a question which is perhaps most fitting for me. Why is it to the interest of the United States to support Israel?

Secretary Kissinger. First of all, because we are committed to the freedom and independence of nations in general against foreign aggression and because we have opposed the resort to military power. Secondly, because whatever the origin of our attachment to Israel, it is now clear that in the Middle East and around the world it has become clear that we have had a special relationship with Israel and that for Israel to be submerged by Soviet arms in this conflict would have had consequences far beyond the Middle East, and this is what we saw as the danger of the radical countries relying on military power solving their problems, solving their problems by resort to force.

1           It is for these reasons that we believe that the survival  
2 and independence and security of Israel are important  
3 and are in no sense incompatible with any legitimate aspirations  
4 of any other nation in the area. And one can add to it  
5 the following: That after 25 years all Arab states have  
6 now practically accepted the fact that the existence of  
7 Israel is no longer at issue. What is now at issue is  
8 the frontiers of Israel, and that is an issue, that is  
9 a problem to be settled by negotiations.

10           Senator Javits. At this time, in your judgment, is  
11 the presence of Israel in that area, in the condition in  
12 which she finds herself, that is great military effectiveness  
13 but with the difficulty which you have described, a frictional  
14 danger, helpful or harmful to the position of Europe and the  
15 rest of the free world with respect to Middle East oil  
16 supply. In other words, is Middle East oil supply more  
17 or less likely to be materially disrupted by her presence  
18 or her absence? You get an attitude for example, in some  
19 quarters in Europe that they would just as soon see Israel  
20 go down the drain and get the oil flowing.

21           Secretary Kissinger. When you have countries in a  
22 monopoly position with respect to energy, as the Arab  
23 countries are, it is unrealistic to assume that they would  
24 not use that monopoly position regardless of whether  
25 Israel exists or not.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 I have seen and you must have seen statistics where  
2 the Saudis can cut oil production and raise prices and come  
3 out ahead of where they were last year, which again, which  
4 in turn was in excess of anything that they could possibly  
5 spend.

6 This is one of the cardinal features of the period.

7 Now, one of the long term solutions is the one Senator  
8 Case mentioned. We have to break the monopoly position of the  
9 Arab countries on the oil supply of Western Europe and the  
10 U. S. and we are going to submit an energy message in the  
11 very near future which will be a first step in that direction.

12 I would say that any realistic Middle East policy has to  
13 begin from the premise that Israel will exist and it is one  
14 of the irresponsibilities of some of the European nations  
15 to engage in this illusion.

16 Israel will exist. We cannot be part of the destruction  
17 of Israel and, therefore, one has to operate within that  
18 framework.

19 Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, may I suggest, too, that  
20 the possibility of exploring the connection between oil  
21 and food, you cannot eat oil, and the Arab masses must eat.  
22 It is said that half the grain in the world available for  
23 overseas consumption originates here or at least in the  
24 North American continent and I would suggest that the

25 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6 carefully.

**TOP SECRET**

4

Is it fair to summarize what you say about Israel's presence in the Middle East by saying it is at least one influence which "keeps them honest" being in a monopoly position?

Secretary Kissinger. I must say that the Shah of Iran, for example, always used to consider the existence of Israel as vital to his own ability to conduct moderate policy in that area, and after all is the second largest oil supplier .

Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, moving to Europe, first I would like to endorse very strongly what Senator Case has said as chairing the Committee of Nine at the North Atlantic Assembly, which Senator Mansfield and I and Senator Sparkman just attended, it was very clear that even Europe as represented by its members on this committee believed that an element which would give an underwriting to detente is the degree of openness which exists in Eastern Europe, and may I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that some recollection be had in the records of the so-called Baruch-Hancock approach to the soviet Union which goes back a very long time, which was premised upon the theory that we would each move a step forward but that we would not move a step until the other side moved a step.

For example, even on the so-called Jackson Amendment, limitation, curtailment, conditioning, a string

First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 by the Congress, must be explored very, very seriously.  
2 Similarly, credits. I am pretty well oriented in business, in  
3 banking, and credits depend on how long and at what rates,  
4 and that is very, very flexible and I think again the Baruch-  
5 Hancock theory was the carrot and the stick. We will gamble  
6 with you for a year, two, or three, and if you do what  
7 you ought to do we will go with you further, but we won't  
8 until you do, until we see some performance. So I just  
9 wonder whether or not that might not be a way in which  
10 rather than the all or none theory, we have to go with them  
11 because it will have some indirect effect upon easing matters.  
12 Our policy might be directed toward getting more out of  
13 detente and yet not in the process, I do not like to use  
14 harsh words, but abandoning at least to some extent our  
15 conscience.

16 Secretary Kissinger. Senator Javits, we could live with  
17 an amendment that set out certain criteria for periodic review  
18 and there were several compromises that were explored at  
19 various stages that we could live with which say every three  
20 years there should be a review of whether indeed some  
21 progress has been made or a finding by the Executive which  
22 then the Congress can review. Those are criteria that we  
23 could live with.

24 What would be very difficult is if the attempt  
25 to put the Soviet Union into a situation which after all it

1 had before 1951, and which is already enjoyed by over  
 2 a hundred other nations would lead to a Congressional prohi-  
 3 bition of that status in terms of very specific conditions  
 4 and lead to a decision to cut off credit, which is what  
 5 the present Jackson-Vanik amendment would in effect do.  
 6 If the amendment could be reformulated so it set down certain  
 7 criteria that it would have to be periodically reviewed  
 8 depending on the language, I think that might be a reasonable  
 9 compromise between the all or nothing positions of both sides.

10 Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

11 I had not gone into Europe with you, which I want  
 12 to do, but I hope there will be another opportunity.

13 The Chairman. Senator Church.

14 Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, I would like to  
 15 add my voice to the chorus of praise for your efforts.

16 I have an idea of the kind of questions we would be  
 17 punishing you with if your efforts had not been blessed with  
 18 success.

19 In your exposition of the foundations for detente you  
 20 mentioned certain mutual interests that give us some  
 21 basis for conflicts, that is to say, our obvious mutual  
 22 interest with the Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear weapons  
 23 and the obvious mutual interests in the reduction of the  
 24 load we carry in Middle Europe, the resolution of the problems  
 25 in Middle Europe, which might have led to conflict.

1 But what is the mutual interest with respect to the  
2 Middle East looking at it not from our standpoint but from  
3 the Russian standpoint?

4 Do the Russians have as much reason to want a negotiated  
5 settlement of this long standing and acrimonious dispute  
6 of Israel and the Arab countries as we have?

7 Is it possible that though the Russians might want  
8 a cease-fire because of the obvious danger of a spreading  
9 war, that they would be less interested in securing a negotiated  
10 settlement since the absence of that settlement is at least  
11 one basis on which they have secured so much influence with  
12 the Arab countries in this critical area of the world?

13 Secretary Kissinger. I think that is a very important  
14 question. If you look at the Middle East as an isolated  
15 area, you could make a good case for the proposition that  
16 the best outcome for the Soviets is a continuation of  
17 the status quo sort of an outbreak of the war. And indeed  
18 the Soviet Union strongly supported the creation of the State  
19 of Israel partly for this precise objective, to put an  
20 element of discord into the Middle East.

21 The motivation, there are three motivations that the  
22 Soviet Union can have in moving toward a settlement.  
23 First, its general interest in detente and the impossibility  
24 of pursuing aggressive policy in the Middle East and  
25 detente policies elsewhere because that we won't permit.



1           The second danger is that in every war so far the  
2 Soviet Union has come out in a weaker political position in  
3 the sense that all they have been able to do for the Arabs  
4 is to mitigate the consequences of the Arab defeats which  
5 were produced by the infusion of Soviet arms. They have never  
6 yet achieved a complete benefit by their own efforts for the  
7 Arabs. And the third reason is that a prolonged period of  
8 diplomatic stalemate may turn the Arab frustrations  
9 against the Soviet Union, as was shown already in 1972 when  
10 Sudat evicted the Soviet advisers.

11           Those are the three motives of which perhaps the general  
12 interest of the detente would be the greatest, but there  
13 is a constant temptation, I hinted at before, basically, of  
14 the Soviets to either take a free ride on the thing we are  
15 doing or to put few obstacles in the way.

16           One of the problems, realistically the Arab countries  
17 now have to come to us because we are the only ones that can  
18 produce a settlement and that is more or less what is  
19 happening, that is what the Egyptian Foreign Minister  
20 really is doing here, and that is why they have been so  
21 eager for me to visit Cairo. They have excessive expectations.  
22 On the other hand, we must not take advantage of the  
23 opportunity to a point where we squeeze the Soviets out  
24 of the Middle East, then they will take a radical position,  
25 frustrate whatever the Arabs may want to do for whatever

1 reason. This where we have to navigate but the temptation  
2 for the Soviets to keep this thing going are definitely there  
3 and we are trying to reduce them along the lines that  
4 I gave.

5 Senator Church. As you know, in the early stage of the  
6 war we talked about the need to supply, resupply Israel  
7 for its losses, and I felt very strongly then that your  
8 action was quite correct in maintaining a military equilibrium  
9 at a time when the Arabs were pressing Israel very hard  
10 and the Israelis were suffering very substantial losses  
11 but I also feel that right as the policy has been up to now,  
12 nothing would be more injurious to the interests of the  
13 Israelis and to the interests of the Jewish community in  
14 this country than an American involvement in a war in the Middle  
15 East, should it break out again, and I think such an  
16 involvement would be far more devisive and acrimondous  
17 and internally far more dangerous to this country and its  
18 well-being in the future than protracted involvement of this  
19 country in Indo China.

20 What I am leading up to is this: I understand that the  
21 amendment has been offered by Senator Hatfield in connection  
22 with the supplemental bill that the Administration is  
23 sending, has sent up , for \$2 billion to cover the cost  
24 of the armament that we have sent into the Middle East.  
25 I haven't read the Hatfield Amendment but I take it it is the

11

same formula that was adopted by Congress in connection with Indo China. And my question to you is if this amendment takes that form it would prohibit the use of any funds contained in the bill for the purpose of introducing American forces into the Middle East without prior and express consent of the Congress.

What would the position of the Administration be on such an amendment?

Secretary Kissinger. Senator Church, the first time I heard of the Hatfield Amendment was on some news show this morning and I haven't read it. Let me reason off the top of my head. I think such an amendment would be a disaster. We have no intention of putting American forces in there, but if we had to conduct an alert last week under conditions where the Soviets would know that we would have to go to Congress before we could react, I think we might have seen those airborne divisions on the way.

One of the indicators we had, incidentally, that I had forgotten to mention was that, and Senator Symington will appreciate, is that all Soviet transports had stood down for two days, which meant they were assembling it someplace or at least gave themselves the option to use it.

Now, we have no intention of putting forces in there except under the most extreme circumstances that I am

would sustain. We have made an internal

0 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 decision in the White House, I do not hesitate to  
2 tell you, that if it were necessary to move forces last  
3 week, we would have gone to Congress for its approval,  
4 but to have this written in as a requirement now in this tense  
5 situation would really in my view be very disastrous.

6 Senator Church. One final follow-up in that connection.  
7 Because we have already had quite enough Presidential wars in  
8 our time, what assurances could you give the committee that  
9 no such action would be taken if we were to refrain from  
10 writing into the bill an expressed provision of this kind?

11 Secretary Kissinger. Well, I have not formally discussed  
12 this with the President. I can tell you that our view last  
13 week was to go to the Congress if American military forces  
14 had been moved in. We might have moved them in and then  
15 go to the Congress. But this really would have depended  
16 on how the situation evolved.

17 I would have thought that the agony of recent years  
18 and indeed of this year should make clear that unilateral  
19 Executive actions simply do not provide the basis for  
20 public support that the great risks that are involved here  
21 would bring about, but I would be glad to discuss this with  
22 the President and give you a more formal assurance.

23 My worry, quite frankly, is if we make this very public  
24 it might reduce the flexibility in a crisis situation. I cannot  
25 now foresee a circumstance in which American forces would go

13

in because I think the crisis is now de-escalating every  
day and hopefully out of the visit of the Egyptian Foreign  
Minister and the Prime Minister of Israel and my visit  
to Cairo we can get the cease-fire so firmly established  
then our primary discussions will be a peace settlement.  
I really do not think we will have another crisis.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

10 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Secretary Kissinger. My concern right now is not to  
2 keep the Congress being able to pass it, my concern is from  
3 getting things on the public record that may rekindle incentives  
4 that we thought we had squashed last week.

5 Senator Pearson. Frank led you to answer my question,  
6 that is, whether or not the alert had moved as a necessary  
7 response to intervention, whether or not it would have been  
8 pursuant to the Middle East resolution, passed after '57,  
9 or whether it would have been the Administration coming  
10 back to Congress, and I think you responded.

11 Secretary Kissinger. Our intention was to go to the  
12 Congress last week. There were many contingencies that were  
13 hard to foresee but the basic intention was to go to the  
14 Congress.

15 Senator Pearson. Well, I was also interested in your  
16 itinerary on the trip to Peking and I want to ask you in that  
17 connection whether or not Arab unity being of the nature that  
18 it is, whether or not an agreement between the Israelis and  
19 the Egyptians through the UN and the US and USSR participating,  
20 whether or not the radical Arab countries, Syria, particularly,  
21 their interest is of a nature to make this even more compli-  
22 cated than it is? Are we going to be able to handle that  
23 part of it? You apparently have that in mind with the  
24 itinerary that you set forth.

25 Secretary Kissinger. Syria has not yet accepted

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

negotiations formally, although they have accepted the cease-fire, including reference to Security Council Resolution 242 which they had never done before, either.

If a settlement can be arranged with Egypt then Jordan will follow very quickly.

Senator Pearson. And Lebanon.

Secretary Kissinger. And Lebanon will follow very quickly. That would leave Syria in an isolated position and Syria by itself is not strong enough to start a war again. And in addition Syria represents almost the most difficult problem for the Israelis because of the Golan Heights issue. So we are not eager to have Syria be the first Arab country which has to be brought into this negotiation.

The logical--we think that if we can get a settlement between Egypt and Israel and Jordan and Israel that this will be enough to diffuse the Saudis who are really looking for a way to get off the course on which they are, whether then after the last radical state will join we are not yet clear.

Senator Pearson. My last question is, why was the response by the Soviets so much really different from the '67 to the '73 war? Except for the very lightning result of the '67 war there wasn't time enough perhaps to respond, but this time you had resupplied during the conflict a signal to you it was hours, not days, very abrupt, alert of the Soviet forces, why in the spirit of this detente was reaction so much different

TOP SECRET

1 then today than it was in '67 and is their view of detente  
2 slipping? Where is Brezhnev now, given the collective  
3 decisions?  
4

5 Secretary Kissinger. In '67 the Soviets moved immediately  
6 into a posture of public and very vocal hostility to us, not  
7 only in their own propaganda but in the UN and contributed  
8 to the fact that all Arab, not all Arab countries but many  
9 Arab countires broke diplomatic relations with us at that time  
10 and it took weeks until Kosygin came over here and met with  
11 President Johnson for this to diffuse because the military  
12 situation was quite different because the Israelis won so  
13 rapidly.

14 This time in their relations with us they went to great  
15 lengths to diffuse it and made several Efforts to bring about  
16 a cease-fire. They were not the principal obstacle to the  
17 cease-fire at the end of the first week on October 13, in fact,  
18 they tried to cooperate with us on that, perhaps not as energeti-  
19 cally as they should have, but we and they had worked out  
20 a formula which failed because our West European allies  
21 were not willing to run any risks with the Arabs and because  
22 the Egyptians over-estimated their military position.

23 They then sent Kosygin into Cairo to try to get  
24 a settlement, all of this before the Israeli victory became  
25 obvious, and I must say when I was in Moscow it was a tough  
negotiation, as it always is with them.

**TOP SECRET**



4

We achieved substantially everything that the Israelis had ever asked from us, acceptance by everybody of 242, direct negotiations and cease-fire in place, which the Israelis had been willing to accept the week before under much less favorable conditions.

Now, events of last week you can interpret in part by their frustration in seeing their clients there wind up in a worse and worse position, and judging from the messages we got from the Egyptians, and if you assume they were even more vocal to the Russians, the Egyptians were in a state of near hysteria last week.

So I think you had many factors combining to produce the events of last week. We do not consider the Soviet behavior exemplary, far from it. They tried to get their advantages from the situation, but we think they moderated more and helped bring about a rapid settlement under conditions that were acceptable to all parties.

Senator Pearson. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask for your help. There were some things I did want to ask about, like the reason for the alert. You have answered that to my satisfaction.

The British and other European countries' total

assent in our problems is something I would like to talk

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 about sometime with you further at your convenience, and  
2 also I would like to know why the Israel intelligence,  
3 supposedly the best, this time was very bad, as well as our  
4 own intelligence. Knowing of your knowledge in the position  
5 in the intelligence field, in the Security Council, I would  
6 like to discuss that sometime at your convenience.

7 I would like to know why it is that we have not been  
8 more effective presenting our problems that have been given  
9 to you because of our additional interest with the Soviet  
10 Union on other matters that do not have to do with Middle  
11 East and the negotiations, how we can be of service in  
12 developing that, and I would like to sometime find out why it  
13 was that the Administration gave in on the original SALT  
14 deal that you made in Moscow, which in my opinion means  
15 that there will not be a meaningful SALT deal made in the  
16 future in all probability especially because of the  
17 philosophy and ideology of the new team that is operating  
18 that situation and, of course, I am excepting you.

19 Now, getting down to the question that I am interested  
20 in, in my opinion, and you do not need any commendations  
21 from me, certainly, but I think your paragraph in your press  
22 conference about the mutual danger to not only us and the  
23 Soviet Union but also to the world is the most profound  
24 constructive, thoughtful statement that has been made since  
25 I have been in government, and I am going to take the liberty

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 of sending to every member of the committee, in case  
2 they missed it -- it was only a paragraph -- to me it is the  
3 whole thing. Like four little fellows said to the fifth,  
4 how would you like to shoot crap? He said, I can't do it for  
5 six reasons. And what is the first reason? I haven't the  
6 money., never mind the other five, you know. Because  
7 you have got it all summed up so beautifully in that para-  
8 graph.

9 Now, what I have been trying to do, and the Chairman,  
10 I am afraid at times I have even bored him to get out the facts  
11 of the nuclear picture. If people would only understand  
12 it better. I made three talks in Missouri over the weekend.  
13 I used the paragraph and people would come up and say, I  
14 had no idea of the fact everything we dropped in four  
15 years to win over Germany and Japan is 1/25th of one percent  
16 of what we have ready to drop tomorrow. The fact that the  
17 Hiroshima bomb with 14 kilotons, according to Dr. York  
18 at this seminar you mentioned previously, killed one hundred  
19 thousand people, 14 kilotons with one of our little fighters  
20 out of Frankfort could drop 700 kilotons on Moscow and  
21 get back, although maybe most of them would not get  
22 through. Only one has to get through to destroy the city.  
23 But to a reason which I think I understand as a member  
24 of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, this committee knows  
25 very little about that, the Armed Services Committee knows

1 very little about that, the Joint Atomic Committee in my  
2 opinion has been over the years an unwitting tool of the  
3 military.

4 There have been major changes as a result of Secretary  
5 Schlesinger going over there and now Mrs. Ray and so forth. But  
6 I think what we have to do, so that we can appreciate the  
7 problem that you face, the ultimate problem that you face,  
8 is to get this information out to the people so they under-  
9 stand the type and character of modernity. I think also it  
10 would save us millions of dollars in not buying equipment  
11 that is not essential to the security of the United States.

12 If there is any basic criticism, after 33 years in direct  
13 connection with the military that I have, it is their prone-  
14 ness to follow tradition as against modernity, especially  
15 if they won the last time.

16 So what I would ask you, do you feel you could help  
17 us? We try to develop a justification for that superb  
18 statement that you made in your summation of reporting to the  
19 people about the Middle East crisis, the basic problem  
20 of this nuclear holocaust danger and why.

21 Secretary Kissinger. I am very sympathetic to getting  
22 out the facts and I would have thought that with this effort  
23 one could put together enough from unclassified sources that  
24 one knows to be correct to present the essential facts. The  
25 Institute of Strategic Studies put out information. I

1 believe it has to be unclassified. I believe when one talks  
 2 of war now one is not talking about historic experience  
 3 anymore, it is a totally different type of thing, and the  
 4 responsibilities of having made that final step is one that  
 5 I don't see how one can justify before any tribunal short  
 6 of contingency very hard to perceive of.

7 Senator Symington. Well, do you think that, would you  
 8 lend your weight to this committee.--

9 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.

10 Senator Symington. -- in trying to get that out?

11 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.

12 Senator Symington. Actually the whole thing is  
 13 a joke. Since the Smyth Report came out in the middle-'40s,  
 14 there has been no basic secrecy. We are not talking about  
 15 detail, we are talking about--

16 Secretary Kissinger. I think I could get my staff to  
 17 put together from unclassified sources enough of the essential  
 18 information and I would be very happy to cooperate with  
 19 the committee in putting out the facts on the military  
 20 situation as I understand it that confronts this Administration  
 21 and confronts any succeeding Administration when it faces  
 22 confrontation.

23 The Chairman. I want to endorse that, I think it is  
 24 very important, I do not think it is out at all.

25 Secretary Kissinger. It is out among experts.

1 The Chairman. But to the public.

2 Senator Symington. I have published quite a few facts  
3 in the last few weeks but so far nobody has accused me of being  
4 a traitor. I have no Ellsberg problem at this time. So I  
5 think the time is right. When I first went on the Armed  
6 Services Committee in '53, I went to the Chairman, no longer  
7 in the Senate, and Senator Saltonstall and said I think we  
8 ought to get into this if we are going to function as a  
9 committee, and he was a great gentleman but he said, "It is so  
10 secret I don't want to know anything about it." And I have  
11 also had the same reaction later on when I tried to get  
12 into it. This committee has tried to get into it, we  
13 don't seem to be able to get the facts, we don't seem to  
14 be able to marshal them. I am confident Secretary Schlesinger  
15 who was Chairman of the AEC, whom I knew at that time, would  
16 cooperate and I think it is so important that this  
17 superb statement that you made be understood by all people,  
18 and I would hope, that is the reason I say I started off by  
19 saying I would ask for your help, I think it would clear up  
20 a great many of your problems.

21 Secretary Kissinger. I would be delighted to cooperate.

22 Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 Secretary Kissinger. I think it is important.

24 The Chairman. Senator Scott.

25 Senator Scott. No, sir, I won't use any time except

1 to say to the Secretary I was in a Judiciary Committee meeting  
2 and that is why I am late and I haven't heard the briefing.

3 Senator Percy. Secretary Kissinger, can we learn from  
4 this experience what went wrong with our intelligence we  
5 did not have more information? What happened to our intelligence  
6 assets in Syria and Egypt we did not know what was going on?

7 Secretary Kissinger. Well, Senator Percy, most  
8 intelligence Failures occur not in collecting facts but in  
9 interpreting the facts. We had the essential facts, we knew  
10 that the Syrian Army was in mobilized positions that were  
11 not typical of it. We knew that the Egyptian Army was  
12 mobilized. I was so disturbed by these reports on the Sunday  
13 before the war broke out that I took the unusual step of asking  
14 the Israeli Ambassador to call on me at the State Department  
15 and give me his interpretation and I relied on the fact that  
16 it is sort of common knowledge that Israeli intelligence is  
17 supposed to be the best in the world.

18 The Israeli Ambassador told me that there was no danger,  
19 no conceivable danger of attack, there was absolutely  
20 nothing to worry about. Nevertheless, I then asked our own  
21 intelligence agencies to give me their assessment and produce  
22 the horrible because I asked CIA and the State Department  
23 Intelligence people claim they had an exclusive right to  
24 brief me, so I got the State Department Intelligence  
25 to brief me in my State Department capacity and CIA to do a

1 paper for me as Assistant to the President and both papers  
2 agreed on the fact there was no danger of a war. I had  
3 that repeated twice more during the week. The facts were  
4 all there. Why did they do it? One, because everybody  
5 assumed the Israelis were so militarily supreme that it  
6 would be total insanity for the Arabs to attack. That was  
7 axiomatic.

8 Secondly, the Israelis in addition to their conviction  
9 and their supremacy were so afraid that if they generated  
10 the fear of war in this country that we would use it to  
11 launch a diplomatic offensive that they have had a vested  
12 interest in down-playing any danger of war and as late as  
13 Thursday evening Eban told me, "We have never had it so good,  
14 there is no danger of war, there is no need for diplomatic  
15 offensive," and all of these things, it wasn't the lesson  
16 to draw on intelligence, not that the factual collection  
17 was wrong, but that if you don't challenge the basic  
18 assumptions regularly by which they are interpreted, the  
19 best facts in the world don't do you any good if you do not  
20 have a professional devil's advocate there.

21 I had a vague uneasy feeling but I didn't mind being  
22 reassured either and so if you do not have a professional  
23 devil's advocate you just don't get it. There had been many  
24 war scares and the Egyptians had mobilized on several other oc-  
25 casions. This misassessment, incidentally, by the Israelis



1 of their position continued during the whole first week  
 2 and we were assured every day until Thursday of that week  
 3 that it would take them only two more days to clear the thing  
 4 up and we all know that this did not happen, which was  
 5 one reason why we did not feel all that urgency For resupply.  
 6 We figured whenever we started, it would be after the war.

7 So they have to assess theri own.

8 Another lesson one should draw, one should never assume  
 9 that any nation is incapable of learning to use complicated  
 10 equipment because one saw all of these weapons piled on the  
 11 Egyptian and Syrian side and the assumption was they never  
 12 knew how to use it so it didn't make any difference. That  
 13 is another lesson one should learn.

14 Senator Scott. Could I interrupt to say the assumption  
 15 seems to have been the Egyptians had not won a war since the  
 16 second act of Aida.

17 Senator Percy. Or the assumption is man will not  
 18 act irrationally and that is a false assumption.

19 Secretary Kissinger. I will tell you, for example,  
 20 everybody assumed, the day the war broke out we got  
 21 an official communication from the Israeli Government saying tha  
 22 by Tuesday night they would have it all cleaned up and,  
 23 therefore, pleading with us not to make any irrevocable  
 24 decisions in the Security Council that would keep them from  
 25 cleaning it up by Tuesday night.

1 We then thought they would be on the other side of  
2 the Canal by then so we told the Security Council that we  
3 felt that all parties should go back to the original starting  
4 line. We thought this would have to be used probably more against  
5 the Israelis as it turned out and was considered an anti-Arab  
6 act because the Arabs were advancing at that time and then  
7 we never put this in the resolution anyway because there  
8 was no support for it.

9 So there were many misjudgments.

10 Senator Percy. Mr. Secretary, the President in his veto  
11 message on the War Powers-Resolution stated that if this  
12 resolution had been law it might have impaired our ability to  
13 respond to the Mid-East crisis.

14 Could you detail out for us how that resolution, if law,  
15 would have impaired our ability to respond?

16 Secretary Kissinger. The problem is how other countries  
17 would assess the necessity of a Congressional review.

18 After a certain period of time they would think they  
19 can. There is a terminal date.

20 Senator Percy. Is the period of time too short or  
21 particularly when you indicated you intended to come to  
22 Congress very quickly anyway?

23 Secretary Kissinger. Well, the judgment that went into  
24 this was that the other countries might then mistake the  
25 permanence of whatever action might be taken.

1 Senator Percy. In the area of the notification to our  
2 allies, could you tell the committee and our colleagues the  
3 procedure that is established to be used to alert our  
4 NATO allies, whether it is an instantaneous procedure as our  
5 own alert to our own military forces, and what the time lag  
6 was even though you had many conversations, obviously,  
7 in the time we pushed the button to alert all of our forces  
8 and the button was pushed to alert all of our allied forces.

9 Secretary Kissinger. Let me again make one very candid  
10 observation here. We will make this an experiment whether  
11 we can keep these executive sessions secret. One of our  
12 problems in relation to NATO is the changed attitude of  
13 Great Britain toward the United States since Britain joined  
14 the Common Market. Many of our consultation procedures  
15 with our allies have always operated on the assumption that  
16 we would keep Britain most closely informed of all other  
17 countries and that the British would then carry the ball  
18 for us when we present the issues to our allies because  
19 they will know the facts and they can then speak as Europeans  
20 and they can sort of defend our positions.

21 Now, Ever since this summer the British have been  
22 moving closer to the French position than toward their own  
23 special relationship vis-a-vis us and it hasn't been as  
24 abrasive as the French position but it has changed the  
25 character of the special relationship and this has been

1 frankly one of the problems.

2 Now, I will send the Chairman all these exchanges. I  
3 do not mind you showing them to the members of the committee  
4 who are interested. I do not want to spread it into every  
5 office. But I do not mind having it in the Chairman's  
6 hands.

7 You will see that we talked to the British two or three  
8 times a day. On the alert I called Lord Cromer within an  
9 hour of receiving the letter. I told him of the facts. I  
10 told him what we were thinking about. I said, "Please notify  
11 London immediately and let us know if there are any problems."  
12 He said, "Oh, this is an extremely serious matter. They  
13 even have a copy of the letter." And we never heard any  
14 complaint from them or any objection or any comment. He  
15 said, "I don't assume that you have any choice here."

16 Now, we informed the military committee of NATO within  
17 an hour of issuing the alert order. We informed the NATO  
18 Council. There was a 2-hour time lag between our issuing  
19 the orders and informing the NATO Council for this reason:  
20 We did not want the NATO Council to hear what we were doing be-  
21 fore we had given a formal reply to the Soviets so we timed  
22 our briefing to the NATO Council for the exact moment that  
23 we delivered our reply to the Soviets here, which meant it  
24 was an hour before that reply reached Moscow, partly because  
25 we thought the situation was so hairy that we should have our

1 alert underway before Moscow had our refusal to joint the  
2 common Soviet-American force, lest they used the refusal to  
3 trigger their force unilaterally, which is what they had  
4 threatened us with.

5 Now this is a circumstance that is not likely to be  
6 repeated. Normally we would notify NATO before we make an  
7 alert. Moreover, this crisis was over, I mean the operational  
8 part of the crisis was over within 12 hours. But this is the  
9 procedure we followed. We told the British immediately, we  
10 told the NATO Council at the precise moment that we delivered  
11 the note to the Soviets, which was about 5:00 o'clock in  
12 the morning here. In fact, we told the NATO Council before we  
13 told the Congressional leaders, given the time difference,  
14 with whom we met at 8:30 in the morning. So we faced a very  
15 extraordinary circumstance here.

16 Senator Percy. Mr. Secretary, consistent with your  
17 demonstrated desire to work with this committee closely  
18 in foreign relation policy, and we deeply appreciate that, is  
19 there anything further that we as individual members can  
20 do to in moments of crisis lie this support and help our  
21 common policy? I think many of us issue statements immediately.  
22 I ordered mine. It was a gross miscalculation for the  
23 Soviet Union to indicate that our domestic concerns would in any  
24 way detract from our ability ot unite solidly behind the

1 use? We use UP and AP. Do you have a desire to have  
2 sent Marshall Wright copies of those immediately?

3 Secretary Kissinger. That would be extremely helpful  
4 and I must say I have found the cooperation with this  
5 committee--

6 Senator Percy. It should go both ways.

7 Secretary Kissinger. -- extremely helpful in this crisis  
8 and if it isn't tempting fate I would like to say the Chairman  
9 was enormously helpful with his intellectual and moral support  
10 throughout all these days.

11 Senator Percy. Thank you very much.

12 The Chairman. Senator Pell.

13 Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 I would like to join in congratulating the Secretary  
15 that he helped steer the ship of state through these very  
16 difficult waters. He did a superior job.

17 I would like to follow up a little bit on Senator  
18 Symington's thought on nuclear weapons. One of the things  
19 that has always bothered me a little is the fact that the  
20 public and even members of the Congress are not permitted  
21 to know where nuclear weapons are, and in what nations they are  
22 around the world, whereas the nations where they are know this  
23 and the opposition knows it.

24 I was wondering if in the letter you were going to send  
25 to Senator Symington and the Chairman, and hopefully all

of us, you could give thought to letting the American people in on this fact. Why shouldn't the American people know where there are nuclear weapons, for the sake of argument, in country X, if country X knows and the Soviet Union knows? What is the rationale for the secrecy?

Secretary Kissinger. Frankly that opposition pre-dates my term in office and I will find the rationale for it and defend it rationally the next time I am here.

Senator Pell. If you cannot defend it, maybe you can strip away some of this.

Secretary Kissinger. I hadn't intended to send a letter, I thought we would have a session here sometime in Executive Session in which we could discuss it and talk about it.

Senator Pell. I think it would be very helpful if you could even go a little further and give us some kind of memo enlarging on the unclassified facts as you were saying you thought would be prepared in your Department.

Secretary Kissinger. I will tell you candidly this particular reason for secrecy I have to look into, what the rationale is. It is clear the countries concerned know.

Senator Pell. I think the Department itself, instead of us trying to pluck out little classified nuggets occasionally, could come up with some kind of white paper or position paper as to what nuclear weaponry can do to the

1 world, what is the effect.

2 One of the witnesses before us several years ago said  
3 'as you say, mankind in the Northern Hemisphere --

4 Secretary Kissinger. It was a disaster of the nature  
5 mankind has never suffered in recorded history anyway.

6 Senator Pell. I think it would be helpful if you  
7 could send us perhaps some kind of unclassified paper. You  
8 might want to throw that idea out. I would appreciate it.  
9 We get things in confidence, they help us in our thinking  
10 but still don't clarify the--

11 Secretary Kissinger. Let me talk to the Chairman to  
12 see how we can conduct such a session in the near future.

13 Senator Pell. Along this question of nuclear weapons,  
14 of the thoughts that occurred to me in connection with  
15 Israel, while the public would not support the Hatfield  
16 Amendments, if things got going very badly for Israel we  
17 would be left with the unpleasant alternative to seeing  
18 Israel put together its component parts for nuclear weapons  
19 and seeing them use it, or I think most Americans would  
20 prefer to see our own people being used rather than  
21 development of a tripping of a nuclear holocaust of any sort.  
22 Do you think this theory of mine has any justification?

23 Secretary Kissinger. Well, if Israel were on  
24 the verge of collapse we would have some very tough decisions  
25 to make and any country of two and a half million facing



1 one hundred million is in a very precarious position in a  
2 war. If they do not win they are very apt to lose very  
3 dramatically. They were in bad shape there for a while,  
4 partly as a result, I don't know which of you gentlemen said  
5 it, the countries that have won a war don't make their  
6 adjustments as rapidly as they should, and the Israelis were  
7 bemused by their victory in '67 to a point where they had  
8 calculated all of the munitions expenditures on the basis of  
9 a '67 type war.

10 Senator Pell. Do you feel in the case of survival they  
11 do have the nuclear capability?

12 Secretary Kissinger. I do not want to speculate on that,  
13 but I would assume that if their survival is threatened  
14 they would use any capability they have.

15 Senator Pell. Supporting strongly objectives of avoiding  
16 a nuclear holocaust, do you see any possibility of China  
17 joining you in these efforts, have these subjects been  
18 raised at all in your conversations?

19 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, but I do not think the  
20 Chinese are ready yet.

21 The Chinese take the position that they would support  
22 the abolition of all nuclear weapons but my estimate is  
23 that what the Chinese consider the overwhelming problem is  
24 to deter the Soviet Union from an attack on themselves  
25 and, therefore, since they have so very few weapons, this

1 is my estimate, they have never said this to me, I think  
2 they would be very reluctant to accept what they would  
3 consider any international control of the few weapons they  
4 have, but again the logic of history will force the  
5 Chinese into the same position as us. They quote Mao's statement  
6 that if 400 million Chinese die, there will still be 400 million  
7 left. This is one of the bravado statements you can  
8 do nothing about. No country has ever lost 400 million  
9 people in two days and the collateral consequences of this  
10 would be so unbelievable that it is nonsense to say that  
11 after that you are going to operate your society with the  
12 remaining 400, that it would be a new world for everybody  
13 under those conditions.

14 Senator Pell. Finally, in connection with the crisis  
15 of last week, while you have pretty well convinced us it was  
16 a true crisis and real crisis, there is still a nagging  
17 feeling in the American people that this may have been  
18 orchestrated a little bit or exaggerated a little bit  
19 because of the domestic problems.

20 Is there any possibility of releasing the note  
21 from the Soviet Union? I know colleagues of mine have read  
22 and apparently have seen it and they characterized it as  
23 brutal. Why shouldn't that be released to clear the air?

24 Secretary Kissinger. If you will let me say one thing:  
25 The domestic crisis which everyone here was aware of

22

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

occurred when I was in Moscow and it was not very fully reported there so that when I came back here on Tuesday morning that crisis had passed me by.

Senator Pell. I am not connecting you with the crisis.

Secretary Kissinger. I know you are not connecting me

with it, but the only reason I mention it is because the

recommendation to the President was made by the body of men

in the National Security Council, none of whom had any domestic

policy responsibilities or had been in any way involved

in any of the discussions that led to it. Why don't we

release this note?

You will have noticed in my press conference I went

to great length avoiding the impression of confrontation.

I never mentioned Brezhnev. I never said what it was based

on. The reason Brezhnev's name got into it at all is because

the Pentagon for reasons which I have never understood put

into the alert order a reference to a Brezhnev-Presidential

exchange and then, of course, it leaked out.

We do not think it is desirable to create a situation

in which it becomes part of the folklore that the President

faced down Brezhnev and that we had eyeball to eyeball

and all that business of '62, and I deliberately said we had

some ambiguous information which was a gross understatement,

in order to prevent this from happening.

I do not see any useful purpose being served, I

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 didn't see any useful purpose being served in getting this  
2 letter out and proving that we made him pull back from  
3 whatever threat was in the letter. What we would rather  
4 aim for is to restore enough confidence in the public  
5 and in the Congress that when Government takes steps, that  
6 sort of measure, it may not be right but it has a very  
7 good reason for doing it.

8 Senator Pell. Thank you.

9 I have one final questions, something extraneous,  
10 if-the Chairman will permit, on another subject.

11 The Senate by an 82 to 10 vote passed a recommendation  
12 we engage in an anti-environmental warfare treaty and the  
13 Department, I believe, is supporting it and the Pentagon  
14 is opposed to it. I wonder if you could direct your offices  
15 to look into what the reason for the delay is in giving  
16 some kind of responsibility to the will of Congress and  
17 the will of the Senate in this regard?

18 Secretary Kissinger. Let me look into this. I know  
19 we are generally sympathetic. I do not know what the real  
20 obstacles are.

21 Senator Griffin. I just join in commending the Secretary  
22 for the excellent job he has done and for the development  
23 of such good relationship with this committee and I hope  
24 that it continues.

25 The Chairman. Senator McGovern.

1 Senator McGovern. In view of the lateness of the hour,  
2 I will follow the good example of Senator Griffin. I am  
3 impressed with the Secretary's presentation here this morning  
4 and greatly reassured. I thought it was a very, very impressive  
5 presentation.

6 Secretary Kissinger. Thank you.

7 Senator Scott. I just want to thank the Secretary  
8 and wish I had been able to hear all of it.

9 Senator Javits. May I ask one thing of the Secretary?  
10 He has been very generous with his suggesting we get  
11 together on other occasions. My experience in Europe with  
12 John Sparkman and Mike Mansfield shows a very serious  
13 situation, Mr. Secretary. It is not an immediate confrontation.  
14 May I respectfully suggest that this is an ideal place  
15 for advice and consent and that if you gave us enough  
16 notice we could get prepared, too. There are some very  
17 good brains around this table, that means going two ways.

18 Secretary Kissinger. I would welcome this. Why  
19 don't we do it, if the Chairman agrees. I will be back  
20 here November 15 or 16. Within a week or two of my return.

21 Senator Javits. Thank you.

22 Secretary Kissinger. Before the end of the month.  
23 I would welcome this because this is one of our most  
24 complex problems.

25 Senator Javits. Thank you.

1           The Chairman. The Secretary has been most forthcoming,  
2 I think, both here and at other meetings and he certainly  
3 has gone to great lengths to communicate with me, which  
4 I appreciate, and in the name of the committee and, of  
5 course, I join my colleagues in commending you on the  
6 way you have handled this matter.

7           I will just say one or two other things.

8           I do not want to go into this because I know the time is  
9 late. One thought is future staff could explore with  
10 the Russians, they are the other greatest nuclear power, the  
11 possibility of a sort of joint statement about this overall  
12 nuclear capability and so on. I think this thing Senator  
13 Symington raised is necessary for the education of our  
14 own people and perhaps one in which they might join. It  
15 isn't any great secret. In your own negotiations we  
16 all know each knows what the other one has. That was  
17 evident at the discussions of the interim agreements and it  
18 might be a very impressive educational venture and would  
19 give much better perspective to some of these individual  
20 cases that arise.

21           That is the way I feel about it. They do not take  
22 it seriously, detente, which you discussed so well in the  
23 beginning.

24           I think you have done a great job in this committee,  
25 now our question is how to educate everybody, I mean beyond  
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6

1 the committee.

2 Unfortunately I think it is a shame under our  
3 situation we could not have this in public, it would be  
4 very informative to the whole public, but I understand  
5 the reasons why. I think there has to be a way to inform  
6 all of the other members of the Congress as well as the  
7 public.

8 So I hope your staff will give some thought to that  
9 while you are journeying to Peking.--maybe as soon as you  
10 get back. And there is one other problem we have not  
11 mentioned. I do not want to go into it now. That is the  
12 disposition of the Palestinian question, which is going to  
13 remain one of the very difficult and thorny ones which  
14 we will discuss at a later date.

15 Thank you very much. Everybody knows this is  
16 an executive session and be very careful what you say to  
17 the press, leave it in general terms. I know you have to  
18 say something but keep it very general and do not do anything  
19 to embarrass these hearings because they are very useful. We  
20 do not want anything to interrupt the possibility of  
21 continuing these.

22 Senator Sparkman. We will refer them to the  
23 Chairman.

24 The Chairman. Everybody be careful.

25 (Whereupon, at 12:15 o'clock p.m., the committee  
adjourned.)