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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS

August 11, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RICHARD T. BOVERIE *RTB*

SUBJECT:

Revised SALT Spread Sheet

Attached is a revised SALT spread sheet which takes into account Jim Wade's comments. (I sent you last night a copy of the original version annotated to show Wade's specific requests for changes.)

At least on the surface, most of Wade's changes appear to have only minimal overall effect on the paper. Perhaps the principal impact is in the "Prospects for Agreement" section, where: (1) the basic agreement portion of Option 1 now appears to be more quickly negotiable (assuming the Soviets would accept the option in the first place), and (2) some uncertainty is introduced into Option 2 concerning the ability to complete an agreement this year.

As I mentioned last night, Wade emphasized that this does not constitute "concurrence" because the sheet does not reflect the following points:

-- Option 1 would provide a framework through which, over time, we could achieve limitations on Backfire and other gray area systems, including the SS-X-20.

-- We have given the Soviets four proposals in nine months; giving them a fifth proposal now could give them the impression that even further "concessions" would be forthcoming if they hold out.

DOS, OSD Reviews Completed

Your Decision

_____ Forward the revised version to the President. Sign the memo to the President at Tab A.

_____ Circulate the spread sheet for VPWG comments.

_____ Take no further action at this time.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)

Classified by Brent Scowcroft.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Comparison of SALT Options

Attached is a revised version of the spread sheet I sent you earlier which compares the basic SALT options. This revised version takes into account informal staff-level comments from DOD.

Relative to the original version, the revised version:

-- Is unchanged in the section on "Agreement Provisions."

-- Has several relatively minor changes in the section on "Military Impact."

-- Introduces in the section on "Prospects for Agreements" the DOD thoughts that: (1) the basic agreement in Option 1 could be worked out readily (if the Soviets would accept the option in the first place), and (2) there is a question whether there is time to work out the details for an Option 2-type agreement this year.

Defense probably would not have major objections to what is included in this spread sheet. However, they would likely find it troublesome that it does not reflect the following DOD views:

-- Option 1 would provide a framework through which, over time, we could achieve limitations on Backfire and other gray area systems, including the SS-X-20.

-- We have given the Soviets four proposals in nine months; giving them a fifth proposal now could give them the impression that even further "concessions" would be forthcoming if they hold out.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft