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9092

National Security Study Memorandum 93

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:    The Arab-Israeli Military Balance

The President has directed that, as a follow-up to the study produced in response to NSSM 81 and in the light of recent exchanges with Israeli intelligence representatives, further studies be prepared which will provide the following:

--Present intelligence estimates of Israeli and Arab air order of battle. The study should (1) identify U. S. and Israeli estimates and (2) where there are significant differences explain the reasons for the differences as specifically as possible.

--Present detailed intelligence assessments of the principal indicators of Arab air capability. The study should (1) identify U. S. and Israeli assessments and (2) where there are significant differences explain the reasons for the differences insofar as possible.

--An assessment of the present effective Arab-Israeli military balance. This study should present a refinement of the analysis in the NSSM 81 paper in the light of any revision in estimates of quantitative and qualitative factors and in the light of any improvement in analytical technique.

The NSC Ad Hoc Group created by NSSM 81 will be reactivated for the purpose of assembling this study. The study will be submitted by May 15 to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs for reference to the Special Review Group.

(Signed) HENRY A. KISSINGER

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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*Resulted in NSDM 66*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*I've signed  
NSSM's*

*do not want  
M.E. matters kicked  
all over the place.*

ACTION 9092

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April 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

*ETS-HK-E6590*

SUBJECT: Following up on Israel's Latest Aircraft Presentation

Following General Yariv's presentation here, I recommend that you take the steps outlined below to insure quick handling of Israel's presentation on its aircraft needs here over the last four days:

1. Sign the attached NSSM. This will reactivate the NSC Ad Hoc Group which I chaired last fall to produce the technical study which identified our options. I would prefer to do this by NSSM for two reasons:

--It puts in writing the requirement for an intelligence analysis which either reconciles or explains U. S. - Israeli differences on air order of battle.

--It permits us to keep the analysis in the framework established last fall with emphasis on capability which is the essence of the military balance. [I asked Yariv to put their best thinking on capabilities into the DIA channel--and to give it to me as well.]

To meet a May 15 deadline, the sooner we can get this memo out, the better. I have not given you a memo for the President since this is simply a necessary follow-on to our earlier study.

Before you sign, I recommend you touch base with Elliot Richardson. Or if you'd rather, I'll ask Bill Cargo to take it up with him. There may be some in Defense who see this as a White House effort to go beyond the March 23 announcement. I think we just have to take the line that the purpose of this NSSM is simply to update our technical analysis of the balance in the light of new information. Having Richardson aboard would be useful.

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*No on Garrison effect*

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. Feel out the Germans very tentatively if you wish on Israeli use of German offset holdings in a way that does not commit us to any viewpoint. You told Rabin you would do this. As you do, you should be aware of the following:

-- This proposed arrangement has almost no friends in the bureaucracy. There are two principal groups of opponents:

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a. One group believes this arrangement would complicate negotiation of any future German offset arrangement. It is a politically sensitive issue on each side and its involvement via an unusual deal in the Mid-East situation could be embarrassing in either Bonn or Washington.

b. Another group has the related concern that Israeli use of this money would reduce U.S. balance of payments return since the Israelis would otherwise be spending other funds here.

-- Given these concerns, U.S. agreement to this arrangement would constitute an extraordinary step. Before taking such a step, we may want the results of our consultation with the Israelis on their longer range economic needs. These consultations begin in Tel Aviv April 23.

-- From the U.S. - Israeli viewpoint, the U.S. will find it very difficult from normal programs in FY 1971 to muster the kind of financial package we have just given them (\$190 million). We may be relieved to have such a device to fall back on.

In short, you may want to see what kind of reaction you get to a tentative question about the German feeling on the subject, but I suggest your position be that we are still studying the proposal.

**Concurrences**

in substance: L. Lynn  
F. Chapin  
F. Bergsten  
H. Sonnenfeldt  
R. Kennedy

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