

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 18, 1974

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National Security Decision Memorandum 252

**TO:** The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency  
The U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing  
Consultative Commission

**SUBJECT:** Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing  
Consultative Commission, Geneva, April 2, 1974

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. component of the SALT Consultative Commission:

1. U.S. Commissioner should continue his efforts towards achievement of an agreed set of procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof for Strategic Offensive Systems and for ABM Systems and Their Components as called for in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.
2. U.S. Commissioner is authorized to accept the Joint Draft Texts for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their Components, dated November 16, 1973, as the basis for negotiating the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. He is also authorized to make appropriate language changes in the Joint Draft Texts including those resulting from the review by government lawyers.
3. The U.S. Government considers the achievement of these mutually agreed procedures to be important, but not at the expense of essential U.S. security interests. The U.S. Commissioner should proceed accordingly consistent with the instructions contained herein.
4. In the negotiations, the U.S. Commissioner should accord priority to inclusion of the following items in the Agreed Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms:

NSS, DOS, OSD Reviews  
Completed

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-- In the case of soft launch sites an area of the launch pad per se at the location of the launch stand must be made unusable by dismantling or destruction; removal of launch device alone is not considered adequate.

-- In the case of silo launch sites the silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed.

-- In the case of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers, the U.S. Commissioner should attempt to obtain Soviet agreement to U.S. proposals in the JDT of November 16, 1973, including those for H-class submarines. The U.S. Commissioner should make clear that in implementing the proposed procedure for "removing the submarines missile section in the open," the missile section will not be replaced by a new section of similar dimensions. Any replacement hull section must be significantly shorter in overall length than the missile section it replaces. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to drop the proposed procedure of sinking in international waters if the Soviets refuse to accept prior notification thereof.

5. The U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek notification that SLBM launchers under construction are intended as replacement for older ICBM launchers or for launchers on older submarines. Notification should be given prior to the start of sea trials of the replacement SLBM launchers. If after several weeks it is clear that the Soviets will not accept any form of prior notification, the U.S. Commissioner should seek instructions.

6. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to negotiate agreed language for the remaining issues as indicated by the bracketed text of the procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms in order to achieve the important elements set forth in para. 4, above, and to protect para. 8 of the Protocol. In this connection:

-- U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek inclusion of a definition of a modern SLBM, and is authorized to modify the language of the present sentence to achieve same objective. If he is unable to obtain Soviet agreement, he is authorized to drop the sentence, but should attempt to obtain Soviet agreement for the record that "launchers for SLBM's first flight tested after 1965 and deployed on diesel submarines are also modern SLBM's."

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-- The U.S. Commissioner should attempt to achieve Soviet agreement that facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites will not be used for storage, support or launch of ICBMs. If unable to achieve Soviet agreement after several weeks, he should seek instructions.

7. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to accept Soviet language on the remaining dismantling or destruction issues as reflected in para. I. 2 of the JDT of November 16, 1973, for ABM Systems and Their Components.


8. At an appropriate time the U.S. Commissioner should inform the Soviet Commissioner that the U.S. does not desire to negotiate ABM replacement procedures during SCC-IV; in the event that the Soviet side indicates an interest in beginning work on these procedures at the next SCC Session (SCC-IV), the U.S. Commissioner should seek instructions.

9. The U.S. Commissioner should retain the current wording regarding voluntary information in the JDT's of November 16, 1973.

10. The U.S. Commissioner should not raise the subject of publication of these procedures. If raised by the Soviet side he should respond that the U.S. has no plans to make these procedures public at this time.

11. Sensitivity of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are to be cleared through the White House.

This NSDM supersedes NSDM 217 and NSDM 237.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Central Intelligence  
Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation

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Completely Outside the System

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Bud - FYI  
Close-out  
April 15, 1974  
Tab A  
signed*

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

*Jan* JAN LODAL/HELMUT SONNENFELD *HS*

SUBJECT:

SCC NSDM

The SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) has now been in session for over two weeks, and the US representative is still without instructions. The Soviets are ready to talk substance; it is something of an embarrassment to the US to be without instructions, so we recommend that you act on the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) as soon as possible.

If we want an SCC agreement at the Summit, we need to move forward to narrow the differences between the US and Soviet positions. Our recommended NSDM contains only two changes from previous US positions -- both dealing with dismantling older ICBMs. These are:

1. Dismantling ICBMs at Soft Sites. Our previous position includes removing all missile equipment, destroying the concrete launch stands and destroying warhead bunkers and handling gear located about two miles from the actual launch sites. We now recommend letting the Soviets keep some equipment (such as warhead handling gear) at locations near soft ICBM launch sites (approximately two miles away), provided the Soviets agree not to use what remains of dismantled soft sites for mobile ICBM deployments. OSD has recently made clear they consider this change an acceptable outcome.

The Soviets are unlikely to accept our proposed prohibition on mobiles at these soft sites which they would interpret as legitimizing our unilateral statement on mobiles in SALT I. Thus, in the end, we will probably have to make a unilateral statement for the record and we expect OSD will go along with it.

The draft NSDM instructs the SCC Commissioner to seek Soviet acceptance of the prohibition on use of dismantled sites to support ICBMs and, if he cannot get acceptance in several weeks, to seek instructions.

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2. Dismantling ICBMs at Hard Sites. Our current position requires that the Soviets dismantle their silo headworks and adjacent launch control bunkers at older ICBM sites. We now recommend allowing the Soviets to forego dismantling launch control facilities (LCCs) at hard ICBM sites (they would still have to destroy the silo head works). Requiring them to also destroy underground launch control bunkers would not increase the time needed by the Soviets to reactivate the sites, but would be costly for them to undertake. The OSD and JCS staffs prefer that we retain our present position of requiring destruction of the launch control facilities but want to meet perceived Soviet concerns by assuring them they could retain their LCCs until there are no longer any active silos left which the LCCs control and that procedures would only apply to older missiles. In short, OSD's approach is to tell the Soviets they should dismantle LCCs at old SS-7/8 sites and emphasize that the requirement applies only to older missiles and does not set a precedent for SS-11s and SS-9s.

Our concern is exactly the opposite. We don't care if the Soviets retain their LCCs at SS-7/8 sites but we are concerned about the special problems posed by widespread deployment of the III-X silos if the Soviets also retain their existing SS-11 and SS-9 LCCs. We should make an effort to get Soviet agreement to dismantling existing LCCs at SS-11/9 sites once the III-X silos are fully operational.

OSD has recently indicated that, as a fallback, they would go along with letting the Soviets retain existing LCCs at the SS-7/8 sites. The OSD staff indicated they considered this outcome acceptable and would not recommend raising the issue to Schlesinger. This approach (letting the Soviets keep the SS-7/8 LCCs) was preferred by ACDA, CIA and State. It is also incorporated in the recommended NSDM.

OSD and JCS have taken their strongest stand on only one issue -- that of prior notification of replacement of older systems. OSD and JCS insist that we continue to seek Soviet agreement to prior notification ( your recent discussions indicate we may be able to achieve such an agreement). We recommend going along with OSD and JCS on this issue for now and have drafted the NSDM along these lines.

In conclusion:

-- The SCC issues are not terribly contentious within the bureaucracy. DOD has been involved only at the staff level; Schlesinger is probably not even aware of these issues. (John Wickham has indicated that Schlesinger need not be involved.)

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-- The recommended NSDM goes along with the DOD position on the issue on which they feel the strongest (prior notification). Moreover, while DOD's preferred positions are not endorsed on the ICBM dismantling question, DOD is on record as saying the proposed decision on this issue is an acceptable outcome.

-- Most importantly, the issues involved in dismantling obsolescent SS-7s and SS-8s do not in any sense constitute a serious risk to national security.

-- Finally, we continue to believe wrapping up the SCC work before the Summit is an important objective. While it will be difficult to reach agreement along the lines of the recommended NSDM by the Summit, we think it can be done. But without our recommended instructions, that go a few steps toward Soviet concerns on secondary issues, a Summit agreement on the SCC will be impossible.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the NSDM at Tab A.

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MEMORANDUM

HAK SGP NSDM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION  
April 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JAN M. LODAL <sup>1/11/74</sup>  
HELMUT SONNENFELDT

SUBJECT: SCC NSDM

The SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) has now been in session for almost two weeks, and the US representative is still without instructions. The Soviets are ready to talk substance; it is something of an embarrassment to the US to be without instructions, so we recommend that you act on the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) as soon as possible.

Our earlier memorandum (Tab I) provides an analysis of the technical issues. In summary, our recommended NSDM contains only two changes from previous US positions -- both dealing with dismantling older ICBMs. These are:

- We now recommend letting the Soviets keep some equipment (such as warhead handling gear) at locations near soft ICBM launch sites (approximately two miles away), provided the Soviets agree not to use what remains of dismantled soft sites for mobile ICBM deployments. Only OSD opposes this change; the JCS as well as other agencies support it.

- We also recommend allowing the Soviets to forego dismantling launch control facilities at hard ICBM sites. They would still have to destroy the silo head works and fill in the holes. Requiring them to also destroy underground launch control bunkers would not increase the time needed by the Soviets to reactivate the sites, but would be significantly costly for them to undertake. The OSD and JCS staffs continue to prefer that we retain our present position of requiring destruction of the launch control facilities.

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Both OSD and the JCS have taken a strong stand on only one issue -- that of prior notification of replacement of older systems. OSD and JCS insist that we continue to seek Soviet agreement to prior notification. We recommend going along with OSD and JCS on this, and have drafted the NSDM along these lines.

In conclusion:

- The SCC issues are not terribly contentious within the bureaucracy. DOD has been involved only at the staff level; Schlesinger is probably not even aware of these issues.

- The recommended NSDM goes along with the DOD position on most issues, including the one on which they feel the strongest (prior notification).

- We need to show some flexibility so that we can wrap up SCC work on SALT procedures as soon as possible. If we could do so before the Summit, this could be another element in the Summit package. Furthermore, within eight or nine months, the Soviets will begin dismantling their older systems. If we don't have agreed procedures by then, we will be forced to either accept whatever procedures they unilaterally choose to use or create an unnecessary disagreement with them.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the NSDM at Tab A.

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