

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

[S-HK-55854]

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June 28, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 116

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
 The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: The U.S. Policy on Mutual Force Reductions
 in Europe (MBFR)

Following the June 17 NSC meeting, the President has decided that U.S. explorations with the Soviet Union and consultations with our Allies in NATO on the subject of mutual force reductions shall be based on the following approach.

In general, the U.S. objective is to develop a consensus within the NATO Alliance governing the substantive elements of its position on mutual reductions of forces in Europe. Regarding specific elements, the Verification Panel will prepare a formulation and assessment of alternative options for MBFR for consideration by the National Security Council based on the following policy:

-- Reductions should cover both stationed and indigenous forces, either simultaneously or in succeeding phases. The primary U.S. objective, however, is to maximize the reduction of Soviet forces, and, for this reason, proportionately large Soviet and American (or stationed force) reductions should be emphasized rather than balanced stationed and indigenous reductions. A reduction of indigenous forces only should be excluded.

NSS, DOS,
OSD Reviews
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-- Another important U. S. objective in reductions should be to establish constraints on the reintroduction of stationed (Soviet) forces or equipment into the zone of reductions. Such constraints should be correspondingly comprehensive, possible to include Soviet territory, as the size of reductions is increased. On the other hand, it is not essential that the area for reductions include the territory of the USSR.

-- The area of reductions should not be confined to the Germanies alone; it is preferable that the area include Czechoslovakia and Poland, especially insofar as Soviet ground forces are concerned. While not desirable, the inclusion of the Benelux countries is acceptable. The inclusion of other NATO countries could be considered with an appropriate expansion of the area for Warsaw Pact reductions.

-- A full range of symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions should be considered based on various degrees of severity, the requirements for adequate verification and their effects upon the conventional balance.

In developing a consensus within the NATO Alliance on this policy, the U. S. shall prepare for future transmission to the NAC.

-- The "sanitized" April 12 Evaluation Report with an appropriate covering memorandum indicating that its conclusions are still tentative. This study should be completed no later than July 2, 1971.

-- A revised version of the June 1971 Elements of MBFR study, modified to indicate the decisions in this memorandum. This study should be completed by July 6, 1971.


-- A range of specific MBFR options and a thorough assessment of their implications. These options should range from limited symmetrical reductions to more comprehensive reductions possibly involving a wider area and a variety of reductions as well as verification provisions and collateral constraints. This study should be completed by August 1, 1971.

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These preparations for consultations should be made by the agencies responsible under the overall direction of the Verification Panel. Prior to the development and consideration by the President of specific mutual force reduction options, it is understood that the substance of our consultations with our NATO allies shall not go beyond existing Presidential guidance. In no instance will reductions figures be discussed with our allies. Regarding the procedure, forum, and timing of exploratory or preparatory talks with the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. should give full weight to the views of the allies.



Henry A. Kissinger

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TO BE DELIVERED AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

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June 23, 1971

TO: David Halperin, London, for Henry A. Kissinger

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: NSDM on MBFR

The following is the NSDM on MBFR which Wayne Smith and Hal Sonnenfeldt drafted. You should be aware that General Goodpaster has serious reservations about making the sanitized Evaluation Report available to NATO because he believes it is overly optimistic concerning enemy capabilities and necessary force levels.

AMH:JTH:feg:6/23/71

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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URGENT ACTION

June 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: K. Wayne Smith/Hal Sonnenfeldt H.S.

SUBJECT: Follow-up to June 17, 1971, NSC Meeting on MBFR

*Modified
Gary/Sweet*

Enclosed at Tab A is a draft NSDM on MBFR for your consideration. It is designed to provide the agencies with a starting position from which to initiate consultations with our Allies and extend substantive preparations for serious negotiations with the Warsaw Pact.

The U. S. Position

The principal points of the draft NSDM follow from the position you presented to the June 17 NSC meeting on MBFR and which was developed earlier at a Verification Panel meeting. In particular, emphasis is given to:

- The reduction of U. S. and Soviet forces as part of a comprehensive approach including both stationed and indigenous forces.
- The reduction of Soviet forces in Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as East Germany. In addition, while it is not critical to include USSR territory in an agreement, it is vital to limit the reintroduction of Soviet forces into Eastern Europe.
- The consideration of only those reductions that are (a) verifiable through national means, and (b) not significantly detrimental to the present conventional balance. For these reasons, we should only consider reductions between 10% and 30%. Phoney approaches such as a freeze or common ceiling should be excluded.

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It is our judgement that this general position was agreed to at the NSC meeting and that a NSDM incorporating it will not arouse significant agency objections and will usefully narrow the focus of our remaining work. On the other hand, a more specific directive could prematurely foreclose options to the President while a failure to issue guidance at this point would give the agencies freedom to develop a U. S. position on their own. Neither of these outcomes would be desirable from the President's viewpoint.

In addition to laying out the skeleton of a U. S. position on MBFR, the NSDM provides for:

-- The transmission of a "sanitized" Evaluation Report to NATO. This was agreed to by Admiral Moorer at the June 11, 1971 VP meeting but his staff have since objected to it on behalf of General Goodpastor. Given Moorer's formal concurrence, we think these staff objections should be ignored.

-- The preparation of a revised Elements paper to transmit the President's position on MBFR to NATO. This paper would hopefully evolve into a statement of the basic Alliance position on MBFR. The alternative approach proposed by State is to let the Allies expand the "criteria" of the Rome Declaration. In our opinion, this would result in a negotiated mess.

-- The preparation of a range of more specific MBFR options for the President's consideration. I will prepare more detailed guidance than is provided by the NSDM.

To maintain our momentum in these MBFR preparations and some substantive guidance on our position, we recommend that you approve the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) on behalf of the President. Given the absence of serious substantive problems or agency disagreements, it is probably not necessary for the President to give much further attention to this NSDM.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) on the U. S. policy for mutual reductions of forces in Europe.

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