

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC MEETING
SALT Compliance
3/5/75 - HAK BOOK

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

March 2, 1975

ETS-HK-ES17a7

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

MORI/CDF Pages 1-2 per C03205598

FROM:

JAN M. LODAL *ML*

SUBJECT:

NSC Meeting on SALT Compliance

I have enclosed both a memo to the President for the Tuesday NSC meeting (Tab A) and a draft of your talking points (Tab B). Both assume that the principal purpose of the meeting is to bring the President up to speed on SALT compliance and head off potential problems growing out of Jackson's hearings.

I have included a brief review of the status of the Geneva negotiations. You may also wish to mention the issue which arose at the Verification Panel of whether to stick with our past position on banning intercontinental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles on ships, seabeds and inland waterways.

In describing and discussing SALT compliance and general SALT verification issues, I suggest you take the following approach:

-- Describe the individual compliance issues, with Colby and Duckett providing the technical details.

-- Describe the Soviet complaints with respect to US compliance with the SALT agreements (Minuteman silo covers, etc.).

-- Discuss the overall problem of adequate verification and the impact of verification on the viability of arms control agreements.


One of the most important results you could achieve at the meeting would be to get everyone in the Administration to agree to take a more realistic approach to verification. We anticipated that compliance ambiguities would arise when the SALT I agreements were negotiated. That is why

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Completed

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the SCC was created -- to deal with such ambiguities. Given the highly technical nature of these agreements, we must expect similar situations to arise in future agreements. We should not permit the possibility of future verification ambiguities, which can be handled so long as there is a measure of good will on both sides, to detract from the advantages to be gained from agreements which have a sound basis and rationale.

This approach is somewhat risky because it openly acknowledges that we cannot write agreements which cover every possible verification ambiguity. Thus, you may not want to take this line at the NSC. If not, I will be happy to revise your talking points accordingly.



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I have included considerable detail in the President's background paper, based on his request for a detailed background paper. If you feel that it is too complicated, I can simplify the discussion somewhat.

I have also enclosed relevant backup materials in the attached briefing book.

ATTENDANCE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

March 4, 1975

Cabinet Room -

Principals

The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Other Attendees

State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
CIA: Deputy Director of Science and Technology Carl Duckett
ACDA: U. S. SCC Commissioner Sidney Graybeal
WH: Donald Rumsfeld
NSC: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Jan Lodal

Following is a summary of the significant developments during the fifth session of the SCC, which was held during the period January 28-February 13.

US Concerns and Soviet Responses

At the opening meeting of the session the US side set forth its concerns with regard to : (a) silo-type launch control facilities; (b) concealment measures; and (c) the definition of MLBMs. At the February 11 meeting, the US raised an additional concern regarding (d) the possible use of an air defense radar in an ABM mode.

-- Silo-type Facilities. The US expressed concern that there are new large silos under construction in the western USSR which US national technical means (NTM) cannot confidently distinguish from ICBM silos. The US side observed that the silos are large enough to hold ICBMs, have headworks which could house needed equipment, and have rapidly-opening doors. The US noted that there are already launch control facilities at these missile sites. During the course of the SCC session, the US stressed that we were not questioning Soviet assertions that the silos are intended for launch control but rather about their potential for use in the future as launchers. The US side advised the Soviets in the opening session that we believed the issue should be resolved by: (a) dismantling or destroying existing launch control facilities at each site within six months after completion of each new silo launch control

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facility; and (b) in the future, equipping such silos with doors or coverings of a type which would preclude the launch of missiles.

The Soviets responded that the silos are intended for missile launch control and that because of their design missiles "cannot be installed" in them. The Soviets asserted that they have clearly defined external features which distinguish them from ICBM launchers. Some of these features were described by the Soviet side (they were the features which we had observed). The Soviets also stated that the US "cannot have any facts concerning the use of these facilities as ICBM launchers since such facts do not exist and in actuality cannot exist." They also observed that the Interim Agreement does not limit the number or nature of launch control facilities, and that this issue was therefore not appropriate for SCC consideration. Finally, with regard to the US proposed solution, they responded that this would be extremely expensive.

-- Concealment Measures. The US indicated that numerous examples of concealment in connection with several Soviet strategic weapons programs had been observed by NTM. Four examples were given--two relating to concealment at ballistic missile test areas, one involving an ABM test center, and one involving the covering of hull sections of ballistic missile submarines. It was stressed that the US was concerned over the expanding pattern of these concealment measures, and it was asserted in the opening statement that the US believed that the Soviet side should "cease" these concealment activities.

The Soviets sought clarification of the examples of concealment at ballistic missiles and ABM test centers. They observed that a "significant portion" of the questions raised by the US in relation to concealment

involves ballistic missile testing, that testing is not included in the provisions of the Interim Agreement, and that such questions therefore should not be considered by the SCC.

Later in the session, without requesting clarification, the Soviets responded to the submarine hull section concealment charge in a way which indicated they had misunderstood our example. We contributed to the misunderstanding by using the term "under construction", (which under the IA does not apply to hull sections not yet in the construction hall.) The example was subsequently clarified by the US side, and Ustinov indicated informally in a humorous vein that between SCC sessions he would send one of his advisors, Captain Kuznetsov, "to the north" to find out what we were referring to. Generally, however, the Soviet defense on concealment matters seemed to be oriented toward interpreting the existing agreements in rather strict legalistic terms, and taking the position that the SCC should not discuss concealment measures which are not very closely tied to the IA or the ABM Treaty.

-- Modern Large Ballistic Missiles. In raising this issue, it was noted that the volume of a new Soviet ICBM (which the US calls the SS-19) is "significantly greater" than the volume of the largest "light" ICBM operational on either side (i. e., the SS-11) within the meaning of the US statement of May 26, 1972. It was stressed that the distinction between "light" and "heavy" ICBM would continue to be important for the agreement the two sides have undertaken to conclude this year. Finally, the Soviets were advised that in the US view any missile with a volume or throw weight greater than the SS-19 must be considered a heavy ICBM.

The Soviets responded initially that this was a complicated question which might require some time for a response, and that it might be discussed either at the next SCC session or within the framework of SALT. Subsequently, the Soviet position within the SCC was brought into step with their position in SALT: the IA applies to launchers rather than missiles; the agreed approach to preventing the conversion of launchers for light missiles to launchers for heavy missiles involves limitations on the dimensions of the launchers; and no definition of heavy ICBMs is needed. There was little formal discussion of this subject at subsequent meetings of the SCC, and it seems clear that this issue will have to be worked out mainly in SALT rather than in the SCC.

-- Air Defense Radar. In raising this issue, the US advised the Soviets that our NTM indicated the possibility that an SA-5 air defense radar at Sary Shagan was being tested in an ABM mode and requested clarification at the next SCC session. There was no further substantive discussion of this subject during the January-February session.

Soviet Concerns

During the course of the session the Soviet side expressed its concern regarding: (a) the confidentiality of SCC proceedings; (b) shelters over ICBM and ABM launchers; and (c) the status of 177 inactive Atlas and Titan ICBM launchers. In addition, the Soviet side offered a proposal for working out an understanding within the framework of the SCC clarifying the procedures for notification of ballistic missiles launches as required by the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USSR and the US.

Confidentiality. In their opening statement at the first meeting of the session, the Soviets leveled a fairly strong charge at the US for failure to maintain the confidentiality of SCC proceedings -- referring specifically to a Voice of America broadcast, an article in the trade journal Aviation Week, and (incorrectly) to a statement by the State Department press spokesman. The Soviet concern over the confidentiality issue was raised on several subsequent occasions in private conversations. These included repeated references to the Nitze article in Foreign Policy, which apparently has generated considerable bitterness in Moscow, and to press coverage of more recent Nitze speeches, etc.

-- Atlas and Titan I ICBM Launchers. In what appeared to be a charge designed to counter the US-raised issue regarding silo-type launch control facilities, the Soviets requested clarification of the status of 177 inactive Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers. They pointed out that only a small amount of dismantling work had been undertaken on these launchers, and that their reactivation time might be substantially less than that required for new construction. They noted that "a simple declaration of US intentions concerning the silos" would be adequate to dispel their concern, perhaps seeking to set the stage for disposing of the silo launch facilities issue through a similar declaration by the Soviets.

-- Concealment. Again, apparently seeking some balance, the Soviets expressed concern regarding shelters over Minuteman launchers at Warren AFB, shelters over ABM launchers at Grand Forks, and the covering of

US ballistic missile submarines undergoing conversion (for Poseidon deployment). We responded during this session to only one of these--Minuteman shelters-- indicating that the US would consider modifying this practice in the context of an acceptable resolution of US concerns. The Soviets asserted repeatedly in their formal statements that they had received official US assurance on two occasions that the use of the shelters over Minuteman silos would be discontinued.

Measures Agreement. The Soviets indirectly responded to the US complaint at the previous SCC session about their runaway SS-9 launch by suggesting that the two sides should resolve an ambiguity in Article IV of the Agreement on Measures. They proposed that there should be notification in advance about a planned missile launch beyond national territory in the direction of the continental part of the other side's territory and there should be immediate notification if this situation occurred unexpectedly as a result of an unsuccessful launch. They argued that a greater uncertainty would be created by a missile flying toward the continental portion of either country than by a missile flying "for example, in the direction of some individual island" -- an obvious reference to Midway in the case of the SS-9. They noted that since the missile in question had not been equipped with a nuclear warhead, and had not flown in the direction of the continental US, they had not

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regarded the incident to be subject to the provisions of the Agreement on Measures. They stated that, with regard to the hazard to aircraft and shipping entailed in such launches, a similar hazard is created by the impact of missile fragments in international waters after unsuccessful missile launches from US test ranges.

Where Things Stand

During the January-February session, neither side offered any real concessions (apart from our indication of willingness to modify our Minuteman shelter practice). Moreover, the initial Soviet tendency was to scrutinize US concerns in a rather narrow, legalistic manner and to try to dismiss those not directly related to the provisions of the IA or the ABM Treaty. The US side stressed the need for each side to give serious consideration to any concerns of the other side. It is too soon, however, to know whether this approach will elicit any sort of favorable response during the next session; if the Soviets persist in the approach taken in the past session, the March-April session could be unproductive in the extreme.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION
February 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JAN M. LODAL *mal*
HELMUT SONNENFELDT *HS*

SUBJECT: US Assurances on Removal of ICBM
Construction Shelters

We have obtained additional information on Soviet claims in the SCC regarding "official assurances" that the use of silo covers at Warren and Grand Forks would cease. Mr. Karpov, the Deputy Commissioner of the Soviet SCC and a member of the Soviet SALT Delegation, told Graybeal in a private, informal conversation that the Soviets on three separate occasions had received assurances regarding US shelters. Karpov indicated that the assurances had not come from President Nixon or President Ford, but from you, and that they were subsequently followed-up by General Scowcroft. Furthermore, Ustinov indicated in a formal statement that the three occasions on which assurances had been given took place in 1973 and in June 1974.

We examined the correspondence and the memoranda of conversation regarding compliance issues during this period; we found no record of any note to the Soviets in which the US gave assurances on removing the silo covers. The memorandum of conversation at Tab A was the only evidence we could find where US comments might be interpreted by the Soviets as assurances. However, the date of this meeting does not correspond to the dates mentioned by Ustinov. In addition, there was no record of action on this matter by Brent Scowcroft, and he does not remember taking any action.

In reviewing the record on this, we did find two notes which were drafted that could have been interpreted by the Soviets as assurances that the US would remove the covers had they been sent. However, our records indicate that they were never sent.

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Our most recent statements on this issue occurred at the recently concluded session of the SCC. Graybeal emphasized that, in the context of arrangements to eliminate other compliance ambiguities, the US will be prepared to modify its use of these shelters. In direct response to the Soviet claims of "official assurances", Graybeal explained that the US was unaware of any such assurances and that there must have been "some misunderstanding or misinterpretation in this regard". This response was in conformance with your decision in our earlier memo to you on this subject (Tab B).

In summary, while we can find no "assurances" other than your March 1974 comments, the Soviets apparently feel that there can be no misinterpretation that assurances were given. Thus, we need your decision on how to proceed. We could, for example:

- Have Alex or some other member of the US SALT Delegation raise the issue with Karpov, who is with the Soviet Delegation in Geneva, to seek further clarification of the Soviet record on this issue.

- Take up the issue in your channels.

- Have Graybeal in the next session of the SCC continue to deny that such assurances were given.

- Ignore the Soviet claim on prior assurances and hope the issue is resolved in the next SCC, or that they will stop talking about it.

In either case, we would continue to link removal of the Minuteman shelters to satisfactory resolution of the compliance ambiguities of concern to the US.

This issue could be explosive. DOD knows of the formal Soviet statements regarding the assurances, and could leak the information to Jackson, who will charge "secret agreements". At this stage, it looks to us as if the Soviets are reading more into this issue than they really have. However, because this issue is so explosive, we believe that you should either take up the issue in your channel, or have Alex follow-up the issue in Geneva to find out more precisely what record the Soviets have of US assurances.

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YOUR DECISION

- Raise the issue with Karpov in Geneva.
- Handle in your channel.
- Have Graybeal deny assurances at the next session of the SCC.
- Ignore Soviet claim on prior assurances.

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Tab A

Brezhnev/Kissinger

Moscow

March 27, 1974

5:50-9:10 p.m.

Brezhnev:

In fact, Dr. Kissinger, I can tell you our military men have certain fears about a violation of the agreement, as far as widening of silos is concerned, to house new-type rockets. You know what those fears are based on? The fact that in the United States about 500 land-based launchers have been covered up. And we made two representations about that.

Kissinger: But we have stopped that.

Brezhnev: That is still going on.

Kissinger: That is impossible.

Brezhnev: That introduces certain questions. It is not something I really wanted to mention but it is a fact. Let us act in good faith.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I have to check this, but we ordered it stopped, and if it is not stopped, it violates orders.

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URGENT ACTION
January 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JAN M. LODAL */wjl*

SUBJECT: U.S. Shelters

In today's SCC session (Thursday), the Soviets claimed that the US had given assurances that the use of silo covers at Warren and Grand Forks would cease. In a private conversation which followed Ustinov's formal statement (Tab A), Karpov further indicated that the US assurances were given "at the highest level" and were made "prior to the Ford-Brezhnev meeting", i. e., that they were made by President Nixon.

I am not familiar with any assurances regarding US silo covers and a quick review of available minutes from past meetings with the Soviets reveals no instances of such assurances. If there have been none, we can instruct Graybeal to deny that assurances were given and to continue with the discussion of compliance ambiguities.

However, if assurances were given, or of instances where US statements may have been misinterpreted as assurances, we probably would wish to take a different approach. We could instruct Graybeal either:

-- To indicate that earlier US statements on this subject might have been misinterpreted, but that no assurances were intended. Nevertheless, the US is willing to consider modifying its use of shelters in the context of an otherwise acceptable agreement on concealment activities.

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-- To continue to maintain that he personally has no knowledge of such assurances.

YOUR DECISION

- Have Graybeal deny assurances.
- Claim misunderstanding, but hold open possibility of removal.
- Have Graybeal maintain that he has no knowledge of assurances.
- Other.

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