

*Minutes attached*

*Indochina  
of Libya*

*[S-H-E-403a]*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

JCS review completed pages 14-31

April 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY  
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

DIA review completed pages 11-13

SUBJECT: WSAG MEETING - Indochina -  
Monday, April 16, 1973

USAF, DOS, OSD, JCS review(s) completed pages 1-10

The purpose of the meeting is to review the situation and to focus on continued serious DRV violations of the agreement. You want to impress on the group the President's impatience. You will want to outline steps we should take now to impress on the DRV that we will not tolerate continued blatant violations. You may want to advise the group that mine clearing operations have been suspended and the JEC talks held off until at least Thursday.

You will want to cover:

State Dept. reviewed & denied release pages 14-31

1. South Vietnam - The situation and possible responses.

- Air attack on Khe Sanh
- GVN relief on Tonle Cham
- GVN escort on Mekong

2. Cambodia - The situation and possible responses.

- Increased U. S. air support
- ARVN cross-border operations
- Speed up in MAP deliveries
- U. S. and Thai airlift
- Strengthened U. S. missions

3. Laos - The situation and possible responses.

- U. S. air support if requested

[Redacted]

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4. Reconnaissance flights over DRV (ROE)

5. ICCS

6. Two-Party Commission and Four Party Team.

7. Summary of Actions Required

NSS review completed.

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1. South Vietnam

25X1 [The Communists continue to build SAM sites around Khe Sanh and to extend the runway, with about 4,200 feet now usable. 25X1  
 Apparently, they intend Khe Sanh to become a major base. There are tenuous indications that some NVA units may be moving back to North Vietnam from South Vietnam and Northern Laos. The [ ] NVA Division moved to North Vietnam from Quang Tri earlier this year. Now some units of the [ ] may also have been withdrawn. Both suffered heavily in earlier fighting. The [ ] 25X1  
 may also have returned from Northern Laos. Forces in Northern South Vietnam, however, are still at least equal in numbers to those there at the beginning of last Spring's offensive and the numbers of tanks and artillery in South Vietnam exceed last year's level.] (Tab A)

-- Ask Mr. Schlesinger to brief.

-- How certain are we that units of the [ ] Divisions 25X1  
 have left South Vietnam? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger)

- . What does this movement mean for NVA strength in SVN and for the relative capabilities of the two sides?
- . Do we interpret this move as evidence of compliance with the Agreement, or as merely reflecting a military need to refit and recuperate?

-- How many of the SAM sites around Khe Sanh are occupied? What is the total AA strength in the area? (There are 4 bns. of SA-2s in 10 sites and 860 AA guns in Quang Tri Province.) (Ask Admiral Moorer)

- . Do we know whether this is limited to the Khe Sanh area, or do the Communists appear to be progressively extending the SAM envelope?

Possible GVN/US Response

- . Can the VNAF operate effectively within the SAM-protected area?
- . Can the VNAF destroy the SAM sites by itself?
- . What can U. S. air do?

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- There has been a recent flare-up of fighting near Kontum. Do you believe this presages more significant actions, or is it only a temporary local high point? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger.)
- The situation at Tonle Cham seems to have stabilized. Do we anticipate renewed enemy attacks? (Ask Admiral Moorer and Mr. Schlesinger)
- How serious is the threat in the Hong Ngu area?

Possible GVN and U. S. Responses

- What is the status of ARVN plans for a relief operation?
- Is ARVN making any serious attempt to clear the banks of the Mekong so the supply convoys can get through to Phnom Penh? (Ask Admiral Moorer)
- The ARVN 9th Division has been attacking close to and across the Cambodian border.

Possible U. S. /GVN Response

- Would large cross-border operation perhaps capture or destroy sizable enemy supply dumps?
  - . What would be the likely enemy reaction?
  - . Would such ARVN operations be likely to relieve pressure on communications to Phnom Penh?
- Would increased B-52 attacks in the Cambodia areas close to the Cambodian border with SVN be an effective help?

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2. Cambodia

[Though the Khmer Insurgents are not believed to be strong enough to take Phnom Penh, they apparently intend to conduct attacks near and within the capital to further weaken the government. In addition, the Communists continue to attempt to cut all lines of communication into the capital. Most worrisome is reported movement of NVA anti-aircraft units from southern Laos into Cambodia.]

[Sihanouk's visit to Cambodia has further moved the political initiative into Communist hands, while in Phnom Penh Lon Nol's resignation from the government has not produced any discernible improvement. (The PRC and Hanoi have reiterated their strong support for Sihanouk.)]

- Ask General Haig to brief on the political situation in Phnom Penh.
- Are there actions we should take to bolster the Lon Nol government?
- Is there any likelihood of a coup? What would such a change mean for the war and for our interests? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger and General Haig)
- Possible Cambodian/U.S. responses.
- Will the FANK be able to repulse Communist attacks in and near Phnom Penh? (Ask Admiral Moorer.)
- Is FANK making any progress in opening the highways and clearing the river banks?
  - . Can we get the GVN to open the Mekong and protect convoys? (We believe this must be done.)
  - . Would such operations impact adversely on the ceasefire? (Ask Ambassador Porter)
- Is our bombing effective? Is it sufficient? (We believe it should be stepped up.)
- . Do we have adequate information on targets?
  - . Are we attacking the NVA AAA units moving into Cambodia? (We should do so without delay.)
- Would FANK be helped by sizable ARVN cross-border operations? (Ask Admiral Moorer) (We think it would.)

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- . Would a dramatic delivery of more military equipment be psychologically helpful? (Defense is prepared to move quickly to provide 2 assault boats, 15 M-48 tanks and 5 APCs which General Haig offered to Lon Nol.)
- We need to keep up the airlift of supplies to Phnom Penh and get the Thai to participate. (Task Defense and State)
- How can we strengthen our mission in Phnom Penh?
  - . Can we get the personnel ceiling raised? (Ask State and Defense.)
- Phnom Penh needs an auxiliary source of power. Can AID provide one quickly?

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3. Laos

[The Pathet Lao are dragging their feet in the current negotiations, probably intending to frustrate Souvanna into softening his terms and because they believe that time favors the Communist side. Militarily the situation remains relatively quiet, likely because the Communists do not wish to give cause for a resumption of U. S. bombing in Laos. But the LPF have proposed a line demarcating areas of control which represent a massive land grab and would turn over to the LPF or put under direct threat important bases and real estate of the RLG.]

- Ask Ambassador Sullivan to summarize the negotiations.
- What are the prospects for successfully forming the Provisional Government?
- Do we expect indefinite Communist delays, or do they have a specific goal after attaining which they would conclude the agreement?
- Will Souvanna hold firm? (Ask Ambassador Sullivan)
- Will the Laotians be able to maintain their military position? (Ask Admiral Moorer and Mr. Schlesinger.)
  - . Are there likely to be attacks on Sala Phou Koun? (Some defectors reported such plans.
  - . Will the friendly forces around Tha Viang be able to hold?

Possible U. S. Responses

- If fighting should increase, will our air support be essential?
- . Are we prepared to provide it? (Ask Admiral Moorer)

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- . Will we have to do some recruiting? (Ask Mr. Schlesinger)

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4. Reconnaissance (SR-71) flights over the DRV.

The President has ordered two flights this week. The first may go tonight Washington time.

--- Ask Admiral Moorer (He is prepared)

-- To describe the track which will be flown

-- To discuss the Rules of Engagement

-- We will need a public position to answer press queries.  
(Ask Ambassador Porter).

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6. The Two-Party and Four-Party Commissions

a. Two-Party Commission

[GVN-PRG discussions center on attacks around Tonle Cham. Progress is stymied while the PRG insists on a meeting of the local commanders only (a communist general and an ARVN major), while the GVN holds out for the commanders and a colonel on each side.]

- Is there any prospect of progress in the Two-Party Commission?  
(Ask Ambassador Porter.)
- Is the GVN position reasonable, or are they trying to block agreement?
- Can we bring additional pressure on the PRG to get the Commission operating meaningfully?

b. Four-Party Team

[The DRV-PRG have emphasized the need for agreement on principles governing repatriation of remains and have said the Team "must be prepared to work for years." We have acknowledged the need for operational procedures for contested areas, but hope for speedy action in areas clearly controlled by the PRC/DRV. The DRV deputy chief has taken our proposals to Hanoi. The DRV may reply at the next meeting on April 17.]

- Are the communists being cooperative so far in the Four-Party Team? (Ask Ambassador Sullivan.)
- What do we anticipate their attitudes will be?
- What kinds of pressures could make them more cooperative?  
(Ask Ambassador Porter.)

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7. Summary of Actions Required

- Preparation of plans for VNAF or US/VNAF air attack on the South (Defense/JCS)
- ARVN clearing actions on the Mekong (State/Defense to Embassy/DAO)
- ARVN country escort on Mekong (State/Defense)
- ARVN cross-border operation planning (State/Defense to Embassy/DAO)
- Increased B-52 and tac air in Cambodia (Defense/JCS)
- Increased B-52 attacks inside Cambodia border with SVN (Defense/JCS)
- Air attacks on NVA AAA units in Cambodia
- Airlift to Phnom Penh (Defense)
- Thai airlift to Phnom Penh (State/Defense)
- Expedite MAP deliveries to Cambodia (Defense)
- Generating equipment for Phnom Penh (State-AID)
- Ceiling relief for Embassy Phnom Penh (State)
- Plans for air support in Laos if requested and related PR plans (Defense/JCS/State)

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[Redacted] to withdraw (Defense/CIA/State)

- PR Plan for SR-71 flights (State)

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April 14, 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Communist Violations of the Vietnam  
and Laos Agreements

Attached at Tab A is the CIA/DIA weekly report, dated April 13, on Communist violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements. Among the report's most significant findings are the following items: Only two small groups of specialists started South during the last week. Two other small groups were also detected for the first time in the pipeline. A high level of North Vietnamese logistics activity continues. Vehicle traffic increased in Quang Tri and over the passes into Laos. Tenuous evidence also suggests that at least some elements of two NVA divisions (304 and 312) in northern MR-1 may be returning to adjacent areas of North Vietnam. However, even if all elements of these units departed, the NVA would retain a force structure in MR-1 similar to what existed on the eve of the 1972 Easter offensive. Communist initiated combat incidents remained at a moderate level in the South but rose significantly in Laos.

Highlights of the details are summarized below.

North Vietnamese Personnel Movements

-- During the reporting period, the initial detection of four small special purpose groups in the pipeline does not significantly affect our total estimate of 35,000 North Vietnamese personnel who were either in the pipeline January 23 or started South since that date. No new combat replacement personnel have started South in the past month and fewer special purpose groups have been detected starting South, thus indicating that infiltration of both categories may be drawing to a close as the rainy season approaches.

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-- The evidence indicating the redeployment of some element of two NVA divisions to southern North Vietnam is tenuous. We do not know whether the change reflects a permanent move or a temporary rest and refitting period before rotating back into the South.

-- A total of ten SAM-2 missile sites have now been established near Khe Sanh (four of their sites are occupied). Two NVA AAA regiments are relocating from Quang Tri to the southern Laos/Cambodian border area. The headquarters element of an NVA armored regiment has moved from the Hanoi area to a point north of Loc Ninh on the MR-3/Cambodian border.

Movement of Supplies

-- Heavy Communist logistics movements continued during the past week, particularly in Quang Tri Province where supplies are being moved into forward areas. Traffic moving South over the passes out of North Vietnam increased slightly. The heaviest NVA truck traffic in southern Laos occurred in areas adjacent to Quang Tri and A Shau Valley.

-- Specific instances of logistics activity inside South Vietnam included:

- On Route 9 in northern Quang Tri Province, 334 vehicles were noted between April 6-10.
- On April 10, 31 x 57 mm AAA pieces were observed parked on Route 616 near Khe Sanh.
- Forty-one buses were observed parked along Route 1 north of Quang Tri City on April 8.
- One hundred thirty southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1033 in the western DMZ between April 6-12.

-- In southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, the following activities, among others, were noted:

- On Route 99 in the central Lao panhandle, 329 vehicles were observed between April 6-10.
- In the period 6-12 April, 322 vehicles were detected moving South through the Ban Karai Pass.

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Combat Activity

-- In South Vietnam, ARVN reported a total of 88 major and 597 minor Communist initiated cease-fire violations, in contrast to 122 and 597 incidents respectively during the previous period. These incidents included 6 major ground attacks, and the downing of 3 helicopters (two with ICCS markings).

-- In Laos, NVA forces launched heavy, sustained attacks, supported by tanks against RLG units defending the Route 4 corridor southeast of the Plaine des Jarres.

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