

DOS REVIEWED 23-May-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 29, 1969

REFER TO DOS

OSD REVIEWED 17-May-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

National Security Study Memorandum 60

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Director of Central Intelligence  
              The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT:     United States Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France

Pursuant to the findings of the Review Group on the short-term U.S. policy toward post-De Gaulle France (National Security Study Memorandum 55), on May 22, 1969, the President has directed the preparation of a more comprehensive review of U. S. policy towards France. This study should set forth the possible alternative courses for U.S. policy in light of the probable course of political and policy developments in France.

Other studies pertaining to U.S. policy toward France should be incorporated into an overall review of the various aspects and options. Consequently, the study requested under NSSM 47, "Military Relations with France," will constitute a separate section to be prepared in a smaller group and reported directly to the Review Group. As previously agreed, the franc-monetary issues paper will be handled in like manner.

The study of the political issues in U.S. relations with France should take into consideration the possible course of events in France, the relationship thereto of U.S. interests and objectives, and the various options open to the U.S. More specifically, the study should concentrate upon alternatives regarding (1) the developments in French NATO policy; (2) the French attitude and policy toward European unity and the British entry into the Common Market; and (3) any other important developments such as French policy on Vietnam, Africa, the Middle East and the Four-Power Talks.

*Attached + Memo from Samenfeldt for HAK, 20 Jan. 1970. J*


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The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe perform this study. Additional members from agencies and departments not normally represented on the NSC IG/EUR may be added for the purpose of this study at the discretion of the Chairman.

The completed study, as well as the separate sections on monetary problems and military relations, should be submitted to the NSC Review Group on August 1, 1969.

Pending consideration by the National Security Council on United States policy toward France, at the conclusion of this overall integrated review, the President has directed that all parts of the Executive Branch shall be guided by the findings of the study requested in NSSM 55, as indicated in NSDM 14.



Henry A. Kissinger

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 8, 1969

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National Security Study Memorandum 65

TO: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Relationships Among Strategic and Theater Forces  
for NATO

As a result of National Security Council discussion of the U.S. strategic posture, prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums 3 and 24, the President has directed that you prepare a follow-on study to analyze the relationship among U.S. strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional postures in deterring and, if necessary, coping with both conventional and nuclear aggression against NATO. The analysis should be based on scenarios for both large-scale and limited aggression.

It should address the following questions:

1. What capabilities are required if U.S. strategic forces are to contribute to the deterrence of strategic, tactical nuclear and conventional attacks on our Allies and to coping with such attacks if deterrence fails?
2. What capabilities are required if tactical nuclear forces are to (a) contribute to the deterrence of conventional attacks on Allies and of attacks involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and (b) cope with such attacks if deterrence fails?
3. Under what types of circumstances and how might U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces be employed in improving war outcomes?
4. What command and control systems and procedures are required to give the President the force employment options described in the answer to question 3?
5. What changes or improvements, if any, seem indicated for our program


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6. Based on the analysis, what modifications or additions, if any, should be made to the criteria for strategic nuclear sufficiency?

The study report should be prepared and submitted to the NSC Review Group by the Secretary of Defense by October 1, 1969. Close liaison should be maintained in all phases of the study with the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The analysis should draw as much as possible on the results of the study completed under NSSM-3.



cc: The Secretary of State  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence