

*orig ret'd to
F Chapin for
dating + dispatches -
4-21-70*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD, NSS, Review
Complete

SUBJECT: Covert Operations in North Vietnam

I appreciate your memorandum of 8 April 1970, subject as above, in response to my memorandum of 5 March 1970.

I agree that these operations properly should be approved and monitored in the 40 Committee and that monthly status reports on these activities are not necessary.

I will distribute copies of your memorandum and attachment to the other principals of the 40 Committee in order that it may be scheduled for consideration at an early Committee meeting.

signed

Henry A. Kissinger

HAK:FChapin:etd
4/16/70

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ACTION

16 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Frank Chapin

SUBJECT: Covert Operations in North Vietnam

At Tab A is a memorandum to Dave Packard which Al Haig asked me to prepare for your signature.

At Tab B are two memoranda on which you indicated your intention of taking the action which you are informing Mr. Packard you will take.

At Tab C is Mr. Packard's memorandum and attachment.

At Tab D is your memorandum of 5 March 1970 addressed to the Secretary of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum to Mr. Packard at Tab A, after which I will distribute copies of his memorandum to the other 40 Committee principals and schedule it as an agenda item for an early Committee meeting.

Attachments
Tabs A - D

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copy sent to F. Chapin
4-21-70

Envelope Sent to

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Frank Chapin

Frank please
discuss this with
Hollidge so he is
aware of how there will
be handled. Please
do reply for Kerk's
reg to Packard.

Hollidge read this material
on 4/14/70 FRC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Covert Operations in North Vietnam

Attached at Tab A is DOD's initial response to the requirement for a monthly report on efforts to identify targets and to develop plans for covert operations in the area of North Vietnam not assigned to CIA (Tab B). Although DOD has rejected CIA's suggestion for assaults on four coastal targets by cross-beach operations, the pot has obviously been stirred and Defense has promised a fuller report in the next few weeks.

In his memorandum, Deputy Secretary Packard recommends that these matters be taken up in the 40 Committee on a case basis, and that the requirement for a monthly report be dropped. I believe that the 40 Committee is the proper forum for systematic consideration of these operations in light of their sensitivity, broad implications, and the interagency cooperation necessary.

The memorandum for the President summarizing the Packard report (Tab A) recommends that efforts related to these operations be monitored by the 40 Committee and that the requirement for a monthly progress report be deleted. You may, however, want to discuss this matter first with Director Helms as a matter of courtesy and to insure that moving these operations to the 40 Committee will not cause serious problems for CIA.

See Helms first before putting on 40 Committee agenda and forwarding attached memo to the President.

Yes No

Attachments

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*Let's just consider
means approval.
He won't be able to do it H.*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

SUBJECT: Covert Operations in North Vietnam

Attached is a progress report from Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard on efforts to identify targets and to develop plans for covert operations in the area of North Vietnam not assigned to CIA. This initial report focuses on covert maritime capabilities and indicates that:

- Four fast patrol boats are available for collection of intelligence, interdiction of shipping, fire attacks on coastal targets, landing 15-man action teams, and intercept and indoctrination of North Vietnamese fishermen.
- Four coastal targets previously identified by CIA are not considered accessible from the beach within acceptable risk factors, primarily due to population density. However, other methods of attacking these targets are under consideration.
- The most lucrative operation appears to be a psychological program directed against North Vietnamese fishermen. Under this concept, North Vietnamese fishing boats would be intercepted by patrol boats and given the impression that a dissident North Vietnamese organization opposing the existing political regime was operating in the area.

Both this report and the one from Director Helms which I recently forwarded to you indicate that efforts are being made to revitalize our capabilities to conduct covert operations against North Vietnam.

In his memorandum Deputy Secretary Packard recommends that all efforts related to covert operations in North Vietnam be monitored by the 40 (previously 303) Committee, which presently evaluates other missions of high sensitivity. Due to the sensitivity of these operations, their far-reaching

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implications, and the fact that both CIA and Defense are involved, I believe that the 40 Committee is the proper place to consider such operations. He also recommends that reports be made on a case basis rather than at monthly intervals. I concur that it will be unnecessary to require a periodic progress report as long as activities are reviewed in the 40 Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That covert operations in North Vietnam be monitored by the 40 Committee and that the requirement for monthly status reports be rescinded.

Approve *F. Joe R. W.* Disapprove _____

I will, of course, keep you informed of progress being made and significant developments.

Attachment

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