

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ EYES ONLY
1971 JUL 5 20

25X1

71 JUL 5 PM 4:59
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
25X1

VZCZCDSI939

1595 1862000

ZNY MNNSH
O 051946Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
ZEN
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
WH12603
DELIVER OOB JULY 6, 1971
TO: DAVID HALPERIN FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
SIT TO-35



25X1

IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT, STORIES HAVE BROKEN IN TEL AVIV TO THE EFFECT THAT A REQUEST FROM SISCO TO VISIT ISRAEL HAS BEEN RECEIVED WITH A DISTINCT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. STORIES ALSO SUGGEST THAT RABIN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO ASK STATE TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO A SISCO VISIT. CONCURRENTLY RABIN CALLED ME AND STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE MORE SUITABLE AND GIVE BOTH SIDES BETTER CONTROL IF WE WERE TO ASK ABBA EBAN TO VISIT WASHINGTON TO EXPLORE WITH STATE THE DETAILS OF ISRAELI POSITION ON THE INTERIM CANAL PROPOSAL. I THANKED RABIN BUT INTEND TO TAKE NO ACTION ON THIS UNLESS EVENTS SUGGEST WE NEED AN URGENT FALLBACK IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE OTHER COURSE OF ACTION. AT THE PRESENT TIME I BELIEVE THE SITUATION IS WELL UNDER CONTROL AND THAT IT CAN BE MANAGED WITHOUT THE EBAN ALTERNATIVE. YOU MIGHT WISH TO GIVE ME YOUR VIEWS THE EBAN VISIT AS AN ALTERNATIVE.

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN OUR DCM IN PARIS, PERRY CULLEY, AND THE SOVIET DCM DATED 2 JULY WHICH GENERAL WALTERS FORWARDED TO ME.

"USSR MINISTER OBEREMKO ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON FOR 11 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ZORIN HAS ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY TO SEE ME TO SAY THAT THE USSR SUPPORTS MADAME BINH'S PROPOSALS AT YESTERDAY'S TALKS. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDER HER 7-POINT PROPOSAL AS A SIGN OF GOOD WILL AND AN INDICATION THAT THE DRV IS READY TO CONDUCT SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO A PEACE. MINISTER OBEREMKO SAID THAT IT IS THE RUSSIAN VIEW THAT THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. HE SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE THAT THE INITIAL REACTION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT NEGATIVE AND ALSO THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERED THERE WERE POSITIVE ASPECTS TO THE PROPOSALS. I ALSO POINTED OUT WE SAW SOME UNACCEPTABLE ASPECTS.

"OBEREMKO SAID THAT HE AND THE AMBASSADOR COULD NOT ELABORATE ON THE PROPOSALS. HE SIMPLY WANTED US TO KNOW THAT THE USSR THINKS THAT THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND THAT WE HAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE PEACE IN VIETNAM.

"MINISTER OBEREMKO ASKED THAT I PASS THE USSR VIEWS ALONG TO THE DELEGATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE." SIGNED: CULLEY.

State Dept. review completed

700
1595

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ EYES ONLY

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

NNNN

MORI/CDF per C05147540

LTS-HK-963744BJ

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY



July 5, 1971


25X1

DELIVER OOB July 6, 1971

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. 

SIT 70-35



25X1

In another development, stories have broken in Tel Aviv to the effect that a request from Sisco to visit Israel has been received with a distinct lack of enthusiasm by the Israeli government. Stories also suggest that Rabin has been instructed by his government to ask State to consider alternative arrangements to a Sisco visit. Concurrently Rabin called me and stated that his government believed it might be more suitable and give both sides better control if we were to ask Abba Eban to visit Washington to explore with State the details of Israeli position on the interim Canal proposal. I thanked Rabin but intend to take no action on this unless events suggest we need an urgent fallback in order to prevent the other course of action. At the present time I

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

- 2 -

believe the situation is well under control and that it can be managed without the Eban alternative. You might wish to give me your views the Eban visit as an alternative.

There follows the text of a memorandum of conversation between our DCM in Paris, Perry Culley, and the Soviet DCM dated 2 July which General Walters forwarded to me.

"USSR Minister Oberemko asked for an appointment yesterday afternoon for 11 o'clock this morning. He said that Ambassador Zorin has asked him specifically to see me to say that the USSR supports Madame Binh's proposals at yesterday's talks. He said that the Soviets consider her 7-point proposal as a sign of good will and an indication that the DRV is ready to conduct serious discussions leading to a peace. Minister Oberemko said that it is the Russian view that these proposals should be taken seriously. He said he was delighted to see that the initial reaction of the State Department was not negative and also that the Department considered there were positive aspects to the proposals. I also pointed out we saw some unacceptable aspects.

"Oberemko said that he and the Ambassador could not elaborate on the proposals. He simply wanted us to know that

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

- 3 -

the USSR thinks that they should be taken seriously and
that we have a good opportunity to secure peace in Vietnam.

"Minister Oberemko asked that I pass the USSR views
along to the Delegation and the Department of State." Signed:
Culley.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY