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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 151130Z NOV 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0271 FLASH
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REFS: A) WHS 2244; B) WHS 2247
DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. I FINALLY SAW THIEU AT 1800 TODAY AND DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO HIM. HE READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY, MADE NOTES AS HE WENT ALONG, BUT OFFERED NO COMMENT.
2. I THEN SAID THAT I HAD RECEIVED THE DRAFT OF THE CHANGES WE WILL SEEK TO GET FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AT THE MEETINGS NEXT WEEK; THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO OBTAIN THESE CONCESSIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN GET THEM ALL; THEY ARE PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE SOME FIFTEEN CHANGES IN THE DRAFT INCORPORATING OUR NEW PROPOSALS AND PROPOSED THAT A TASK FORCE ON OUR SIDE MEET WITH A TASK FORCE TO BE DESIGNATED BY HIM TO GO OVER THESE CHANGES IN DETAIL. I STRESSED THE ABSOLUTE URGENCY OF DOING THIS WITHOUT DELAY IN VIEW OF THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT MEETING ON NOVEMBER 20. I PROPOSED THAT WE MEET TOMORROW MORNING; ON OUR SIDE WE WOULD HAVE AMBASSADOR WHITEHOUSE, MR. BENNETT, AND MYSELF.
3. I GAVE THIEU A COPY OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND OFFERED TO GO OVER WITH HIM THE CHANGES WE PROPOSE TO SUBMIT CONCERNING HIS THREE MAJOR CONCERNS: A) OBSERVANCE OF THE DMZ; B) WITHDRAWAL OF NVA TROOPS TO NORTH VIETNAM; AND C) THE COMPOSITION AND ROLE OF THE KCRC. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO STUDY THE DRAFT OVERNIGHT AND CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF IT TOMORROW.
4. I SAID THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS POINTED OUT, WHAT WE DO SHOULD THE ENEMY RENEW ITS AGGRESSION IS FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT WE SAY IN THE AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED ME TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION FOR THE GVN IS OUR ABILITY TO ENFORCE AND PROTECT THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF OUR FIRM INTENTION TO DO SO. THIS MEANS THAT IF THE AGREEMENT IS NOT OBSERVED, THAT IF THE CEASEFIRE IS VIOLATED, WE WILL REACT PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN.

DOS Review Completed.

5. I RECALLED THAT GENERAL HAIG HAD GIVEN NHA A DRAFT PROTOCOL ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CONTROL AND SUPERVISION AND THAT WE HAVE SINCE RECEIVED A DRAFT PROTOCOL COVERING THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION. WE WILL ALSO GO OVER THESE WITH HIS TASK FORCE, BUT BELIEVE THAT THE PROTOCOLS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED BY OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN PARIS, SINCE WE CONSIDER THE KLEBER FORUM AS THE ONLY AVAILABLE PLACE FOR FOUR PARTY DISCUSSIONS.

6. THESE WILL BE NEEDED TO DEVELOP AGREEMENT WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON THE PROTOCOLS. WE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT HE WILL AUTHORIZE HIS DELEGATION IN PARIS TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT PROTOCOLS WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BEGIN DISCUSSIONS PROMPTLY.

7. THIEU EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT WHETHER THE GVN HAD ADEQUATE STAFF IN PARIS TO UNDERTAKE THIS. I REPLIED THAT THE PROTOCOLS WERE QUITE SIMPLE AND I THOUGHT THEY WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN HANDLING THIS WITH OUR DELEGATION.

8. THIEU SAID THAT NHA WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME IN THE MORNING TO SET UP THE TASK FORCE MEETINGS AND I SHALL BE REPORTING PROMPTLY.

9. WARM REGARDS.

BCOPJMRAY

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