

**EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY**

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TOP SECRET 282130Z OCT 72 SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY  
VIA BUNKER CHANNELS

1972 OCT 28 PM 7 27  
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FROM: HENRY A. VISSINGER  
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER  
CITE: WNS2803

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

DOS, ARMY reviews completed.

OCTOBER 28, 1972

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER

FROM: HENRY A. VISSINGER

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR SAIGON 0239. WE UNDERSTAND THIEU'S NATURAL CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO ENEMY'S INTENTIONS AND ARE NOT MOTIVATED HERE BY ANY NAIVETE WITH RESPECT TO THEIR TREACHERY. IN MANY RESPECTS IT WOULD BE UNNATURAL AND MORE DISCOMFORTING WERE THESE MANIFESTATIONS NOT EVIDENT



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2. WITH RESPECT TO REPORTS EMANATING FROM HANOI ABOUT ESTABLISHED DATES FOR BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT, DISCUSSIONS ON SPECIFIC DEADLINES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE DRV WERE ALWAYS HYPOTHETICAL. SOME OF THE DATES WHICH THE DRV CITED ARE WRONG. IN ANY EVENT THE HYPOTHETICAL CHARACTER OF THESE DISCUSSIONS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT NONE OF THEM HAVE BEEN KEPT. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE SO CALLED "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE," THIS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO A LANGUAGE PROBLEM WHICH WE HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF CORRECTING EVEN IF IT TAKES SIX WEEKS IN PARIS TO DO SO.

3. AT THIS POINT IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. AND GVN MOVE TOWARDS TO UNITY. THE ISSUE OF THE DRV FORCES IN THE SOUTH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. IF INFILTRATION IS IN FACT STOPPED AND THE DRV WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND WITH APPROPRIATE PREPARATION ON THE PART OF THE GVN, THE INITIAL LEOPARD SPOT SITUATION SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, IF THE U.S. AND GVN HAVE MOVED WITH GOOD WILL AND UNITY IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE, WE WILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO VIOLATIONS BY THE NORTH WITH THE ESSENTIAL BASE OF U.S. DOMESTIC SUPPORT.

4. I WOULD NOT INVITE THIEU TO GIVE US ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE CHANGES AT THIS TIME SINCE IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT WE CAN GET THEM. WE ALREADY HAVE MANY CHANGES AS A RESULT OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON, AND I THINK THIEU'S CONCERNS ARE CLEARLY KNOWN HERE.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

5. WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN PARIS TO IMPROVE THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST TO THIEU THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO SEND NHA TO PARIS AT THE TIME OF THE NEXT ROUND SO THAT I CAN BRIEF NHA EACH EVENING ON THE OUTCOME OF EACH DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. AT THIS JUNCTURE I THINK THE BEST WE CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT WOULD BE A MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE ON THE "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE" AND SOME REFERENCE TO THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. I HOPE YOU AND CHARLIE WHITEHOUSE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THIEU AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES WITHOUT ANY LET UP, AND ABOVE ALL KEEP A CONTINUAL FLOW OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE HALT GROWING SUSPICION AND THE CONTINUING DRIFT BETWEEN THIEU AND OURSELVES.

6. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPERATIVE THAT THIEU RECOGNIZE THE STRATEGY THAT WE ARE PURSUING HERE AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES. THE U.S. INTENDS TO PROCEED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS IT NOW EXISTS. EVERYTHING THAT IS SAID HERE IS DESIGNED TO ENABLE US TO RETAIN THE ESSENTIAL BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THIEU AND HIS GOVERNMENT WITHOUT WHICH ALL OF OUR OBJECTIVES WILL HAVE BEEN LOST. IF THIEU BELIEVES THAT HE CAN PRESSURE US INTO MARGINAL MODIFICATIONS, HE MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT HE CAN DO THIS ONLY AT THE RISK OF JEOPARDIZING THE GOOD WILL OF THE U.S. FOR BETTER OR WORSE, WE ARE NOW MOVING DOWN A ROAD IN WHICH HANOI WILL BE ABLE TO ISOLATE THIEU AS THE CULPRIT, IF HE ENABLES THEM TO DO SO. HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ALL OF MY EFFORTS THUS FAR HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE NEED TO PREVENT THIS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT, BUT WE NEED HIS COOPERATION.

7. WE WILL REPLY SEPARATELY TO THE GVN MEMORANDUM REGARDING MY PRESS CONFERENCE.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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