

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: REFER TO OSD

**SUBJECT:** Extracts from Briefing of Dr. Kissinger  
by Joint Staff

**DATE:** November 3, 1972

**PARTICIPANTS:** Colonel Carlson  
Colonel West  
Dr. Kissinger  
General Haig  
Commander Howe

OSD REVIEWED 02-Dec-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

The following are Dr. Kissinger's comments during the JCS Briefing on November 3, 1972:

Kissinger: (Commenting on a report that a second helicopter had crashed in MR-1) What happened to the helicopter that crashed?

Carlson: One officer and seven crewmen there evaded.

Kissinger: What happened to the first helicopter?

Carlson: It dropped its crew off and left. To straighten this out what happened was that the first helicopter got in and out successfully but the second helicopter crashed and burned.

\*\*\*\*\*

Carlson: Enemy units have been ordered to disperse in MR-3.

Kissinger: Where was the major battle?

Carlson: In the An Loc/Quan Loi area (points to the map).

Kissinger: That is all right. I know where that is.

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2

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Carlson: The enemy is urgently pushing people into MR-4 and an enemy regiment is moving east to the My Tho area. This poses a sapper threat to South Vietnamese towns in the area.

Kissinger: What is the ARVN doing about it?

Carlson: There is no apparent shifting of ARVN units in response yet. This, of course, is only based on a radio intercept and there is no indication of enemy activity in the area yet.

\* \* \* \*

Kissinger: I thought the B-52s were going to go a little bit farther north?

Carlson: They struck around the 18 degree line in this general area (points to map). Their authority extends, however, to 18 degrees, 45 minutes, near the Vinh area.

Kissinger: Why haven't they come near there?

Carlson: I don't know but they definitely have not gone up there.

Kissinger: Are the Navy and Air Force arguing about it. Are they trying to see if they can fly a B-52 off a Navy carrier?

Carlson: No, they are not doing that.

Kissinger: Why are they not hitting where they are suppose to?

Carlson: I don't know and they are not scheduled for today.

Kissinger: They are not being very responsive. They have better pray that the war is ending, otherwise, something is going to happen to the command structure.

Colonel Carlson then began to read a MACV appraisal of the air operations taken from the morning SPECAT (Attached at Tab A).

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3

Carlson: (Reading from report) "We are meeting our most urgent commitments but, of course, cannot satisfy all requirements."

Kissinger: Why? With the assets that he has, I don't know why he cannot meet the problem. Two weeks ago we were told he couldn't use more sorties. Now he is saying he can't satisfy all the requirements.

\* \* \* \* \*

Kissinger: (Referring to tactical air strikes against Bai Thuong airfield) Why are we hitting airfields? There haven't been any North Vietnamese aircraft there in a long time, have there?

Carlson: There have not been any in three months to the best of my knowledge.

Kissinger: I am beginning to lose my patience with the military. They wasted B-52 strikes last week on aircraft. It is incomprehensible to me when we have only about three weeks left, that we are hitting these fields. What Route Package are these airfields in?

Carlson: It is in the lower part of Route Package 4.

Kissinger: Oh yes, I am familiar with that one.

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IN SUMMARY, WE ARE DOING ALL POSSIBLE TO GET THE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS FROM OUR ALLOCATED AIR POWER. WE ARE MEETING OUR MOST URGENT COMMITMENTS BUT OF COURSE CANNOT SATISFY ALL REQUIREMENTS. WE BELIEVE OUR PRIORITIES ARE ABOUT RIGHT. WE WILL SHIFT THEM DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION AND WILL BE PREPARED IN PARTICULAR TO SUPPORT MORE AMBITIOUS RVNAF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS WELL AS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE AGAINST THE ENEMY LOGISTICS NETWORK IN NVN.

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PAGE 6 RHMSMVA971A S. S. O. S. E. T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

6. (S) BOTTLE NECK CAMPAIGN: ON 17 OCTOBER 1972 WE BEGAN A COORDINATED AIR EFFORT TO CLOSE THE MOUNTAIN ROUTES LEADING INTO MU GIA, BAN KARAI AND BAN RAVING PASSES. TO DATE A TOTAL OF 36 VULNERABLE HIGHWAY SEGMENTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CUT BY GUIDED ORDNANCE. RESULTS FROM PHOTO AND VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE APPROACHES TO MU GIA AND BAN KARAI HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY CLOSED. HOWEVER, WEATHER HAS LIMITED THE CLOSURE OF THE BAN RAVING APPROACHES. THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN AUGMENTED BY AROUND THE CLOCK HARASSMENT OF ROAD REPAIR EFFORTS BY FAST FAC AND F-111'S. THE MATERIEL FLOW SOUTH FROM RPH2 HAS BEEN FORCED BY THESE ATTACKS AGAINST THE ROADS TO STACK UP IN TRUCK PARKS AND STORAGE AREAS IN NORTHERN RPH1 AND IN RPH2. THAT WHICH IS MOVING HAS BEEN BY  
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S E C R E T SPECAT: EXCLUSIVE FINAL SECTION OF 3:  
CHANNELLED INTO THE MORE EXPOSED COASTAL LOCIS. THE ARC LIGHT  
SERIES, F-4111S AND F-41S HAVE REPORTED REMARKABLE RESULTS IN  
DESTROYING AND DAMAGING TRUCKS, SUPPLIES AND OTHER MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT. WEATHER HAS SEVERELY LIMITED PHOTO CONFIRMATION.

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA09715 S E C R E T SPECAT: EXCLUSIVE

BUT CREW REPORTS AND FAC OBSERVATIONS IN RP-1 ARE INDICATIVE  
OF THE SUCCESS TO DATE OF THE "BOTTLENECK" CAMPAIGN. TRUCKS  
DESTROYED - 177; TRUCKS DAMAGED - 48; SUPPLIES DESTROYED - 45;  
STACKS; SUPPLIES DAMAGED - 5 STACKS; AAA/FIELD GUNS DESTROYED - 3;  
58; AAA/FIELD GUNS DAMAGED - 6; SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS - 463;  
TANKS DESTROYED - 4; TANKS DAMAGED - 1; SAM LAUNCHERS DAMAGED - 1;  
1; RADAR VANS DESTROYED - 3; BULLDOZERS DESTROYED - 7; BULLDOZERS  
DAMAGED - 4; STEAMSHOVELS DESTROYED - 2; STEAM ROLLERS DAMAGED - 1;  
2; SAM TRANSPORTERS DAMAGED - 2; TRACTOR DESTROYED - 1; ROAD  
GRADER DESTROYED - 1; ROAD GRADER DAMAGED - 2; SAM2 MISSILES  
DESTROYED - 1; CRANE DAMAGED - 1.

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PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9715 S E O R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

7. (U) ALTHOUGH MORE THAN 100,000 REFUGEES HAVE BEEN GENERATED IN MR 4, ONLY 16,200 (16%) ARE ESTIMATED TO BE IN REFUGEE CAMPS. THIS LOW PERCENT OF IN-CAMP REFUGEES CONTRASTS WITH THE SITUATION IN MR 1 WHERE OVER 74 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 675,000 REFUGEES GENERATED ARE LOCATED IN IDENTIFIED REFUGEE SITES. UNLIKE OTHER AREAS IN VIETNAM, THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES IN MR 4 IS ACCOMPLISHED EASILY BY SAMPAN, AS A RESULT, MOST REFUGEES ARE ABLE TO WITHDRAW RAPIDLY FROM AREAS OF ACTIVE COMBAT, MOVE IN WITH FRIENDS OR RELATIVES IN MORE SECURE AREAS UNTIL THE FIGHTING SUBSIDES, AND READILY RETURN TO THEIR HOMES WHEN THEY ARE SECURED. THUS, SELDOM HAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LARGE REFUGEE CAMPS BEEN NECESSARY IN THE DELTA. WHILE THIS METHOD OF PROVIDING FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IS EFFECTIVE, IT IS QUITE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHO IS ACTUALLY A DISPLACED WAR VICTIM AND THUS QUALIFIES FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS, EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE BY THE GVN TO PROVIDE GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO ALL PERSONS IN NEED.

PAGE 4 RHMSMVA9715 S E O R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

8. (S) TACAIR BDA SUMMARY:  
A, NVN1 ON 2 NOV USAF F4D'S STRUCK MILITARY TARGETS W AND SE OF VINH, RR22, AND IN VIC OF MU GIA PASS, QUANG KHE AND DONG HOI IN RR21. IN RR22 PHANTOMS DESTROYED 70 CUBIC METERS OF SUPPLIES, SEVEN TRUCKS, SEVEN WAREHOUSES, INTERDICTED ONE ROAD, SET OFF FIVE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND IGNITED NINE FIRES. IN RR21 PHANTOMS DESTROYED 43 TRUCKS, SEVEN WAREHOUSES, SIX 20MM AAA GUNS, FOUR HIGHWAY BRIDGES, THREE STACKS OF SUPPLIES, ONE 25,000 GALLON POL TANK AND ONE HELICOPTER. NINE TRUCKS AND TWO RR TUNNELS WERE REPORTED DAMAGED. FOUR ROADS WERE INTERDICTED. AIRCREWS OBSERVED 14 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND 28 FIRES. TWENTY-EIGHT F4111 SORTIES WERE FRAGGED, 22 IN RR21 AND SIX IN BARREL ROLL. TWENTY-FOUR EXPENDED ORDNANCE OVER THREE PRIMARY TARGETS, THREE WERE DIVERTED TO ALTERNATE TARGETS IN STEEL TIGER, AND ONE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. POST STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT YET AVAILABLE. EXCEPT WHERE NOTED, AIRCREWS REPORTED RND DUE TO DARKNESS. TARGETS:

STRUCK ARE AS FOLLOWS: RR21: NUI CA AY VMS (STRUCK TWICE);

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PAGE 5 RHMSMVA9715 S E O R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE.  
DONG DEU IDP, BAN SAN TSP NW (DIVERT), XOM Y LANH MIL COMPLEX, PHOUng CHAY HWY FERRY, PHONG NHA PPS, CO RI TDOI TKP, BAN DA TOI IDP, HA TAN HWY BRIDGE, CHA LI STORAGE/TSP, TRUNG THUAN PPS, BAN SAN TSP (DIVERT), QUANG KHE STORAGE AREA.

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CA NUM TRP; BAN PHA NOR TRP (DIVERGENT EXTREMELY LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSION); HA MON TRP; AN BO PPS N; VIT THU LU TRP W AND THE XUAN DUO TRP (STRUCK TWICE); BARRELI ROLL; NONG PET BIVOUAC/STORAGE AREA (ONE LARGE SECONDARY FIRE); NONG PET TRP; BAN PHIASI BIVOUAC/STORAGE AREA; BAN CHAIS STORAGE; BAN XIANGKIAS BIVOUAC/STORAGE AREA AND THE BAN KHAY PPS (THREE LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS); B. RVNI. A TOTAL OF 59 US AND 14 VNAF TACAIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN CONTACT THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC. TACAIR ACTIVITY WAS LIGHT AND SCATTERED THROUGHOUT ALL OF THE MR. TACAIR STRIKES DESTROYED TWO 130MM FIELD GUNS, ONE 82MM AAA GUN, TWO 60MM MORTARS, A TANK, TWO TRUCKS, A VEHICLE,

THREE STRUCTURES AND FOUR BUNKERS, ONE TANK, A STRUCTURE AND THREE BUNKERS WERE DAMAGED, AND 57 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

PAGE 6 RHMSMVA9715 S. G. B. E. T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SEVEN SECONDARY FIRES AND 23 ENEMY KBA WERE REPORTED.

C. LAOSI TACAIR SORTIES IN THE VICINITY OF SARAVANE AND THE PDJ DESTROYED A 122MM FIELD GUN, A STRUCTURE, FOUR BUNKERS, FOUR SUPPLY SHELTERS AND FOUR POLI BARRELS, A STRUCTURE AND A BUNKER WERE DAMAGED RESULTING IN 27 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND TWO SECONDARY FIRES.

D. THIS INFORMATION HAS NOT BEEN CORRELATED WITH PARAS 2 AND 4 OF THE COMMANDER'S SUPPLEMENTAL APPRAISAL.

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RUMJOPA/CDR 8TH AF ANDERSON AFB GUAM

RUMJIAA/CDR 16TH AF MARCH AFB GA

RUMHMA/CGFMFPAC

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 1 OF 3

FOR ADM MOORER AND ADM GAYLER, INFO AMBASSADOR BUNKER, GEN MEYER, ADM CLAREY, GEN CLAY, GEN ROSSON, GEN VOOT, LTC JOHNSON, LTC PITTS, LT GEN WILSON AND ADM HOLLOWAY FROM GENERAL WEYAND, DELIVER UPON RECEIPT

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA9710 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SUBJ: COMUSMACV PERSONAL APPRAISAL OF THE ENEMY/FRIENDLY SITUATION(S) 1. (S) IN NORTHERN MR 1 THE VNMC UNITS WITHDREW UNDER HEAVY ENEMY PRESSURE TO THE E BANK OF THE THACH HAN RIVER, LEAVING A SMALL CONTINGENT ON THE W BANK. THE ABN DIV CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN THE HAI LANG FOREST AREA TO ISOLATE AND RETAKE FSB ANNE. ACTIVITY INCREASED VIC PHU LOO, THUA THIEN PROV, AS PROBABLE ELEMENTS OF THE 6TH NVA REGT ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT CLAY. IN THE QUE SON VALLEY OF QUANG NAM PROV 3RD ARVN DIV FORCES RECAPTURED THE OLD QUE SON DIST HQ IN HEAVY FIGHTING. TERRITORIAL FORCES VIC HAU DUO DIST TOWN, QUANG TIN PROV, REPORTED SPORADIC HEAVY CONTACT. AN ELEMENT OF THE 6TH ARVN REGT HAS REINFORCED IN QUANG NGAI PROV ENEMY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST GVN POSITIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO INTERDICT MAJOR LOC. US TACAIR FLEW 116 SORTIES AND US NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIPS FIRED 1200 ROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF I CORPS. ENEMY LOSSES YESTERDAY WERE 134 KILLED, 19 CAPTURED AND TWO HOI CHANHS, WHILE INCOMPLETE GVN CASUALTY FIGURES REFLECT 29 KIA AND 124 WIA.



PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9713: S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E  
 2. (C) IN MR 2 LIGHT SCATTERED ACTIONS YESTERDAY ACCOUNTED FOR 69 ENEMY KILLED AND ONE CAPTURED, WHILE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 19 KIA AND 22 WIA. 11 CORPS WAS SUPPORTED BY 48 US TACAIR SORTIES AND 129 ROUNDS OF NGF. IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS OR PROGRESS WERE REPORTED AS ARVN FORCES CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN THE TAN CANH/DAY TO AREA AND THE KON TUN RASS. IN WESTERN PLEIKU PROV THE DUO OO RANGER CAMP WAS EVACUATED YESTERDAY, AS REPORTED; HOWEVER, THE COUNTERATTACK DID NOT MATERIALIZE, AN OPERATION BY ARVN BGRS IS REPORTEDLY UNDERWAY TODAY TO RETAKE THE CAMP.

3. (C) IN MR 3 ACTIVITY CONTINUED AT A LOW LEVEL AND WAS

PAGE 4 RHMSMVA9713: S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E  
 CHARACTERIZED BY LIGHT AIR AND LOCALIZED GROUND CONTACTS. THE ENEMY IN MR 3 IS AVOIDING GROUND COMBAT EXCEPT IN VERY ISOLATED INSTANCES. ONE MAJOR BATTLE OCCURRED AT QUAN LOY DURING WHICH A REGT OF THE 18TH ARVN DIV WAS FIRST ATTACKED BY THE ENEMY AND THEN COUNTERATTACKED INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE ENEMY FORCE. THE 18TH DIV WAS SUPPORTED WITH 32 US TACAIR SORTIES. TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR THE PERIOD WERE 345 ENEMY KIA, 78 FRIENDLY KIA AND 93 WIA. THERE WERE 68 US TACAIR SORTIES FLOWN IN THE MR.

4. (C) IN MR 4 THE SITUATION REMAINED RELATIVELY UNCHANGED WITH THE PATTERN OF ACTIVITY BEING THE SAME AS EXPERIENCED

PAGE 5 RHMSMVA9713: S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E  
 OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, ENEMY LOSSES IN THE MR YESTERDAY WERE 236 KILLED AND 31 DETAINED, WHILE FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 31 KIA AND 150 WIA. 11 CORPS WAS SUPPORTED BY 49 SORTIES OF US TACAIR AND 56 ROUNDS OF NGF. ACTIONS IN KIEN TUONG PROV

WITH PROBABLE ELEMENTS OF THE 174TH NVA REGT HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 121 ENEMY KILLED OVER THE PAST 3 DAYS. THIS UNDERSTRENGTH REGT'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THESE HEAVY LOSSES MAY INDICATE THE URGENCY WITH WHICH THE NVA VIEWS THE NECESSITY OF MOVING QUICKLY ALL MAJOR UNITS INSIDE IYSVN BORDERS.

9. (S) AIR OPERATIONS APPRAISAL

AT WITHIN RVN, EXCEPTING NORTHERN MR. 4 WHERE MOST UNITS CONTINUE TO DEFEND IN PLACE, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN POSITIONING

PAGE 6 RHMSMVA9713 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE:

ITS FORCES AND CONDUCTING WIDESPREAD SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS TO GAIN A MAXIMUM PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE. THIS HAS IN TURN DICTATED A DISPERSAL OF ARVN ELEMENTS FOR COUNTERACTION OPERATIONS. THIS SHIFTING PATTERN HAS ALSO INCLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME NEW ENEMY AOLS AND THE HURRIED INTRO. DUCTON OF FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE REPUBLIC'S BORDERS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. MACV RESPONSE TO THIS HAS BEEN TO REDISTRIBUTE US FACIS AND ALLOCATE IN-COUNTRY TACTICAL AIR SORTIES TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM SUPPORT POSSIBLE TO THE TERRITORIAL FORCES AND THE REGULAR ARVN FORCES ENGAGED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE MILITARY EFFECT OF THE ENEMY'S CHANGE IN TACTICS IS TO PROVIDE ARVN A GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEAT HIM IN DETAIL AND WE HAVE GEARED OUR SUPPORT SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO THAT TYPE OF SITUATION.

9. IN NVN, THE COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO MOVE LARGE SCALE LOGISTICAL SHIPMENTS SOUTH. RECENT INTELLIGENCE HAS NOTED THE DEPLOYMENT SOUTHWARD OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT SUCH AS TRUCKS, TANKS AND ARTILLERY PIECES. ENEMY LOGISTICS ACTIONS:  
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RHCOAAA/CINCSAC

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RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUHHRGA/CINCSARPAAC

RHMXAAA/CDR 7TH AF TSN RVN

RUNJQFA/CDR 8TH AF ANDERSON AFB GUAM

RUNJIAA/CDR 15TH AF MAROH AFB CA

RUHHFMA/COMFMPAC

RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE SECTION 2 OF 3:  
INDICATE A COORDINATED EFFORT TO RETAIN IN SVN ALL MILITARY  
OPTIONS. IN NORTHERN LAOS, THE ENEMY HAS SECURED THE PLAINS  
DES JARRES AND MAY SOON POSE A THREAT TO LONG THIEP.  
IN SOUTHERN LAOS, THE NVA HAS BEGUN PREPARATIONS TO SUPPORT

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA9714 S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE:  
THE SEASONAL MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO HIS FORCES  
IN SVN AND CAMBODIA. ENEMY TACTICAL UNITS HAVE EXPANDED  
COMMUNIST-HELD AREAS TO A NEW HIGH, WITH APPROXIMATELY 75  
PERCENT OF SOUTHERN LAOS CURRENTLY UNDER ENEMY CONTROL. ENEMY  
FORCES IN CAMBODIA HAVE COMPLETED THE INTERDICTION OF THE  
MAIN LAND LOCIS INTO PHNOM PENH WITH THE RECENT CUTTING OF  
ROUTE 4. INTERDICTION OF SUPPLY CONVOYS MOVING ALONG THE  
MEKONG WOULD APPLY GREAT PRESSURE ON THE KHMER GOVERNMENT,  
PRODUCE ANOTHER RICE SHORTAGE IN THE CAPITAL, AND ENDANGER

THE VIABILITY OF THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT.  
TO MEET ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTIVITY, THE DEMANDS ON OUR  
ALLOCATED AIR RESOURCES ARE UNDERSTANDABLY SEVERE AND LIKELY  
TO BECOME MORE SO IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.  
OUR DAILY ALLOCATION OF AIR EFFORT IS DIVIDED AMONG THE FOLLOWING  
PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS: SUPPORT ARVN DEFENSE OF TERRITORY NOW  
HELD; SUPPORT ARVN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO RETAKE LOST TERRITORY  
AND RECOVER CONTROL OF POPULATED AREAS; COUNTER ENEMY EFFORTS  
IN NVN TO RESUPPLY AND REEQUIP FORCES IN RVN; AND SUPPORT

PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9714 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E

FOR FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

D, IN RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT FLUID SITUATION MACV RECENTLY INCREASED TACTICAL AIR ALLOCATIONS WITHIN EACH MILITARY REGION ON THE BASIS OF REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED BY EACH REGIONAL COMMANDER. THESE ADDITIONAL ASSETS HAVE ENABLED THEM TO EXPEDITE THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY BOTH REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, IMPROVED COORDINATION PROCEDURES WERE ESTABLISHED TO INSURE

RESPONSIVE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL AIR, PARTICULARLY IN SUPPORT OF TERRITORIAL FORCES WHICH ARE THE PRIME ELEMENT TO BLUNT THE ENEMY'S DISPERSAL OF FORCES.

E, OUR PROGRAM IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY. WHILE THE ENEMY HAS SUCCEEDED ON OCCASION BY HIGHLY VISIBLE RAIDS AGAINST HAMLETS NORTH OF SAIGON AND TEMPORARY ADVANCES ELSEWHERE, SUCH AS IN DAK SEANG AND BA TO IN KONTUM AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES, HE HAS PAID A HEAVY PRICE. IN RESPONSE TO THESE ENEMY ATTACKS, ARVN LIGHT AND TACAIR FORCES HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES IN BOTH MEN AND EQUIPMENT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, NECESSARY AIR SUPPORT

PAGE 4 RHMSMVA9714 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E

HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF RVNAF EFFORTS TO MOVE OUT, OPEN HIGHWAYS, ELIMINATE ENEMY POCKETS OF RESISTANCE, AND LIBERATE VILLAGES AND DISTRICT TOWNS.

F, IN THE PDU, WE HAVE ENDEAVORED TO INCREASE THE EFFORT BY S-28'S, F-41'S, AND GUNSHIPS IN RESPONSE TO THAT FLUCTUATING BUT OBVIOUSLY CRITICAL SITUATION.

G, AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT LON NOL, WE DELIVERED A

B-52 STRIKE YESTERDAY WITH GOOD RESULTS AGAINST AN ENEMY LOGISTICS BASE AREA ALONG HIGHWAY 4 SOUTHWEST OF PHNOM PENH. THIS STRIKE WAS CONSIDERED UNUSUALLY IMPORTANT BY LON NOL AND HANK, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO HONOR LON NOL'S REQUESTS WHEN POSSIBLE. OUR TARGETING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

H, WE HAVE APPLIED A CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT OF EFFORT AGAINST ENEMY LOGISTICS TARGETS IN NVN, AND WE PLAN TO INTENSIFY THAT PROGRAM AS THE SITUATION IN COUNTRY PERMITS. STRIKES AGAINST TRUCK PARKS AND WAREHOUSE STORAGE AREAS ALONG HIGHWAYS IN ROUTE PACK 1 HAVE REPEATEDLY YIELDED LARGE NUMBERS

PAGE 5 RHMSMVA9714 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E

OF SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES. OUR TARGETING SYSTEM IS WORKING WELL.

THE ENEMY'S [No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/02/13 : LOC-HAK-490-1-9-7] AUTHORITIES PERMIT.