

[TS-HK-AD37]

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

September 14, 1970

MORI C05099247

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting, September 8, 1970

State Dept. review completed

OSD, JCS reviews completed.


Ambassador Sullivan began by referring to the proposed visit to the U.S. by Vice President Ky. Sullivan had wanted to let the South Vietnamese themselves take the responsibility for deterring Ky, but Thieu's adviser had come in with a request for the U.S. to get out in front and Bunker had endorsed this request. Bui Diem was of the opinion that Ky now would go to Paris and stay there until early October, or after the McIntire rally, and then transit the U.S. This would be a face-saving way for Ky to get out of the situation. Sullivan said that he would draft a cable to Saigon saying that we did not understand why the U.S. should get into the business of turning Ky off.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Concerning what Ky might do if he visited the U.S. Sullivan surmised that it would be possible for Ky to visit centers in the U.S. where South Vietnamese Air Force personnel were receiving training; he might also go to the Air Force Academy. According to General Dunn, it might be possible for the Vice President to meet Ky at the airport (which hopefully would be Dulles -- far enough out of town to avoid demonstrations).

Sullivan mentioned the statement by a Cambodian spokesman to the effect that Sihanouk had made a broadcast from Peking admitting the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.

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Sullivan brought up the subject of a reported Cambodian peace initiative, [redacted] that something along this line was being contemplated by senior Cambodian officials. This report had spoken of the Cambodians

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having received a letter from a "senior foreign official" on what might be done by them diplomatically to get in touch with North Vietnamese representatives. Even though they had evidently seen little prospect of success, they had charged Sonn Sann with conducting diplomatic initiatives in Europe. Sonn Sann had already called on Habib concerning this subject, as Habib had reported by telephone.

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Sullivan stated that Secretary Laird continued to be interested in getting GVN to release 500 more sick and wounded NVA prisoners, though it seemed unlikely that there were this many presently in GVN hands. Secretary Laird had also said that both Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu had given him a commitment that large numbers of NVA prisoners would be released, but Sullivan knew of no such commitment. General Karhohs agreed. He had been present when Secretary Laird had discussed this matter with Ambassador Bunker, and felt that Bunker had been very noncommittal about further POW releases. He doubted also that Thieu would have given any commitment.

Sullivan remarked that GVN Foreign Minister Lam had come up with a plan for reconvening the Djakarta Conference in an effort to get world opinion focussed again on the Communist presence in Cambodia. This matter was discussed at length by the group, and a consensus emerged that while a reconvening of the Djakarta Conference might not be a bad idea, it would be inadvisable for the GVN to take the initiative.

Sullivan asked Carver about the prospects for the GVN Senate's passage of the Program Law. Carver replied that the Saigon station felt there was no early prospect of passage. The problem was that Thieu would argue against submitting it to the present lame-duck Senate but that the new Senate would not come in until October 15 and might not get around to considering the Program Law until sometime later. All agreed that this was regrettable. Sullivan thought that it would then be necessary for us to urge Thieu to take action by decree. He would talk to the White House about this. This was some reprieve in time in that the U. S. AID bill would not be coming up before Congress until after the elections. One alternative to action by decree on Thieu's part would be for us to take the GI payroll to the open market and take bids on piasters to be paid for dollars. This would be very drastic, however.

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Sullivan noted that there had been a broadcast by South Vietnam Liberation Radio on August 30 reviewing the 19-month history of the negotiations. He had been intrigued at the discussion of the overall PRG solution, which made a distinction between problems involving "ourselves and the enemy," which had to be settled now, and "ourselves and the people," which could be settled later. The withdrawal of U. S. troops was put in the first category, leading Sullivan to wonder if the PRG was becoming more flexible on a political solution. The implication was that a political solution might not be tied to the U. S. troop withdrawal.

General Karhohs informed the group that Admiral Moorer would be visiting Southeast Asia between September 29 and 30, and would be visiting all four Corps in South Vietnam and going to Bangkok and Phnom Penh as well. General Karhohs would be accompanying Admiral Moorer.

General Karhohs reported that with the closing down of USAF operations from Chu Lai and Tuy Hoa Air Force bases, the bases would still be operated under U. S. control. Transport squadrons would continue to use them, and also U. S. Army activities would also be conducted from them.

General Karhohs also reported that an economist was being assigned to the MACV staff. The only problem was that there were very few senior officers in the armed forces who possessed economic training, while those with economic training were presumably too junior to carry enough weight.

Mr. Nooter called attention to the fact that the Washington Post had printed an article from AID replying to the Manciewicz and Braden article. He also noted that questions were beginning to come in from the field on implication of the NSDM on economic assistance to Vietnam. He assumed that these questions could be dealt with without undue difficulty.

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