

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

October 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group, October 27, 1970

Ambassador Sullivan observed that the North Vietnamese had been very coy and cagey on the President's peace initiative. They were evidently attempting to convey the impression that they were not interested in it (e. g. Xuan Thuy's announced trip to Budapest) so as to build up a back-lash against it. However, they had not been very successful in this. Sullivan noted that he had talked with Bob Kleiman of the New York Times, who had reported he was receiving a great many letters from left-wing intellectuals, which were hostile with respect to the peace initiative. Kleiman wanted a few letters on the other side which could be printed on the "Op Ed" page to help offset the hostile pieces which the New York Times had run. (Evidently as an editorial writer he was able to exercise some discretion in the selection of letters.) I suggested he might wish to get in touch with Herb Klein in generating favorable comments. Sullivan said that he was having Mary Lord do a letter. According to Sullivan, Kleiman had recently talked with Peter Weiss, who had received a map from the PRG delegation in Paris purporting to show the areas of South Vietnam under Communist control -- inevitably, almost all. Weiss had said that he wanted to talk to people in State and Kirk would see him. I mentioned that I had seen this map, as well as a map indicating areas of Cambodia allegedly under Communist control. The Cambodia map had actually shown a smaller area under the Communists than that depicted in DIA maps.

State, JCS, OSD reviews completed pages 1-4



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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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ARMY, NAVY, OSD, DOS, JCS, USAF, reviews completed.

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Sullivan remarked that an article datelined Saigon on U.S. combat losses in Laos appeared to him to be far more than a leak. In his judgment, this sounded like a backgrounder and he had sent a cable to Saigon to ask about the circumstances of any such backgrounder. The press had already gotten on to the State spokesman and to Freidheimer in Defense in a very clever way: the reporters had asked for the release of statistics on casualties in Laos which had been reported by the Embassy in Vientiane. Because the President had said that we would be free and frank, this data had to be made available. General Smith declared that Admiral Moorer had been very disturbed over the Saigon story, and had expressed his concern to General Abrams via a back-channel message. Sullivan felt that there would surely be hearings on this issue when the Senate reconvened, since on the face of it we seemed to be cutting across the Church Amendment.

Sullivan recalled that Dr. Kissinger had affirmed in his conversation with Ky in Paris that the President would see Ky after the elections. There was still no date for this meeting, though. Bui Diem was putting together a schedule for Ky on the assumption that he would be in the U.S. between November 15 and 25. The schedule included many stops, but we couldn't prevent Ky from traveling widely. Sullivan was stressing to Bui Diem that nothing could be firm until the President's date had been received. General Smith said that General Minh, the GVN Military Attache, had presented a schedule to Fruend in Defense which had indeed contained many stops. Fruend had just "accepted" the schedule and had disclaimed any authority to make arrangements on the grounds that the matter was up to the White House and to State. General Smith furnished a list of U.S. military installations where Vietnamese were training as a possible basis for scheduling visits by Ky (Tab A).

Sullivan asked General Karhohs about a cable which had been sent to Defense for clearance concerning the release of a substantial number of POWs for the forthcoming holidays. Was Warren Nutter holding clearance up for some reason? Sullivan had heard that such was the case.

General Karhohs said that Ralph Jefferson acted for Nutter on POW matters and he doubted that Nutter was personally involved; nevertheless, he would look the matter up. Sullivan pointed out we had released POWs

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before, and in fact had done so last year. I asked Sullivan what was done with these POWs, and Sullivan replied that this was a problem -- most became Chieu Hois. About 200-odd had been involved.

Sullivan referred to a recent conversation between Thieu and Tran Van Don, in which (according to Don) Thieu had said he would reorganize the government to bring in more people and would also meet Big Minh. Had Carver anything further to add? Carver said that he had no information, and noted that Tran Van Don was not famous for being an accurate reporter. He would inquire.

Sullivan brought up an AID message to Saigon, apparently sent by the Public Administration people, proposing changes in a government reorganization bill in the Lower House. Sullivan said that this message was unacceptable. We had now gone past the stage when we needed to tell the GVN how to organize the government. If the subject came up at all it should be at the Bunker/Thieu level and also should be discussed in Washington.

Sullivan noted that with NSDM 89 we now had a level of expenditures for Cambodia on the economic as well as the military side, and asked Nooter what pain this would cause AID with respect to its Vietnam program. Nooter replied that AID cannot now make its \$350 million budget for Vietnam unless there is a supplemental, and may be as much as \$30 to \$40 million short. If there was a short-fall, it might be possible to make a transfer next spring from the Development Loan Fund to supporting assistance in order to carry Vietnam through.

Sullivan noted that there was a North Vietnamese Red Cross Mission in Bangkok, and wondered if we had adequately explained why it was there. Was there a larger signal involved? He called attention to the fact that the Second Secretary of the North Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane had invited a representative of Operation Brotherhood to come to North Vietnam to help handle medical problems. Was Hanoi trying to establish good relations with Southeast Asian countries which were not involved in Indo-China? Carver agreed that there might be greater political significance than met the eye, and said he would look into the situation.

Sullivan turned to the question of Congressman Price visiting Hanoi in return for extending an invitation to Vy to come to the U.S. He had

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heard that Defense believed that there was a difference between an official visit by Vy and a private one, and that Secretary Laird felt that Price should keep in touch with Vy and maintain the contact. General Karhohs confirmed this, and added that Secretary Laird doesn't think much of Senator Pell and believes Price would be a more reliable representative. Sullivan stated that he disagreed on the desirability of having Price issue an invitation to Vy to come, even in a private capacity, and added that if Defense wanted it this way there would be a split position sent to Dr. Kissinger.

General Karhohs said that Secretary Laird had approved a message to MACV which he, Karhohs, had drafted on what could be done to improve the Phoenix program. Sullivan declared that Colby had sent in a letter asking the Ad Hoc Group to cover the same point, and requested Karhohs to hold up Laird's message until a reply could be drafted to Colby and the matter coordinated. Sullivan would circulate the Colby letter, which addressed itself to criticism of the Phoenix program which had been put forward by Bob Kohmer.

Sullivan informed the group that he had been asked by State to do a backgrounder on Indo-China. This was not intended to be a commentary on the President's October 7 proposal, but rather a description of the way things stood in Indo-China. Originally, it had been intended only for the foreign press, but State had felt that it would be impossible to hold the line against U.S. journalist and had added some of these.

Nooter mentioned that AID at Saigon had just come up with an engineering study of the transportation system in Vietnam which took a dim view of the GVN's purchase of another Boeing 727. What may have been uppermost in the minds of those drafting the study was whether the funds for the purchase of this expensive aircraft in effect come from U.S. aid. The Congressional reaction was a sensitive point.

Carver touched briefly upon CIA Director Helm's trip to Southeast Asia, and casually let it drop that he, Carver, had drafted the report to the President.

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TAB

SERVICE	INSTALLATION	VIETNAMESE STUDENTS	TYPE TRAINING
AF	Air Force Academy	0	
AF	Lackland/Randolph AFB	233/40	VNAF-English language training/ UPT-T-41
AF	Keesler AFB, Miss	200	T-28 pilot training
AF	England AFB, La	50	CCTS for C-47, A-1, A-37
AF1/	Fort Wolters, Tex	280	TH-55 Helicopter Tng
AF1/	Ft Hunter - Stewart AAF, Ga	336	UH-1 Helicopter Tng
Navy	Newport, RI	250	OCS
Navy	US Naval Training Center Great Lakes, Ill	100	Various enlisted specialists
Navy	US Naval Station, Treasure Island, Calif	702/	Electronic Technicians
Navy	Naval Training Center San Diego, Calif	100	Various enlisted specialists
Army	Ft Rucker, Ala	16	Helicopter Training
Army	Ft Leavenworth, Kansas	11	Command & General Staff College
Army	Ft Bragg, NC	5	Psy Ops
Army	Ft Benning, Ga	11	OCS and Inf/Off Advance
Army	Ft Sill, Okla	23	Arty Off Adv, Radar Technicians and Communications

1/ Training conducted by Army funded by AF.

2/ On 15 Nov an additional 60 OCS graduates will be training in small boat operations.

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Tab