

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~INFORMATION
September 30, 1970

MORI C05099235

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

OSD Review Completed

SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting, September 25, 1970

State Dept. review completed

USAID review completed

Ambassador Sullivan brought up the Ky visit, and remarked that Foreign Minister Lam and Ambassador Bui Diem had gotten a real working over from many people in State on the need to discourage Ky from coming. Bui Diem was now in Paris, and the first accounts of his efforts sounded quite good. Ambassador Bruce had an appointment with Ky, as did Dr. Kissinger. However, there was nothing definitive as yet even though it looked possible for the trip to be turned off. If Ky actually came, 125 SY personnel would be needed to protect him. In addition, it was likely that a confrontation would take place between the McIntire supporters and the hippies, yippies, etc. The FBI had informed Sullivan that these types were planning to make a big thing out of Ky's presence. This would be too bad, since it would raise the Vietnam issue earlier than we wanted -- it would be better if we dealt with Vietnam on our own terms.

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Thieu was worried about the possibility of Ky's making some initiative in Paris. Sullivan felt that Ky indeed might be inclined to do this especially if he called off his U.S. trip. He would need to explain why he was staying on in Paris. Sullivan anticipated that Ky might touch on the subjects of a cease-fire and free elections in SV. If he were to do this in a press interview, it wouldn't be so bad, but if he made a more formal pitch, there would be considerable confusion.

Sullivan said that he did not yet have a feeling for how the American people had reacted to Madame Binh's proposal on POWs. Her pitch was transparent and fraudulent, but it seemed that more and more among the next of kin were being influenced by Hanoi's tactics. This was a sensitive issue, and we needed to be careful as to how we handled it so as not to give Madame Binh's proposal more credibility.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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2

Sullivan noted that Senator Pell had received an offer from Xuan Thuy to go to Hanoi. Sullivan believed that we should encourage the Senator to go, and added that in his opinion Senator Pell could be trusted to keep from being used by Hanoi. General Karhohs observed that Secretary Laird favored Senator Pell making the trip, and hoped that something could be accomplished by it. It emerged that the Senator was not planning on going until January or February if he went at all.

Sullivan stated that the conference committee on the Defense Appropriations Bill had accepted the Fulbright amendment on allowances for foreign troops, but that according to Senator Stennis it would apply to new agreements only so that we would have no problems on this score. Sullivan suggested that the legal people in Defense should look into the other aspects of the Fulbright amendment, and provide interpretations on support for local forces in Thailand and Laos and what could and could not be done on behalf of the Cambodian government.

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Nooter announced that AID was undertaking a review of the FY 72 budget for Vietnam along the lines which he had brought up in the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, i. e. a total of \$750 million with an increase in the CIP, a decrease in DOD requirements, and a \$250 million short-fall. The question was whether this short-fall would be funded by AID by DOD or by both. If AID was to take care of it, we needed to address the question of how it would be handled. There might be objections to increasing the AID appropriation by \$300 million; nevertheless, DOD's input would go down anyway and it would be better to face up now to the desirability of placing this responsibility on AID. It might be possible to call the increase a "Vietnamization fund" which would take the place of DOD funds. Nooter added that the possibility of approaching the Japanese for help was being considered.

Sullivan remarked that he understood Secretary Laird's conversation with the President on a supplemental had been inconclusive, and that the Secretary had been asked to come back with figures backing up his belief that a supplemental could be obtained now. Sullivan had heard that Senator McGee wouldn't address the AID bill until after the elections, ostensibly because of hostile "pecking." Under these circumstances, it would be awkward to go in for a supplemental before an actual appropriation bill had been passed. Sullivan surmised that the President's request to Secretary Laird for further data was a deft Presidential way of saying "no."

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

Nooter questioned the figure of \$100 million for Vietnam in Secretary Laird's proposed supplemental. Neither AID nor State believed that this sum was necessary, and it would be difficult to justify it before the Congress. Nooter believed that it would be inadvisable to ask for funds which could not be justified.

Sullivan raised the question of the disposition of surplus U. S. Government property in Vietnam. He wanted to know if Defense had a good idea of what surplus property was on hand so that its disposal could be handled in the most effective manner. General Karhohs and General Smith both asserted that Defense had a very good idea of the surplus property available, since this was on computers and the information was kept up to date. The group agreed that if MAP funds shrunk, excess stocks might begin to figure much more importantly in the U. S. military assistance programs and we would need to keep a handle on the surplus property situation.

Sullivan said that during Foreign Minister Lam's conversation with Ambassador Johnson, the question of GVN's release of more NVA prisoners had come up. Lam had remonstrated against the release of anymore, but had eventually said that it would be possible for the GVN to arrange the release of more "packages."

Turning to the visit to Washington of Senator Tran Van Don, Sullivan remarked that Don had said he was "putting together a team" to see if it was possible to work with Thieu. About a dozen people would be involved, representing a broad spectrum of non-governmental opinion. The objective would be to work in the government, rather than with Thieu personally. Sullivan indicated that he did not know what Don really had in mind by all this, and would try to find out more.

General Karhohs referred to messages cleared in the White House on further U. S. troop withdrawals, and said that Secretary Laird had instructed Admiral Moorer to make this information available to General Abrams and have him discuss the withdrawals with Vien. The GVN would need to know what our plans were so that it could make plans of its own to mesh with our redeployments. Although the rate of redeployment was quite rapid, the posture of the Army world-wide was such that a slow-down would not be feasible.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

4

General Karhohs announced that General Ewell would meet with Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer on October 3. General Karhohs also announced that Brigadier General Watkins had been named MACV Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs.

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