

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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April 18, 1974

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National Security Decision Memorandum 252

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission, Geneva, April 2, 1974

The President has approved the following instructions for the U. S. component of the SALT Consultative Commission:

1. U. S. Commissioner should continue his efforts towards achievement of an agreed set of procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof for Strategic Offensive Systems and for ABM Systems and Their Components as called for in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

2. U. S. Commissioner is authorized to accept the Joint Draft Texts for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their Components, dated November 16, 1973, as the basis for negotiating the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. He is also authorized to make appropriate language changes in the Joint Draft Texts including those resulting from the review by government lawyers.

3. The U. S. Government considers the achievement of these mutually agreed procedures to be important, but not at the expense of essential U. S. security interests. The U. S. Commissioner should proceed accordingly consistent with the instructions contained herein.

4. In the negotiations, the U. S. Commissioner should accord priority to inclusion of the following items in the Agreed Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms:

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-- In the case of soft launch sites an area of the launch pad per se at the location of the launch stand must be made unusable by dismantling or destruction; removal of launch device alone is not considered adequate.

-- In the case of silo launch sites the silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed.

-- In the case of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers, the U.S. Commissioner should attempt to obtain Soviet agreement to U.S. proposals in the JDT of November 16, 1973, including those for H-class submarines. The U.S. Commissioner should make clear that in implementing the proposed procedure for "removing the submarines missile section in the open," the missile section will not be replaced by a new section of similar dimensions. Any replacement hull section must be significantly shorter in overall length than the missile section it replaces. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to drop the proposed procedure of sinking in international waters if the Soviets refuse to accept prior notification thereof.

5. The U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek notification that SLBM launchers under construction are intended as replacement for older ICBM launchers or for launchers on older submarines. Notification should be given prior to the start of sea trials of the replacement SLBM launchers. If after several weeks it is clear that the Soviets will not accept any form of prior notification, the U.S. Commissioner should seek instructions.

6. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to negotiate agreed language for the remaining issues as indicated by the bracketed text of the procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms in order to achieve the important elements set forth in para. 4, above, and to protect para. 8 of the Protocol. In this connection:

-- U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek inclusion of a definition of a modern SLBM, and is authorized to modify the language of the present sentence to achieve same objective. If he is unable to obtain Soviet agreement, he is authorized to drop the sentence, but should attempt to obtain Soviet agreement for the record that "launchers for SLBM's first flight tested after 1965 and deployed on diesel submarines are also modern SLBM's."

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-- The U. S. Commissioner should attempt to achieve Soviet agreement that facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites will not be used for storage, support or launch of ICBMs. If unable to achieve Soviet agreement after several weeks, he should seek instructions.

7. The U. S. Commissioner is authorized to accept Soviet language on the remaining dismantling or destruction issues as reflected in para. I. 2 of the JDT of November 16, 1973, for ABM Systems and Their Components.

8. At an appropriate time the U. S. Commissioner should inform the Soviet Commissioner that the U. S. does not desire to negotiate ABM replacement procedures during SCC-IV; in the event that the Soviet side indicates an interest in beginning work on these procedures at the next SCC Session (SCC-IV), the U. S. Commissioner should seek instructions.

9. The U. S. Commissioner should retain the current wording regarding voluntary information in the JDT's of November 16, 1973.

10. The U. S. Commissioner should not raise the subject of publication of these procedures. If raised by the Soviet side he should respond that the U. S. has no plans to make these procedures public at this time.

11. Sensitivity of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are to be cleared through the White House.

This NSDM supersedes NSDM 217 and NSDM 237.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Central Intelligence
Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation

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