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TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
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~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE 271555Z AUG 71  
FROM AMB. SMITH SALT HELSINKI 0198  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

25X1

DEAR HENRY:

NOW THAT SOVIETS HAVE MADE THEIR ANTICIPATED MOVE TO TWO SITES FOR EACH SIDE, THE QUESTION AS I SEE IT IS WHETHER THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR TWO SITES. IN EFFECT, THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THE PRICE FOR MALMSTROM IS LENINGRAD OR OMSK.

THE SOVIETS SHOW NO INTEREST IN A DEAL ALLOWING THE US MORE SITES OR MORE MISSILES THAN THE USSR.

I SHARE THE BELIEF OF THOSE MILITARY EXPERTS WHO HOLD THAT FROM A MILITARY STRATEGIC STANDPOINT THERE IS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

ONE AND TWO SAFEGUARD SITES.

I GATHER FROM THE NEGATIVE PREGNANT OF NSDM-117, "FALLBACK FROM TWO SITES AND 200 INTERCEPTORS IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNLESS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT", THAT A ONE-SITE DEAL IS NOT RULED OUT.

HOWEVER, THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATING A ONE-FOR-ONE ABM AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BE LABELLED AS GRAND FORKS IN EXCHANGE FOR MOSCOW WILL DRAW CRITICISM FROM SOME MILITARY AND POLITICAL QUARTERS. BUT THERE IS A WAY TO IMPROVE A "ONE-FOR-ONE" DEAL.

IF IT SQUARES WITH PRESIDENT'S TIMING CONSIDERATIONS, I SEE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN STICKING TO OUR PRESENT POSITIONS FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, TRYING TO GET SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON RADAR QUESTIONS AND ADJOURNING ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER WITH A BRACKETED, BUT COMPLETE, ABM TEXT AS THE PRODUCT OF THIS SESSION. SUCH AN OUTCOME LIKELY WOULD MEAN NO PROGRESS HERE ON OFFENSIVE FREEZE DEFINITION.

BUT IF THE PRESIDENT WANTS MORE MOVEMENT ON THE ABM LEVEL QUESTION HERE AND IS DISPOSED TO ADJUST OUR POSITION, I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING:

EACH SIDE TO HAVE ONE SITE WITH 100 LAUNCHER/INTERCEPTORS ANY PLACE IN ITS COUNTRY; AND SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE LOCATION OF SUCH SITE. RADAR WOULD BE AS WE PROPOSED FOR NCA.

THE RATIONALE FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS THAT SINCE IN THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WE ARE TO NEGOTIATE FOR AN ABM BAN, THE INITIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD IN EFFECT BE AS CLOSE TO AN ABM FREEZE AS IS PRACTICAL. THUS, EACH SIDE COULD FINISH CONSTRUCTION ON THE ONE SITE IT IS NOW WORKING ON.

IF THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION FOR A BAN FAILS, THE US MAY IN THE FUTURE WANT A NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY DEFENSE (EVEN CONGRESS MAY COME TO SEE THE ADVANTAGES OF NCA OVER A SINGLE SITE IN AN ICBM FIELD).

THIS PROPOSITION, WHICH SHOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO USSR, WOULD KEEP US OPTIONS OPEN FOR: 1) A MINIMAL START ON ICBM DEFENSE, 2) AN NCA DEFENSE, OR 3) A TOTAL BAN.

I HAVE ASKED HAROLD BROWN TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH YOU ON MONDAY.

WARM REGARDS.  
GERRY SMITH

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0934 ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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