

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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November 14, 1974

FOR: LARRY EAGLEBURGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Can you pass these two papers to Hal
Sonnenfeldt. He is expecting them.

Thanks.

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Attachments

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: REFER TO DOS

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: REFER TO CIA

DOS REVIEWED 16-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

CIA REVIEWED 16-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-145-74
12 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Subject: Soviet SALT Proposal (TS)

1. (TS) In reviewing the recent Soviet proposal for limiting strategic offensive arms, I am encouraged that the Soviets appear to be moving toward the substance of our approach, that is equal aggregates of central systems, freedom to mix within the aggregate, and no limits on US forward based systems. I believe the Soviet proposal shows movement and could be modified to provide suitable basic guidelines for further negotiations toward a new SAL agreement.

2. (TS) In my view, several clarifications and modifications will be necessary before we agree on this approach. For example:

a. The obligation to allow a 200 launcher compensation to the Soviets for allied systems should be made part of the agreement, and an increase in numbers of allied systems should not require reductions of US systems by a like number.

b. Collateral constraints required to assure verification of MIRV limits must be worked out.

c. Paragraph 4 should be clarified to insure development work can proceed on the M-X program, although deployment could be restrained until post 1985. Testing and deployment in a 1985 follow-on agreement should not

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3

DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2004

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d. Paragraph 5 must be modified to delete restrictions on preliminary construction and production of TRIDENT prior to 1977. If this can be worked out, we could accept the number 10 limit on numbers of TRIDENT submarines.


e. Paragraph 6 must be clarified to assure:

(1) It would not apply to air mobile launchers, or it would apply to air mobile launchers provided similar limitations were placed on land mobile launchers.

(2) It would not count each missile launcher on the B-1 additively in the overall aggregate of launchers.

f. It must be assured that all of these limitations apply equally to both sides.

3. (TS) Without the above changes, the Soviet proposal would allow their central systems programs to proceed with virtually no changes whereas US programs would stagnate. With the changes, I believe we would have the guidelines from which the SALT Delegation can reach a new agreement equitable to both sides.



GEORGE S. BROWN, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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ENCLOSURE

DISCUSSION

- Proposal takes into consideration US position on equal aggregates, freedom to mix, MIRV limits and no FBS compensation.
- Reductions are primarily cosmetic, but Soviets do reduce by 185 systems.
- The 2400 level does place an upper limit on strategic systems for both sides and the 200 compensation on the US side, for its allies, would not seriously degrade the US capability.
- Separate written obligation to allow 200 systems compensation could be construed by Congress as an attempt to bypass Jackson Amendment.
- Unless the Soviet proposal can be modified/expanded in several important areas, it severely impacts on US programs without equivalent impact on Soviet programs, i.e.:

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- Prohibits development/deployment of US follow-on ICBM.

- Stops TRIDENT development and deployment until 1977 and limits TRIDENTs to total of 10.
- Eliminates B-1 from program due to methods of counting, ASMs as individual launchers.

CONCLUSIONS

- Soviet proposal could be accepted with the following modification/expansion:
 - Obligation to allow 200 compensation should be made part of the agreement.
 - Corollary constraints are required to assure verification of MIRV systems.
 - Paragraph 4 should be modified to allow development work on an M-X prior to 1985, and not preclude testing and deployment in follow-on agreements.
 - Paragraph 5 should be modified to delete restrictions on development and production prior to 1977 but TRIDENTs could be limited to a total of 10.
 - Paragraph 6 should be clarified to assure it:
 - Would not apply to air mobile launchers; provided limitation also placed on ground mobile launchers.
 - Would not count B-1, ASMs in total aggregate of launchers.
 - All of these limitations to apply equally to both sides.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Probable Criticism of our SALT Position

The following are the attacks that might be made against an agreement along the lines I have discussed. The counterarguments follow at the conclusion of this memorandum.

1. From the right, it might be argued that:

-- Any agreement that perpetuates unequal numbers is inherently to our disadvantage (it violates the Jackson resolution) and limits our capabilities. Even if coupled with unequal MIRVs for the same period, this compensation is illusory, especially since the Soviet MIRVed ICBMs are so much larger than ours and since there are no constraints on throw weight or Soviet modernization of ICBMs.

-- The final outcome in 1985 would be a great differential in ICBM RVs in the Soviet favor; compensation in SLBM RVs and bomber weapons are unsatisfactory because they are strictly second strike weapons. The Soviets would vastly out distance us in counterforce capability.

-- Nothing is accomplished in terms of improving Minuteman survivability because Soviet MIRV throw weight guarantees the ability to attack US silos and reduce them to a few survivors. In fact, the large ICBM MIRV throw weight permitted the Soviets would even threaten a potential US ICBM.

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-- Because of the 2200 limit, the US can achieve only a minimum program; there is no room to introduce new systems, such as air mobile ICBMs; moreover, if there is a ban on new ICBM silos, and a sublimit on the number of Trident missiles and B-1s, then in effect, we are consigned to "inequality" during a period of vast Soviet modernization.

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-- The US is far ahead in MIRV missiles and technology. This agreement essentially freezes the US and permits the USSR to catch up.

-- The US cannot reach true equality, because we are forced to retain old systems in order to reach 2400.

-- We cannot verify Soviet compliance with the MIRV limits.

-- The US would be better off with a simple, equal numerical limit and no further restrictions on how we design our forces.

2. From the left, we might expect the following:

-- Such an agreement contains no "arms control"; indeed, rather than providing for reduced force levels, it calls for an increase by the US in 1984-85, and even requires an increase in Trident and B-1 plans. Once again, the military will use the agreement to justify an unnecessary buildup.

-- MIRV limits at the incredibly high level of 1320 guarantee literally thousands of RVs, and in addition only channels competition into technology, where there will be a high premium on accuracy and yields.

-- There is little moderation in deployment rates, no limit on technology, and no reductions.

-- Since both sides probably plan something like 2400 in any case; we might even be better off without any agreement.

3. The counter arguments are:

-- Politically, if we can achieve a breakthrough in SALT, it is insurance against a deterioration of the entire relationship, at a time when (a) we may face a possible confrontation in the Middle East, and (b) No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28 : LOC-HAK-482-2-10-3g to grow without massive budgetary increases.

-- With a new Congress, in a pre-election period, in the face of energy related economic difficulties and inflationary pressures, our chances of appropriating and sustaining funds for new systems beyond those already envisaged are not very good, particularly if the proposal seemed to offer a basis for agreement.

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-- Indeed, financing the B-1 will be a political battle all the way as the unit cost soars out of sight.

-- The prospective agreement has the advantage that it is premised on carrying out the Trident and B-1 programs, thus improving the chances for their survival in Congress.

-- Limiting the Soviets to 2400 for ten years is an important accomplishment; intelligence estimates predict levels of at least 2600 and possibly over 3,000 without an agreement; these high levels are quite likely given the Soviet obsession with large numbers and their strategic perception that they have more than one enemy.

-- Limiting Soviet MIRVs is also an achievement: according to latest intelligence, the very least the Soviets intend is 1400 MIRV missiles by 1985, the likely MIRV force is 1760 and the maximum is set at 2780; given their current throw weight advantage, a limit on MIRV is, in effect, the only route to restraining technology.

-- While there will be some verification uncertainties, we can have high confidence that widespread cheating is not going on.

-- We give up very little if we can agree on sublimits on Trident type SLBMs and on B-1 in our own forces, and, in this way, gain a sublimit on Soviet heavy ICBMs with MIRVs. The Soviets would thus give up 3.0 million of MIRVed throw weight.

-- Finally, any agreement is bound to be temporary given the state of relations, but some further agreement is a pre-condition to progress. Once the basic steps contained in this agreement have been taken, further progress on more complicated matters,

Further qualitative improvements and reductions can be
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