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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Not referred to DOC. Waiver applies.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 25, 1971

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: JCS, OSD Reviews Completed

AL HAIG 

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Secretary Rogers  
Tuesday, May 25, 1971, 9:30 a.m.

State Dept. review completed

MORI/CDF C05080394 Pages 1-3

In addition to the China issue and the Bunker cable you should be prepared to discuss with Rogers the following:

-- He may want to know why we have held up the British computer issue. You should tell him that the President just wanted to recheck the status of it and that it is now cleared to proceed in accordance with the President's original decision.

-- He will ask you why we have not cleared instructions on the MBFR. The package is on the left flap. Rogers' approach is generally consistent with the guidance which you sent to State last Friday. In the package is a memorandum telling him that the message is approved although it should be made totally consistent with the President's guidance memo. There are no substantive differences that are worth a hassle on this issue.

-- You may wish to raise with him the French transistor issue. Hal's memo is at Tab E. The simple problem on the French Transistor issue is that Defense and Commerce non-concur. Sonnenfeldt had recommended that you call Packard as soon as possible and tell him that the President intends to overrule Defense's objections. Actually State should have taken care of that problem themselves, but apparently opted to let you adjudicate the issue.

-- You may wish to discuss the Middle East situation. As you know, over the weekend Bergus saw Heykal. Heykal told Bergus yesterday that Sadat wants Bergus to come to Washington to deliver a message directly from Sadat to the President and to return to Cairo with the reply. This would probably be followed by a visit from Fawzi. Reportedly, Sisco thinks this would be troublesome and is planning to parry this move. State has indicated that it will send over a cable for your approval today. At Tab F is the summary of the latest situation from this morning's Information Items.

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May 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Mid-East Situation

The following items should bring you up to date on breaking developments:

-- Interim Canal Agreement: Bergus saw Heykal over the weekend in line with his instructions to smoke out the latest and harder UAR position on reopening the Canal which Foreign Minister Riad presented late last week. After a preliminary meeting, Bergus concluded that (1) Sadat may have given some kind of undertaking to the Foreign Minister to handle the canal negotiations, and (2) he believes the Russians are exerting pressure to lift the canal negotiations out of the purely American context. Then yesterday Heykal informed Bergus that Sadat wants Bergus to come to Washington and deliver a message from him directly and personally to you and to return to Cairo with replies. Fawzi's visit could follow this move. Sisco feels the attendant publicity would create problems for you; they are planning to parry this move.

In a separate conversation with Foreign Minister Riad, Riad (who "bared his personal feelings to an unprecedented degree," including mentioning that he wanted to resign) made the following points: (1) Sadat "really wanted" to work with the U.S. (2) Sadat had to go to Moscow last month because of strained UAR-Soviet relations (implying they remained so). (3) It was his personal opinion that Sadat would last only about a year unless there was visible progress towards peace.

On the same matter, the Israelis clarified their position on a canal deal. Abba Eban summoned Ambassador Barbour to say that the Israeli proposals, as presented to Secretary Rogers, remained valid in spite of Sadat's tough speech outlining his requirements last week. Eban said he thought there had been

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more progress than that speech had indicated, that he was willing to concede it may be just a speech rather than a formal diplomatic position and that he would appreciate having the U.S. assessment of Sadat's position. He stated that the ball was clearly in the Egyptian court at this point. He also expressed the Israeli view that the canal agreement was a pilot project for an overall agreement, i.e., it would settle the question as to who would move into the area from which Israel withdraws. He said he believed the U.S. might be backing away from its initial position that the whole of Sinai would be demilitarized.

-- Soviet Aspects: Podgorny is arriving in Cairo for talks with Sadat this week. Since the advent of Sadat's purge within the UAR, we have been watching for signs of the private Soviet reaction. (They have taken the public posture that it is a purely internal UAR affair.) The net impression of our reporting is that the Soviets were not forewarned and that, although they recognize the purely power struggle aspects of post-Nasser politics, they appear concerned about the long-range implications of Sadat's move since those purged were publicly and privately associated with pro-Moscow leanings. In short, we read that the Soviets are not certain about how Sadat intends to behave (although their military and economic assistance relationship will automatically define a heavy degree of reliance) at a time when much public attention has been given to UAR moves towards the U.S. It would seem that the Podgorny visit to Cairo would fall in the "reassurance" category on the part of the Egyptians and fact-finding, or as Ambassador Beam calls a "fence-mending" mission for the Soviets.

-- The Israelis are pressing on the question of an aircraft decision. Eban told Ambassador Barbour yesterday -- following press publicity that the U.S. was in no rush to make up its mind -- that Israel would like to know the status of its requests. The Israelis would like to be able to say that our military relationship is proceeding normally and that the U.S. is making no attempt to link it to any other questions.

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