

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador  
Avner Idan, Minister  
  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *WR*  
  
DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, June 19, 1973  
2:00 - 2:40 p.m.  
  
PLACE: Ambassador's Office  
Israeli Embassy  
Washington, D. C.

[The Ambassador made the following presentation, on the basis of a cable he had just received from the Prime Minister.]

Dinitz: First a couple of general remarks, then some specific remarks. These are from the Prime Minister. We have succeeded in communicating with her, and these are her remarks, after consultation with us. We offered some of our own ideas.

She is now stronger in her opinion that our original request was the correct one, that is, that every effort should be made that there should not be a joint document. The effort of Dr. Kissinger to draft such a new paper only points out the dangers that exist in such an exercise.

Secondly, we continue to negate the necessity . . . we continue to believe in the lack of necessity for a joint document between the two superpowers in a documented form as a contribution to the solution to our problem -- which we continue to see as only through negotiations between the parties.

The third general remark is that all the reservations we have stated to Dr. Kissinger in our last meeting of June 15 are valid also for any subsequent remarks, and in fact they were strengthened by this development.

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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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The fourth point: We want to reemphasize that in our response to your request to give our remarks, we are not either partners to the preparation of the document nor are we obligated in any way or form to its content.

Now I want to add my own personal point, as number five, to relay to Dr. Kissinger. I know it was a difficult decision for the Prime Minister to go ahead with commenting on the matter, and I know she was guided by two considerations: She trusts Dr. Kissinger, and she didn't want to make his already difficult work more difficult. And second, she did not want the impression to be created that by not reacting we are in acquiescence with some of the serious points we see in it.

So far for general remarks. Now, the particular remarks to some of the most important points. We don't say that if we sat down with legalistic eyes we wouldn't draft it differently on other points, but these are the most important. I will cover these in order of the paragraphs, not the order of importance.

[The paper to which these comments are addressed is at Tab A.]

In paragraph four, the word "agreement" does appear, but to make it clearer we think it must be supplemented by "between the parties." So it wouldn't be thought it meant agreement among the superpowers or someone else. This goes to our original philosophy that security arrangements and guarantees cannot be instead of secure borders but at best in addition to them, with the agreement of the parties concerned. I would add orally that there couldn't be a situation where the Soviet Union and the U. S. come to us and say "we have decided to guarantee you." Security must result from secure borders that we will achieve in agreement with our neighbors. If there are any additional guarantees, it will be in addition and after agreement between parties.

Second, in the same paragraph 4 -- I told you earlier that the Prime Minister was concerned about a Soviet foothold in the area. A physical Soviet presence. You have corrected it somewhat. But the word "participation" can have a dual meaning. You probably meant participation in the international negotiation, but it could mean physical presence. We suggest saying: "International guarantees could include the Soviet Union and the United States." In other words, take away "appropriate participation." We don't want them there.

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In paragraph six, our remarks are very simple. We kindly request you omit the whole paragraph. Because the problematics of it are clear. You're talking about the specific status of the Suez Canal. But you're not talking about the specific status of Sharm el-Sheikh except in terms of freedom of navigation. We don't think you will get a phrase about continued Israeli control of Sharm el-Sheikh, so we are better off without it. If your friends ask, "what about freedom of navigation?" you can say it's covered by Resolution 242 and there is no need to restate it.

The most serious problem is paragraph seven. This is crucial. This is for us very serious. I presume you didn't even realize what a serious word you introduced into it. In 1972 you succeeded in preventing inclusion of this item because there was a reference to UN decisions, UN resolutions. That was very good, very clever. But now you are taking from these UN resolutions the most bitter pill for us -- free choice -- and incorporate it in the document by saying in paragraph seven "implementing the choices of the refugees." This is absolutely unacceptable for us. We have opposed it bitterly ever since 1949.

And this is in spite of the fact that you did incorporate the sentence "consistent with national sovereignty." We don't think this is enough of a safeguard.

So we repeat our request to deal with the refugee problem in the manner that Resolution 242 dealt with it: "the necessity . . . for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." Period.

It would have been desirable to add that sentence which I gave you earlier [about sovereignty] -- I feel it's a good thing for both parties. But if Dr. Kissinger has any difficulties with this, it would suffice to have only the reference to Resolution 242. But by no means can we accept this question of choice.

Regarding paragraph eight, we really feel that such a paragraph should be included in the peace treaty and not in a general document of principles. So we feel it's premature and not necessary. This is not so much a remark of substance but rather an observation.

[This was the end of the Ambassador's comments on the paper at Tab A. He then raised a few other matters.]

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Other Matters:

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2. Jordan/West Germany: Dinitz raised a matter which he said was not urgent and which he had thought of saving for his next meeting with you. Israel is interested in helping Jordan with its economic problems in the interest of stability. Dinitz asked how you would view financial assistance from West Germany to Jordan. Israel was contemplating whether to offer Jordan help in mobilizing and obtaining funds secretly in West Germany -- through banks, government, whatever, but secretly -- but the Prime Minister first wanted to know your thoughts on the matter. I will remind you of this question before you see Dinitz next.

3. Ambassador Dinitz will be in Atlanta at the Governor's residence Tuesday night and Wednesday. He will be back in Washington Thursday morning. He will come back immediately if you want to see him. Or you can reach him through his office, or contact Minister Idan.

4. Minister Idan would like to invite you to dinner or lunch the week of July 8th. He leaves his post here on July 12th. He wonders if you could make it the evening of the 8th \_\_\_\_\_, 9th \_\_\_\_\_, or 10th \_\_\_\_\_ for dinner, or the 8th \_\_\_\_\_ or 11th \_\_\_\_\_ for lunch. Can we set a date tentatively?

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General Working Principles

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the peace treaties must be based.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for compensation.
8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its performance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.



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ACTION

July 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: Golda's Message to President on Watergate

Dinitz told you on June 2 that he had passed to Len Garment an oral personal message from Mrs. Meir offering the President her sympathy and understanding in his current difficulties. She hoped he would be soon free to devote his time and energies to his goal of building peace.

It turns out that Len Garment's memo to the President passing on this message (Tab I) was not forwarded to the President. It was apparently treated as too routine. *(Apparently either a Kehring or a Harig decision)*

It occurred to me that you might want this to go forward. We could send it up again, if you like.

Send it forward \_\_\_\_\_

Forget it *HK* \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1973


MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: LEONARD GARMENT

Israeli Ambassador Dinitz called on me today and delivered the enclosed letter to you from the Prime Minister (Tab A). He added that he was instructed by the Prime Minister to convey to you the following personal message:

That she is saddened by the difficulties that beset you and wants you and Mrs. Nixon to know you have her sympathy and understanding. She prays for a satisfactory resolution that will soon enable you to address your time and energies fully to the task of building a more peaceful world. This she knows is the goal which is closest to your heart.

I thanked the Ambassador and told him I would convey to you the letter and personal message.

Attachment



ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, 22 May 1973

Dear Mr. President,


May I say how moved I was to receive from Mrs. Nixon and yourself such kind birthday greetings.

Your warm remarks addressed to me on the occasion of our 25th anniversary and on my own 75th birthday are deeply appreciated. They echo in our hearts the feelings of friendship and gratitude which our people cherish with respect to you, Mr. President, personally and to all the people of your great country.

Please accept at this time my sincere expressions of goodwill coupled with the prayer, which all Israel shares, that your historic efforts in support of peace everywhere will speedily be realized.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



Golda Meir

H.E. Mr. Richard Nixon  
President of the United States  
The White House