

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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State Dept. review
completed

MORI C03352111

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:


Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Adviser
to the President for National Security
Affairs
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *MR*

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, May 3, 1973
6:30 - 7:15 p. m.

PLACE:

The Map Room
The White House



Our remarks are that the information in the [redacted] generally confirms our information from other sources. It doesn't match every detail but it generally checks.

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CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]

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2

We also know Syrians have a major function in any military act. We also know the Syrians began military preparations.

We also call attention to the fact that Jordan will find itself under pressure from Egypt, Syria and possibly also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

These are the questions I am supposed to ask you: Do you have such information?

Dr. Kissinger: Not yet.

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Amb. Dinitz: I am to ask whether has given you such information.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have to check.

Amb. Dinitz: The third question is whether the Syrians and the Iraqi forces will try to enter Jordan against the will of the King, but unlike 1970, not against his regime but to take positions against Israel.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think?

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Amb. Dinitz: to be alarmist. But what concerns me is that what this message says we also have similar information.

My concern is whether Syria would do such a thing without the encouragement of the Russians. And there is no evidence of the Russians encouraging this.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not plausible before the Summit.

Amb. Dinitz: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: Egypt is also part of this.

Amb. Dinitz: It seems like part and parcel of the whole strategy, in which Syria will play an important part. Where Egypt might take action independent of the Russians, Syria is much less likely to because of the flow of Soviet arms. It doesn't seem likely.

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3

If in your absence this develops, whom do I see?

Dr. Kissinger: Scowcroft. You don't think it is so imminent that we should make contingency plans? I should be here.

Amb. Dinitz: Within a month.

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Amb. Dinitz: Sisco wants to have lunch with me, alone, on something he heard from the White House. Would this be Russian Jews?

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe the Ismail talks, because the Egyptians leaked it to our Interest Section. If he raises Ismail, you can say you got a brief account from the White House. On the Russian Jews, it is up to you.

Amb. Dinitz: If it is in regard to Russian Jews, I won't talk to them in the same way as to you.

Dr. Kissinger: I really must implore you --

Amb. Dinitz: I really tried hard before the meeting with the President.

Dr. Kissinger: I knew, I could tell.

Amb. Dinitz: It is really difficult here, because of the guilt feeling here because of the holocaust. In Israel it is a big issue because Golda has not come out for the Jackson Amendment.

May I say that a meeting between Jackson and the President should take place.

Dr. Kissinger: A private meeting?

Amb. Dinitz: Yes. The Senator is upset that he did not see the President alone.

Dr. Kissinger: I saw him alone. He is the only one who got advanced word.

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4

Amb. Dinitz: I have reason to know that if he gets a private meeting he might be willing to redraft the amendment along the lines you suggested -- more monitoring than preventive, and eliminate the harassment provisions. It is easier for the Jews.

Dr. Kissinger: I saw Jackson last night and I think he will be reasonable. I wanted to show you my last message to Ismail. [Tab A] As you see, I have not committed myself to anything. Just a few general statements.

Amb. Dinitz: Well, there are many many pitfalls along the way.

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing can happen. It is too complex.

Amb. Dinitz: Very interesting his last speech. Total withdrawal from any reasonable diplomatic approach. To warn the Soviets against falling into the trap of the U. S. proposal when it was their proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they have any serious interest. Last March, and November, there were no proposals but at least there was some interest. Now it takes weeks to get an answer.

Maybe we should take an initiative, just to make it concrete.

Amb. Dinitz: Along the lines of negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: I know your domestic situation, but just to make a concrete proposal.

Amb. Dinitz: There are dangers. It prejudices you in negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but doing nothing has its dangers too.

Amb. Dinitz: The onus is on them, because we have accepted the two proposals from State put to us.

Dr. Kissinger: It can't go on indefinitely.

Amb. Dinitz: In Moscow will it come up?

Dr. Kissinger: We will get a two-hour speech.

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"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's message of April 20. Because of other commitments, it now appears that it would be most convenient for him to meet about May 18. If that is acceptable to Mr. Ismail, Mr. Trone will come to Cairo to discuss the various possibilities for a meeting.

"2. Mr. Ismail's presentation at the last meeting was very much appreciated. It is Dr. Kissinger's understanding from the last meeting that the Egyptian side proposed proceeding as follows: It would be the immediate objective to develop possible heads of agreement which could lead to simultaneous negotiations on arrangements for withdrawal from the Suez Canal and on a final settlement. It was his understanding that the Egyptian side would present its more detailed views as to the contents of these heads of agreement at the next meeting.

"3. The US has repeatedly stated that it attaches great importance to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. However, it is still to be decided which channel would be most effective -- whether the White House should directly conduct the negotiations or whether they should be conducted through diplomatic channels under White House supervision. In either case, the White House will maintain an active interest.

"4. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's reassurance on efforts to maintain the security of these meetings. That security is absolutely essential if there is to be any possibility of a fruitful outcome from these discussions."