

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

INFORMATION

February 23, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: A. Denis Clift *ADC*

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With UK Foreign Secretary  
Sir Alec Douglas-Home; London, Tuesday,  
February 26, 1974, 9:00 - 10:45 a.m.

Your principle purpose in meeting with Sir Alec will be to consult on the Middle East and to provide him with a review of the steps you are planning to take in your upcoming round of Middle Eastern negotiations. Background papers and talking points on these issues have been staffed separately by Hal Saunders and are already in your books for the trip.

Additionally, with regard to the next EC approach to the Arabs, you have received/cable <sup>the</sup> at Tab A conveying the message from Sir Alec: "Not to worry, the UK will veto anything that might injure U.S. interests or efforts in the Middle East."

You will also wish to touch base with Sir Alec on:

-- Energy Conference Next Steps,

State Dept. review completed

-- Diego Garcia,

-- US-NATO and US-EC Declarations,

JCS review  
completed.

-- SALT.

OSD Review Completed

I. Energy Conference - Next Steps

The Energy Conference follow-up meeting of the international coordinating committee will have convened on February 25, just prior to your meeting with Sir Alec. The British are continuing to play a positive role; they are sending a strong delegation to the follow-up meeting headed by Sir Jack Rampton who, as you know, worked with the United States on the preparations for the Energy Conference. The President on February 18 sent a Cabinet

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Office message to the Prime Minister expressing his appreciation for the constructive role played by the UK delegation during the Energy Conference, and you have sent a message of appreciation to Sir Alec.

You may wish to make the following points:

-- You greatly appreciate the strong delegation the UK has sent to the February 25 coordinating committee meeting,

-- You attach considerable significance to this meeting as it is important not to lose momentum in implementing the decisions of the Energy Conference.

-- You recognize, of course, that there will still be problems ahead, but you are confident that a good work program will be developed, and the United States will continue to press hard for concrete, tangible results.

-- You are hopeful that the French will eventually decide on some form of participation; however, in any event, we will move ahead, as it is essential to develop cooperative solutions to the international energy problems.

II. Diego Garcia

On February 20, UK Charge Sykes was given the President's reply to Prime Minister Heath's letter of February 5 regarding the US-UK private understanding on Diego Garcia.

In his reply the President accepted the Prime Minister's assurances that he will give rapid and sympathetic consideration to any US proposal for use of the facilities, and the President, in turn, assured Heath that he would consult with him at the earliest possible stage should we have to make some unusual use of the Diego Garcia facilities. To implement the public understanding, a DOD/State team will have arrived in London on February 25 to negotiate an exchange of notes constituting an Executive Agreement. You may wish to make the following points:

-- the President's reply to the Prime Minister has been delivered to the British;

-- we greatly appreciate the positive spirit in which this understanding was reached;

-- you would again confirm, as did the President in his letter, that the United States will plan on early consultations with the UK should they be required;

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*f would not raise this in anything but a private meeting with Home.*

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-- the decision to expand the Diego Garcia facilities is important for its contribution to strategic stability;

-- On the related UK-US strategic issue of Super Antelope, you are pleased that the United States has been able to give the UK a positive response on proceeding with the Polaris improvement program.

### III. US-NATO and US-EC Declarations

There has been some forward movement with the French on the NATO Declaration as the result of Rumsfeld's recent talks with DeRose. We are still waiting for the EC to take the next formal step by providing us with their revised text of the EC Declaration.

Acting on White House instructions, Ambassador Rumsfeld has privately informed Secretary General Luns that the United States believes April 25 would be a good date for the signing of the NATO Declaration. Rumsfeld has also indicated to UK Ambassador Peck that we think London would offer the right site for the signing of the Declaration. In response Peck has advised us that the UK has already raised this with Luns who says that Belgium must be given first choice. Luns has confirmed this to Rumsfeld saying that "at this date it would be impossible to hold the signing ceremony in London because Belgium would be so embarrassed". The British plan to pursue this with Luns after their February 28 elections. You may wish to make the following points:

-- We seem to be making some headway on the NATO Declaration, although the French still want explicit reference to the US-USSR nuclear agreement which we cannot accept.

-- You also believe it is important in the NATO Declaration to remove the reference to a differentiated threat to the United States and Europe. In this regard, the Canadians have tabled a useful formulation.

-- How does the EC calendar look at this point, in terms of the next round of consultations on the US-EC Declaration? (Current indications are that the EC may provide us with its revised text on March 5, and the next round of consultations may take place on March 14 in Bonn -- this timing would mesh with the March 13 reinforced NAC meeting of political directors.) In this declaration, the recognition in some way of the spirit of US-European partnership is important to the United States.

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-- It is important to have Japan associated with the Declarations; accordingly, you hope the UK will agree with us on the desirability of an EC-Japan-US trilateral declaration.

-- You will continue to consult with Sir Alec on the site for the NATO Declaration signing.

#### IV. SALT

You will want to bring the British up to speed on our SALT proposal, in particular the MIRV throw weight concept. (The NAC has not yet been briefed.) You should explain that our main emphasis is on trying to control the new Soviet ICBMs and to forestall the need for a U.S. buildup. Additionally, you may wish to make the following points:

-- The other key elements of our approach are:

- Equal numerical aggregates of central strategic systems at 2350.
- A program of phased mutual reductions over a 10-15 year period.


-- At the same time, we do not yet have a clear Soviet reaction to our proposal but we have agreed to make every effort to conclude an agreement before the President's visit this summer.

\* \* \* \*

A copy of State's briefing memorandum is at Tab B.

Hal Saunders, Chuck Cooper and Jan Lodal concur.

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*Scowcroft  
LL*

C:HSonnenfeldt  
2/21/74 EXT. 34404  
C:HSonnenfeldt

S/S - MR. LUERS \* \* \*

*Scowcroft  
McFarlane  
Rodman (2)  
Saunders*

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

NODIS *Cherokee*  
TOSEC *65*

HS  
HS  
S/S

E.O. 11652:  
TAGS: PFOR  
SUBJECT:

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT

SYKES HAS JUST BEEN IN TO SEE ME ON INSTRUCTIONS TO CONVEY AN ORAL MESSAGE TO YOU FROM ALEC HOME IN REGARD TO YOUR BREAKFAST CONVERSATION ON THE EC APPROACH TO THE ARAB. THE BASIC TONOR OF HOME'S FOLLOW-UP COMMENTS IS NOT TO WORRY AND THAT THE BRITISH WILL VETO ANYTHING THAT WOULD INJURE OUR INTERESTS OR EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I MADE NO COMMENT OTHER THAN TO THANK SYKES IN YOUR BEHALF AND TO SAY THAT I DID NOT THINK YOU HAD QUESTIONED THE INTENTIONS OF THE BRITISH OR THE OTHERS BUT WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE OBJECTIVE EFFECTS OF WHAT THE NINE WERE PLANNING. IF YOU SEE HOME IN THE NEAR FUTURE YOU WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT THIS OPERATION. FAILING THAT, I DOUBT THERE IS MUCH POINT IN FURTHER WRITTEN EXCHANGES SINCE THE NINE ARE CLEARLY DETERMINED TO LAUNCH AN INITIATIVE AND OUR POSITION HAS BEEN MADE AMPLY CLEAR.

BEGIN TEXT OF SYKES' SPEAKING NOTE

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1. YOU WILL RECALL SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOMES'S DISCUSSION WITH DR. NESSINGER OVER BREAKFAST. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE NINE WILL GO AHEAD WITH THE DIALOGUE, AND DECISIONS MAY BE TAKEN AT THE NEXT MINISTERIAL POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING ON 4 MARCH. ANY FORMAL COMMUNICATION WILL, OF COURSE, COME VIA THE PRESIDENCY, BUT I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN OUR VIEWS, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

2. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY EXPLAINED IN GENERAL TERMS OUR VIEW OF THIS DIALOGUE. IT IS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE ARABS, TO BE GIVEN PRACTICAL EXPRESSION THROUGH COOPERATION ON INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL MATTERS. IT IS NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT (EUROPEAN DISCUSSION OF GUARANTEES IS NOWHERE NEAR COMPLETE AND ANY PROPOSAL WHICH MAY EMERGE LATER ON WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO FIT IN WITH AMERICAN TIMING); NOR IS IT RELATED TO PROPOSALS SOLVING THE ENERGY CRISIS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR EUROPE TO CONTINUE WITH THE DIALOGUE, BUT THAT IT IS IN NO WAY INCOMPATIBLE WITH US INTERESTS.

3. THE REASONING BEHIND OUR VIEW IS AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) WE UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US INITIATIVES ON THE ENERGY AND MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENTS. THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE WAS GOOD EVIDENCE OF THIS;
- (B) THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE NINE MAKING AN UNSOLICITED APPROACH TO THE ARABS. THE ARABS ASKED THE COMMUNITY FOR A DIALOGUE, AND THE COMMUNITY CAN HARDLY TURN THEM DOWN, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT A REPLY;
- (C) WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DIALOGUE CAN DAMAGE US POLICIES. SHOULD THERE BE ANY SIGN OF A DEVELOPMENT IN POLICY TOWARDS THE ARABS WHICH MIGHT CUT ACROSS AMERICAN PEACE EFFORTS, OR INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS ON OIL SUPPLIES AND CRISIS, WE SHOULD OPPOSE IT, WITHIN THE POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY OF THE NINE;

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- (D) THE PURPOSE OF THE DIALOGUE IS TO ESTABLISH A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE ARABS. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PEACE-MAKING, AND ONLY A REMOTE CONNECTION WITH OIL. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS ABOUT THE DIALOGUE IS THAT IT SHOULD DIVERT THE ARABS FROM THEIR EXPRESSED WISH FOR A FURTHER EUROPEAN STATEMENT ON PEACE AND NOTABLY BOUNDARIES. WE WANT TO AVOID FURTHER DECLARATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT YOU WANT US TO AS WELL;
- (E) THERE ARE MANY HOOPS TO GO THROUGH BEFORE WE GET TO THE STAGE OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE ARABS. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A JUXTAPOSITION BETWEEN SUCH A CONFERENCE AND THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE OR THE FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS;
- (F) THE ARABS ARE ALREADY AWARE OF THE BROAD OUT-LINE OF WHAT IS BEING PROPOSED. IF WE DO NOT PROCEED WITH IT, THEY WILL DEDUCE THAT WE HAVE BEEN RIDDEN OFF UNDER PRESSURE FROM YOU, FROM THE ISRAELIS, OR BOTH. THIS WILL DO NO GOOD TO THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST IN GENERAL WHICH ARE SURELY BEST SECURED BY KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ARABS.
- (G) YOU MAY BE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT EUROPEAN IDEAS ON "GUARANTEES", BUT GUARANTEES ARE NOT PART OF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE ARABS. WE HAVE ONLY JUST BEGUN TO STUDY THEM A NEUF. THERE IS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE IN COLLATING OUR OWN, UK, IDEAS (OF WHICH YOU AND THE SECRETARY ARE ALREADY AWARE) AND THOSE OF THE OTHERS. WE FULLY APPRECIATE THAT THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE TIMING OF ANY EUROPEAN MOVE ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI QUESTION IS SENSIBLY RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA AND TO AMERICAN PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS.
- (H) WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NINE ARE KEEPING YOU INFORMED BILATERALLY; AND ARE TAKING ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN VIEWS ALL THE TIME. THE NINE HAVE AGREED THAT YOU WILL BE INFORMED OFFICIALLY AS SOON AS MINISTERS HAVE APPROVED THE PROPOSAL.

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
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WE CANNOT ACT COLLECTIVELY BEFORE THAT. AS YOU KNOW, THE COMMUNITY WANT TO TAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION TO DEFINE THEIR IDEA VIS-A-VIS OTHER COUNTRIES OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES. THE EURO/ ARAB DIALOGUE FORMS PART OF THIS, AND IT SEEMS TO BE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH CLOSE TRANS- ATLANTIC RELATIONS. WE HOPE THAT THE US WILL WELCOME IT IN THIS SPIRIT, AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE EUROPEAN UNITY OF WHICH WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION APPROVES.

END TEXT

IF YOU WISH THIS PURSUED WITH THE BRITISH IN ANY WAY BEFORE YOU RETURN FROM MEXICO PLEASE INSTRUCT. 44

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL  
(With SECRET Attachment)

To: The Secretary  
From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman *AAH/LWJ*

Your Meeting with Douglas-Home  
Tuesday, February 26 - 9:00 - 10:45 a.m.

Participants:

UK: Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec  
Douglas-Home  
Lord Carrington, Secretary of State  
for Energy  
Sir Thomas Brimelow, Permanent  
Under-Secretary, FCO  
C.D. Wiggin, Assistant Undersecretary  
FCO (NATO and Western Europe)  
Michael Weir, Assistant Undersecretary  
FCO (Near East)  
Hugh Overton, North American Desk, FCO

US: The Secretary  
Under Secretary Sisco  
Chargé Sohm

Analysis/Background:

You last met Sir Alec at the Washington Energy  
Conference and had bilateral discussions with him  
at breakfast on February 11. Your meeting on  
Tuesday will offer an opportunity to brief the  
British on your expectations for our Middle East  
trip. It may also be used to foster the spirit  
of cooperation which the British displayed at the  
energy conference.

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Tuesday's meeting will take place just two days before the British general election in which Heath is seeking a new mandate to deal with the industrial relations difficulties which the country is undergoing. Foreign policy has not become an issue in the campaign, with the exception of the question of EC membership which Labor has sought to develop as an important theme. These efforts have been essentially unsuccessful; the major issues continue to be domestic: industrial relations and inflation. At this point in a bitter campaign, it appears that the Conservatives will be returned to power, but whether their majority in the Parliament will increase or decrease is moot. With polls showing Liberal strength as high as 20 percent, a coalition government cannot be ruled out.

The British will wish to have your assessment of Middle East prospects, including the chances for Israeli-Syrian disengagement in light of past Syrian attitudes and the current state of Israeli domestic politics. They will also want your views on the reaction of the Arab oil producing nations to the energy conference. Some European topics, which you may wish to cover in addition to the discussion of the Middle East, are included at Tab A.

A scenario will be provided by Embassy London upon your arrival.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Issues and Talking Points
- Tab B - Biographic Information
- Tab C - Suggested Arrival and Departure Statements

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Drafted: EUR/NE:CLFloyd:cn  
2/22/74 ext. 20829

Concurrence - EUR/NE <sup>MB</sup> Mr. Buell, EUR - Mr. Stabler <sup>WS</sup>  
EUR/RPM - Mr. Streater (CSCE, MBFR, Year of Europe), EUR/RPE - Mr. Albrecht (Energy),  
NSC - Mr. Clift, C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt

## ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

### 1. CSCE

UK Position: The British know that Moscow strongly desires a "successful" CSCE, concluded at summit level, and have insisted that the Soviets should pay a price for a successful conference by accepting some expansion of East-West ties and limits (confidence-building measures - CBM's) on their use of military force to pressure their neighbors. The British apparently believe progress on these fronts will be necessary to justify, to domestic opinion, their participation in CSCE, and Heath has publicly stressed the need for relaxation of constraints on human contacts and the flow of information. British representatives have therefore aggressively pressed the Soviets for concessions on freer movement and CBM's, and have privately deplored our low profile at CSCE. They have tabled in Geneva, with support from the Germans, French and other Allies, a CBM resolution calling for prior notification of troop maneuvers and movements, despite strenuous Soviet opposition to the latter measure. They intend to press the movements issue for a while, dropping it eventually in return for Soviet acceptance of more stringent CSCE constraints on maneuvers.

US Position: We frankly differ with the British and believe the West will obtain little or nothing of value from CSCE and that it is thus unwise to irritate Moscow in an effort to extract meaningless concessions. At the same time, we have not wished openly to break ranks with our Allies at Geneva.

### Your Talking Points:

--We wish to avoid needless confrontation with the Soviets at CSCE and would hope that the participants could move as expeditiously as possible toward necessary compromises.

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--On CBM's, we doubt that anything significant can be achieved, but we will remain silent on the British proposal for prior notice of troop movements;

--We join the UK in doubting the utility of post-CSCE follow-on machinery with a political-security role;

--We are not pressing for a summit-level finale but will not stand in the way if the Europeans desire it.

## 2. Year of Europe

British Position: The UK response to our Year of Europe initiatives has been reasonably constructive. In the development of the NATO Text the UK has been forthcoming. However, they have not joined us in taking issue with the French formulation implying a differentiation in the threat to the US and other Allies. Moreover, they have generally been reluctant to take issue with the French concerning those aspects of the US-EC declaration on which the French have strong views. In an effort to assist in the development of a shorter, less legalistic US-EC text, however, the UK recently tabled in the Nine a revised draft, as did the French and Italians. The UK has been among the most negative of the EC concerning the US proposal for a tri-regional declaration with the Japanese.

US Position: We believe that the texts of the Year of Europe declarations should be completed in time to permit their signature in April. In the US-EC text, we wish more forthcoming references to the concept of partnership, enhanced consultations and the interrelationship among issues than the Nine so far have been willing to accept. In the NATO text we wish to remove any reference to a differentiation in the threat to Europe and North America, and to eliminate explicit mention of the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Japan should be associated with the

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Year of Europe by subscribing to a tri-regional declaration approved at a heads of government meeting during the President's trip to Europe.

Your Talking Points:

--With respect to the NATO declaration we still wish to remove the reference to a differentiated threat to the US and Western Europe. In this regard, we support the recent formulation tabled by the Canadians.

--We do not believe it is in the interest of the European Allies to proclaim publicly a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers and to make it an organic element of NATO doctrine.

--With regard to the US-EC text, we understand that the UK furnished an initial, shorter draft for consideration by the Nine, as did others and we appreciate this constructive contribution. We continue to wish to include in the text reference in some manner to "partnership," enhanced consultations and to the interrelationship among issues. We hope the UK will lend its weight in the Nine to developing a text which takes into account our views on these issues.

--We will be prepared to continue discussions with the Nine Political Directors later, after we have had time to examine the text now being developed.

--With regard to timing, we believe that the texts of both declarations should be completed in time to make possible their signature in the second half of April. While a date for a possible trip to Europe by the President is

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still under consideration, the stage of development of the declarations will be an important factor in reaching a decision.

--In our view, the texts should be signed at a level equivalent to that of the President. In this regard, we would welcome UK efforts with the Allies to help open the way to agreement on arrangements for signature meeting this criterion.

--It is essential to associate Japan with the declaration enterprise. We strongly want a tri-regional document involving the EC, Japan and the US in order to visibly link Japan's future with that of the West in common endeavor.

--The appearance of excluding Japan from a closer relationship with the "inner club" of North American and Western European allies could have important effects on Japan's policies.

3. MBFR

British Position: The UK would like the Vienna negotiations to proceed slowly, and recently has shown concern over proposed Allied tactics aimed at gaining Soviet agreement to begin discussion of US-Soviet forces in return for qualified Allied assurances on the linkage between Phase I and Phase II.

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The UK wants to avoid having UK forces subject to MBFR reductions in Phase II, and to avoid subceilings on national forces which would inhibit European defense cooperation and Allied flexibility.

Sir Alec may also ask about your views on air and nuclear forces.

US Position: We would like the negotiations in Vienna to move to a discussion of US-Soviet ground forces as a first step toward the common ceiling outcome. As a tactical move toward this, we are prepared to have the Allies tell the Soviets that the Phase II will begin a fixed period of time after Phase I, and to give an Allied assurance that forces of other direct participants, and specifically the FRG, will be involved in Phase II in return for an equivalent Soviet commitment to a common ceiling.

We agree that MBFR should not inhibit future Allied flexibility or defense cooperation. prejudice European

We have told the UK and FRG that we would like to hold trilateral discussions with them on nuclear aspects of MBFR,

Pending development of internal studies and final USG decision, we have delayed issuing final invitations.

Your Talking Points:

--We are not seeking to press the pace of MBFR but believe that beginning of discussion in Vienna of US-Soviet ground forces is a timely step toward gaining greater Soviet acceptance of the Allied approach to MBFR.

--Given the Soviet quid pro quo, we wish to go as far as the Allies are willing on assuring

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the East that national forces will be involved in Phase II.

--We believe it possible to negotiate agreements in MBFR on both US/Soviet and on other national forces without mortgaging future European defense cooperation or seriously inhibiting Allied flexibility. However, it is too early to speculate on our position if Allied concerns about European defense cooperation call into question the Phase II negotiations.

If the question of nuclear trilaterals comes up:

--we would like to sort out our own thinking further prior to detailed discussion with the UK and FRG on the question of inclusion of nuclear or air forces in MBFR.

#### 4. Energy

UK Position: The British were of significant assistance in the successful outcome of the energy conference, and are fielding a strong delegation for the initial session of the coordinating group, February 25-26. Regarding EC-Arab consultations, the British Charge, Richard Sykes, reiterated to Under Secretary Sisco on Friday, the British view that it would be less of a risk at this juncture to have low-key contacts between the Community and the Arabs than it would be to call off the whole idea. If the idea of consultations were dropped, the Arabs would probably feel that it was because the US had pressured the Community. This would be unfortunate and could be detrimental to our efforts to avoid a consumer-producer confrontation.

#### Your Talking Points:

--We do not believe that consumer countries genuinely interested in a cooperative solution to the energy crisis should propose broad new institutional arrangements to Arabs or other producers until after major

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consuming countries have fully discussed and agreed upon how best to pursue our common objectives with respect to producing countries.

--We would in particular hope that EC Nine countries will take no decisions at this time concerning possible EC/Arab cooperation arrangements. Unless carefully planned and coordinated, EC/Arab conference would result only in putting both Arab moderates and radicals in one room with further price increases a likely outcome. Arab states might use such a meeting to raise other political issues as well.

--Any EC political approach to Arab countries in absence Mid-East settlement could prove very harmful to our own efforts to find a permanent solution unless carefully orchestrated in advance with US. Even economic cooperation proposals would most likely include the supplying of military equipment and other matters with strong political implications.

--In the long run, however, we hope that the Europeans will become fully involved in the Mid-East and believe that the EC Nine can play a constructive role in maintaining the stability of the region.

5. SALT II

UK Position: The British will be interested to hear our views on SALT II. They have also suggested to ACDA, through working-level contacts, in Washington, their desire to have bilateral consultations with us on SALT--perhaps in conjunction with trilateral discussions on MBFR mentioned under section 3 above.

Your Talking Points:

You may wish to:

--Acknowledge the utility of future bilateral

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discussions on SALT, as the British have suggested.

--Outline for Sir Alec the current US negotiating position, particularly the MIRV throw-weight concept.

--Remind Sir Alec that Ambassador Johnson is scheduled to give the NAC a detailed briefing Wednesday, February 27.

6. Diego Garcia

Sir Alec may express his satisfaction that an agreement in principle has been obtained for the expansion of the facility at Diego Garcia to enable the support of periodic US naval deployments into the Indian Ocean. (A State/DOD team is in London the week of February 25 to negotiate an exchange of notes constituting an executive agreement governing US use of Diego Garcia. We anticipate no difficulty in closing the small gap between the US and UK drafts).

Your Talking Point:

--We are grateful for the forthcoming British response to our proposal for an expansion of the Diego Garcia facility to meet our mutual needs, and we look forward to regular consultations on defense policy in the Indian Ocean area.