TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 22, 1975

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State Dept. review completed

TO:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JERRY BREMER

1. The Secretary has reacted to a number of your messages.

25X1

- 3. On C-130's for Egypt (Tohak 36), he asks that you test the waters with Defense as you suggest in paragraph four.
- 4. On Tohak 37, the Vice President should attend the Franco funeral. He has no problem with Ellsworth for the Air Force job.
- 5. On Israeli arms issues, (Tohak 39), he wants to be sure that when you get some of the items released, we get credit for it. You should therefore call Dinitz when you have them released so that he knows who did it.
- 6. Warm regards.

OSD Review Completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Scowcroft reports on his meeting with Dinitz on arms

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/15 : LOC-HAK-470-1-5-3

SECRET

WASO35
OO WTE34
DE WTE #5987 2950313
O 220235Z OCT 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 39//
TO BREMER/BARBIAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY
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S E C R E T SENSITIVE WH52016

25X1

TOHAK 39

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM

BRENT SCOWCROFT

- 1. I MET WITH DINITZ ON THE ARMS ISSUES.
- 2. I HAVE SEVERAL PAGES OF NOTES ON THE VARIOUS ITEMS, BUT I WILL COVER WITH YOU ONLY THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS.
- 3. F-15 -- HE COMPLAINED ABOUT DEFENSE'S PROPOSED DELIVERY SCHEDULE AND SHOWED ME A PAPER FROM DEFENSE PROVIDING "TENTATIVELY AND FOR GENERALIZED PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY" A DELIVERY SCHEDULE BEGINNING IN JULY, 1976. HE SAYS HE WOULD SETTLE NOW FOR JANUARY, 1977. WICKHAM HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO ME THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A FEW R&D AIRCRAFT IF THE ISRAELIS WILL ACCEPT "USED" EQUIPMENT. THERE ARE ONLY 6 R&D BIRDS, HOWEVER. I INTEND TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH WICKHAM TOMORROW.
- 4. ON LASER-GUIDED BOMBS, HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED FIVE DESIGNATORS AND 125 BOMBS BEFORE THE REASSESSMENT. I WILL SEE ABOUT GETTING AT LEAST THAT MUCH RELEASED.
- 5. RECOVERY AND BRIDGING TANKS-- RECEIPT OF THESE ITEMS FROM PRODUCTION WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL 1979. THE ISRAELIS ARE REQUESTING 25 OF EACH TYPE FROM STOCKS. DINITZ SAYS THE GERMANS ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE THEM IF WE WILL APPROVE. SCHLESINGER DID NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE GERMANS ON HIS RECENT TRIP. WICKHAM SAYS YOU TOLD HIM NOT TO. IF WE ARE TO PROVIDE THEM FROM STOCKS, THE GERMANS ARE THE ONLY FEASIBLE SOURCE.
- 6. IMPROVED HAWK-- DINITZ CLAIMS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE REASSESSMENT TO EXCHANGE FOUR BATTERIES, WHICH THE ISRAELIS NOW HAVE, FOR IMPROVED HAWK BATTERIES.

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SECRET

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
- 8. ACCORDINT TO DINITZ THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 35 ITEMS ON WHICH THEY HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A RELEASE FROM MUNITIONS CONTROL. I WILL CHECK WITH STATE ON THOSE ITEMS.
- 9. I HAVE SEPARATELY LEARNED FROM WICKHAM THAT DEFENSE HAS BEGUN TO MOVE ON SOME ITEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAVE RELEASED 200 MAVERICK MISSILES, 600 SHRIKE MISSILES, 2 OV-1 RECCE AIRCRAFT, AND OVER TWO MILLION ROUND OF VARIOUS TYPES OF AMMUNITION.
 - 10. I WILL KEEP YOU POSTED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

WARM REGARDS.

0453 #598**7**

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/15:



No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/15: OC-HAK-470-1-5-3 >n
is no easy way to get them, but we might
ask Saudi Arabia for three planes due
for delivery next month.
Ask Saudi Arabia
Prefer

SECRET

WASO30

RODEWWEE4#5982 2950136
P 220042Z OCT 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 36//
TO BREMER/BARBIAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY
ZEM
S E CR E T SENSITIVE
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TOHAK 36

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

- 1. 6-130°S FOR EGYPT -- THE MEMO BY HAL SAUNDERS ON THIS SUBJECT DOES NOT OVERESTIMATE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. IN FACT, THERE IS NO GOOD WAY TO PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT.
- 2. FOR STARTERS, THE LIBYAN SOLUTION APPEARS TO ME TO BE A NON-STARTER. FOR THE NEXT OPTION, I SEE NO ONE IN THE PRODUCTION SCHEDULE WHOM WE COULD BUMP EXCEPT PERHAPS THE THREE AIRCRAFT DUE FOR DELIVERY TO SAUDI ARABIA NEXT MONTH. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD GO ALONG, IN LIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHATQE ARE DOING FOR EGYPT. THE ONLY OTHER OPTION IS TO TAKE THEM FROM THE AIR FORCE, EITHER FROM INVENTORY OR FROM PRODUCTION. I HAVE NOT RAISED THIS WITH DEFENSE, BUT I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEYWOULD COMPLAIN. THE KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY UPSET TO COMPLAIN TO PRO-ISRAELI CONGRESSMEN, IN AN ATTEMPT TO STYMIE THE DEAL.
- 3. IN THIS LATTER REGARD THERE IS ONE ELEMENT WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE SAUNDERS MEMO. THAT ELEMENT IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONGJSSIONAL INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD GET IT TWO WAYS IN THIS DEAL. FIRST, THE SALE WOULD REQUIRE A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION. SECOND, SINCE IT INVOLVES MORE THAN \$25 MILLION, WE WOULD HAVE TO NOTIFY THE CONGRESS, A LA HAWK MISSILES FOR JORDAN, AND CONCEIVABLY WITH SIMILAR CONSEQUENCES.
- 4. I WOULD THINK THAT IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO MAKE A LOW KEY APPROACH TO THE SAUDIS TO SEE WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR THREE AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT. IF WE COULD GET THREE FROM THE SAUDIS, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SQUEEZE THREE MORE FROM DEFENSE WITHOUT RAISING AN UNMANAGEABLE FUROR. IF YOU WISH ICOULD TEST THE WATER WITH DEFENSE TO GET AT LEAST A GENERAL IDEA HOW SERIOUS THE OPPOSITION WOULD BE.

yer ___

5. IN SUM, THERE SIMPLY IS NO EASY WAY TO DO IT. WITH RESPECT

END OF PAGE 01





TO PROVIDING THEM NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT, IT CAN BE DONE IF WE HAVE ANY IDEA AT ALL WHAT IT IS THEY MIGHT WANT. I WILL CHECK WITH SISCO AND SAUNDERS IN THIS REGARD BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE PICKED UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SADAT.

WARM REGARDS. 0406 #5982

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