

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

July 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...
THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT:

My Talks with Chou En-lai

State Dept. review completed

DPMO review completed.

Introduction

My two-day visit to Peking resulted in the most searching, sweeping and significant discussions I have ever had in government. I spent seventeen hours in meetings and informal conversation with Chou En-lai, flanked by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, member of the Politburo and of the Military Commission; Huang Hua, the new Chinese Ambassador in Ottawa; and Chang Wen-chin, head of the West European and American Department in the Foreign Ministry. Another four hours was spent with Huang and Chang, mostly on drafting a communique. These meetings brought about a summit meeting between you and Mao Tse-Tung, covered all major issues between our two countries at considerable length and with great candor, and may well have marked a major new departure in international relations.

It is extremely difficult to capture in a memorandum the essence of this experience. Simply giving you a straightforward account of the highlights of our talks, potentially momentous as they were, would do violence to an event so shaped by the atmosphere and the ebb and flow of our encounter, or to the Chinese behavior, so dependent on nuances and style. Thus, this memorandum will sketch the overall sequence of events and philosophic framework, as well as the substance of our exchanges. For the intangibles are crucial and we must understand them if we are to take advantage of the opportunities we now have, deal effectively with these tough, idealistic, fanatical, single-minded and remarkable people, and thus transform the very framework of global relationships.

What Happened

The Chinese treated the entire visit with elaborate correctness and courtesy. They were extremely tough on substance and ideological in their approach,

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

but their dealings were meticulous; they concentrated on essentials; they eschewed invective and haggling over details. The atmosphere on the human plane was relaxed and cordial, matter-of-factly; (one did not have the sense that they were carrying out instructions to be cordial as is often the case with Dobrynin.)

Thus Chinese hospitality started in Pakistan as we boarded the Pakistani plane in pre-dawn obscurity to be greeted by four senior Chinese officials, headed by Chang, flown up from Peking two days earlier along with three Chinese navigators (they had insisted on boarding the plane half an hour before us). And it continued right through to our return flight to Islamabad two days later with all the Chinese officials (except Chou) at the airport and the plane loaded with one last round of Chinese dishes, the latest English version of Mao's works, and photo albums of our visit prepared throughout the night.

We were met at noon at the Peking airport by the very senior Marshal Yeh who, like Chang aboard the plane, sought to confirm that you were in principle prepared to visit their country and that I was there for constructive talks between equals. Both were worried about why I had come secretly (Yahya had told me the same thing). Was I ashamed to acknowledge meeting them? Here, and in Chou's specific references on several occasions, the Chinese showed extreme sensitivity to slights such as Dulles' refusal to shake Chou's hand in Geneva in 1954.

We were whisked in Chinese-built limousines, curtains drawn, through wide, clean streets, with little traffic except bicycles. We passed through the huge Tienmen Square, capable of holding 500,000 people, to a stately, serene, totally secluded government guest house in the Western section of the capital. After drinking tea with our Chinese hosts, we rested, consumed the first of a series of Chinese meals of staggering variety and quantity, and prepared for Chou's arrival.

He came at 4:30 p.m. At our first encounter like the entire visit, he was matter of fact, urbane, and totally at ease without any of the self-conscious sense of hierarchy of Soviet officials. After a few minutes of ice-breaking small talk and an official photograph, we moved to a conference table and launched into three hours and twenty minutes of discussions.

I gave the substance of the opening statement you had approved, considerably truncated to get to the point quickly, laying out a possible agenda which we in fact took up point-by-point in our meetings -- the summit, Taiwan,

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

Indochina, relations with major countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union, South Asia, future American-Chinese communications, arms control, and any other topics of interest to the Chinese. He immediately moved to their fundamental concern, Taiwan, and I rejoined with our position on Indochina.

We broke at 8:00 p.m. for dinner, continuing a low-keyed substantive discussion. Indochina came up again as we finished off the last few of the fifteen or so dishes.

Our resumed session from 9:50 to 11:20 p.m. was dominated by the subject of great power relations in general. Chou spoke of the Chinese fear of a remilitarized Japan, and violently and contemptuously attacked Soviet imperialism which he claimed had learned its lessons from the U. S. I explained the philosophical framework of U.S. foreign policy in the post-war period culminating in the Nixon Doctrine. Chou listened raptly, asking very probing but non-contentious questions, some based on the President's remarks in Kansas City of July 6. (It was characteristic of Chou that when I indicated that I had seen only press reports, I found Chou's own annotated copy of the text waiting for me at breakfast with a request to return it since it was the only copy he had.)

On Saturday morning, July 10, we were taken to the Forbidden City, where the entire, enormous Imperial Palace grounds had been closed off from the public for a half day so that we could take a secret tour. For two and a half hours we absorbed the magnificently simple and proportionate sweeps of the red and gold buildings, the courtyards each with its own character, and the living quarters of past emperors. The Director of all of China's archeological museums guided us past ancient relics of China that had been unearthed in recent years.

We then proceeded to the Great Hall of the People where we were greeted by Chou for another four and a half hours of discussions sandwiched around a one and a half hour roast duck lunch.

Before lunch Chou made a one and a half hour presentation, as always without notes, responding to each of the seven points on my original agenda. This was an extremely tough presentation, though put forward without rhetorical flourish -- the preoccupation with Taiwan; the support for the North Vietnamese; the spectre of big power collusion, specifically of being carved up by the US, USSR, and Japan; the contempt of the Indians, hatred for the Russians and apprehension over the Japanese; the disclaimer that China is, or would want to be, a superpower like the Russians and we who have 'stretched out our hands too far'; and throughout, the constant view

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

that the world must move toward peace, that there is too "much turmoil under the heavens." There were light touches as well, such as Chou's revelation that James Reston was taking a slow train from the border which would conveniently get him to Peking right after our departure. Still, Chou ended with a challenge -- whether there was any sense in a high-level meeting given our vast differences.

I responded very toughly, pointing out that they had raised the issue of a Presidential visit and that we could not accept any conditions. I would not raise the issue again; they had to decide whether to issue an invitation. I then launched into a deliberately brusque point-by-point rebuttal of Chou's presentation. Chou stopped me after the first point, saying the duck would get cold if we did not eat first.

At lunch the mood changed and Chou's geniality returned. I gathered the impression that his speech had been largely for the record.

At the end of lunch Chou launched into a moving account of the Cultural Revolution which he continued to relate even after I noted that this was China's internal affair. One could tell that the Revolution was an anguishing period for him. He described China as torn between its fear of bureaucracy and the excesses of revolution, with each side claiming to speak for Mao until the acknowledged excesses threatened to destroy the fruits of some fifty years of struggle.

After lunch I continued my comments on his remarks, having covered Taiwan and Japan before the break. On Indochina, as on Taiwan, I noted the need for time for a political evolution and I re-emphasized the link between the two questions. After moving through the other issues such as great power relations, South Asia, communications between our governments and arms control, we had laid a sound substantive framework. Chou, suddenly, matter-of-factly returned to your visit to China. He suggested the summer of 1972, indicating that they would prefer it if you met the Soviet leaders first. He said that they were not afraid of anyone but they were not looking for unnecessary trouble either. I said that a US-Soviet summit had been agreed in principle but I could make no promise and would accept no condition. I also said that a summer summit might look like a political campaign gesture. Chou then moved your visit up to the spring.

We adjourned at six so Chou could go to another meeting (he normally works from noon to early morning) and agreed to meet four hours later to draft the joint announcement. We returned to the guest house for dinner and

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

an evening of fits and starts, of nighttime strolls and cancelled meetings and a complicated, occasionally painful minuet of communique drafting. This process is described in the section dealing with the summit.

The next morning we held a final two hour meeting which wrapped up the summit, the communique, and final substantive comments. In the first forty minutes we reached agreement with Huang and Chang on the Communique at Tab A. This capped a drafting process that had its quota of tension but was marked by the other side's clear willingness to meet us half way. Our negotiating over the language was free of the pettiness and elbowing that we have experienced with the Russians. And once the basic bargain was struck, the rest of our business flowed comparatively easily.

Chou, who had been waiting nearby -- so as to avoid a confrontation over language -- suddenly appeared after the announcement was agreed, and we proceeded to settle all the major principles of your visit along the lines you wished.

After bidding farewell to Chou, we and the other Chinese officials had a final lunch. All tension was gone and Marshal Yeh's normally impassive face was finally creased by smiles. On the way to the airport he recounted some of his experiences -- how over forty years ago as a division commander of Chiang, he heard of Mao and his 2000 followers in the mountains and joined them. And as we drove up toward the waiting Pakistani plane he remarked that none of them on the Long March had ever dreamed to see victory in their lifetimes. They had thought their struggle was for future generations.

Yet, he said, "here we are and here you are."

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

The Chinese

Two qualities in the Chinese came across with particular force during this initial encounter: their inward philosophical tension and their inward strength.

For us this episode is, of course, a major new turn in international relations. For the Chinese Communists it is no less than a personal, intellectual, and emotional drama. They have endured fifty years of the Long March, struggle against the Japanese and Kuomintang, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution.

Yet here they were, dealing with arch capitalists, while what they call a "war of liberation" was going on at their borders, acting out a drama of philosophic contradictions. The moral ambivalence of this encounter for them was reflected in a certain brooding quality, in the occasional schizophrenia of Chou's presentations, in the jagged rhythm in drafting the announcement, and the tales of the Cultural Revolution and the Long March and Mao Tse-Tung's inspirational leadership. This ambivalence showed up also in their request during our Saturday Imperial Palace tour for an oral summary statement to be made on tape by both sides the final day. I suggested this idea be shelved until we had finished our discussions and they confirmed it would be for internal use only. When Chou arrived at the guest house late that evening he said that they no longer considered the tape necessary. I suspect they wanted the tape for Mao Tse-Tung.

Thus these were men in some anguish. Yet their long history of past suffering gave them an inner confidence that was reflected in a certain largeness of spirit. There was none of the Russian ploymanship, scoring points, rigidity or bullying. They did not turn everything into a contest. Profoundly committed and firm on principle, they dealt in historical terms; and once we reached basic understandings, such as on the announcement, details fell into place without maneuvering for petty gains.

They can be expected to be meticulous in their diplomacy. Indeed they stressed over and over again that they considered meticulous observance of even the spirit of our agreements the key to good future relationships. When I mentioned the fact that the Russians had put out their own, and different, English translation of the May 20 SALT announcement, Chou showed obvious contempt and assured me that the Chinese would never resort to such a gambit. Our hosts stressed that the television film and photos of our visit would be held until we agreed to their use.

The Chinese are clearly men of deep conviction and a wide chasm of ideology and isolation separates us. But they were nevertheless willing to paint prospects not only of normalizing relations but moving onward to friendship and cooperation.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-7-

Chou En-lai epitomized these qualities. He spoke with an almost matter of fact clarity and eloquence. He was equally at home in philosophic sweeps, historical analysis, tactical probing, light repartee. His command of facts, and in particular his knowledge of American events, was remarkable. He insisted on admitting faults in their society, and protesting that their lavish hospitality was only "what they should do."

There was little wasted motion, either in his words or his movements. Both reflected the brooding inner tension of a man concerned both with the revolutionary fire of the next generation and the massive daily problem of caring for 750 million people, one who endured the tribulations of the Long March and was now inviting the President of the United States to visit his capital.

Chou was also genial and urbane, with a refreshing sense of humor. He displayed an easy egalitarianism -- with his interpreters who had a free though respectful relationship with him, or with all of our party who he consistently ushered into and out of elevators in front of him. And he was considerate -- in his genuine concern when one of my colleagues wasn't feeling well, in briefing me just before my departure of events in the world from which I had been insulated, and in making sure that we would continue to use the Yahya channel occasionally because "one should not burn bridges that have been useful."

In short, Chou En-lai ranks with Charles De Gaulle as the most impressive foreign statesman I have met.

Of course; these people were on their best behavior. These were the cream of their current elite; and it is inconceivable that the next generation there will produce leaders tempered by such experiences. Almost all of the positive qualities we saw are Chinese, not communist, and can be found in Taiwan or Singapore or San Francisco. Much of their ideology is distasteful, and living in China today would be a numbing, depressing experience. They are certainly fanatically tough. They do not wish us well. Their new society has been purchased at a terrible cost -- in freedom, spontaneity, color, and family life. But the present generation of leaders understand big conceptions. Our dealings will be difficult, especially as we inaugurate a brand new relationship. The rewards and risks will be great. But if we keep our nerve and are clear about our purposes we can start a new historical course.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-8-

Summit

The summit emerged as the cause of a major Chinese ambivalence. Even before the meetings started the Chinese were anxious to get confirmation that you were in principle willing to go to China. On the other hand they pretended that they had responded to your request. On substance Chou took an initially hard position that the summit should be in the context of improving Sino-US relations and that the best way to accomplish this was by the establishment of diplomatic relations. He eventually backed away -- only after considerable give-and-take -- by reluctantly acknowledging that recognition was not an "absolute" precondition for a summit, though this direction should be set by it.

This was in the earlier stages of our talks. Later on, Chou again toughened his position by stating that the initiative for a summit had come from you and not from the Chinese. I referred to the actual messages, which I had brought with me, but suggested that if it was so difficult perhaps we should drop the idea of a summit for the time being and go on to substantive matters.

By the second day, the Chinese stand again had softened. On the way to our tour of the Forbidden City, Ambassador Huang referred to Chou's interest in a statement on a summit. Chou himself raised the subject in our discussions that afternoon and after making no headway with a ploy that a summit should be in a climate of Sino-US friendship to be established by recognition, proposed at about 5:30 in the evening that a drafting committee for a joint summit communique meet that night at about 8:30 p. m. He told me that he had another appointment, but would personally appear about 10:30 p. m.

Having gone this far, Chou was willing to look more deeply into the summit issue. He listened to my thoughts on general principles, and insisted that another high-level meeting between our representatives would be necessary before the summit took place to fix the agenda and details. The U. S. representative, he said, should be either me or someone else of similar stature close to you. I mentioned Ambassador Bruce and in his final statement he said that it should be either Bruce or I. This time, though, the visit should be an open one.

Chou in addition expressed a desire to have your summit with Mao Tse-Tung take place after any similar meetings with the Soviets. Even though he

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-9-

was willing to be flexible when I explained our problems, this was a significant sign (and perhaps the most significant) of the Chinese worries about their confrontation with the USSR.

Producing a mutually satisfactory communique proved to be a tense process. Their drafters failed to appear at the stipulated time, and at about 10:45 p. m. we were told that they would not arrive before 9:00 the next morning. I had in the meantime been walking in the grounds of the guest house to discuss with my associates the possible reasons for the delay, and I also had made it plain to their protocol people that I had to leave Peking no later than 1:00 p. m. the next day whatever the state of our discussions. I also said that as the President's representative they had to give me a precise meeting time and could not keep me on standby. They must have sensed my irritation, for just as we were going to bed we were informed that Chou was coming. He arrived at about 11:15, referred to my departure time, apologized for getting us up, and said that his drafters would appear shortly. He departed after an hour's friendly conversation dealing with Taiwan, India, the Berlin issue, and the Soviet Union.

I then spent several hours with the Chinese officials going over a draft by their side which would have had the initiative for the visit coming from you, and which would have keyed the summit just to seeking "normalization of relations." (Tab B). I insisted that the origin of the visit had to be put in terms of mutual interest. They agreed after a while, although there were differences over the exact language. Where they had trouble was over my insistence that the summit meeting should have a broader scope than just the normalization of relations. At about 1:40 a. m., they proposed a 30-minute recess in which they would try to work out language on both points suitable to us, and left the room. We took another brief walk in the grounds and returned to await their arrival; at 3:00 a. m. we learned that they had left the building entirely (they must have gone to Chou En-lai's office) and would not return until 9:00 a. m.

Ultimately, at 9:40 a. m., on July 11, Chou and the other officials reappeared. At this point there was some confusion; Chou, it seemed, would be strolling outside while the others came in to discuss their draft communique with me. Our first word, however, was that all were to come in together, and the Chinese seemed rather embarrassed at the sudden shift in plan. In their new version of the communique they had gone very far to meet my requirements, and their wording needed only a few minor changes to be fully acceptable. The agreed joint communique (Tab A) suggests a mutual desire for the summit with you accepting their invitation, and its purpose has been broadened to "questions of concern to both sides."

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-10-

With agreement reached on the communique, Chou quickly appeared. Presumably for "face" reasons, he had not been prepared to present himself unless or until there was such an agreement. Once in the meeting, he accepted easily all the details for the summit which I then put forward. He made the point that Chairman Mao had personally endorsed the summit meeting, and accepted my proposed date and time for the public release of the joint communique, even though "this may cause us a little trouble."

I can only account for the fits and starts in the drafting of the joint communique by attributing them to a deep conflict between ideological and practical considerations on the Chinese side. Ideologically, the concept of Chairman Mao sitting down with the leader of what they call the "imperialist camp" must be extremely difficult for some Chinese to accept, despite the prospect of its moving forward their campaign against Taiwan.

On the other hand, I believe they are deeply worried about the Soviet threat to their national integrity, realistically speaking, and see in us a balancing force against the USSR. And, unlikely as it may superficially seem, I sense that they actually do appreciate the balancing role we play in Asia. Nevertheless, it is hard for life-long revolutionaries to act against their own principles, and we must be exceptionally careful not to drive them away.

The Chinese will undoubtedly stress the Taiwan issue as the key to normalization of relations, but we can maintain that all issues of mutual concern will be discussed for the sake of Asian and world peace. On all other issues Chou in effect left all the other basic principles up to you, giving us precisely what you wished:

-- A visit of up to five days.

-- Probably one other city besides Peking. (He mentioned Mao might be outside the capital for more quiet talks with you.)

-- Small official delegation, to include Secretary Rogers, myself and a couple of aides.

-- Agenda will probably look somewhat like the one Chou and I had, with this subject to be pursued by Bruce and/or me.

-- Small press delegation; he said this could mean around ten. They will establish the groundrules after we tell them what they should be.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-11-

-- Minimum secret service; I really don't think security will be any problem. They said security is the responsibility of the host country.

-- The PRC will not invite other U.S. political leaders before your visit. I emphasized that it was important that our new departure in relations start at your level and not be muddled by eager politicians in advance. This would not rule out newsmen and cultural exchanges in the interim.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-12-

Taiwan

This was described by Chou as the basic issue between the U.S. and the PRC, going back to the Korean war, when we "surrounded" Taiwan and declared -- in contrast to our previous position -- that its status was "undetermined." Chou maintained that this was still our position, citing as a case in point a recent statement by the State Department press spokesman to the effect that Taiwan status was legally undetermined. (You will recall that you took considerable exception to this statement.) I emphasized that they might have noted that the remarks by the press spokesman had not been repeated. There was considerable laughter on the Chinese side over this, and frequent later references. Chou asked whether we could apply the same method to Laird's comments about nuclear weapons for Japan. I am sure that they were already aware that you had clamped down but wanted confirmation.

Chou then went on to say that to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, the U.S. must:

- Recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and a province of China.
- Recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China.
- Withdraw all its armed forces and military installations from the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait within a limited period.
- Consider that the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty is invalid.

I responded that the Chinese were going beyond what they had said to us in their messages and in the two 1970 Warsaw talks, in which they had requested the removal of our military presence only. I said that we had to distinguish between what could be done immediately and what had to be left to historical evolution. With respect to military presence there were two components to our forces on Taiwan -- those related to the defense of Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, and those related to the defense of Taiwan. The former could be withdrawn after the end of the war in Vietnam; the latter would depend on the general state of our relations with the PRC.

Chou asked whether I was linking the Taiwan issue to Indochina. When I affirmed it he did not demur but turned to a discussion of Indochina, pointing out only that it was easier for the Chinese who were not at war to take a long view than for the Vietnamese.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-13-

On the political future of Taiwan, I said we did not advocate a "two Chinas" or a "one China - one Taiwan" solution but would accept any political evolution agreed to by the parties. We hoped that this evolution would be peaceful, and Chou said the PRC would try to keep it so.

I said that we could not accept recognition as a condition to your visit to Peking. Chou, after much give and take, said that recognition was not a precondition but that the visit should set recognition as the ultimate direction of our policy. He accepted my position that some time would be required, i. e., well into your second term.

Chou said that if China was to be patient it needed three assurances: first, that the US would not support "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan" policy; second, that we would not support the indigenous Taiwan independence movement; and third, that we would not permit Japanese troops to move in. I stressed that this would be our policy but noted that some events on Taiwan might be beyond our ability to control. Chou interposed no objection.

Regarding the UN, I said we might support a position where the admission of the PRC would be by a majority vote, but the expulsion of other countries, i. e., Taiwan, would be by a 2/3 vote with the Chinese Security Council seat going to the PRC. As soon as the PRC gained the necessary 2/3, it would be China's sole representative in the UN.

Chou stated that the PRC did not regard getting into the UN as a particularly urgent matter. It had lived without the UN for 21 years, and could continue to do so. However, if others asked, the PRC would of course maintain its stand that its legitimate rights in the UN must be restored. China would have to oppose the US position which I had described. When I suggested that he mute the rhetoric, he agreed smilingly. Chou added that our proposed stand would cause more difficulty to us than to the PRC. He did not take undue exception to it as long as we would not put it forward ourselves, but would simply support it if proposed by others. (Significantly, discussion of the UN issue came well before agreement on the summit and the joint communique, showing that the one was not an obstacle to the other.)

As a final point on Taiwan, Chou noted that the agreement on your meeting with Chairman Mao would "shake the world." Afterwards, Chiang Kai-shek might collude with the USSR or Japan, and would demonstrate against you. Chiang would try to operate independently of the U.S. Chou knew this from his previous associations with Chiang, and the US "should beware."

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-14-

Indochina

Chou En-lai was as forthcoming as we could have hoped. His attitude throughout reflected the ambivalence of Peking's position. For ideological reasons, he clearly had to support Hanoi. On the other hand, it was apparent that he did not wish to jeopardize the chances for an improvement in our relations, especially after I explained the positions we had taken in Paris and warned of the danger of escalation if negotiations failed. He came back to this latter point again and again, without threat or bluster, simply using it as an argument for the desirability of peace.

Thus Chou went back and forth between a formal theoretical defense of Hanoi's position (though in much lower key than Le Duc Tho at Paris) and concrete questions that sought to discover areas of agreement. He stressed Peking's support of Hanoi while insisting that there had not been advisers in Indochina nor would there be. He criticized American aggression but stressed Chinese interest in an "honorable exit" for the US.

From the outset, I linked the Indochina conflict and our relations with Peking:

-- I pointed out that two-thirds of our forces in Taiwan were linked to the war and their removal would depend on an end of the conflict.

-- I also pointed out that an end to the war would accelerate the improvement in our relationship.

In addition, I reviewed the current situation in Paris and pointed out that the talks were blocked because of Hanoi's insistence on the overthrow of Thieu and its refusal to agree to a ceasefire. I warned that a breakdown in the negotiations would mean continuation of the war, with incalculable consequences.

Chou addressed Indochina several times during the first two days of our talks.

On the first day he asked a number of questions about our position, generally in an intelligent and sympathetic manner. These were:

-- Were we really ready to pull out?

-- Would we close all our bases?

-- Why would we wish to leave a "tail," such as some advisers and/or the Thieu Government?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-15-

-- Would we be prepared to accept having the Indochinese people determine their own future?

-- Why did we wish a cease-fire?

-- Would we wish to continue giving aid to the present government?

It was clear that he understood the linkage between Taiwan and Vietnam and did not object to it. He also was extremely concerned about the possibility of escalation. In addition, he made the following points:

-- He revealed that he had not been informed about the secret meetings we have had with the North Vietnamese in Paris recently.

-- He said that China only had two objectives with regard to a Vietnam settlement:

. There must be a withdrawal of US and Allied forces.

. The peoples of the three Indochinese countries must be left to decide their own future.

-- He insisted that China would keep hands off after a settlement.

On the second day Chou took a harder line. As part of a generally tough presentation, he attacked the Thieu and Lon Nol Governments and he charged us with having committed "aggression" in Indochina since World War II. He warned that we should pull out completely and not leave a "tail" behind in the form of advisers since these would be the entering wedge for a new involvement.

He warned about the dangers of escalation but also made clear that China would not intervene. He explained several times that Chinese assistance to Hanoi had never included combat forces -- there had only been some bridgebuilding and road repair crews during the bombing.

He stressed that there were no Chinese advisors in Indochina nor would there be.

The morning of our departure, without prompting, Chou returned to Indochina in an astonishingly sympathetic and open manner. He made the following points:

-- He hoped our negotiations in Paris would be successful and he wished me luck.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-16-

-- He would talk to Hanoi after the announcement of the President's visit to Peking had been made.

-- Peking supports Mme. Binh's seven point proposal but they were negotiable.

-- He hopes our withdrawal will be complete, thorough and honorable.

-- He thought that we would find Hanoi more generous than we believed.

This means he will talk to the North Vietnamese and may be able to exert some influence. The mere fact of his talking to them is likely to compound the shock of your announced visit to Peking. In any case, he knows that the very fact that we and Peking are moving closer will have an impact in Hanoi.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-17-

Japan

Chou repeatedly expressed concern about the revival of Japanese militarism, and I have no doubt that the PRC relationship with Japan is in fact a serious matter for the Chinese. Chou maintained that the rapid development of Japanese economic power would inevitably carry rearmament in its wake. In this, he said that Japan's economic expansion would lead to political expansionism. He pointed to the great budgetary increase of Japan's Fourth Defense Plan over its predecessors as a case in point. He quoted Sato as mentioning that Japan's rapid economic growth would permit this plan to be completed in two to three years rather than the five originally contemplated.

He noted also that Sato had now spoken of the defense of Taiwan, Okinawa, and Korea being essential to the defense of Japan, and took Sato's mention of this in our 1969 Joint Communique with him as an indication that the US was supporting Japan's rearmament. Japanese troops might even go to Taiwan. At one point he mentioned the possibility of Japan colluding with the US and the USSR to carve up China, and cited Secretary Laird's speech in Japan as a sign of U. S. interest in Japan's developing nuclear weapons. He doubted that the return of Okinawa would be without nuclear weapons. Chou plainly was holding us responsible for trends in Japanese policy which appeared to threaten China.

I declared flatly that we were not encouraging, and indeed opposed, any revival of Japanese expansionism. I agreed on the military implications of Japan's economic growth and said that the US and PRC interests coincided in trying to keep this growth under control. All the US supported was Japan's ability to defend itself. Paradoxically, the presence of US troops on Japan helped to restrain the Japanese rather than the reverse. We would never collude with other countries in carving China up.

I strongly denied that what Secretary Laird had allegedly said was Administration policy, and pointed out that once Okinawa reverted to Japan our bases would be under the same restrictions as now exist for those in Japan. Chou accepted this, and later personally called attention to the State Department spokesman's comments on Secretary Laird's speech.

Although Chou had started off with a very rigid position on Japan, I believe that he understands the restraining role which we play with respect to the Japanese. This came through toward the end of our meetings, when he asked that we see to it that, as US troops are withdrawn from Taiwan, Japanese troops are not moved in to replace them. I said that this would be done.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-18-

Korea

Korea was cited by Chou as another area of "turmoil under heaven." This arose first from the fact that there was no peace treaty there despite China's efforts in 1954 to extend the Geneva Agreements to Korea. Chou had proposed this to get something better than a ceasefire in Korea, and Anthony Eden, in the chair, had gone along until Walter Bedell Smith had "waved his arms" and caused Eden to reject the move on procedural grounds. Presumably, Chou was suggesting that China wanted an arrangement in Korea which had legal status.

Chou went on to say that there was constant conflict along the DMZ; U. S. forces were still present; and ROK troops were in Vietnam. There was now a joint U. S. -South Korean army in which Thailand was also represented. Park Chong-Hee was as aggressive as Syngman Rhee. Therefore, the DPRK -- and China -- had a right to be concerned.

I said that what happened in Korea depended very much on the general relationships in the area. If the war in Indochina ended and U. S. -PRC relations developed, the ROK troops in Vietnam would return, and it was conceivable that before the end of your next term most of the U. S. troops in Korea would be withdrawn. Chou himself suggested that in those terms the process had already begun with our removal of 20,000 men, and I agreed. On Chou's other points, I said I knew of no Thai troops in the ROK. The joint U. S. -ROK military command was not a new policy; it was intended to make our withdrawal easier and was not a new commitment.

Chou's remarks on alleged ROK aggressiveness gave me an opportunity to highlight North Korean actions. I said that the PRC was opposed to ROK military aggression against the North Koreans, but North Korea for its part was very harsh in its military measures against both the US and the ROK. We believed it would be very helpful to Asian peace if the PRC could restrain North Korea in the use of force against the U. S. and the ROK. Chou did not reply, but I think that his silence may be taken as a form of assent -- he could hardly admit that an ally of the PRC was behaving aggressively.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-19-

South Asia

Chou described the South Asian subcontinent as a prime area of "turmoil under heaven." This was because India had long ago under Nehru adopted an expansionist philosophy, not only committing aggression against Pakistan but against China as well.

Chou went into great detail to outline the development of the hostile relationship between China and India. This began, he said, when the Indians became aware in 1959 that the Chinese had built a road across Indian-claimed territory between Sinkiang and the Ali region of Tibet -- but how could this have been Indian territory when the Indians weren't even aware when the road was built?

The Indians had then attacked a Chinese military post in this region, but had lost heavily because the Chinese position was uphill from where the Indians were and was strongly fortified. But world opinion (including Khrushchev) felt that the Chinese must have started hostilities because of the heavy Indian losses. The Indians had also used force against the Chinese in other areas. The culmination was the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

Chou made the following points:

-- India was responsible for the present turmoil in East Pakistan. It was supporting Bangla Desh and had allowed a Bangla Desh "headquarters" to be set up on Indian territory.

-- In the light of Indian expansionist ambitions, India would use any military aid -- such as that given by the USSR -- for aggressive purposes. Chou acknowledged that we were not giving military assistance to India, but said that one had to keep the consequences of any aid in mind.

-- China would stand by Pakistan in the present crisis. This position began to develop with a rather low-key remark at dinner the first night that China "could not but take some interest in the situation," and ended with a request to me at the end to convey assurances of Chinese support to President Yahya Khan.

I told Chou that we were trying very hard to discourage an Indo-Pak war.

I assured Chou that we were bringing all the influence we could to bear on India to try to prevent a war from developing. Chou said that this was a good thing, but he inferred that we might not be able to do too much because we

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-20-

were 10,000 miles away. China, however, was much closer. Chou recalled the Chinese defeat of India in 1962 and hinted rather broadly that the same thing could happen again.

The Chinese detestation of the Indians came through loud and clear. Conversely, China's warm friendship for Pakistan as a firm and reliable friend was made very plain. The lesson that Chou may have been trying to make here was that those who stand by China and keep their word will be treated in kind.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-21-

Communications

I explained that it was essential for our two governments to be able to communicate rapidly, reliably and secretly -- without the intervention of third parties, however friendly. This had two aspects -- how to get in touch with each other and whom to deal with in the government. I suggested three levels of contact:

- A hot line between Washington and Peking for urgent messages.
- A secure direct channel between the Chinese leaders and yourself which would not be vulnerable to the bureaucracies or developments in a third country. This would be used for important and sensitive matters, to agree on basic principles and to clarify misunderstandings. It would be kept free of the bureaucracy to prevent both leaks and formalism. I mentioned Paris, London or Ottawa as possible contact points.
- A diplomatic contact such as Warsaw for more technical issues and implementation of agreements reached through the secure channel.

Chou's first reaction was rather cool, with a suggestion that it might be premature. On the second day Chou returned to the subject to say that he would let me know the next morning at our final session.

On Sunday morning he never mentioned the hot line proposal and stated that revival of the Warsaw Talks would be a waste of time. They took more of everybody's effort in preparing instructions than they were worth. He agreed that we did need a secure White House/Peking channel and chose the Chinese embassy in Paris, saying that their Ambassador there was a member of the Central Committee and that Ottawa would be too much in the limelight. I said that General Walters would be our contact in Paris and would be in touch on July 19. We shall communicate either by sealed envelopes or through messages to be transmitted by their Ambassador. Chou added that we should continue to pass some non-substantive notes through President Yahya who had been a good friend.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-22-

Great Power Relations

Chou professed apprehension over the possibility that the US, USSR, Japan and even India might collaborate to carve up China. He showed deep bitterness against the Soviets and contempt for their petty tactics. The Soviets, he said, were proceeding down the U. S. road in "spreading their hands out too far." While he was confident they would be ultimately defeated, he inferred that difficult times might be expected before this came about. Fear of revived Japanese militarism was a major theme throughout our discussions. Japan's economic growth was to him equated with expansionism, and he felt that rearmament to back it was already taking place. In addition, China's historical distrust of the Indians came through strongly.

I emphasized that the US would never collude with other powers against China and that this would be shortsighted since the US and China had no real conflicting interests. Indeed, in the area of relations among large countries our interests were very comparable. With respect to Japan, we were interested in its having the ability to defend itself, but would oppose Japanese militarism. While the objective consequences of US actions might sometimes look like collusion, we would strive consciously to avoid this. I assured Chou on the following:

- that you were prepared to inform them in advance of major decisions we have with other great powers that might affect them.
- that you would take their views into account.
- that we would consult on items of interest to them and try to reflect their concerns. I offered to explain to him our approach on other negotiations we were conducting, such as SALT. Except for a general question on Berlin issues, he did not take this suggestion up.

Chou several times emphasized that China lacked the economic base to be considered a great power, but had no desire to be considered one, and indeed wished to avoid the kind of great power rivalry existing between the Soviet Union and the U. S. Chou alleged that even after China's economy became developed it would still not act as a great power. The Chinese clearly like to picture themselves as free from the vice of great power ambitions which have only served to stir turmoil in the world and brought problems for the

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-23-

powers themselves. They prefer to be cast in the role of championing the less powerful and fortunate countries of the world. Their attitude toward great powers now is a mix of hostility, suspicions and fear. This may be rather disingenuous, however, for while they profess not to envy those who are undisputably great powers, they may be making a virtue out of a necessity. And their very interest in a U. S. -Chinese summit has them playing a great power game.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-24-

Arms Control

I asked for their views on the Soviet proposal on a five power nuclear conference, reminding him that you had held up our response so as to get Chinese views. They flatly rejected the idea as a Soviet attempt to lasso them. I said we would be slow in our response; that other countries' pressures might force us to go along; and that if such a conference were held we would seek to make sure that China was not put at a disadvantage. On SALT I assured them we would conclude no agreement directed against them, and that we recognized that limiting their embryonic strategic program at this time would be discriminatory. I said we were willing to discuss accidental war agreements with them such as we were discussing with the Russians; Chou replied that we could raise this with them whenever we wished. I added that we were prepared to consider a renunciation of force agreement such as Chou had proposed in 1955. He responded in low key that Taiwan was linked to this issue and immediately went on to say he hoped my Paris Talks with the North Vietnamese would bear fruit.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-25-

Americans Detained in China

At the very end I said that we would be grateful for a pardon of all or some of the four Americans still held in China when the PRC thought conditions were ripe. We were not making a request and recognized it was China's matter to decide, but we would consider their release a voluntary act of mercy. Chou said that their law allowed shortened sentences for good behavior and they would continue to study the matter. (This could well mean they might make a gesture.)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-26-

Conclusion

I am frank to say that this visit was a very moving experience. The historic aspects of the occasion; the warmth and dignity of the Chinese; the splendor of the Forbidden City, Chinese history and culture; the heroic stature of Chou En-lai; and the intensity and sweep of our talks combined to make an indelible impression on me and my colleagues.

These forty-eight hours, and my extensive discussions with Chou in particular, had all the flavor, texture, variety and delicacy of a Chinese banquet. Prepared from the long sweep of tradition and culture, meticulously cooked by hands of experience, and served in splendidly simple surroundings, our feast consisted of many courses, some sweet and some sour, all interrelated and forming a coherent whole. It was a total experience, and one went away, as after all good Chinese meals, very satisfied but not at all satiated.

We have laid the groundwork for you and Mao to turn a page in history. But we should have no illusions about the future. Profound differences and years of isolation yawn between us and the Chinese. They will be tough before and during the summit on the question of Taiwan and other major issues. And they will prove implacable foes if our relations turn sour. My assessment of these people is that they are deeply ideological, close to fanatic in the intensity of their beliefs. At the same time they display an inward security that allows them, within the framework of their principles, to be meticulous and reliable in dealing with others.

Furthermore, the process we have now started will send enormous shock waves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility. It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan. It will have major impact on our other Asian allies, such as Korea and Thailand. It will increase the already substantial hostility in India. Some quarters may seek to sabotage the summit over the coming months.

However, we were well aware of these risks when we embarked on this course. We were aware too that the alternative was unacceptable -- continued isolation from one-quarter of the world's most talented people and a country rich in past achievements and future potential.

And even the risks can be managed and turned to our advantage if we maintain steady nerves and pursue our policies responsibly. With the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-27-

Soviet Union we will have to make clear the continued priorities we attach to our concrete negotiations with them. Just as we will not collude with them against China, so we have no intention of colluding with China against them. If carefully managed, our new China policy could have a longer term beneficial impact on Moscow.

With Japan our task will be to make clear that we are not shifting our allegiance in Asia from her to China. On Taiwan we can hope for little more than damage limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty even while it becomes evident that we foresee a political evolution over the coming years. With our other Asian allies we will need to stress both our continued bonds and our hope that reconciliation between us and the Chinese will serve the cause of regional peace. And in India, after the initial shock, our China moves might produce a more healthy relationship.

For Asia and for the world we need to demonstrate that we are enlarging the scope of our diplomacy in a way that, far from harming the interests of other countries, should instead prove helpful to them.

Our dealings, both with the Chinese and others, will require reliability, precision, finesse. If we can master this process, we will have made a revolution.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/ EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

ANNOUNCEMENT

Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.

Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DRAFT (First Chinese Draft)

ANNOUNCEMENT

Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Envoy of the President of the United States of America, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.

In order to seek the normalization of the relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, President Nixon has expressed the wish to meet the leaders of the People's Republic of China. The Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes and agrees to extend an invitation to President Nixon for a visit in the spring of 1972. President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

October 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER #
SUBJECT: My October China Visit: The Atmospherics

A Cool Arrival

We began our stay in China under what superficially appeared to be chilly circumstances. When we landed in Shanghai on October 20 the weather was partially overcast, and only a handful of PRC officials were on hand to greet us -- the same four who had met us last July in Rawalpindi plus two representatives of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office. Their manner seemed correct, but restrained. And in Peking the reception committee was virtually the same as the one which greeted us in July when we arrived secretly, although this time the visit was publicly announced. As before, Marshall Yeh Chien-ying headed the official PRC party, joined this time by Acting Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei (whose presence did serve to up-grade the affair).

Our move from the airport to the Guest House (the same one which we stayed in before, incidentally) was similarly chilly. The motorcade skirted the city over roads which were closed to normal traffic and heavily guarded; the sky seemed grey and threatening. We discovered upon entering our rooms in the Guest House that each of them contained an English-language propaganda bulletin carrying an appeal on the cover for the people of the world to "overthrow the American imperialists and their running dogs." I had a member of my staff hand the one in my room back to a PRC protocol officer with the remark that it must have been put there by accident; subsequently, we collected all these bulletins and presented them to the Chinese, who received them in silence. The Chinese staff at the Guest House on the first day were very cool and impassive -- a fact especially noted by our Chinese-speaking members of the party.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 2 -

Growing Warmth

A thaw began to set in later that day, when Prime Minister Chou En-lai met my entire official party in the Great Hall of the People. Following a photographic session of his staff and mine at the entrance to the conference room, Chou seated us inside behind the inevitable cups of green tea and proceeded to say a few words of personal greetings to everyone in the party. He was extremely cordial during the general meeting which followed. Then at the formal banquet which he hosted for the entire party (including the crew of the aircraft) he shook hands with each one of us individually; he gave what I consider to be an extraordinarily warm welcoming toast (attached at Tab A); and he went around the room after the toast to touch glasses with every American present. Chou had done his biographic homework well on those Americans at his table, and flattered them with references to their educational and professional history or past experience in China.

From this point on the character of the visit was firmly fixed by our Chinese hosts. It was in my judgment a careful, thoughtful, conscientious effort, first:

-- to make me and my party feel like truly welcome guests; and second;

-- to get the Chinese public accustomed to the idea that a senior U. S. official and the members of his party were in fact being received as honored guests by the top PRC leadership.

The way my visit was built up by the Chinese leaders, as well as the lengths to which they went to assure that the public and lower-ranking PRC officials got the message, became very apparent as the days went by.

Publicizing the Visit

The day after our arrival we learned from foreign press reports that the People's Daily (the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper) had on the preceding day carried an announcement of the arrival which reported the composition of the welcoming committee. Although to us the composition of this group was virtually the same as before, no politically-aware Chinese could have missed the point that I was met by very high-ranking PRC personalities indeed.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 3 -

More significantly, on October 21 the People's Daily carried two photographs of Chou En-lai's meeting with us the day before. One was the group photograph of our two parties standing together outside the conference room, with Chou by my side. The other depicted us sitting down in the period prior to the general meeting during which Chou had extended his personal greetings to me and all the members of the party. These two photographs were very similar in format to those which have been taken when Chou has met innumerable other delegations, except for one thing -- they showed Chou extending the same courtesies to me, as the representative of the President of the United States, which he had extended to personalities who were allies or at least neutrals. The average Chinese could not have failed to be greatly impressed, if not shaken, by this juxtaposition. This was the first time any American official had been pictured in the press with PRC officials. This was a clear signal to the populace.

Anti-American Propaganda

I should note here that I did not become aware of the People's Daily photographs until late on October 22, and in the meantime had raised with Chou the question of offensive anti-American signs in Peking. I had noticed a Reuters story covering my arrival which had said that the Chinese had had their little joke; my motorcade had driven past a series of Chinese characters at the airport which denounced "American Imperialism." At my meeting with Chou on the afternoon of October 22, I handed him this story and pointed out the problems that language of this nature would create for you. He responded along the lines of what he had said that morning about the PRC's anti-U.S. propaganda in general: this was "firing an empty cannon." However, he seemed to accept what I had said and to take it to heart. More about this later.

Informing Party and Government Officials

On the evening of October 22 an event occurred which I consider quite exceptional, and which must have had the same effect on the Chinese present. We were taken to the Great Hall of the People to see a "revolutionary" version of Peking Opera, and were met there by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, the Acting Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister's Secretary, and other leading PRC personalities. These escorted us into the auditorium, where to (I am sure) our mutual surprise, approximately 500 cadres, or PRC and Chinese Communist Party officials,

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 4 -

were in attendance. Immediately upon entering the hall, Marshal Yeh and the other top PRC leaders began to clap their hands loudly, inviting a response from the audience. I must in all candor admit that the American visitors did not exactly bring the house down, but the point was surely driven home: these Americans were honored guests who were distinctly personae gratae to the PRC. The Acting Foreign Minister told me during the intermission that the members of the audience were hand-picked from among personnel of the Foreign Ministry and other key PRC departments. These people were ones whom the senior leaders particularly wanted to read the handwriting on the wall.

(It later occurred to us that the applause might have been more prolonged if we had joined in! While this would be inappropriate in our customs -- as well as in Chinese tradition -- the PRC has emulated their despised Soviet revisionist fellow socialists in this regard: the honored guests are expected to join in, reciprocally -- and simultaneously.)

Exposure to the Public

If the Peking Opera event could be taken as Chou En-lai's means of enlightening the cadres as to the new turn in events, then my trip to the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs on October 23 was his way of bringing the public into the picture. When our motorcade departed at about 9:00 a.m., I found myself escorted not just by protocol representatives, as would have been perfectly proper (and acceptable), but by the Acting Foreign Minister, the Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Mayor of Peking. These ostentatiously led me up the steep inclines of the Great Wall before a scattering of curious onlookers, and later down into the tomb of one of the Ming Emperors before a much larger group of spectators. By this time the People's Daily arrival announcement of October 20 and photographs of October 21 had been widely noted; I could see that I was being recognized and that the level of my official escort was being taken in.

It was during the trip to the Great Wall that I believe some pay-off from my remarks to Chou En-lai on signs could be noted. As we drove farther into the mountains and the pass narrowed it became more and more obvious that a large number of slogans painted on the rocks along the road had been blotted out. Of course, this could have been a by-product of the general down-playing of sloganry since the end of the Cultural

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 5 -

Revolution, but my staff assures me that at least some of the blotted-out slogans looked freshly done. Another point of interest about this trip concerns security: at literally every road junction along the entire right-of-way there was at least one uniformed member of the Public Security Forces. This in itself was no small enterprise.

The next day, October 23, brought a further and even more ostentatious appearance before the Chinese public. Our Chinese hosts had arranged a visit for me and the members of my party to the Summer Palace, about a half-hour's drive west of Peking, and once again I was escorted by senior PRC officials rather than by protocol functionaries. My host on this occasion was Marshal Yeh, who saw to it that he and I were properly displayed together before what the Chinese call "the masses." The Acting Foreign Minister and the Secretary to the Prime Minister were also present. The high point of this episode was our taking tea aboard a boat poled out onto the Summer Palace lake in plain view of literally hundreds of Chinese spectators. The fact that a strong, cold wind was blowing (on an otherwise perfect day) did not deter our hosts; they clearly wanted this boatripe to take place and only a hurricane could have prevented it. When I waved to the crowds of people on the shore, they clapped loudly. Word was sinking in, but I should add, too, that there appeared to be no coaching and that the applause seemed genuinely enthusiastic.

Apropos of our visit to the Summer Palace, Prime Minister Chou told me later in one of our restricted sessions that a North Vietnamese newsman had been there and had taken many photographs. The Chinese, Chou said, had assumed from his appearance that he was one of "them;" they had not recognized him as being a North Vietnamese and were more than a little disturbed to discover his true identity.

Visits to Points of Interest Around Peking

Over the next two and a half days I became involved with the Prime Minister in serious substantive discussions, and found that my movements as a result became rather restricted. Others of the party, however, continued to move about the city and its environs, looking at centers of interest which you yourself might wish to visit. Significant impressions were:

-- Along the route to an oil refinery and chemical complex, some 40 km. west of Peking, the people appeared to be forewarned of the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 6 -

motorcade, and showed much interest in it. Sizeable crowds gathered to watch the group pass in villages and major road junctions. There were no evidences of hostility; quite the contrary -- the bystanders seemed pleased to see Americans.

-- Near the oil refinery, an obvious job of painting over signs had taken place. The road bent between two large brick and plaster billboard-size signs, one of which still contained an innocuous propaganda exhortation, and the other of which had been splashed over, obviously hastily, with red paint.

-- At the oil refinery itself, the authorities were correct but friendly. Certainly our people were treated no differently from other foreigners who have visited the complex.

-- In Peking, when several members of the party went shopping at the Friendship Store (the special store for foreigners), a large crowd of Chinese gathered quickly to watch, but with evident goodwill. The sales personnel were extremely friendly and helpful, despite the fact that as a courtesy to us the store had been kept open past the normal closing time.

-- Another stop which a number of the group made in Peking was at a hospital where the ancient Chinese practice of acupuncture (treatment of ailments by needles) was being put to modern use. What nobody expected was that this turned out to be a display of acupuncture techniques used as anesthesia for three major surgical operations: an appendectomy, the removal of an ovarian cyst, and the removal of a portion of a diseased lung. Although none of our people had any medical background whatsoever, they were led as "American friends" through every stage of these operations. (I am pleased to report that all operations were a success.) This strikes me as being somewhat beyond the ordinary in the reception of foreigners who are not M.D.'s.

The morning prior to the acupuncture episode a free moment occurred for me while Prime Minister Chou and his colleagues discussed some of the substantive points which I had raised. A suggestion was made that I should visit the Temple of Heaven, south of the main city of Peking, which I accepted. The Chinese were able to arrange this on 30 minutes notice, and also saw to it that the Mayor of Peking was present to accompany our party to the temple area -- the site where the Emperors of China prayed annually for a good year. Once again we were on public

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 7 -

display before the people of Peking in company with leading PRC officials.

Additional Impressions

A few other vignettes may help to characterize the spirit with which the Chinese received us:

-- On the evening of October 24 a farewell banquet at the Great Hall of the People, which was originally to be hosted by the Acting Foreign Minister, was preempted by Chou En-lai. Chou did not have to do this, but made the extra effort. As before, he was a most gracious host. He did not, though, repeat the round of toasts -- once the dinner was over, he and I went into a nearby conference room for a further discussion of substantive issues.

-- As I have previously indicated, the aircraft crew was given the most hospitable treatment. Sightseeing tours were arranged for the crewmen, special quarters were constructed for them at the airport, gifts were provided, and indeed they were accorded the same kind of meticulous courtesy with which those of us in the Guest House in Peking became so familiar.

-- Repeatedly during my conversations with Chou En-lai a deep and abiding Chinese hatred of the Russians came through. The Chinese are concerned about Soviet power, but utterly contemptuous of the motivations of the leaders who exercise this power.

-- Also at frequent intervals during my conversations with Chou, he brought in the fact that Chairman Mao Tse-tung was fully behind the US-PRC contact. This line of Chou's must surely be seeping through to the members of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy.

-- The (to me) remarkable display of courtesy and warmth which has been accorded us. This ranged from the detailed and meticulous way we were housed, fed, and transported, to the cordiality of our social conversations and tours, to the beautiful gifts and collections of photographs with which each of us were plied upon departure. I realize that the Chinese are traditionally capable of being good hosts under strained circumstances, but the treatment we have received appears to transcend what might have been expected. For us, a rapprochement

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 8 -

is a matter of tactics, but for them it involves a profound moral adjustment. This is not easy for them, but they are making it and more.

My final observation once again concerns signs. I have mentioned the offensive sign at the airport noted in the news reports upon our arrival which the interpreter in my car indeed translated for me as we sped past it on our way into Peking as something having to do with "American Imperialism." When on October 26 we returned to the airport prior to our departure, the offensive characters were gone. The sign was still there, but had been completely repainted; the message had nothing to do with the United States.

Peking's Commitment to Improving Relations

There are many possible conclusions which might be drawn from the atmospherics of this visit to Peking. In my opinion, one conclusion stands out above all the others: the Chinese leadership is committed to a course leading toward an improvement of relations with the U.S. The People's Daily announcement and photographs, the display of friendship toward us by top PRC officials before their cadres, the public gestures of friendship, the toning down of anti-U.S. propoganda, and the many instances of personal courtesies extended to us, all underscore this commitment. Any reversal of the direction in which the PRC leadership is moving would at this point probably involve serious domestic repercussions for Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the other senior personalities who have joined with him in this endeavor.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Premier Chou En-lai's Extemporaneous Toast
October 20, 1971

Dr. Kissinger and friends,

I would like to take this opportunity to welcome President Nixon's special envoy Dr. Kissinger and the other American friends who have come to China for this interim visit. The purpose of Dr. Kissinger's present visit is to make preparations related to the political discussions and technical arrangements of President Nixon's visit.

A new chapter will now be opened in the history of the relations between China and the United States after they have been cut off for 22 years, and we should say that the credit for this should go to Chairman Mao Tsetung and President Nixon. Of course, there must be someone serving as a guide, and it was Dr. Kissinger who courageously made a secret visit to China, the so-called "land of mystery". That was quite a remarkable thing. This is now Dr. Kissinger's second visit to a land that should no longer be considered a "mystery". He has come as a friend, and has also brought with him some new friends.

As for me, although I have never been to the United States, I know quite a few American friends, and the United States is not unfamiliar to me. It is evident that the social systems of our two countries are different, and our respective world outlooks -- Dr. Kissinger likes to use the word "Philosophy" -- are totally different, yet this should not prevent us from finding common ground. The Sino-American talks have gone on for 16 years now, but no common ground has yet been found. Now President Nixon will personally come to Peking for discussions, and Dr. Kissinger is his advanceman. We hope these discussions will achieve positive results.

Our two peoples are great peoples. Although our two countries are separated by the vast Pacific Ocean, friendship links our two peoples together. After receiving the U.S. table tennis team this year, we received a number of other American friends. We hope that this new era will be approached in a new spirit.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the great American people and the great Chinese people and to the health of Dr. Kissinger and all our other friends!

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

11/11/71

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: My October China Visit: Discussions
of the Issues

Chronology

Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I held very intensive substantive discussions for some twenty-five hours, building on the solid base that we had established in our July conversations. We had an additional five hours of talks at two banquets that he hosted for us and I spent many more sightseeing hours with Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chi Peng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister, and other officials which lent greater insight into Chinese thinking.

(Attached at Tab A is a list of my meetings with Chou; at Tab B is a full itinerary of our stay, including all meetings and sightseeing tours.)

Chou and I met ten times at the Great Hall of the People and our guest house. The opening general session included all my substantive assistants plus Messrs. Chapin and Hughes on our side; our other meetings were private, with usually only one assistant on our side. On the Chinese side, Chou was generally flanked by Acting Foreign Minister Chi, their top American expert in their Foreign Ministry, Chang Wen-chin, the secretary to the Prime Minister, Hsuing Hsiang-hui, the Deputy Chief of Protocol, Wang Hai-jung, plus interpreters and notetakers.

The first session on the afternoon of our arrival, October 20, was devoted to general philosophy, our overall approach to the People's Republic of China, the agenda for our discussions, and the major questions concerning your forthcoming trip. This was followed by over ten hours of very intense discussions in three meetings on Thursday and

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

Friday, at which, in addition to your trip, we explored the major issues that we had covered in July -- Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, South Asia, and arms control, as well as touching on other subjects by way of illustrations. Concurrently one of my assistants and the State Department representative held two meetings on subsidiary issues such as ongoing diplomatic contacts, exchanges, and trade. And the technical people met on arrangements for your visit.

These substantive meetings provided the background and framework to enable me to table a draft communique for your visit, which you had seen, at the end of the meeting on Friday afternoon. On Saturday evening, in my sitting room, Chou and I settled the major remaining issues concerning the arrangements for your trip, and Chou said that his Acting Prime Minister would meet with us the next morning to begin the redrafting of the communique. The next morning Chou showed up instead and delivered a sharp speech. We subsequently launched right into a rigorous drafting process which Chou decided he had personally to conduct. We consumed the better part of five meetings lasting eleven hours as we went through seven drafts over a sixty hour period which included two rugged nights of drafting and negotiation, from Saturday afternoon through the morning of our departure, October 26. This process and the resulting tentative communique I have described to you in a separate memorandum. Discussions on the communique, of course, included a great deal of substantive exchange on the draft formulations as well as general philosophy and principles.

At the last session, in addition to clearing up the final issues concerning the communique, we resolved other outstanding technical problems such as the announcements concerning my visit and the date of your visit and the general public line the two sides would take.

Major Results

Against the backdrop of my July conversations with Chou there were no major surprises.

The basic premises on which we have both moved to open a dialogue remain. Both sides know there are profound differences but recognize

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

that domestic and international constraints demand a phased resolution of outstanding issues. Meanwhile the very momentum of our joint initiative carries inherent advantages: for them, the burnishing of their global credentials, a general direction on Taiwan, and the prospect of a lower American military profile in Asia; for us, some assistance in reaching and safeguarding an Indochina settlement, and built-in restraint on Chinese activities in Asia; for both of us, less danger of miscalculation, greater exchanges between our peoples, and a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Chou confirmed an essential ingredient for launching this process and moving it forward -- Chinese willingness, despite their past rhetoric, to be patient on solutions. He was even more explicit than in July that they do not require time deadlines so long as principles are established. Several times he emphasized that the PRC, being a big country, could afford to wait on issues of direct concern, such as Taiwan, while the more urgent matters were those concerning her smaller friends, such as Indochina and Korea, whom one couldn't expect to have a broad perspective. This line is consistent with Peking's virtuous stance of championing the cause of smaller nations and refusing to be a superpower with its characteristics of bullying and overinvolvement.

Another consistent theme, as in July, was Chou's insistence on frankly acknowledging that there is much turmoil in the world and great differences between us. Both in our discussions and in the communique drafting, the Chinese showed their disdain for pretending that peace was either near or desirable as an end in itself; for submerging differences in ambiguous formulas of agreement, or for discussing such subsidiary issues as arms control, trade, or exchanges which only serve to make relations look more "normal" than they really are.

Among the general points that I emphasized were the fact that in some areas we could set trends but the policy implementation had to be gradual; that we should not push the process too fast because this would give your domestic opponents a chance to sink your initiative; and that Peking should not try to complicate our relations with our allies.

In brief, the essential outcome on each of the major topics was as follows:

-- Your trip. We achieved all of our major objectives, thanks both to our approach of minimizing our requirements and Chinese

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

willingness to do all within their capabilities. The basic technical and substantive framework has been established; the arrangements have been agreed upon in principle; another technical advance will flesh out the details; the substantive discussion clarified both sides' positions; and a tentative joint communique has been drafted.

- Taiwan. Both sides understand the direction in which we are heading and what the U.S. can and cannot do, but we have not yet agreed on what can be said in the communique. We will gradually withdraw our forces from Taiwan after the Indochina war. We urge that any solution of the Taiwan question should be peaceful; and we will oppose, within our capabilities, Japanese sway over Taiwan. The PRC is in no hurry to get all our forces out but wants the principle of final withdrawal established; is most interested in global acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China and its status is not undetermined; will try for a peaceful solution of the issue; and strongly opposes Japanese influence or Taiwan independence.
- Indochina. Peking will be helpful, within limits. Both in formal and informal talks the Chinese made it clear that they hope we achieve a negotiated settlement and are saying this to Hanoi. They recognize the desirability of tranquility in Indochina for your visit and our relations generally (indeed they consider it the "most urgent" question in the Far East), as well as the link between the conflict and our forces in Taiwan. In addition to sounding these themes, I outlined the history of our private negotiations; stated that Hanoi needed Peking's largeness of view so that there could be a settlement; and warned that we have gone as far as we can and negotiations had to succeed in the next couple of months or we would carry through our unilateral course which was more risky all-around.
- Korea. We are both clearly sticking with our friends, but the working hypotheses are that neither side wants hostilities and neither Korea can speak for the whole peninsula. Chou pushed for equality for Pyongyang, said that a permanent legal resolution

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

of the Korean war was required, and transmitted an abusive eight point program from their ally. I rejected the latter, said that we were prepared to consider a more equal status, and warned against North Korea's aggressiveness.

- Japan. We agree that an expansionist Japan would be dangerous, but we disagree on how to prevent this. Our triangular relationship could prove to be one of our most difficult problems. The Chinese are painfully preoccupied and ambivalent on this issue -- they seem both genuinely to fear Japanese remilitarism and to recognize that our defense cooperation with Tokyo exercises restraint. The latter point I emphasized, pointing out that Japanese neutralism, which the PRC wants, would probably take a virulent nationalist form. I also warned against Peking's trying to complicate Tokyo-Washington relations, a seductive temptation for the Chinese to date.
- Soviet Union. The Chinese try to downgrade the Russian factor, but their dislike and concern about the Soviet Union is obvious. I reiterated that we would not practice collusion in any direction, that we would treat both nations equally, that we would keep Peking informed about our relations with Moscow, and that we have many concrete issues with the USSR. Chou accepted the last point, including the fact that some of our negotiations with Moscow would work objectively to Peking's disadvantage.
- South Asia. The PRC doesn't want subcontinent hostilities any more than we do. Indeed the Chinese seemed more sober about the dangers than they did in July. Chou reaffirmed their support for Pakistan and disdain for India. In turn I made clear, in our talks and in the communique, that while we were under no illusions about Indian machinations and were giving Pakistan extensive assistance, we could not line up on either side of the dispute.
- Subsidiary Issues. The Chinese clearly want to keep the focus on major bilateral and regional issues and not get sidetracked on more technical questions that suggest a regular bilateral relationship. Thus they showed almost no interest in arms control, airily

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

6

dismissed the subject of trade, and unenthusiastically included a reference in the communique to facilitating scientific, cultural, technical and journalistic exchanges.

- Prisoners. We can expect some movement before your trip on at least one of the two CIA agents held by the Chinese, with release of the two pilots linked to an overall Indochina settlement. Premature public disclosure would, of course, be ruinous.

Opening Session

A brief rundown of the opening meeting is important, because it set the basic framework and tone for all the subsequent conversations.

I began by delivering the opening statement which you have seen, with some of the rhetoric pruned. My approach was to sketch the general principles which guide our relations toward the PRC and our attitude toward your meetings with the Chinese leaders; lay out the agenda for the following days and secure agreement on how to conduct our business; and raise the principal questions concerning the technical arrangements for your visit.

I described the US attitude toward the PRC as the following:

- You are personally committed to an improvement in relations;
- Our policy is based on the profound conviction that better relations are in our interest and is not an attempt to create a power combination;
- We are aware that our two countries have different views and that neither the PRC nor the US would trade in principles;
- We believe that our two countries share many congruent interests and that it is no accident that they have had such a long history of friendship;
- Asian and global peace requires Chinese cooperation and we would not participate in arrangements affecting Chinese interests without involving the PRC;

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

7

- We do not accept the proposition that one country can speak for all socialist countries;
- The one issue that divides us (Taiwan) is itself a product of history and if we could agree both on the general direction and a realistic process to resolve this issue, there should be no fundamental obstacle to the positive development of our relations.

I then set forth the case for gradual resolution of the issues between us, first implicitly by sketching the reactions to the July 15th announcement both at home and among our friends. I said that while we had set new currents in motion, we could not suddenly overturn traditional relationships; the old must coexist for a while with the new. Chou, here and later, acknowledged this but naturally his emphasis was on the importance of new departures. I added that foreign reaction to the July announcement was generally positive, but not all nations (e.g. the Soviet Union and India) really felt that way. I then emphasized the domestic problems you faced from some of your traditional sectors of support and the courage you have shown and which Reston had so much difficulty in acknowledging in his interview with the Prime Minister. (These were themes that I had instructed our whole party to stress in their social conversations.) Chou acknowledged that the PRC also had internal difficulties.

I then became more explicit about the need for gradualism. We had expected some of the adverse reactions and were determined to carry forward the constructive beginning that had been made in July. Both the PRC and we had been meticulous in implementing our understandings to date and were treating each other as men of honor. Looking to the future we had to sort out the questions which could be resolved immediately, from those on which we could agree in principle but would need time to implement, and those which had to be left to historical processes. We would carry out scrupulously whatever we had agreed to; this phased approach was not a pretext for avoiding fundamental problems but a guarantee that we would be successful in resolving them.

I then suggested an agenda consisting of three types of subjects: (1) the major issues such as we had discussed in July; (2) subsidiary issues

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

8

such as ongoing contacts and exchanges; and (3) the technical arrangements for your visit, the major aspects of which I then touched upon. (See the next section of this report.)

Chou and I then informally agreed on a game plan for the three types of issues that we had already settled in advance through communications and a private talk I had with the senior Chinese representative who had come to meet us at Shanghai.

(This game plan was carefully followed over the next five days: On the technical subjects, I laid out the fundamental considerations and handed over the books we had prepared in advance. The Chinese studied these and came back with questions in meetings with technical personnel headed on our side by Messrs. Chapin and Hughes. The major issues were referred back to me and Chou and were settled in social and private sessions. Chou and I held a series of private meetings on the major substantive issues and the drafting of the communique. The State Department representative and a member of my staff held two sessions on the subsidiary issues of diplomatic contacts, exchanges and trade.)

Chou made some preliminary comments on the substantive agenda which foreshadowed his approach on subsequent days. He termed Taiwan the crucial issue for normalizing our relations. He called Indochina the most urgent issue in order to relax tensions in the Far East. He moved Korea to third on the agenda, giving it a higher priority than in July, citing both sides' responsibilities for settling this question which the 1954 Geneva Conference had not treated. His fourth and fifth topics were Japan, which he said had a far-reaching influence on reducing Asian tensions, and South Asia where both sides were concerned. He put relations with the Soviet Union sixth and last; this was not a main issue, as Peking was not opposed to our relations with any other country.

Then, clearly for the record, Chou once again said that they would prefer it if you visited Moscow before Peking. I subsequently repeated for the record that it was we who had set the date for the Moscow summit, and this was based on the ripening of conditions, not on Peking's desires to interfere with US-USSR relations. Chou eagerly assented.

Chou came back to my statement that the old must coexist with the new. He knew that it was impossible for us to cut off all our traditional foreign

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

policy relationships at once, but there was also a need to break with some conventions. He again referenced your July 6 Kansas City remarks about new power relationships and a speech that Prime Minister Heath had just delivered concerning Britain's future role. He said that Heath had shown courage by recognizing the necessities to adapt to the realities of the new Europe, just as you had shown courage in your China initiative. He noted that conservative parties were often the ones to make bold new moves, citing as additional examples Ike's ending of the Korean war, Lincoln's handling of the Civil War, and Britain's expelling of Soviet spies. Following his regular custom, he once again put Chairman Mao's stamp on your visit by saying that when you two meet it should be possible for you to understand each other even though your stands differ greatly.

I then sounded a warning about Peking's making trouble for us with our allies. First, I noted that we supported Britain's entry into the Common Market and a more unified and autonomous Europe. I added that we didn't seek to drive a wedge between the PRC and its friends, and it would be shortsighted if either side tried to use the improvement in our relations as a device to destroy the traditional friendships of the other side. This would only cause the two sides to draw back into the rigidity from which they were trying to escape.

Chou rejoined this was only part of the story and could not be accepted absolutely. Since we were entering a new era it was necessary that some relations change; otherwise life would be as it was before. He cited an old Chinese proverb which says that "the helmsman must guide the boat by using the waves; otherwise it will be submerged by the waves." I replied that we had no intention of avoiding difficult problems, such as Taiwan, but until we were able to cement our friendship we should not give domestic opponents on both sides an opportunity to destroy progress. Many were saying that China was only using the initiative as a trick to destroy our traditional relationships so as to resume the old hostilities from a better tactical position. Chou once again said that times were advancing and that we would either seize upon the opportunities presented or be submerged by the tides of the times.

This exchange set up the basic philosophic tension in our ensuing discussions as we sought, generally successfully, to strike a balance between their imperatives for change and ours for time.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

10

Your Trip

You already know the agreements reached on the arrangements for your visit through my earlier messages, our conversations, and Dwight Chapin's separate report. Our approach was to scale down our requirements to the minimum in advance, present all technical considerations in writing, let the Chinese come back to us with questions, and not try fruitlessly to squeeze extra mileage out of them once they told us what they would do.

This approach paid off handsomely. The Chinese appreciated our attitude, knew that we were not bargaining in conventional fashion, carefully clarified the issues so that they knew what was involved, and then agreed to the maximum that their technical capabilities would allow. In each case they met our essential requirements in terms of numbers and facilities, and when we left, there remained only a few issues on the itinerary for me to check with you.

At the opening session I outlined our general approach, stressed that we would not let technical issues interfere with the historic thrust of your visit, and then ticked off the major issues to be resolved:

- On the itinerary, I said that we were thinking of a five-day trip with perhaps one other stop besides Peking.
- On communications, I stressed the need for secure and rapid communications for the President at all times and said a ground station was the easiest method. Chou asked when a Vice President could take over some of the responsibilities of a President, and he revealed that he had read extracts of Six Crises which showed that you had restrained yourself when President Eisenhower was incapacitated.
- On security, I said that we would rely on them as host country, that we had reduced our numbers drastically, and that the primary function would be for our men to serve as liaison with the Chinese security people.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

11

-- On the press, I explained the dimensions of the corps on other Presidential visits and how we had cut back the numbers.

-- Finally I sketched the outlines of the official (12) and unofficial (16) party.

I then explained the books that we had prepared which showed the dimensions of past Presidential visits, the reduced optimum plan for your visit to China, and then the bare minimum plan that we had finally made. (During this exchange Chou revealed that, after hearing of your liking for it, he had seen the movie Patton and believed that you admired the General because he was one to break through conventions.)

Later in this opening meeting, after I made clear that we would still proceed with the summits in the order that they were announced, Chou moved quickly to indicate that the Chinese preferred the February 21 date. He thus made it clear that there would be no haggling over this issue despite whatever other differences might crop up during the next few days. He also indicated that the Chinese were thinking of a visit lasting seven days instead of the five that I had indicated.

During the first part of our first private meeting the next morning, Chou and I explored further some of the major questions concerning arrangements. We pinned down February 21 as the date for your visit. We agreed to the general concept of meetings during your visit similar to the ones during this one -- a general opening session of the two official parties, followed by private meetings between you and the Chinese leaders and concurrently between the foreign ministers, and perhaps another closing general session. And we confirmed that neither side would say anything to the press during or after your visit which was not first mutually agreed upon.

We then discussed the meeting between you and Chairman Mao. Chou said that the Chairman wanted to meet you early during your visit, after greeting the official party, and again towards the end. I said you wanted to meet alone with Mao. He rejoined that the composition of our side was up to us, but that the Chairman was always accustomed to having the Prime Minister present for specifics, although Mao was of course fully at home on general principles.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

12

On the itinerary, we agreed that I would come back to Washington with two formulas, one for a five day visit and one for seven days. He said that he would accompany you wherever you went, made clear that they would expect you to travel on a Chinese plane, and introduced the idea of an overnight visit to Hangchow. There was further discussion of these issues during which I made another pitch for the ground station, and said that I would have to consult with you on the question of the aircraft, since an American President had never traveled on another nation's plane.

Meanwhile the Chinese technical personnel were studying for twenty-four hours the books we had given them. On Thursday afternoon they began two days of meetings with our counterparts during which they posed a series of questions to clarify the meaning of our presentations.

After a private meeting on late Thursday afternoon, I took Chou aside and expressed Mrs. Nixon's desire to see his country; he said he would check with Chairman Mao.

During our sightseeing trips to the Great Wall and Summer Palace, the Chinese mentioned Hangchow several times, underlining their hope you could go there. (Mao will probably be there, for in July Chou had said that you might be meeting him outside of Peking. However, an inconsistency arises since Chou has said that you would meet Mao early in the trip and Hangchow would come at the end of it. Since there will be two meetings between you and Mao, there could be one in Peking early in the visit and one at Hangchow at the end.)

At 9:00 p.m. on October 23 Chou came to my sitting room in the Guest House and proceeded to settle the major outstanding technical issues. He first accepted the overall dimensions of the Presidential party and support group, i. e. some 350 personnel. He said the Chinese had accepted these numbers out of respect for our having cut down the figures drastically in advance. (Chinese acceptance included 80 press. This represents a large incursion for them, but they explained on other occasions that their only concern was whether they could properly accommodate all the journalists, including having sufficient interpreters.)

Having heard our preference for a five day visit and that a trip to Hangchow would increase the numbers, Chou began to back away from that suggestion. He said that we could compromise on a six day visit which included five

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

13

days in Peking and one day in Shanghai. Knowing of the intense Chinese interest in Hangchow, I said that I would be prepared to raise this issue with you. He then made clear, in typical Chinese fashion, that Mrs. Nixon would be welcome by saying that once she saw the villa in Hangchow she would not want to spend the night in Shanghai.

Picking up a reference I made to the legal aspects of sovereignty, Chou said they would like to buy the proposed ground station and Boeing 747 processing center, and if not they would rent it. I replied that it would be easier to lease it. As I then acknowledged to Chou, this was clearly an example of their "principled" approach on technical as well as substantive questions. They want to do things themselves and maintain their concepts of sovereignty. Within their capability, they would be as forthcoming as possible. Thus, this equipment was admissible so long as it "belonged" to them.

The only comments on technical matters with an edge to them were Chou's references to security. He made clear that this was the responsibility of the host country and several times noted our requirements with a slight dose of sarcasm. (The Chinese did show some genuine concern about the security problem caused by the large press contingency.)

We settled on the text of the communique for my visit and the October 27 release date and we agreed that the announcement of the date for your visit would be in the latter part of November. After first suggesting that the text of the latter could refer only to "late February," Chou was soon persuaded of the need to be specific about the date.

Chou then was once again very firm on your traveling in a Chinese plane, and I said I would discuss it with you. Chou said that the idea of an occasional U.S. envoy to Peking after your visit could be in the communique, and I made a pitch for Bruce once the Indochina war was behind us. He stipulated there would be two meetings between you and Chairman Mao. After some further discussion, which included agreement on what I would say at my backgrounder and my informing them of the upcoming Cannikin test, we adjourned the session.

This exchange left only a few loose ends which we have since tied up. At the final session, I confirmed that there would be another technical advance party, led by General Haig, after the announcement of the date

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

14

of your visit. Since my return, we have informed the Chinese that Mrs. Nixon will accompany you and that we accept a seven day visit, including an overnight at Hangchow. We have also informed the Chinese that we believe the date for the announcement of your visit should be November 23, 1600 Washington time. On the question of your travel within China, we should take some more time to respond so that the Chinese will realize that this is a major decision for us.

These discussions on arrangements for your visit confirmed both that our somewhat unconventional approach of presenting our minimal requirements at the outset made sense and that the Chinese do not engage in haggling over technical details once agreement in principle has been reached. Their acceptance of our numbers, their leasing of the ground station and 747, and their insistence on a Chinese plane for your travel within their country illustrate their basic attitude on arrangements.

Chou might have engaged in some brinkmanship by raising shadows about your trip while we were wading through some of the difficult substantive issues. He did not do this, partly because this is not his style and partly because he needs the visit as much as we do. In any event, while we had some rough and tough private discussions, there was never any doubt cast by either side on the fact that your visit would proceed as planned.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

15

Taiwan

This remains, as we always knew it would, the single most difficult issue. On the one hand Chou says that the PRC, being a large country, can afford to be patient; that it is showing restraint in the language that it is suggesting in the communique for your visit; and that Indochina, and even Korea, are more urgent problems, because the PRC can be less generous about its allies' interests than about its own. On the other hand, the Taiwan question remains one of fundamental principle for Peking, as it has for 22 years; Chou is pressing formulations in a communique which we still cannot accept; and he has made it clear that there will be no normal relations until this problem is resolved.

Resolution of this issue in a way that allows our relations to move forward over the next few years depends on China's willingness to accept our thesis that we can do more than we can say, that to push the process too fast and too explicitly could wreck the whole fabric of our China initiative. While Chou understands our dilemma, he has problems of his own and he must show concrete progress on this issue for his own domestic and international audiences. Accordingly, our discussions and our communique drafting were dominated by the tension between the Chinese thrust for clarity and ours for ambiguity.

This was the first substantive issue that we discussed. I opened by reviewing the understandings that we had laid out in July:

- We would withdraw those forces on Taiwan related to Indochina in a relatively short period after the war in Indochina is over.
- We would reduce other forces on Taiwan progressively over a longer period of time, depending on the state of our relations. In response to Chou's query, I said that we would not set a final date on these withdrawals but that both sides understood the evolution.
- We would not advocate a two-China or one China, one Taiwan solution. At this point Chou said that we should not advocate a one-china, two-government solution as suggested by our UN position. He noted the PRC had been very restrained in its attacks on this position.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

16

- We would not support or encourage the creation of an independent Taiwan movement, and we would take action on any information provided to us that Americans officially or unofficially were doing so. Chou interjected his concern over recent demonstrations at UN Headquarters for an independent Taiwan which he claimed were nationwide, even global in scope. I said that as far as I knew the US had nothing to do with this and that I would check into the facts. Chou took the occasion to criticize CIA actions around the world, and I rebutted briefly.
- We would not support, indeed we would oppose, to the extent we could, the establishment of Japanese military forces on Taiwan or attempts by Japan to support a Taiwan independence movement.
- We would support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and would pose no obstacle to this.
- We were prepared to move toward normalization of relations with the PRC, keeping in mind Chinese views.

I said that you would be ready to reaffirm all of these points to the Chairman and the Prime Minister in a restricted meeting. I added that this was a painful process for us; we had worked with the government on Taiwan for years and whatever the historical causes, it was not easy to make such changes. Opposition to this policy would certainly arise as it began to unfold. We would not challenge the PRC view that this was an internal matter, but the PRC should settle the issue peacefully.

On the UN, I noted that we had carried out the policy I had outlined in July and that we had kept our rhetoric down. In fact it was better for both of our countries if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year, for then the process would be pushed too fast and there would be a rallying point for opponents of your China policy.

I then reemphasized that we could do more than we could say on Taiwan, and that some things had to be left to historical evolution so long as we both understood the direction in which we were headed.

Chou then asked a series of questions which underlined that their primary concern is not so much our policy but Japanese intentions and the possibility of Taiwan independence, neither of which we can completely control.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

17

After a brief historical lesson on why Taiwan is Chinese territory, Chou revealed what the British were prepared to do in order to elevate their diplomatic mission in Peking to Ambassadorial level: acknowledge that Taiwan was a province of China, withdraw their consulate from Taiwan, and support the Albanian Resolution at the UN. The British would also agree privately that they would not promote the view that the status of Taiwan was undetermined, and if they received inquiries the British government would say that its position was unchanged.

Chou said this would be sufficient if the PRC acted expediently, but instead they considered it unacceptable. The PRC objected to the British reserving their position if the issue of Taiwan's status were raised; Chou noted that Britain signed the Cairo and Potsdam declarations declaring Taiwan belonged to China. He reinforced this by relating some more history, including the US role, to demonstrate why the status of Taiwan was not undetermined and to underline PRC sensitivity to this issue. He then got to his point: what was the US policy? Do we maintain that the status of Taiwan is still undetermined or was it our view that Taiwan had already returned to China and was a province of China? This was the crucial question. How the Chinese people would solve the question of Taiwan was of secondary importance. He added that, as he had already said in July, the PRC would try to bring about a peaceful settlement of this problem. He acknowledged that this was a difficult question for us.

I responded by again saying that we must separate what we could say and what our policy is. We did not challenge the premise that all Chinese maintain there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China. In that sense we didn't maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined. Expressing this in a communique was a different matter, but we were prepared to note that all Chinese maintain there is but one China. We would also make sure that there would be no further statements by our officials that Taiwan's status is undetermined. In response to Chou's question about what we would say if other countries were to raise this question, I said that I would have to check this with you. I assured Chou that we were not encouraging any government to maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined and that the UK position had not received our encouragement. Furthermore, if a government were to raise this issue we would certainly not support it; I pointed to our UN position which was careful not to address this question.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

18

I again declared that we would do nothing to promote the elaboration of a two-China or one China, one Taiwan policy in whatever form such plans were presented and that we would attempt to encourage a solution within the framework of one China by peaceful means. This question was for the Chinese to settle and not something we could actively push.

Chou then raised the issue of our defense treaty, asking whether once Taiwan returned to the Motherland it would still have effect. I replied that if Taiwan and China were to become one again by peaceful means the treaty would automatically lapse. Chou repeated that they considered the treaty illegal and that we should withdraw all our forces from the area. I said that we understood their position, that we hoped for a peaceful solution, that the evolution of events would make unnecessary any formal action on the treaty.

Chou emphatically stated that diplomatic relations between our countries were not possible until our forces had been withdrawn and the defense treaty had lapsed. They could not send an ambassador to Washington if another Chinese ambassador were there; it was possible for you and me to go to China since Peking considered there was but one U.S. and there was no competing US ambassador in Peking. He pointed out that the presence of the Nationalist ping-pong team in the US had prevented the sending of the PRC ping-pong team. (In other contexts the Chinese indicated they still planned to send their team, however.) This problem of there being a GRC ambassador in our country underlies the PRC position about ongoing contacts: i. e. they agree to our sending an envoy to Peking but do not wish to reciprocate; and Chou turned down the suggestion of a return invitation to him as a result of your visit. It may also influence their lukewarm attitude on other subsidiary issues which smack of more normal relations, such as trade and exchanges.

I then pressed further on the need for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. We would place no obstacle in the way of a political resolution which saw Taiwan and China get back together again peacefully. Chou commented that if Chiang Kai-shek or his son wished to negotiate, the PRC would not discourage it. I interjected that frankly what we most would like and encourage is a peacefully negotiated solution after which our military relations would automatically be at an end. A peaceful

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

19

settlement would solve the questions of the defense treaty and our military forces. If there were no peaceful settlement, then it would be easier for us to withdraw our military presence in stages than to abrogate the treaty. The latter was unlikely.

Chou acknowledged these points but raised concerns about the Japanese taking our place. I replied that we would oppose that and that we had a common interest in preventing the military expansion of Japan. To encourage Japanese expansion in Taiwan would be shortsighted, but we had to select the issues on which we were able to enforce our discipline.

Chou cited Secretary Laird's comments which suggested increasing Japan's military potential. I responded that this was not official US policy, and while we could not prevent such statements, we could make sure that they would not have any practical consequences.

Chou then dwelt further on his fear of Japanese influence in Taiwan, not only military but also political and economic, and he cited contacts between various Japanese elements and officials on Taiwan. I said that it was relatively easy for us to prevent the projection of Japanese military presence on Taiwan while our forces were there; we would continue to oppose these forces after we departed but this was less under our control. If the Japanese began sending military forces outside of its territory, we would be forced to reconsider our entire policy in the Pacific. Political and economic expansion was more difficult to measure, but it was not American policy to let Taiwan become subsidiary to Japan. Chou warned that this would be most disadvantageous to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East. (Indeed, so concerned was Chou about Japan's role that in a later meeting he said that he didn't want all US forces withdrawn from Taiwan for fear that Japanese forces would then move in.)

I made the point that if before diplomatic relations there were visible signs of Sino-American cooperation such as exchange programs, this could affect the situation on Taiwan as well as in Japan. I also warned Chou against exploiting US-Japanese differences, saying that we were coming under attack in some quarters for giving up Japan in our initiative toward China. There had to be some restraint on the Chinese side. He then claimed that they had shown restraint toward Japan and said that they would not deal with Sato.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

20

That afternoon, October 21, Chou picked up the United Nations issue. He dispassionately noted PRC opposition to our position, and I explained that we had chosen this route over one that clearly indicated a two-China policy. Chou emphasized that the status of Taiwan was much more important to them than the UN seat and that they would refuse to go to the UN if our position prevailed. He then revealed that they didn't particularly like the Albanian Resolution either, since it did not specifically address the question of the status of Taiwan. (At our final meeting, which as it turned out, occurred at the very end of the UN debate, Chou pointedly complained that his talking to me at this time was very embarrassing for China's friends at the UN.)

When I invited Chou's views on a successor to U Thant, he offered nothing, saying that they had not thought about the matter. He did take the occasion to praise Hammarskjold and indirectly denigrate U Thant, a sign that the PRC might want an activist Secretary-General.

Chou concluded the brief UN discussion by repeating the need to make progress on the Taiwan question. I again pointed out that if we moved too quickly on this issue our opponents could destroy the fragile relationship that we were trying to build with the PRC. I acknowledged the PRC's need to show some progress, but repeated that if we went too fast we would tear the whole fabric of our relationship. We thus had to establish a direction in our conversations, insure that every step was implemented, and take no steps that were detrimental to our relationship.

This intensive discussion on Taiwan was later picked up in the communique drafting process which I have reported separately. Chou did indeed show some restraint in their language formulations and attempted to meet some of our concerns. We in turn moved toward their position by not challenging the one-China position of all Chinese and by indicating that we would reduce our forces in the Taiwan area. Chou's formulations, which I could not accept, would have us actively express the wish that a one-China solution be brought about by peaceful means and pledge that we would finally withdraw all our forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

Chou explained repeatedly that they were not setting a deadline on our withdrawal and, in fact, surprisingly admitted that they hoped we would keep some forces on Taiwan for a while in order to keep out the Japanese.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

21

The Chinese will be patient but at one point toward the end Chou did suggest that if, e.g., six years passed without solution of the Taiwan issue, the Chinese would be forced to liberate by "other means," his single reference in our discussions to the use of force.

As reported separately, I told Chou that I would talk this issue over with you and see whether we could come back with a new formulation for the communique. He indicated little further budging on their part but said that they might be able to change a word or two of their position if we presented a new formula. It will prove difficult and painful to close the remaining gap between us, but I think we can do it successfully.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

22

Indochina

Our discussions on the afternoon of October 21 on this subject were generally similar to those we held in July.

I underscored the reasonableness of our approach, pointing out that our negotiating proposals had addressed every concern of their allies. I stressed the advantages to the PRC of an Indochina settlement, on the one hand, and the risks of continued conflict on the other hand. Against this backdrop I made a somewhat more emphatic pitch than July for Chinese help with Hanoi, while still making it clear that we would not embarrass Peking. Chou, in turn, emphasized the desirability of our setting final withdrawals before your visit (without insisting on a political solution). He reiterated that peace had to be made with Hanoi directly, but explicitly hoped that negotiations would succeed. As in July, he was obviously uninformed about the details of our negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

Chou led off the session by citing Indochina as an urgent issue and the need for final U.S. withdrawals. He asked why we had not accepted, or at least replied to, Mme. Binh's seven points. He then explained that they could not accept Ambassador Bruce in Peking while a war was still going on. I interjected that we understood this, but given the trust he had in the White House we hoped that the PRC would find him acceptable after the war.

Chou continued that our not setting a date for final withdrawal could prevent your visit to China from being as successful as otherwise, although he made clear that this was not a condition. He repeated the PRC's support for the seven points and said that final decisions on a settlement rested with Hanoi, not Peking. He then inquired why we had not set a final date and said that this was more urgent than the UN question or the normalization of Sino-US relations.

Telling the Prime Minister that he had been misinformed about the negotiations, I proceeded to give him a fairly detailed rundown of our negotiating efforts over the summer, including the outlines of our most recent proposal of October 11. I did not give him either a piece of paper or all the details on our proposal, but enough to show its forthcoming nature. I pointed out how we had met all of the concerns of the North Vietnamese

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

23

and the PRG, even to the point of using some of their formulations. We had addressed ourselves primarily to the North Vietnamese nine point proposal, which, according to Hanoi, superseded the PRG seven points. I told Chou that it was tempting for us to publish our negotiating proposals since this would dominate public opinion in our country, but that we preferred to try and reach a settlement. I then sought Chinese influence in Hanoi with the following arguments:

- We understood that Peking didn't want to interfere in the negotiating process. But we questioned whether one small country, obsessed with its suffering and conflict, could be permitted to thwart every sign of progress between the U.S. and Peking because its suspicions were so great that it would not make a negotiated settlement.
- Why would we want bases in one corner of Asia when the whole trend was toward a new relationship with Asia's most important country?
- If Hanoi showed Peking's largeness of spirit we could settle the war within days.
- We wanted the independence of North Vietnam and the other countries of Southeast Asia. Perhaps there were others (i. e. the Soviet Union) who might wish to use Hanoi to create a bloc against China.
- We had made our last offer and we could not go further. We knew the PRC did not trade in principles, but the proposals we had made would end the war on a basis that would not require it to do so.

Chou then asked a series of questions about our withdrawals, the new elections, and the ceasefire. He frankly admitted, as he had in July, that he had not heard a word about these negotiating proposals. He asked whether we had sent a message with Podgorny to Hanoi. When I said that we had not, Chou laughed contemptuously about Russian diplomatic efforts, including their extensive travels since the July announcement. He indicated privately that Moscow had made unspecified proposals in Hanoi which Hanoi had rejected.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

24

Chou said that our withdrawal would be a "glorious act" for us, and I responded that we had to find someone with whom to negotiate. We would withdraw in any event: the only question was whether it would be slowly through our unilateral policy or more quickly as a result of negotiations.

Chou made a distinction between Vietnamese and Indochina-wide ceasefires. He expressed concern that an Indochina ceasefire would freeze the political situation in the entire region (his main problem being Sihanouk's status, of course). I said that we would not interfere with whatever governments evolved as a result of the ceasefire. We then had a testy exchange on Cambodia where I pointed out that there would not be any need to arrange a ceasefire if North Vietnamese troops would withdraw and let the local forces determine their own future. Chou did not deny their presence; he said that they were there in sympathy for their South Vietnamese compatriots. In order to explain Hanoi's suspiciousness, he recalled the "deception" of 1954 when the North Vietnamese had been tricked and no election had been held. Getting quite excited, he termed this a "dirty act", launching into Dulles. I replied that the guarantee for our actions in a peace settlement lay not in clauses but in the difference in our world outlook compared to the Dulles policy of the 1950s.

I again pointed out the generosity of our proposals and the temptation to go public with them. Chou said that he could not comment on our offer since he did not know about it in detail. (Later I said that I was not giving him our detailed proposal since that was up to the PRC's ally to do. Chou agreed. In a later meeting Chou did acknowledge that our political proposal represented a new element.) He maintained that Hanoi's preoccupation and suspicion were understandable for a small, deceived country. The North Vietnamese could not be expected to have a large view like the Chinese. (Marshal Yeh on another occasion told me that Hanoi was too proud; having as it thinks defeated the world's largest military power, Hanoi was very reluctant to take advice. In this it was egged on by Moscow. Peking, according to Yeh, genuinely wanted peace, but it did not want to make it easier for Moscow to pursue its policy of encircling China by creating a pro-Moscow bloc in Indochina.)

In any event, Chou said, the settlement was up to us and Hanoi. He again emphasized that it was important to have this problem essentially settled before you came to China.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

25

I then summed up:

- I had made seven secret trips this year to Paris which was not the activity of a government seeking to prolong the war;
- We were no long-term threat to the independence of Vietnam and wanted to make peace;
- We recognized the limits to what the PRC could do and the complications of the Soviet role, but nevertheless if the opportunity presented itself, we would appreciate Peking's telling its friends its estimate of the degree of our sincerity in making a just peace.
- We could not go any further than our proposals of October 11.

Chou again commented that they hoped we could settle and get out, whereas the Soviet Union wished to pin us down. He said it would be impossible not to mention Vietnam in the communique if the war had not been settled. I rejoined that there should be no misapprehension that Vietnam was an extremely sensitive issue for us and that it was impossible to accept a communique that was critical of us. When Chou asked why we had not made a public pledge of final withdrawals, I said this would gain us two to three months of favorable headlines, but we were interested in making a settlement rather than empty propaganda victories.

Chou concluded by again wishing us well in negotiations, calling Indochina the most urgent problem with regard to the relaxation of tension in the Far East, and saying that U. S. withdrawal would be a glorious act. I closed with the hope that he understood what we were trying to do even though we recognized that the PRC had to support its allies. When I said that the Prime Minister should teach his method of operation to his allies, he commented that the styles of various countries differed and that they couldn't impose their will on their friends.

In a subsequent session where Chou was bearing down on the issue of foreign troops, I pointed to the Chinese forces in Laos. He said that these were ordinary workers plus anti-aircraft forces needed to protect

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

26

them. If peace came, the latter could be withdrawn "in a day's time." In any event these personnel were building the road at the request of the "neutralists" and would all leave when the job was done.

In our last meeting Chou made the rather remarkable comment that he believed we "genuinely want a peaceful settlement."

Hopefully this issue will have been transformed by the time you go to Peking. We cannot expect Peking to lean hard on its friends. We can expect it to help tip the balance for a negotiated settlement if the other objective realities move Hanoi toward a bargain. If so, Peking will have incentives to encourage North Vietnamese compliance. On the other hand, if the conflict continues, Peking (and Moscow) will not want to see a major offensive -- and our reaction -- shadowing the summit. Thus the situation on the ground, and our declining role should provide a relatively quiet setting. And the communique draft has Peking backing its friends in inoffensive language while we emphasize a negotiated settlement.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

27

Korea

Chou devoted considerable time and passion to this subject, which he placed as number three on the agenda. In East Asia, the three principal "powder kegs", in his view, were Taiwan, Indochina and Korea, with the last two the most urgent. (This had some quality of being for the record to prove loyalty to allies.)

He opened his presentation on the afternoon of October 22 by regretting, as he had in July, that the 1954 Geneva Conference had not settled the Korean question. A ceasefire had been reached but no treaty had been concluded and a serious crisis could therefore arise. He said that the Panmunjom meetings had gotten nowhere, that North Korea had no participation in the UN debate, and that North Korea could participate in UNCURK only under unacceptable conditions. He noted with approval the recent opening of talks between the Red Cross Societies of North and South Korea, and I pointed out that we had helped this process along since the July talks.

Chou continued as follows:

- U.S. military forces should withdraw from South Korea as Chinese forces had done in 1958. He acknowledged that we had already taken out a third of our troops and said that we had paid a great price to do it, i. e. extensive military assistance.
- The 1965 treaty with Japan was even more serious and there was the possibility that Japanese military forces would replace American ones. Officers of Japanese self-defense troops had been going to Korea (I had checked on this since July and Chou was indeed correct).
- If there were increased military strength and hostilities after we withdrew this could not but directly affect relaxation of tension in the Far East.
- Their Korean friends were "most tense" and this could not but affect the Chinese government and people.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

28

Chou then handed over a list of eight points from the North Korean government, published in April 1971. This document is a generally abusive series of demands upon us to withdraw our forces and military support for Korea, give North Korea equal status, prevent Japanese influence, disband UNCURK, leave the Korean question to the Koreans themselves, and let North Korea participate in the UN debate unconditionally. Chou reaffirmed the importance of this question and noted that while big China could live with the problem of its divided status for a while, the PRC could not ask its smaller friends, Vietnam and Korea, to be so patient.

I retorted in extremely sharp fashion. I said that the Nixon Administration was dedicated to improving relations and easing tensions in East Asia, but we reject the translation of this goal into a series of unilateral demands upon us. We were prepared to set certain directions, but we could not accept a paper which listed all the things that the U.S. "must" do and called our ally a "puppet." The PRC had never done this, and we respected it for standing by its friends. But it was important for North Korea, as it was for North Vietnam, to show some of the largeness of spirit of its large ally.

Chou backed off from the abusive language, stating that it was "firing empty guns." I said that the substance was more important in any event. I informed him that we had received a communication from North Korea, through Roumania, earlier this year and had responded in a conciliatory fashion but had heard no more. I then clarified what the objectives in the peninsula should be. We were prepared to discuss the possibility of a more permanent legal basis for the existing situation in Korea, but we were not interested in a legal situation that made the reopening of hostilities possible (i. e. we would not scrap present arrangements so as to invite aggression). When I noted that our ultimate objective was the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, Chou again raised the fear of Japanese troops replacing ours. I assured him that our policy here was the same as on Taiwan, namely that it was not our objective to replace our forces with Japanese self-defense forces and that we were opposed generally to the military expansion of Japan. Chou declared that the PRC attached great importance to that statement.

I then pressed Chou further to clarify Chinese objectives. I said that if their goals were to bring about stability in the peninsula, avert war, and

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

29

lessen the danger of the expansion of other powers, then Chinese and American interests were quite parallel. If, on the other hand, their goals were to undermine the existing government in South Korea and make it easier for North Korea to attack or bring pressure upon the South, then a different situation existed.

In response to his inquiries, I made clear that we would not encourage South Korean attacks against the North, and in the case of clear South Korean aggression, our mutual defense treaty would not apply. I also said that we were already reviewing the UNCURK question and that we recognized North Korea as a fact of life. Chou stressed that the PRC was interested in equal legal status for both Koreas. Unification should be left to the future.

In our further exchanges I said that it was our policy:

- not to allow Japanese military forces to enter South Korea to the extent that we could control this;
- as tensions in the Far East diminished the number of U. S. forces would continue to go down and could be expected to be small;
- in any event, we would not allow South Korean military attacks while our forces were there;
- as an end of a complicated process, but not as an immediate objective, we could envisage North Korea as a lawful entity in the U. N. and elsewhere;
- there was merit in North Korea's having fair representation in discussion about the peninsula;
- as for final reunification, we had not studied this problem but it should be accomplished peacefully.

At the end of our discussion, Chou in effect accepted our position that the issue of Korea would take time but that opinions could be exchanged in the interim. There was some agreement on general objectives although

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

30

not about specific methods and we had reached no conclusion about the way peaceful reunification should be effected. In addition, we agreed that the two parties in the peninsula should treat each other as equals and that neither one had the exclusive right to unify the country.

Chou again emphasized that keeping Japanese military forces out was paramount. I said that we would attempt to do this, but that if North Korea should start aggression then one could not be sure of the consequences. I made very clear that whatever we could do in Korea depended on North Korean restraint. Chou agreed that all these issues were mutual and that both of us should use our influence with our friends to keep them from military adventures. He cautioned, however, that the era of negotiations, such as the Red Cross meetings, could be the era of "dragging out" and while they would wait on Taiwan, it was harder for their smaller friends to be patient.

In the communique draft we agree to disagree. The Chinese back their allies' eight points and call for abolition of UNCURK. We honor our commitments to South Korea and endorse reduced tension and increased communication in the peninsula. These formulations are preferable to a formal joint position that suggests we are negotiating on behalf of our allies.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

31

Japan

In addition to discussing Japan's role in Taiwan and in Korea, reported elsewhere, Chou En-lai and I talked about Japan's future in Asia in our afternoon meeting on October 22. We agreed that neither country wanted Japan to rearm and to resume the outward thrust that it had shown in the 1930s and 1940s. But we disagreed on the best way to assure that this would not happen.

Chou suggested that we drop our mutual defense ties and that Japan pursue a policy of neutralism, and I sharply rejoined that this was the best way to encourage a remilitarized, expansionist Japan and that the security we provided exercised restraint. I think Chou recognized the validity of our arguments, but obviously had difficulty acknowledging the virtues of a U.S. - Japan defense relationship. His ambivalence was reflected in his uncharacteristically lame presentation, during which he seemed unsure of himself, his strategic arguments were weak, and he continued to fall back on pat phrases.

At my invitation, Chou outlined Chinese views of Japan:

- Japan's "feathers have grown on its wings and it is about to take off", i. e. its tremendous economic expansion was inevitably leading it toward military expansion;
- Its economic assistance to other countries was not to help them develop but rather to establish Japanese economic domination;
- The Soviet Union was looking for Japanese investment and markets and was encouraging it to be more aggressive;
- China was not hostile toward Japan, and great changes have taken place in both countries since the war; the PRC was ready to conduct its relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

When I questioned Chou on what he meant when he said that the PRC wanted Japan to pursue a policy of "peace and friendship", he defined this as Japan's recognizing the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, giving

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

32

up all ambitions for both Taiwan and Korea, and respecting the independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China. I responded as follows:

- China's philosophic view had been generally global while Japan's had been traditionally tribal;
- Japan had always thought that it could adjust to outside influences and still maintain its essential character;
- Japan was subject to sudden explosive changes, such as going from feudalism to emperor worship and from emperor worship to democracy in very short periods;
- These Japanese traits imposed special responsibilities on those who deal with them;
- We had no illusions about Japanese impulses and the imperatives of their economic expansion;
- The present situation is a great temptation for everybody, especially the PRC and the USSR, since Japan's orientation has been made uncertain by the July announcement.

I then said that the Soviet Union had made a special effort to exploit the situation and the PRC had too -- I cited a People's Daily September 18 editorial which said that the U.S. could betray Japan at any moment. I sharply warned that such competition could only encourage Japanese nationalism. The present relationship with the U.S. exercised restraint on Japan; conversely, leaving Japan on its own would be a shortsighted policy. Someone would be the victim, for neutralism in Japan would not take the form of Belgian neutralism which had been guaranteed by others, but rather that of Swiss and Swedish neutralism which rested on large national armies. Both those Americans who believed that Japan would blindly follow the American lead and those other foreigners who tried to use Japan against the U.S. were shortsighted. It was therefore important that both the PRC and the U.S. show restraint on this issue.

I then repeated some of our principal policies toward Japan:

- We opposed a nuclear rearmed Japan no matter what some officials might suggest to the contrary;

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

33

- We favored keeping Japan's conventional rearmament to a level adequate only to defense;
- We were opposed to the overseas expansion of Japanese military power;
- We recognized that Japan's economic development concerned the whole world and not just Japan.

I repeated that for these major principles to be effective there must be restraint on all sides. When Chou claimed that a nuclear umbrella tended to make Japan aggressive against others, I said that the alternative of Japan's nuclear rearmament was much more dangerous. There was no question that if we withdrew our umbrella they would very rapidly build nuclear weapons. When Chou asked whether we were capable of limiting Japan's self-defense strength, I said that I could not promise this, but that we would have a better opportunity to do this with our present relationship than in a situation when Japan felt betrayed by us and Japanese nationalism asserted itself. I said that we had no incentive to encourage Japan to be dominant twenty-five years after World War II when we had fought against this very concept. If Japan did rearm itself, then the traditional relationship between the U.S. and China would reassert itself.

Chou noted that the Russians were cooperating with the Japanese and trying to use them in Siberia. I commented that I thought that they would pull back once they were confronted with Japanese methods and that in any event it was dangerous for the Russians to whet Japanese appetites for Siberia. I thought both sides would play with each other but neither would reorient itself that completely. Chou again was skeptical on whether the U.S. could control the "wild horse" of Japan, and I again rejoined that while we couldn't do this completely, we had a better chance of controlling the military aspects under present arrangements than under the neutralism that he was pushing.

We ended up agreeing to disagree, with my commenting that our two countries had certain parallel interests with regard to Japan.

Chou closed by noting that we had helped Japan greatly to fatten itself, which I acknowledged. I pointed out that we did not need Japan for our

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

34

own military purposes and that whenever Japan wanted us to withdraw military personnel we would do so. However, this would not be cause for Chinese rejoicing.

The tentative communique draft clearly delineates US-PRC differences on Japan, consistent with the general approach of the first part of the document. Thus the PRC opposes Japanese militarism and supports a neutral Japan, while we place "the highest value" on friendly relations with Japan and state we will continue to honor our mutual defense treaty obligations. This can only help us with Tokyo and is much preferable to artificial -- and suspicious -- agreed US-Chinese positions.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

35

South Asia

This issue surprisingly consumed much less time than I expected, and while China clearly stands behind Pakistan, I detected less passion and more caution from Chou than I had in July.

Chou opened up by mentioning an October 7 letter from Kosygin to Yahya which he termed equivalent to an ultimatum threatening Pakistan. He said the situation was very dangerous and asked for our estimate.

I made the following points:

- At first India had a reasonable complaint about the political and economic burden of the refugees coming from East Pakistan. We had moved to meet this problem by providing over one-half of the foreign relief to refugees in India, or nearly \$200 million.
- However, India was now trying to take advantage of the crisis as a means of settling the whole problem of Pakistan, not just East Pakistan. The Indian strategy apparently is to change abruptly the situation in East Pakistan so as to shake the political fabric of West Pakistan.
- I then outlined U.S. policy and the steps we had taken to support Pakistan in the consortium, debt relief, and other bilateral areas. I emphasized our total opposition to military action by India, the warnings that I had given the Indian ambassador about cutting off economic aid if they were to move, and the fact that you would repeat these warnings to Mrs. Gandhi when she visited the U.S. I added that we had urged the Russians to exercise restraint. They had told us they were trying to do so, but we were not sure whether this was in fact the case.
- We thought there was a good chance that in the near future that India would either attack or provoke Pakistan into action.
- Finally, I outlined our proposal that both forces withdraw their troops from the border and that Yahya make some political offers so as to overcome hostile propaganda and make it easier to support him in the UN and elsewhere.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

36

Chou thanked me for this information and said that he wished to study the Kosygin letter further before discussing this issue the next day in more detail. He commented that Tito had been persuaded to the Indian view by Mrs. Gandhi, and this plus Soviet support would increase the risk of Indian miscalculation.

I then stated that we had no national interest in East Pakistan and only wanted the political solution there to reflect the will of the people. We had made many proposals to India to separate the refugee problem from the political evolution in a way that would not prejudice the future. However, India had made it very clear that they were trying to force political steps on Yahya in so short a time frame that it could only wreck the structure of West Pakistan.

Chou commented that the Soviets were exploiting the situation, as part of their general strategy of exploiting contradictions in Asia so as to free their hand in Asia. He thought this was "a very stupid way of thinking." I commented that Moscow would learn that gratitude was not one of the outstanding qualities of the Indian leadership.

Perhaps significantly, Chou, despite his promise, never came back to this subject nor mentioned the Kosygin letter again. This might be partly due to the fact that we spent so much time on other substantive subjects and that we now had the communique drafting process in front of us. However, there were opportunities to raise South Asia again in our subsequent meetings if Chou had really wanted to.

In any event, China still stands clearly behind Pakistan, as reflected in their formulation in the draft communique which reads that "it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian subcontinent." I believe the PRC does not want hostilities to break out, is afraid of giving Moscow a pretext for attack, and would find itself in an awkward position if this were to happen.

Chou surely recognized from my presentation and from our communique formulation, which urges India and Pakistan to resolve their differences peacefully, that we have too great stakes in India to allow us to gang up on either side. Nevertheless he did not attempt in any way to contrast their stand with ours as demonstrating greater support for our common friend, Pakistan.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

37

Soviet Union

Chou initiated this topic by asking our views, and I replied as follows:

- We had kept the PRC scrupulously informed over the summer about our relations with Moscow.
- The Moscow summit would now take place because the necessary conditions had been met. There had been various attempts to have the President visit Moscow first, which we had, of course, turned down.
- Our July 15 announcement had not changed the direction of Soviet policy but had improved Russian manners. I had pointed out in my opening statement that this announcement had triggered an extraordinary amount of Soviet diplomatic activity and we were aware that it was designed to outmaneuver the PRC.
- We have a number of concrete issues with the Soviet Union which we have every intention of pursuing, such as SALT and Berlin. The Russians were now pressing us very hard on a European Security Conference.

Chou commented acidly that in the final days of the Berlin negotiations the Soviet Union had made concessions very rapidly and given up all their principles. He said indeed that the Berlin Agreement had turned out to be much more substantive, with Soviet concessions, than we had estimated in our private communications. I responded that we had foreshadowed that the agreement would primarily concern access procedures and asked him what other concessions he thought Moscow had made. He said that the Russians had conceded that West Berlin was a part of West Germany, which they had never done before and which would embarrass East Germany.

I pointed out that the Soviet Union wished to free its hands in Europe so as to concentrate elsewhere, and Chou admitted this possibility. There was a contradiction in the Soviet policy -- on the one hand they wanted to ease tensions so that they could concentrate on the East, but on the other hand their policy was apt to loosen things up in Eastern Europe.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

38

I said that we recognized that the Berlin Agreement increased Chinese problems, and Chou responded "that does not matter." I assured him that we did not make deals for that purpose and that we would keep him informed on the details concerning the negotiations on Berlin. The Soviet Union wanted a European Security Conference to solve their contradictions in Eastern Europe by at the same time dealing on a bloc-to-bloc basis and easing tensions with the West.

I then gave Chou a brief accounting of the Gromyko talks, saying that the European Conference was one of the topics that Gromyko had raised with you, along with the Middle East and subsidiary questions like trade. Concerning the latter I informed him that Secretary Stans would be traveling to Moscow in November. Chou inquired about the Middle East. I told him that if there were any serious chances for settlement I would let him know; prospects were generally gloomy at this point. I added that Gromyko had asked me to tea where we went over the same ground that you and he had covered. In addition, he had discussed U.S. relations with China with the standard Soviet line that Moscow had no objections to our improved relations but would object to our colluding. (On the way to the airport, Marshal Yeh said that he thought the Soviet Union wanted to settle the Middle East so that it could concentrate on China. He therefore hoped we would settle our problems with China quickly.)

I summed up our discussions by echoing some of the themes I had sounded in my opening statement with regard to our policy toward Moscow. I repeated that we would keep Peking informed of anything that might affect its interests; that we would conclude no agreements that would work against Peking (mentioning our deflection of the Soviet proposal for provocative attacks in 1970 as well as the third country aspects of the accidental war agreement); and that anything Peking heard from other sources about what was going on could not be true.

Chou asked if the Russians had talked to us about their border dispute. I replied that they had made an oblique reference to China's exorbitant claims, but that I had refused to discuss this question. (On the way to the Great Wall the Acting Foreign Minister explained to me the nature of the Sino-Soviet border dispute. It was not true that the PRC wanted to regain all territories lost by China in the 19th century. What the PRC wanted was (a) an acceptance by the USSR that the treaties had in fact been unequal,

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

39

and (b) a delineation of the border in minor aspects such as putting the demarcation line into the middle of rivers instead of on the Chinese side as the Soviets claim. Also, he said, the Soviets had pushed troops into all disputed territories -- this was unacceptable.)

Throughout our meetings Chou often interlaced disdainful and hostile comments about the USSR, but always in the tone that the PRC was not afraid of any confrontation. He referred to their petty negotiating tactics, their sticking their hands out in various places, and their complicating of efforts for an Indochina settlement (a point reiterated by Marshal Yeh in one of our sightseeing conversations).

As for our policy, the Chinese should be under no illusions that we fully intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking, that we have a number of concrete areas of interest with the Russians, and that while we will not conclude any agreement with the purpose of complicating Chinese problems, we can not be held accountable when the objective consequences of such dealings have this effect.

In the draft communique the PRC declares it "will never be a superpower" and opposes "hegemony" and "power politics." Chou specifically suggested we might want to leave in some of our language (which I was prepared to delete) about improving communication so as to lessen the danger of confrontation because this would refer to our relations with Moscow. Both our countries declare against collusion, forswear hegemony in Asia, and oppose "efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

40

Arms Control

Chou reflected the same Chinese disinterest in this subject that was so manifest in July.

I led into the topic when I was outlining our approach toward our relations with the Soviet Union, and I reaffirmed that we were prepared to make with the Chinese any agreement on arms control that we had made with the Soviet Union. I repeated that we would not participate in any agreement that would "lasso" the PRC.

I said, as I had in communications over the summer, that we were prepared to sign an agreement on accidental war, for example, with the PRC. Such an agreement would mean no restraints on China's military preparations but would provide an opportunity for each side to inform the other about unexplained events. I made clear that we were not urging this on the PRC or making a formal proposal, but were merely letting them know that we were prepared to make a similar agreement with them. I mentioned also our willingness to conclude a hot line arrangement.

Chou responded disingenuously that such agreements as accidental war and hot line did not really apply to them, since they had said they would never use nuclear weapons first. He said, more out of politeness than genuine interest, that he would accept the texts of possible agreements to look them over. I subsequently gave him the text of our accidental war agreement with the Soviet Union.

Chou referred to the Soviet proposal for a five power nuclear disarmament conference, and I recalled that we had in effect rejected this proposal also. He then inquired about the new Soviet initiative in the United Nations for a world disarmament conference. I noted that although it was not a formal proposal, we would have to reply; I thought all countries, whether in the UN or not, would be included. When I asked about the Chinese attitude, he responded that he thought the Soviet proposal might be an attempt to reply to the Chinese initiative for a world nuclear disarmament conference, but pointed out that the Soviet idea concerned general disarmament, not just nuclear disarmament. I commented that Khrushchev had made a similar proposal every year and we did not consider it very

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

41

useful. Chou then labelled the Soviet proposal unrealistic and an exercise in firing an "empty cannon" (a phrase he had used to describe Chinese propaganda against the U.S.). Nobody really needed to pay attention to it; it would waste the time and energies of nations. I said that we would try to deflect discussion on this initiative into specific subjects and try to treat problems on a regional basis rather than on a global one.

Chinese coolness towards arms control was further demonstrated in the communique drafting process. I put into our drafts our willingness to sign with the PRC any arms control agreement that we had made with other major powers and Chou took this reference out.

I think we have made a useful record in recent months of making clear to the Chinese that we are not trying to conclude arms control agreements at their expense, that we recognize their current lack of interest in the subject, and that we are always ready to conclude with them any agreement that we have made with the Soviet Union. While I do not think they will want to discuss these subjects seriously in the near future, our stand should be both reassuring to them and a clear demonstration of reasonableness and equal treatment.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

42

American Prisoners in China

As in July, I waited until the final meeting to raise this subject and did so as asking the PRC a favor, not making a formal proposal. You will recall that the PRC holds four men: Downey (life) and Fecteau (20 years) downed on a CIA-sponsored flight in 1952; and Smith and Flynn (no charges), pilots in Vietnam who went over the border in 1965 and 1967 respectively.

Since July, I had checked into the actual circumstances concerning Downey and Fecteau whom the Chinese had claimed were CIA agents. They indeed were, and CIA, for its part, would be willing for us to admit their activities if this were required to get the men released. In my talks with Chou, I confined myself to saying that I had found that these men had engaged in activities that would be considered illegal by my country. I thus said that our plea had nothing to do with the justice of the case, on which we conceded that the Chinese had a correct legal position. However, if, as an act of clemency, the PRC would consider that they had been sufficiently punished, this would make a very good impression in the U.S.

Chou responded as follows:

- As he had said in July, the Chinese legal process permitted a shortening of sentences if the prisoners behaved well, which he further defined as confessing to crimes. In response to my question, he said that they had all confessed.
- In about two months time the PRC might consider lessening the sentence of some of the men who had behaved well and they would let us know later what they had in mind.
- They had released early this year the old man, Mr. Walsh. I said that we would do our best to see that anyone released would not engage in propaganda against the PRC, and Chou admitted that Walsh had behaved well since his release.

I then inquired about the two pilots; to my knowledge theirs were unintended intrusions into Chinese territory and they were victims of the war. Chou replied that Peking had to deal with these men "in a different light." If the pilots were released before the Vietnam war were concluded, this "might give a bad impression" (i. e., Peking believes it has enough trouble already with Hanoi).

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

43

Chou concluded by suggesting that they could move on the two agents first, pointing out that they had already served long sentences and that Fecteau's term was almost completed. I said this would mean a great deal to the American people and we would treat any release as an act of clemency.

Thus in the near future we might expect a release of Fecteau and perhaps the shortening of Downey's life sentence. If we can reach a settlement on the Indochina war, we could get the two pilots back as well. All of this may be possible without our having to make any public statements about the activities of our men. However, it is absolutely essential to keep this information secret, for any public disclosure of Chinese intentions would almost certainly wreck our chances for early releases.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

44

Subsidiary Issues

I knew in advance that the Chinese would be cool to proposals in the commercial and exchange program fields. In the Warsaw talks they resisted our approach of focussing on these side issues, and they made the same point in a note this summer. Even now that we are talking about Taiwan and other major issues, they want to keep the emphasis there and away from areas which suggest a "normal" relationship.

I sought to meet this resistance head on in my opening statement by acknowledging their attitude and explaining ours. We considered progress in these fields not as a substitute for fundamental agreements but rather to give impetus to them. It would keep off balance those who wished to see the new U.S. -China dialogue fail. Chou and I agreed that such questions could be discussed by our assistants while we held private talks on the major issues.

These side discussions touched upon three questions: continuing US-PRC contacts; exchanges between the two countries in the fields of science and technology, culture, sports, and journalism; and bilateral trade (in brief and low-key fashion).

On continuing contacts, the Chinese reaffirmed their backing of a proposal Chou had made in July - the sending of a high-level U.S. representative to the PRC from time to time. On several separate occasions I emphasized your preference for Ambassador Bruce, whom we hoped would be acceptable to Peking once the Indochina war was over. Chou did not confirm or deny acceptability. The Chinese were not interested in more formal contacts such as "liaison offices" or "interests sections" in friendly Embassies on the grounds that the liaison arrangement they had with Japan was entirely non-governmental and that the presence of a Chiang Kai-shek Embassy in Washington precluded their establishing an interests section here.

Cautious interest in exchanges was displayed by the Chinese. Our side explained the rationale for and outlined a broad spectrum of exchanges in a variety of areas, and the Chinese accepted a representative list of possible programs. They indicated that while there would be exchanges, these would be strictly non-government and limited in number from the Chinese side.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

45

When we raised the subject of trade and said we were prepared to liberalize our restrictions further, they said bluntly that they had absolutely no interest in the matter. Indeed they were grateful that the USSR and the US had caused them to be self-reliant.

Of possible follow-up interest was a strong statement against hijacking-whatever the motive - by Chou in one of our private meetings.

The Chinese disinterest in these subsidiary issues probably stems partly from a wish to focus more on the fundamental issues in the US-PRC relationship, and partly from a desire to preserve as much ideological purity as feasible by not appearing to rush into a too-active program of contacts and exchanges with the U.S. As for trade, they may not have defined their goals and probably see little immediate potential in any event.

On the other hand, the Chinese appeared to appreciate our rationale for seeking to make some progress on subsidiary issues: that this would help make movement possible on the more fundamental questions and convince detractors of improved relations that gains could, in fact, be made from this course. Thus they included references in the draft communique to sending a periodic envoy to Peking and to facilitating exchanges in various fields.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAK Meetings with Chou En-lai

Wednesday, October 20, 1971

Time: 4:40 p.m. - 7:10 p.m.
Place: Great Hall of the People
Subject: Opening Statements, Agenda, President's Visit
(followed by Banquet, Great Hall of the People)

Thursday, October 21, 1971

Time: 10:30 a.m. - 1:45 p.m.
Place: Great Hall of the People
Subject: President's Visit, Taiwan, Japan

Time: 4:42 p.m. - 7:17 p.m.
Place: Great Hall of the People
Subject: United Nations, Indochina

Friday, October 22, 1971

Time: 4:15 p.m. - 8:28 p.m.
Place: Great Hall of the People
Subjects: Korea, Japan, South Asia, Soviet Union, Arms Control

Saturday, October 23, 1971

Time: 9:05 p.m. - 10:05 p.m.
Place: Guest House (sitting room)
Subject: President's Visit

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

Sunday, October 24, 1971

Time: 10:28 a.m. - 1:55 p.m.

Place: Guest House

Subject: General Philosophy and Principles, Communique
(Banquet, Great Hall of the People)

Time: 9:23 p.m. - 11:20 p.m.

Place: Great Hall of the People

Subject: Communique, Announcements of Trips

Monday, October 25, 1971

Time: 10:12 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.

Place: Guest House

Subject: Communique

Time: 9:50 p.m. - 11:40 p.m.

Place: Guest House

Subject: Communique

Tuesday, October 26, 1971

Time: 5:30 a.m. - 8:10 a.m.

Place: Guest House

Subject: Communique, Prisoners, Announcements of trips,
Technical Matters

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

DETAILED ITINERARY OF VISIT TO PEKING
(October 20-October 26, 1971)

Wednesday, October 21

- 8:30 a.m. Arrived Shanghai. Tea and breakfast at Airport Terminal. (Met by delegation from Peking, headed by the Director of the North American, Western European, and Australasian Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by representatives of Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office, including the Director)
- 9:30 a.m. Departed for Peking with Chinese delegation aboard.
- 11:20 a.m. Arrived Peking. Met at airport by Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission Yeh Chien-ying and Acting Foreign Minister, Chi P'eng-fei)
- Motored to Guest House in Western Peking.
- 4:20 Departed for Great Hall of the People for group photographs with Prime Minister Chou En-lai; Vice Chairman Yeh and Acting Foreign Minister present.
- 4:40-7:10pm Brief tea followed by general meeting with Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Rest of group toured the Great Hall.
- 7:10-10:15pm Banquet for all Americans, including the aircraft crew, given by Prime Minister Chou En-lai, attended by Vice Chairman Yeh and Acting Foreign Minister.

Thursday, October 21, 1971

- 10:30am-1:45 Meeting in Great Hall with Prime Minister.
pm
Remainder of party visited Forbidden City
- Messrs Jenkins and Holdridge met with Hsiung Shih-hui, Secretary to the Prime Minister, to discuss subsidiary issues (10:10 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.)
- 4:40pm-7:17 Meeting with Prime Minister.
pm
First technical meeting on trip arrangements (4:30-7:00 p.m.)

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Trip arrangements meeting chaired by Yu Shang, Vice-Minister of Public Security; and included Han Hsu, Acting Director of Protocol; Ch'en Ch'ia, Director of Information Department of Foreign Ministry; Liu Cheng-ching, Deputy Director of the General Administration of tele-communications, and Cheng Jui-ai, Director of the Peking Bureau of the General Administration of Civil Aviation

8:15pm Entire group attended special performance of Peking Opera ("Shachiapang") in Great Hall small auditorium hosted by Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying. Acting Foreign Minister also present.

Friday, October 22, 1971

8:00am-1:00 pm Departed for visit to Great Wall accompanied by Acting Foreign Minister and various officials associated with trip arrangements. Visited Ming Tombs on return trip.

4:15-8:28pm Meeting with Prime Minister at Great Hall. (Messrs Holdridge and Jenkins met with Secretary Hsiung to discuss subsidiary issues and then joined meeting with Prime Minister at about 6:30 p.m.)

9:15pm (aprox.) Friendship store held open for shopping by group.

Saturday, October 23, 1971

9:00am-noon Visit to Summer Palace, including boat trip on lake, accompanied on tour by Vice Chairman Yeh and /in car by/ Hsiung.

3:30-7:15pm Trip arrangements meeting at Guest House.

4:00 p.m. Brief visit by Dr. Kissinger to Friendship store.

9:05-10:05pm Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to guest house for private meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3

Sunday, October 24, 1971

- 9:00 a. m. - 12 noon Most of group visited Peking Petro-Chemical Factory about 30 miles from Peking. Escorted by Mayor of Peking Wang, Vice Minister of Public Security, and met by Head of Revolutionary Committee of Chemical Plant. Communications Technical discussion in neighboring guest house.
- 10:28a. m. - 1:55 pm Prime Minister came to Guest House for private session.
- 3:00 - 3:55 p. m. Trip arrangements group visited guest house where President will reside, followed by brief technical meeting (3:30-3:55 p. m.)
- 8:15 - 9:20 p. m. Peking Duck banquet in Great Hall for entire party hosted by Prime Minister. Vice Chairman Yeh and Acting Foreign Minister also attended, along with those involved in trip arrangements.
- 9:23 - 11:20 p. m. Private meeting with Prime Minister in Great Hall.

Monday, October 25, 1971

- 10:00 - 11:00 a. m. Visit to Peking indoor sports arena (gymnasium) for tour of facilities by group other than Dr. Kissinger. Accompanied by Acting Director of Protocol Han Hsu
- 10:12 - 11:00 a. m. Private meeting with Prime Minister Chou En-lai at Guest House.
- 12 noon-1:30 p. m. Party visited Temple of Heaven in Peking, escorted by Mayor of Peking and Acting Director of Protocol.
- 3:30 - 6:00 p. m. Most of party visited Peking hospital to witness demonstration of acupuncture anesthesiology. (These operations witnessed: lung removal, appendix, and ovarian cyst removal, as well as several tooth extractions). Mayor of Peking and Acting Chief of Protocol accompanied group.
- 8:30 - 10:15 p. m. Group, less Dr. Kissinger, went to neighboring Guest House for showing of film of July trip followed by movie of ballet, Red Detachment of Women.

CONFIDENTIAL

4

9:50 - 11:40 p. m. Prime Minister came to Guest House for private meeting.

Tuesday, October 26, 1971

5:30 - 8:10 a. m. Prime Minister came to Guest House for private meeting. At conclusion of meeting Prime Minister requested to bid farewell to those in guest house not at meeting.

9:40 a. m. Group departed for airport, accompanied by Vice Chairman Yeh and Foreign Minister.

10:30 a. m. Departed Peking, accompanied by Acting Director of Protocol.

11:55 a. m. Arrived Shanghai. Met by Director of Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office. Served lunch in airport lounge.

1:15 p. m. Departed Shanghai.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: My October China Visit: Drafting the
Communique

Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I negotiated a tentative draft communique for your China trip (attached at Tab A) in the course of going through seven drafts and eleven hours of meetings during the last two and a half days of my visit. During this process Chou was extremely tough and skillful but also reasonable and broad in outlook. The result of our efforts is an unusual communique that clearly states differences as well as common ground between the two countries and reassures the friends of both sides rather than raising anxieties because of the compromise language, which would be subject to varying interpretations. A communique along these lines should portray your conversations with Mao and Chou as being between leaders who stuck by their principles but had the largeness of perspective to move relations forward despite profound disagreements.

Our position on Taiwan (page 6) is the only remaining issue. Although we significantly narrowed our differences on this most painful issue, including a clear effort by Chou to show some restraint, I said that I could not accept the final Chinese compromise formulation, that I would have to check with you, and that we would go back to them with counter-language. The rest of the communique remains tentative, of course, and is subject to change because of events during the next four months and your talks with the Chinese leaders. But we now have a working draft which should be acceptable to both sides, though causing both some domestic problems, and which could never have been produced under the time and publicity pressure of your stay in China.

THE PROCESS

Tabling of Conventional U.S. Draft

As reported in separate memoranda, we spent the first three and a half days of talks establishing the basic framework of arrangements

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 2 -

for your visit and exploring in depth the various substantive topics we had covered in July. With this backdrop I tabled a draft communique -- which you had seen -- the evening of October 22 (Tab G). It was highly conventional, stressing fuzzy areas of agreement and using vague generalizations. Its basic thrust was to glide over differences and emphasize common ground. I purposely held back our formulations on specific areas like Indochina, Korea, South Asia, or the military forces on Taiwan. On the evening of October 23, Chou gave me his initial reaction. It was that it could serve as a basis for discussion, that naturally they would want to add their views in some places to show differences, and that he would send his Acting Foreign Minister to undertake the redrafting process the next morning.

Sharp Chinese Response

On the morning of October 24, Chou showed up personally instead and delivered a scorching one-hour presentation -- as he indicated -- at the explicit instructions of Mao. His basic theme was that the Chinese believed in revolutionary progress rather than a Metternich-type peace that stressed stability at the expense of justice and was bound to be short-lived because of its essential oppressiveness. Progress required struggle not peace, or peace only after struggle. The world is in turmoil and the small would inevitably overturn the big. We could not continue to hang onto our old friends if we were entering a new era.

Chou clearly had been ordered by Mao to emphasize the Chinese revolutionary dogma and reject our effort to submerge differences and accent cooperation. He said that our basic approach was unacceptable. Our fundamental differences had to be set forth in a communique; otherwise the wording would have an "untruthful appearance." Our present draft was the sort of banality the Soviets would sign but neither mean nor observe. The Chinese kept their promises; they were not afraid to state disagreements.

I replied very harshly, saying that Chou's position hadn't surprised me, but that such language of infallibility and preaching was intolerable for a communique. I pointed out that the Chinese wouldn't respect us if we started our new relationship by betraying our old friends, and that problems had to be solved by history, not force. I said that we could accept the basic approach of each side's stating its views so long as we

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 3 -

also staked out common ground so as to indicate progress. I emphasized that we would reject language that tended to put us on trial or to humiliate an American President. After explaining the difficulties with drafting a communique from scratch during your visit, I concluded by saying that the choice was up to Chou, reminding him that he had said to an American group that it didn't matter if your trip failed. Chou affirmed their wish for a successful visit and asked for a break. He then agreed to launch into a drafting process.

This exchange foreshadowed our basic positions in the negotiating process we then embarked upon. Chou's emphasis was on sharp delineation of our respective positions while my objectives were to dilute the rhetoric and shorten the length of opposing views, and expand areas of agreement.

Chinese Counter-draft Stressing Differences

The Chinese worked on a draft all day and, after stuffing us with roast duck at a banquet, tabled their first draft that evening (Tab F). It contained very strong rhetoric on their general approach to international affairs and sharp formulations of Chinese views on specific issues. Despite my needling, Chou was at first reluctant to hand his draft over. I responded that I agreed with the basic concept of both sides plainly stating their views and then common positions, but that the Chinese views were phrased in the most intransigent fashion and you would not travel all the way to China to hear propaganda that one could read in the newspapers.

I then voiced our principal objections. In the general section, we could not have an American President sign a document which said that revolution has become the irresistible trend of history or that "the people's revolutionary struggles are just." Nor would we brook reference to racial discrimination -- while we were equally opposed to it, mention of it in this communique would be certainly interpreted as a critique of American domestic problems. There was almost no mention of agreed principles in international or bilateral relations.

On specific issues, the Chinese draft had us both stating that Vietnam was the most urgent question for the relaxation of tension in the Far East. It cited China as "the reliable rear area" and Chinese backing

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 4 -

for the Indochinese peoples' "fighting to the end for the attainment of their goal" -- clearly unacceptable phrasing while Americans were dying or held prisoner in Indochina. The Chinese called for the complete withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and Japan and the unconditional return of Okinawa. The draft had both sides agreeing that Taiwan is the "crucial issue" obstructing normalization of bilateral relations. And the Chinese had linked periodic visits of US envoys to progress on Taiwan; this I rejected too.

I stated that the total impact of their draft would be disastrous and inconsistent with our self-respect -- the rhetoric must be toned down and some progress shown. I delayed our scheduled departure from the next morning to the next afternoon. Our side then went back to our Guest House to redraft the better part of the night.

Muting the Rhetoric and Expanding the Positive

Our counter-draft (Tab E), which we presented the morning of October 25, took out their most offensive language, put in our own positions and beefed up areas of agreement. On specific regional issues we kept the structure of each side's expressing its views and then a common position, albeit rather vapidly. I defined our objective as being to state differences without being offensive and showing a positive direction without raising false hopes. I again put off our departure, to the next morning. The Chinese took our draft away, and we once again endured a lengthy wait until dinner time that night when we got the second Chinese draft (Tab D).

Because of time pressure we had but two hours to deal with what remained a tough version. There was still much objectionable Chinese rhetoric and not enough positive material. The Chinese had also changed the structure, lumping regional issues with general views under each side's position and not attempting to state explicit agreed positions on these specific questions. Chou explained his reasons:

(1) We should not state common positions for appearance sake, but only when they in fact exist -- this wasn't really the case for the regional issues.

(2) The agreements were so vague as to lead each side to explain its position in contradictory manner giving rise to post-summit controversy.

(3) It gave impressions of Sino-US condominium which was in neither party's interest.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23 : LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 5 -

I pointed out with melancholy that the Chinese draft still accentuated our differences in provocative fashion. We had to decide whether we were starting a new period in our relationship or employing new tactics in a continuing struggle. We would be condemned for signing such a document which still had a largely negative cast to it, appealed to revolution, and spoke of supporting the Vietnamese people to the end. I then gave them our third draft (Tab C) proposing once again reduction of their offensive phrasing, e. g. on revolution and backing the Indochinese peoples' struggles, and restoring some positive language of agreement. I also was somewhat more forthcoming on Taiwan which now was clearly emerging as the most difficult issue. Making clear that I was stretching my instructions, I used language that said the US would not challenge (rather than merely noting) the views of all Chinese that there is but one China and indicated progressive reduction of US forces on Taiwan.

During two hours of sparring Chou elaborated some of the philosophic underpinning of their approach to the communique. He drew a clear distinction between principle and policy execution, in effect paralleling our approach that we could set a course on certain issues but time was needed to resolve them. In this session particularly, but also in others, he emphasized that while they had to have principles like troop withdrawals or sovereignty over Taiwan, they clearly could do without time deadlines. They were in no hurry but the direction must be clear. Chou was startlingly frank and concrete with respect to our military withdrawal from Taiwan -- not only would they not press for a timetable, they actually preferred that some US forces remain so as to keep the Japanese forces out!

After very candid exchanges, the Chinese took away our draft for revision at 11:35 p. m.

Agreement on a Tentative Draft

At 4:45 a. m., October 26, we were given a third Chinese draft (Tab B) which was a considerable improvement. It muted some of their rhetoric in the direction of our changes and kept most of our additions of positive language. On Taiwan, they clearly made an effort but their formulation was still beyond what I could accept.

We met at 5:30 a. m. with four or five fundamental issues remaining. I pointed to a few phrases which remained annoying and to the deletion of our reference to our honoring our commitments to Korea.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 6 -

Chou said that it was a difficult situation because they had accepted without change our statements of principle, such as individual freedom and peaceful competition (this was true) while we were trying to dilute their formulations. There was no question that the two sides have deep differences and they should be stated. He suggested that it was extremely difficult to reach agreed language before I left, that this text was tentative, and that some work could be left until your visit. I rejoined that the more we could settle now the better. Chou agreed but stressed the need for confidentiality. He then again displayed reasonableness as he made a further effort to curb some of their language and agreed to restoration of our Korean language.

We also had another long exchange on Taiwan during which he made clear he could budge no further. He pointed out that they had used great restraint on this question, had thought hard about reformulations which could meet our concern, and were not stipulating any timetables. However, there had to be some concreteness or the Chinese people would not understand. He agreed with me that their objective was to be explicit on this question while ours was to be ambiguous. In turn I said I was already operating on the margin of my authority with the formulation I had proposed and was extremely doubtful that you would consider their language. We left it that I would discuss this with you and might propose a new formulation, in which case they might be able to change a couple of words.

By 8:10 a.m., we had reached agreement on the tentative draft at Tab A except for Taiwan (underlined portion) as well as cleaning up remaining technical issues such as public announcements and statements. I reaffirmed to Chou that knowledge of this communique would be confined to the White House. They clearly want secrecy about this document for the same reasons we do, as well as not to derogate from Mao's authority before he has had a chance to talk to you.

THE RESULT

The draft communique should serve us better than the conventional type which contains contrived and ambiguous language. It is an honorable document in which both sides vigorously and inoffensively set forth their differing views on the world scene and specific issues. This reflects the basic reality, which you have been stressing, that there

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 7 -

are fundamental differences between us and the Chinese. The communique then states how despite these differences, we have common interests in our conduct of international relations and bilateral dealings and how we propose to further them. There is thus both realism and forward movement.

This paper should prove more reassuring to our friends than a blander document where they would search for hidden meanings or understandings. US-PRC joint positions on such questions as Indochina, Japan and Korea would be all but meaningless given our differences and could only be expressed in language that each side could interpret as it wished. Such agreements would either be an artful exercise in semantics or suggest we and the PRC were negotiating on behalf of third countries (which, moreover, the communique states that we won't do).

Instead, while the PRC supports its allies, we go clearly on record as honoring our commitments to Korea and placing the highest value on our relationship with Japan and honoring our mutual defense treaty obligations. On the Asian subcontinent our neutrally-phrased position compares with Peking's pro-Pakistan stance -- this should help us marginally with India while not really hurting us with Pakistan, for whom we remain the only real Western friend. On Indochina, we restate our standard position, and this issue may well have been transformed by the time of your visit.

Some of the Chinese rhetoric in the document is unpleasant and this, combined with what inevitably will be a painful section on Taiwan, will cause us some problems. But Chou took out the most offensive language such as supporting revolutions and opposing racial discrimination and generally rounded off the Chinese statements so that they are very mild in comparison to standard Maoist expressions.

The Chinese hardly need the communique as a propaganda vehicle. They have many other instruments for that purpose (including now the United Nations). Indeed the language on Chinese positions, while naturally still grating on American ears, can only look restrained to any audience familiar with the usual public lines. In fact, it is difficult to see how Chou could have gone much further on the language and still preserved his international and domestic positions. He recognized the points I made about our own domestic problems and took them into account in his redrafting. Furthermore while he let us edit his formulations, he did not attempt to change ours -- he even reinserted some language of ours that we had dropped because we had deleted some of their phrases.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 8 -

Another positive element was Chou's restraint in terms of making any demands on us. While there is some vigorous rhetoric on general principles, the Chinese do not, for example, specifically call for the withdrawal of our forces from Korea or Japan. Indeed Chou time and again emphasized that, while in principle foreign forces should be withdrawn, the PRC was not specifying any time limits.

Thus the Chinese are willing to pursue their objectives by banking on the thrust of history. They will continue to be tough, but they essentially accept our arguments that we can often do more than we say, that the process must be gradual, and that some issues must be left to evolutionary pressures. This involves great risks for them, at home and abroad, given their past public demands and dissidents in their own camp.

Furthermore, they are clearly gambling on your reelection. Chou specifically pointed out toward the end that they could be in real trouble if your Administration was not in power to implement our understandings. He shares what he described as your wish that you preside over the 200th anniversary of America's birth.

All of this does not mean that Chou was easy to deal with -- he emphatically was not. But nevertheless he was able to empathize with our difficulties and he made an effort to produce language to meet our concerns. Nor is the communique without domestic and international problems. But it is fair to say that the problems for Chou and the PRC are at least as great.

In short, if we can navigate the Taiwan issue successfully, we should have a communique that is realistic, clear, dignified, reassuring to our friends and positive for the further development of US-Chinese relations.

Attachments

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, viewed similar places of interest.

-2-

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions and views.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress -- this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the

-3-

Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for the abolition of the "U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;" it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian sub-continent.

The U. S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The U. S. side believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U. S. side desires to work with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States

-4-

supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U. S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution, and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U. S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina. The existing commitments between the U. S. and Republic of Korea would be honored; the United States would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems are contrary to the interests of the people of this region.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23 : LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7

-5-

on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

-- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

-- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

-- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

-- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland;

-6-

the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U. S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U. S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U. S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U. S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present

-7-

frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon,) U. S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse tung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____, and the two sides held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U. S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U. S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ where they viewed similar places of interest.

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the

United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great turmoil exists and expounded their respective positions. The Chinese side pointed out that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want to make revolution -- this has become the irresistible trend of history. It must be recognized that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and settle the affairs of their respective countries as independent and sovereign nations. The peoples' revolutionary struggles are just, and they deserve sympathy and support and absolutely permit of no foreign intervention. The Chinese people firmly support the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and against oppression and racial discrimination and firmly support the people's' struggles to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower, and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The U.S. side declared that

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that relations between states should be conducted on the principles

- 3 -

of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, and that on this basis, international disputes should be settled without resorting to the use or threat of force. It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

The two sides stated that neither was prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The leaders of the two countries held that the Indochina question, especially the Viet Nam question, is the most urgent question for the relaxation of tension in the Far East. The Chinese side stated that the Chinese Government fully supports the seven-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam question put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples, that the Chinese people pledge themselves to provide a powerful backing for the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, that Chinese territory forever remains the reliable rear area of the three Indochinese peoples and that the Chinese people are prepared to undertake the greatest national

sacrifices and firmly support the three Indochinese peoples in fighting to the end for the attainment of their goal. The U.S. side stated
... .. The two sides agreed that the basic principle guiding the settlement of the Indochina question is: All foreign troops must withdraw from the region of Indochina, and the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia should be left to settle their own questions by themselves free from foreign interference.

The two sides noted that eighteen years have already elapsed since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, yet the Korean question remains unsettled. The Chinese Government fully supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971; the U.S. troops should withdraw from south Korea completely; it is impermissible to introduce the Japanese militarist forces into south Korea; and the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" should be abolished. The U.S. side stated

The Chinese side expressed its firm opposition to the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism, maintained that the United States should withdraw all its troops and all its nuclear and military bases from Japan and return Okinawa unconditionally, and held that an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan may have such

armed forces as are necessary for its self-defence. The U.S. side stated:

The leaders of the two countries expressed deep concern over the tension in the south Asian subcontinent. The two sides opposed the interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan from any quarters by exploiting the situation in East Pakistan. The two sides hoped that India and Pakistan could resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations. All attempts to disturb peace and use armed force are contrary to the interests of the people of this region and should be condemned.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States and agreed that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The U.S. side state: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China; the United States

-6-

will encourage the Chinese to settle this internal question by themselves through peaceful negotiations; it will not carry out or support any activities aimed at separating Taiwan from China and will withdraw the U. S. troops and military installations in Taiwan after it has completed the withdrawal of all the U. S. armed forces from Indochina. The two sides held that the settlement of this crucial issue between China and the United States and the normalization of relations between the two countries are not only in the interests of the Chinese and American peoples but also conducive to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

The two sides are resolved to work for the attainment of this goal and have reached an understanding on certain steps that are to be taken. While effecting these steps, the U. S. Government will send senior representatives to Peking at unfixed intervals for concrete consultations.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides hoped that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the

-7-

gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the
People's Republic of China.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, viewed similar places of interest.

-2-

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions and views.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress -- this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the

-3-

Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for the abolition of the "U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;" it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian sub-continent.

The U. S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The U. S. side believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U. S. side desires to work with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States

-4-

supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U. S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution, and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U. S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina. The existing commitments between the U. S. and Republic of Korea would be honored; the United States would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems are contrary to the interests of the people of this region.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23 : LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7

-5-

on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

-- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

-- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

-- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

-- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland;

-6-

the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U. S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U. S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U. S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U. S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present

-7-

frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon,) U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, viewed similar places of interest.

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions and views.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress --- this has become the irresistible trend of history. It must be recognized that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and settle the affairs of their respective countries as independent and sovereign nations, and any foreign intervention is absolutely impermissible. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The

Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and firmly supports the peoples' right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the struggle of the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam question put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea"; it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan;

- 4 -

it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian sub-continent.

The U.S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The U.S. side believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U.S. side desires to work with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure

- 5 -

or intervention. The U.S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution of the Indochina conflict to which end it had made a series of proposals; and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems are contrary to the interests of the people of this region.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that

- 6 -

countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

-- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

-- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

- 7 -

-- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

-- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

- 8 -

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present

- 9 -

frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

10/25 - evening

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse tung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, viewed similar places of interest.

-2-

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress -- this has become the irresistible trend of history. It must be recognized that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and settle the affairs of their respective countries as independent and sovereign nations. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own country. The Chinese side strongly expressed its firm support to the seven-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Vietn Nam question put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U. N.

- 3 -

Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea"; it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly advocates an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian subcontinent.

The U. S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U. S. side desires to work with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The U. S. supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U. S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution of the Indochina conflict to which end it had made a series of proposals; and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U. S.

-4-

forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina. The relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea were freely entered into by both sides and the existing commitments would be honored. The U.S. would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The U.S. placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The U.S. urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems are contrary to the interests of the people of this region.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, irrespective of their social systems, have a common interest in working toward a resolution of international differences in the interest of all mankind. They further agreed that relations between states should be conducted on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The U.S. and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their own relationships.

-5-

It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

-- both wish to reduce the danger of military conflict;

-- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

-- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

-- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between the two countries; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U. S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments",

-6-

"two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side stated: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It will support efforts to reach [an equitable and] peaceful resolution of the ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the mainland. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, the U.S. side stated that the U.S. forces would be progressively reduced as tensions in Asia diminished. This would be done without the abandonment of United States interest in a peaceful solution.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations for further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of

-7-

issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon,) U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

- 2 -

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, viewed similar places of interest.

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want to make revolution — this has become the irresistible trend of history. It must be recognized that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and settle the affairs of their respective countries as independent and sovereign nations. All progressive actions which are in the interest of the people of one's own country and are supported by the people deserve sympathy and support and absolutely permit of no foreign intervention. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not

- 3 -

bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese aide stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and firmly supports the peoples' struggles to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side strongly expressed its firm support to the seven-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam question put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples and its determination to support to the end the struggle of the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia for the attainment of their goal; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for the abolition of the

- 4 -

"U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea"; it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people in their just struggle to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the south Asian sub-continent.

The U.S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The U.S. side believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U.S. side believes that the effort to erase the fundamental sources of conflict is served by building a just and secure peace, just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression.

- 5 -

The U.S. supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U.S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina. The relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea were freely entered into by both sides and the existing commitments would be honored. The U.S. would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The U.S. placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The U.S. urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations; All attempts to disturb peace, use armed force or interfere in another country's internal affairs are contrary to the interests of the people of this region and should be condemned.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign

policies. However, the two sides agreed that relations between states should be conducted on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

-- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

-- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

-- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

- 7 -

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between the two countries; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined". The U.S. side stated: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China; the United States Government does not challenge that position. The United States will support the settlement of the question of the unification of Taiwan and the mainland through peaceful negotiations and will not carry out any activities aimed at separating Taiwan from China. The United States will withdraw

its troops and military installations in Taiwan after it has completed the withdrawal of all the U.S. armed forces from Indochina.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese

- 9 -

and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse tung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, viewed similar places of interest.

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and expounded their respective positions. The Chinese side stated its views as follows: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want justice. It must be recognized that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes, and settle the affairs of their respective countries as independent and sovereign nations. Foreign intervention is impermissible. The Chinese people firmly support the right of nations to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower.

The U.S. side declared that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The U.S. side believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding. Such an effort requires that countries treat each other with mutual respect, not with censure, and with a willingness to compete peacefully letting performance be the

-3-

ultimate judge. Equality means that no country should claim infallibility and that each country will be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U.S. side believes that the effort to erase the fundamental sources of conflict is served by building a just and secure peace, just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The U.S. supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides, aware of what divides them but equally conscious of their responsibilities for world peace, agreed that:

-- countries, irrespective of their social systems, have a common interest in working toward a resolution of international differences in the interest of all mankind;

-- relations between states should be conducted on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force;

-- it is against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

-- both wish to reduce the danger of military conflict;

-- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony;

-- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states;

-- progress toward the normalization of relations between the two countries is in the interests of all countries; and

-- broadening of mutual areas of interest would contribute to their shared objective of working toward the normalization of relations.

The leaders of the two countries discussed the Indochina question. The Chinese side stated that this issue, especially the Vietnam question, is the most urgent question for the relaxation of tension in the Far East. The Chinese Government fully supports the seven-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the

Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. The U. S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention, that its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution of the Indochina conflict to which end it had made a series of proposals; and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U. S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina.

The two sides agreed that the basic principle guiding the settlement of the Indochina question is: All foreign troops should withdraw from each of the countries of Indochina, and the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should be left to settle their own questions by themselves free from foreign interference.

The two sides noted that eighteen years have already elapsed since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, yet there is still no permanent legal status for the Korean peninsula. The Chinese Government fully supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971; declares that all foreign troops should withdraw from South Korea and not be replaced by any other foreign forces; and states that the "UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" should be abolished. The U. S. side stated that

its relations with the Republic of Korea were freely entered into by both sides and that existing commitments would be honored. The U. S. would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula.

The United States and the People's Republic of China agreed to offer any assistance to the two parties in Korea to reach a mutually acceptable peaceful solution and to consult with interested parties with a view toward replacing the 1953 armistice with an agreement formally ending hostilities.

The Chinese side expressed its firm opposition to the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism, maintained that the United States should withdraw all its troops and all its nuclear and military bases from Japan and held that an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan may have such armed forces as are necessary for its self-defense. The U. S. side stated that it placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and that it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. It was pointed out that these arrangements contribute effectively to the common goal of preventing a resurgence of traditional conflicts.

Both sides agreed that Japan is of cardinal importance to peace in Asia and that neither side should try to complicate the other side's

efforts to improve relations with Japan.

The leaders of the two countries expressed deep concern over the tension in the south Asian subcontinent and took the position that an armed conflict would be disastrous for the peoples of the area. The two sides therefore urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations. All attempts to disturb peace, use armed force, or interfere in another country's internal affairs are contrary to the interests of the people of this region, and should be condemned.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious dispute between China and the United States regarding Taiwan. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between the two countries; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government in China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side stated that the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The

United States Government does not challenge that position. It will support efforts to reach an equitable and peaceful resolution of the ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the mainland. With respect to the U. S. military presence on Taiwan, the U. S. side stated that the U. S. forces would be progressively reduced as tensions in Asia diminished. This would be done without the abandonment of United States interest in a peaceful solution.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U. S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on outstanding issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that normalization of relations between the

two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The Visit

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Communist Party on _____ for a (_____ hour) review of world affairs (and met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung again for further talks on _____). President Nixon held extensive discussions with Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest between the two countries.

Accompanying President Nixon on his visit and participating in many of his talks were U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Henry A. Kissinger. In addition to Premier Chou En-lai, taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were (_____). President Nixon, Premier Chou En-lai, and the members of their two delegations had a wide ranging exchange of views. Their talks were detailed, frank and at all times friendly.

(Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:)

(Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:)

President Nixon, in addition to visiting Peking and viewing cultural, industrial, and agricultural sites in the vicinity of the capital city, also

toured _____ and _____ where he viewed similar places of interest. In all of these places he met with a warm and friendly reception and in turn expressed the friendship of the American people for the Chinese people.

General Principles of Bilateral Relations

The two leaders acknowledged that the long-standing differences between the two countries not only in their bilateral relations but in their perspectives of international problems would not quickly or easily be resolved. At the same time, the two sides agreed that the visit of President Nixon to China and the hospitable reception accorded him demonstrate that countries, irrespective of their social systems, can work together toward resolution of differences in the interest of international peace and security.

Aware of what divides them but equally conscious of their responsibilities toward all nations to cooperate in building a just and lasting peace, the President and the Premier agreed to conduct their international affairs on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. They undertook to approach the elimination of the differences between their countries through peaceful negotiations, and, pending final resolutions, to renounce the threat or use of force in settling matters at issue between their two countries.

They recognized that there were also significant specific areas of mutual interest between their two countries. Both wish to reduce the danger of military conflict. And each seeks better understanding and mutual benefit through all forms of increased international contact including trade as well as cultural, scientific and technical exchange. They agreed that the broadening of mutual areas of interest would contribute to their shared objective of working toward the normalization of relations. Each would continue to seek out additional areas of cooperation with the other.

The President and the Premier declared that neither of their countries seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Both President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai emphasized that neither was prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third country or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states. At the same time they agreed that progress toward the normalization of relations between their two countries in itself represented progress toward a secure and lasting peace and was therefore in the interests of all countries. The two sides agreed that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major power to collude with another against a third, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

General View of the World Situation

During the talks, both sides noted with regret that turmoil still exists in many parts of the world and that the danger of military conflict remains. They expressed the hope that, on the basis of the principles enumerated above, potential conflicts could be averted and that steps to eliminate their causes could be initiated. To this end, President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai clarified their positions with respect to a number of areas where they might contribute toward a more peaceful environment.

Premier Chou En-lai and President Nixon also clarified their respective positions concerning Taiwan. Premier Chou En-lai stated that Taiwan is an integral part of the People's Republic of China, and that the future of Taiwan is therefore an internal matter. President Nixon stated that the U. S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States Government takes note of that position and will support efforts to reach an equitable and peaceful resolution of the ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the mainland. Premier Chou En-lai observed that the People's Republic of China has not chosen force of arms as a means of resolving the issue.

Bilateral Relations

President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai expressed awareness that the objective of achieving restoration of full relations between their two countries would require time and patience on both sides. They resolved that efforts to reach this goal would continue, building upon the gains achieved during President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China.

They agreed therefore that negotiations on outstanding issues would be carried on by means of further periodic visits to Peking by senior representatives of the United States Government, who would remain for the length of time necessary to clarify the positions of both sides.

The President stated that the United States Government was prepared to conclude with the People's Republic of China any arms control agreement that it has concluded with other major powers.

Pending the normalization of relations, President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai agreed that a number of concrete steps would be taken to maintain contacts and to improve the understanding between the Chinese and American peoples and between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. These steps will include:

- The facilitation of exchanges between the American and Chinese peoples of a scientific, technical, commercial, cultural, educational, and personal nature.
- The facilitation of the travel of newsmen to each country on a reciprocal basis, including the early establishment of resident press bureaus in each country.
- The two sides agreed to reduce obstacles to mutual commerce, and the President specifically declared the intention of his Government to ease further some U.S. trade restrictions.

The President and the Premier were gratified to have this opportunity after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries,

to discuss world problems and to present authoritatively to one another their respective views on a great variety of issues. Both leaders are convinced that such an exchange of views has in itself contributed to a better understanding and a reduction in tension between their two countries.

The President expressed his appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown him and his party by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1972

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: The Great Hall of the People
Peking, China

DATE: Midnight, January 3, 1972

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. CHI P'eng-fei
Vice Foreign Minister
Mr. CHANG Wen-chin, Director of the West
European, American and Australian Affairs, MFA
Mr. HAN Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA
Miss Nancy T'ang (Interpreter)

Haig: I am very honored that the Prime Minister is seeing me personally.

Chou En-lai: Yes, because I heard from Minister Fei and the Director of West European, American and Australian Affairs, who both told me that you had important matters to convey.

Haig: Yes, Dr. Kissinger and the President asked me to request an audience to give you, in blunt terms, a soldier's assessments of recent events in South Asia and discuss them in context of the President's visit.

Chou En-lai: How is Dr. Kissinger? I heard he had a slight cold.

Haig: He has had a touch of the flu but is much better today.

Chou En-lai: You have to be careful here too because it is snowing. I don't know whether it has snowed in Washington yet.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

Haig: We have had no snow yet. Usually by this time we would have had snow.

Chou En-lai: This is your first visit to China, I suppose?

Haig: Yes, both myself and Mrs. Hartley. We are very honored to be here. I said today that my father-in-law came to China some 48 years ago for his first visit to China.

Chou En-lai: 48 years ago. Very interesting. I believe he is still well? Your father-in-law? So you can now write him a postcard from Peking.

Haig: Yes, his trip was 48 years ago. Mr. Prime Minister, I thought what I would like to do is not belabor any of the special details that we have passed on in our messages but the Prime Minister will recall that we took a number of steps during that period.

Chou En-lai: Yes, I remember that you conveyed certain messages through a certain channel.

Haig: We believe and we have very strong confirmation that those steps were effective in convincing the Soviet Union to influence the Indians to accept a cease-fire rather than to proceed with attacks against West Pakistan -- in other words to stop short of what had been their goal against Pakistan. One of those steps was Dr. Kissinger's reference to the possible cancellation of the President's Moscow trip if the conflict continued. Since the cease-fire has gone into effect, we have made a very careful assessment of the overall implications of recent events on the subcontinent and we have concluded that up until recently the Soviet policy on the subcontinent has been, in general, to keep the subcontinent divided. This was manifested in their performance during the earlier conflict between India and Pakistan but we think they have decided on a

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 3 -

rather precipitous shift in their policy to adopt one in which they would now seek to encircle the PRC with unfriendly states. We believe that this modified Soviet strategy has evolved as a result of recent events and has caused them to overhaul their former strategy for the subcontinent. We also noted when the crisis developed that the Soviets tried very hard to divert us from the course that would converge with the policy of the People's Republic. In short, they sought to influence us to maintain a hands off policy. During the period when this crisis started to develop, they invited Dr. Kissinger to visit Moscow personally on several occasions as guest of Mr. Brezhnev. They also offered to reach agreements with us in the accidental attack and provocative attack areas, all of which we rejected. We rejected these approaches by the Soviet Union on two grounds -- one was on the grounds of principle. We felt we had certain obligations with respect to Pakistan and we felt we could not tolerate use of force to dismantle that country. But we also rejected the Soviet approaches because we felt that the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest.

Again, speaking the blunt language of a soldier, I would not be so naive to infer that this is a precipitous shift in our attitude which has suddenly developed after the years of differences which have divided us. Rather, we have arrived at these conclusions because we are convinced that the Soviet strategy is first to neutralize the People's Republic and then turn on us. Therefore, our interests are self interests. I would want this clearly understood.

Since the cease-fire has gone into effect between India and Pakistan, we have carefully assessed subsequent Soviet actions and we are convinced that they intend

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

to continue their efforts to encircle the People's Republic. We say this based on a number of factors. Included among those factors are their repeatedly announced support for the Bangladesh, and their offer to move advisers and assistance into East Pakistan, the recently announced visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan and, above all, their stepped up expressions of support for Hanoi in its conduct of the war, as well as increased Soviet materiel support for Hanoi. In the context of what I have just said, I would also like to comment very briefly on the recent decision of the U. S. Government to launch a series of limited aerial attacks against North Vietnam.

This was a decision that was taken only with the most careful thought and with the greatest reluctance. We believe that our policy with respect to the war in Southeast Asia is very clear at this point. We have undertaken every reasonable step to bring the conflict to an early conclusion. On the 11th of October, we transmitted to Hanoi the most forthcoming set of proposals for settlement of that conflict that we could conceivably develop, including the offer to have the current leader in Vietnam step down prior to a post-settlement election. In the face of these proposals, no one can doubt that we have any intention of maintaining our presence in South Vietnam. We have told Hanoi that we would withdraw and withdraw totally and they understand this. Despite these proposals of October 11th, we have yet to receive any response from Hanoi nor have we even received from them an expressed willingness to discuss these proposals in Paris as we have offered to do.

Instead, from Hanoi, we have seen a step-up of attacks in Cambodia and Laos. We have seen increased attacks against our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam. We have seen the continued development of Hanoi's supply route through the demilitarized zone and we have seen rocket attacks

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 5 -

against populated centers in South Vietnam. We have seen increasing numbers of missile attacks from sanctuary in North Vietnam against our air forces in Laos. These actions we could not but interpret as an effort by Hanoi to humiliate the United States -- a humiliation that no great power can accept. In this context, our retaliatory strikes were launched. Also in this context, future U.S. air activity over North Vietnam will be directly related to Hanoi's future actions. For our part, our strongest wish is to settle the conflict as quickly as possible and on terms, the fairness of which cannot be doubted. On the other hand, we cannot subject ourselves to the kind of humiliation which Hanoi's actions seem designed to achieve.

In the context of what I have just said, we have concluded that the continuation of the war in Southeast Asia can only give Moscow an opportunity to increase its influence in Hanoi and to further the encirclement of the People's Republic. We feel strongly that Moscow is urging Hanoi in the direction of continued military action and as such, they are forging another link in the chain which is designed to constrain the People's Republic. In all of these circumstances, we also believe that President Nixon's visit takes on a new and immediate significance which transcends its earlier importance. In the context of the events I have just described, i. e., the immediate effect to the People's Republic and the revised Soviet strategy, the President's visit is not only one of long term historic significance -- the original motivation and the guiding force underlying the visit -- but now we see an immediate significance which must now be considered with respect to the President's visit. In the light of our own strategic interests -- America's strategic interests which I described earlier -- we are convinced of and dedicated to the proposition that the viability of the People's Republic should be maintained. We have accepted this premise in full consideration of those things which divide us. We recognize that these

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 6 -

differences are both ideological and practical in nature. On the other hand, just as Dr. Kissinger outlined to you earlier, Churchill was willing to cooperate with Stalin in order to cope with the greater danger of Hitler Germany. We feel that the United States and the People's Republic must concert at this critical juncture. We are prepared to use our resources as we did during the crisis between India and Pakistan to attempt to neutralize Soviet threats and to deter threats against the People's Republic.

In sum, this is an overly generalized and soldier's blunt elucidation of Dr. Kissinger's and the President's views. It suffers from brevity and hence the oversimplification which a more careful exposition would avoid. We have considered some of the implications of this assessment and we have asked ourselves in the short term what the United States could do within the context of this assessment to deal with some of the events which we think could occur in the future. One of the steps we are prepared to do unilaterally and without any reciprocity on the part of the People's Republic -- is to provide you with our assessments of the Soviet threat which exists against the People's Republic to the degree that our own technical resources are able to do so. I would emphasize that these would be steps taken without condition and without reciprocity and Dr. Kissinger has asked me to inform you that when he arrives with the President he would be ready to discuss the modalities of furnishing this information, perhaps through a third country or through whatever other means you might prefer.

An additional implication of the assessment I have just provided is the fact that we have a major problem developing within the United States which your Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Huang Hua can confirm, and Miss Tang has observed first hand also. This is a strange merger of forces within the United States -- all dedicated to either preventing the President's visit to Peking or to contributing to its

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 7 -

failure. The forces which have converged are composed of first the American Left which is essentially pro-Soviet and if it is not truly dominated by Moscow in that sense of the word, it is at least strongly attracted toward Moscow and future U. S. alignment with Moscow. In this instance, the Left has been joined in a strange wedding with those conservative elements who are strong supporters of Taiwan. A third area of difficulty for us in the United States is a degree of bureaucratic haggling concerning the wisdom of the initiative to visit Peking.

All of these factors have converged in a way which poses a very serious threat to the success of the visit. In the short run, these forces would hope to prevent the visit at all -- in the longer run, they would hope to prevent or deter the normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States. For this reason, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are all the more concerned about making President Nixon's visit a success not only in reality but also in the appearance of the visit itself. Thus, we feel it must succeed in both fact and in appearance.

Unfortunately, most American journalists are shallow idiots. They draw their editorial line from the immediate atmospherics of the situation and from what is essentially the instantaneous reporting of a set of circumstances rather than from a careful analysis of the realities and implications of these realities. For this reason, it is crucial that there be no public embarrassment to the President as a result of his visit to Peking. It is in our mutual interest that the visit reenforce President Nixon's image as a world leader. I have brought several journalistic efforts of recent weeks from some of our more important newspapers, such as the New York Times, which I would like to leave with the Prime Minister so that he can see how these forces have been working in

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-8-

the United States against both the normalization of relations and the President's visit. In the light of these trends, we would hope that between now and Dr. Kissinger's visit that perhaps certain steps could be taken -- one might be some strengthening of the positive aspects of the Joint Communique which was worked out so satisfactorily during Dr. Kissinger's visit. We are thinking along the lines of a possible reference to trade or something that would give an immediate sense of accomplishment as a result of the visit, such as increased scientific or cultural exchanges.

Finally, the most crucial issue in the Public Communique which would be released at the time of the President's visit is the unresolved issue of the status of Taiwan. You will recall that Dr. Kissinger left without this language being agreed upon. We have looked at this problem from two perspectives. The first is what we will actually do about Taiwan in the future and second, is what we will say about Taiwan in conjunction with the President's visit. In order for us to be, very bluntly, anti-Soviet and pro-People's Republic, we must have the support of the American conservatives. As I pointed out, this support is intimately linked today to the issue of Taiwan. At this point, I would like to categorically reaffirm what Dr. Kissinger told you about our future policies towards Taiwan:

First, we will do nothing to encourage or support the movement towards an independent Taiwan. Second, we will do nothing to encourage or to support Japanese efforts to manipulate the future of Taiwan either through the independence movement or a Japanese presence in Taiwan.

And third, we will withdraw war-related U.S. forces from Taiwan as soon as the war has been

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-9-

concluded. Also, over the longer period we will gradually reduce our presence there.

In summary, the United States finds itself caught between the dilemma of a Left Wing which is dominated by forces friendly to the Soviet and by the Right Wing which is dominated by pro-Taiwan forces. For this reason, and in the light of all the considerations I have mentioned tonight, we would urge you to reconsider very carefully the language in the Joint Communique that pertains to Taiwan and, hopefully, to agree to a formulation that is somewhat less truthful and somewhat less precise than the language which Dr. Kissinger carried away with him during his last visit. I have brought another version of the paragraphs pertaining to Taiwan which I would like very much to leave with you, on an ad referendum basis. Perhaps when Dr. Kissinger arrives there can be further discussion on this subject. In the interim, Dr. Kissinger felt that you should have our assessment of what we consider to be the overriding strategic implications of Soviet actions and strategy. We have made some very careful soundings since Dr. Kissinger's return and we know that the language that was considered during his visit would cause an uproar in the United States. This, we feel, would only strengthen the very forces that are working against the visit itself and the implications of that visit for the future of both of our countries.

That concludes the strategic assessment of the President's and Dr. Kissinger's or rather my interpretation of that assessment. I must apologize for its bluntness but I felt that you would appreciate this kind of candor. Candor was certainly the characteristic of Dr. Kissinger's discussions here and especially those with the Prime Minister.

I do have several minor administrative matters to raise in this very restrictive form and in such a way that the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-10-

rest of our party would not be privy to them. With your approval, I will discuss them now.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Go ahead.

Haig: First, Dr. Kissinger considers that it is essential that he attend all the meetings between the President and yourself and whatever meetings might occur between the President and the Chairman. That is the first item.

Secondly, Dr. Kissinger again asked me to emphasize the essentiality of having concurrent meetings at the level of the Foreign Ministry and the Department of State which would occur whenever the President would meet with you and with the Chairman. It might pose a challenge of some magnitude to have sufficient substantive topics to cover but we are confident that together we can accomplish that constructively.

Next, I would like to reiterate what I have given to your very hospitable representatives today and that is that the composition of our party is made up of many technicians. Some of them are not governmental. They are all great advocates of their particular specialty. They may, during their visit here, be the source of some abrasive demand or requirement which would run counter to our mutual best interests. I want to emphasize if there are any demands of that kind that develop at the technical level you should not feel obliged to accept them but rather bring them to me so that no technical matter can be permitted to act as a source of irritation or detract from the success of this visit.

Each of our representatives who has been to China before now has returned with the greatest respect and admiration for the hospitality and for the professionalism and skill of your representatives. I am

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-11-

determined to keep that high level of cooperation and respect alive during this visit and I am prepared to take whatever steps you or your representatives might feel necessary to insure it. Therefore, I would again urge that anything your side feels may be counter-productive is brought directly to my attention.

One last very minor thing, Mr. Prime Minister, is that Dr. Kissinger was concerned because just before I left a female television personality called him and told him she was going to contact your Ambassador in New York and try to get him on her show and to use Dr. Kissinger's name to get him on the show. Dr. Kissinger wanted you to know that he had not given approval for this and felt that this was totally a Chinese matter as to whether the Ambassador appears or not.

Chou En-lai: We have not gotten news of this yet.

Haig: The commentator is a Miss Nancy Dickerson

Chou En-lai: So she approached Ambassador Huang Hua about that?

Haig: If she has not already, she will probably do so soon and she may use Dr. Kissinger's name.

Chou En-lai: That is a small matter.

I thank you for your rather clear notification. Of course, you have said you have not gone into great detail but we understand the general idea. And, of course, we must report this to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and also must consult with other colleagues. Therefore, I am not able to give an official reply. However, I would like to comment on what you have said. The first thing is just as you mentioned that the coming together of our two countries would be beneficial to the promotion of the normalization of relations between our two countries and also to the relaxation of tension in the Far East. We believe this will not only be beneficial to the U.S. but also to the People's

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-12-

Republic of China and also to the peoples of our two countries and to the people in the Far East.

The second point is that Soviet meddling in the South Asian subcontinent and in Indochina, in my opinion, is not due to a change in the strategic policies of the Soviet Union but rather a necessary consequence of reaction on the part of the Soviet Union toward the coming closer between China and the United States. And I mentioned this to Dr. Kissinger during his first visit to China -- that we were anticipating to shoulder, to bear the consequences of this coming together of U.S. and China and that we were prepared for this and we do not, therefore, find it to be unexpected. For instance, the question of the subcontinent. It was because the Sino-American Communiqué of July 15 -- the first announcement of July 15th, your time, was published that the Soviet-Indian Treaty, a so-called treaty which was actually a military alliance, came into being after having been delayed for two years. It was finally signed in Delhi in August and it can be said that Pakistan did not deal with that very earnestly at that time.

Of course, this is not something that either China or the United States could do for them as their friend. And, therefore, when later on in December, the situation had already become rather urgent, when we heard of Dr. Kissinger's information about the policy as adopted by the United States, we considered that although it was rather late at that time already, we considered that that was the only possible policy that could be adopted at that time. Of course, now, the question of the subcontinent has become complicated. And we believe that it will continue to develop. And if the United States Government has any other new further opinion with regard to this situation, we are willing to hear it. Because the obstruction of

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-13-

India's advance toward West Pakistan is only a temporary phenomenon. And with the development of the already complex situation on the subcontinent, will undergo still more changes. And, therefore, in the interim period from now until the visit of your President to China, if the U.S. Government has any new information it would like to convey, we are willing to exchange opinions on the situation in the area.

I would like to say also, very frankly, that our opinions differ from yours on Vietnam. We believe that it was not necessary for the U.S. Government to bomb North Vietnam in such a way as President Nixon has never done since he has taken office, as he did around Christmas last year. And, in addition, this action was taken after President Nixon had withdrawn I believe around 400,000 troops from South Vietnam, and, therefore, this action made it even more unacceptable to the people of the world, including the people of the United States and this was also reflected in the press of the United States. And this also occurred at precisely the time when President Nixon declared to the world around Christmas that he wished to move toward relaxation of tension and toward peace in the world. And if we should say that Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean and in the South Asian subcontinent have increased, we should say that they were led into that area by India. But if we should say that the Soviet Union was given an opportunity to increase its influence and its force in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam then we should say that it was assisted by the recent action of the United States. Because as I remember, when Dr. Kissinger was here discussing things with us, he expressed particular admiration and appreciation of the fifth point put forth by Madame Binh of the Republic of Vietnam. The basic spirit of that clause was to change South Vietnam and Indochina into a non-allied area, i. e., an area which would maintain

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-14-

peaceful and friendly relations with all sides. And this would be beneficial to the relaxation of tension in Southeast Asia. It would also be beneficial to the improvement of relations between the United States and China. However, now the U.S. bombing has increased the Soviet influence and tension in this area. Of course, this is not of great consequence to us but it is quite bad for the local area. It will make the situation in all of Southeast Asia tense and it will also be a matter of great concern to the people of the U.S. and the world and it will not be favorable toward the ending of the war in that area.

Originally, we were waiting to convey these views to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when they come later on but since you have now mentioned these matters, we think this is also another opportunity to advance some of our opinions. Of course, this is also just an initial exchange and I believe we will have another opportunity to exchange opinions. And, of course, as you said, this exchange is limited to us two.

And as for the third factor, we have taken into consideration the fact that you have certain internal problems which we see from the press and also Dr. Kissinger mentioned it during his previous visits and we have also felt the three forces which you mentioned. I would also like to ask something very bluntly and to you as you are a military man. Is it that the Pentagon also has differing opinions?

Haig: Some elements in the Pentagon have differing opinions but those who are the most responsible and strategic thinkers are in full agreement with this initiative and the visit of the President.

Chou En-lai: As for the two questions -- the two issues that Dr. Kissinger raised about the Joint Communique.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-15-

The first is essentially a question of trade. We understand this proposal and we can also see from American opinion that they are also attaching importance to this question and this is also an issue that carries weight.

The second is the suggestion you have brought from Dr. Kissinger about the wording of the part about Taiwan. In our opinion, the paragraph that we have written down -- I am not speaking about the part the Chinese says but the part that the U.S. side says. We believe that in the wording of that part we have fully taken into consideration the present dilemma that you just now mentioned between the United States Government and the forces you mention from the Left and the Right because this is a force of crucial significance to the United States but since you have brought a new opinion, we would be willing to take it into consideration, because as we have mentioned before we are always willing to get the work done as best as possible because you must work with a view toward the future. And also Dr. Kissinger has already given some hints about this question to the press -- five points, isn't that so?

Haig: Five points?

Chou En-lai: You have not seen them? A Minister of Japan -- we found it in the Japanese press. They were representatives of the Democratic Socialist Party -- the leader of that party.

Haig: He did talk to him.

Chou En-lai: And he announced these five points to the Japanese press.

Haig: I don't recall Dr. Kissinger using five points.

Chou En-lai: We have been trying to get a copy.

Haig: I will find out about that. I did not sit in at the meeting.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-16-

Chou En-lai: We will try to get a copy and give you an English translation. Of course, it quoted Dr. Kissinger and these words came from the Japanese. As for the specific questions you later mentioned (administrative questions), we don't think there is any question to that because we believe during his second visit Dr. Kissinger mentioned these points. I believe we can cooperate very well on them. Of course, you can continue discussions with Acting Foreign Minister Fei, either directly or you can have separate group discussions with various other people. Of course, we will not do anything to embarrass you and if anything comes up at lower levels, they will not be settled there. They will be brought to you.

As for your plans for this present visit to China, there are two suggestions. One was that you would spend a greater portion of your time in Peking and then go to Shanghai and Hangchow for a visit. Another would be you would stay here for a short time -- then go to Shanghai and Hangchow and come back here. In my personal opinion, it would be better to have all issues decided in Peking and then go to other places. It would be economizing on the time. But, of course, if you would like to wait for a reply from Washington before you would like to finalize certain details or if you have other political matters to discuss later on, then a return trip would be better. Either question is entirely up to you to decide.

Haig: I think, at first glance, we would favor a longer time here and then the trip to the other two locations and depart from there. I think we will know that better after we have had discussions of the schedule tomorrow morning at the plenary sessions, after which we could decide. But I believe that this would be the best way to proceed.

Chou En-lai: I am sorry to have taken up too much of your sleep.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 17 -

Haig: I am honored that you have taken this time to see me.

Chou En-lai: I am also very happy to have been able to meet you. Anyway, if you are going to contact Dr. Kissinger, please send my regards to him.

Haig: I will do so.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

January 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: The Great Hall of the People
Peking, China

DATE: 11:00 A.M., January 6, 1972

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. CHI P'eng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister
Mr. HAN Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA
General A. M. Haig, Jr.
Miss Nancy T'ang (Interpreter)

FM Chi: So you went to see the Palace Museum this morning?

Gen Haig: Yes, we had a most enjoyable visit there. It was just marvelous and extremely educational.

FM Chi: The only thing -- it is rather cold in the morning.

Gen Haig: It is cold, but it serves to wake you up.

FM Chi: Yes, it is good to wake you up.

Gen Haig: It also helps the appetite.

FM Chi: That is a good thing.

Gen Haig: I will do what Dr. Kissinger did while he was here -- put on weight. First, Mr. Minister, I thought I would like to just reiterate and reemphasize personally that I am very grateful for the personal cooperativeness that we are receiving at every level from your people. I am somewhat embarrassed to find that some of our people, have come with all the answers and have not operated with as much efficiency as I would have preferred. This has required additional patience and assistance from your side which has certainly not been lacking.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

FM Chi: I heard that they have had rather smooth and rather good discussions in the groups.

Gen Haig: Everything has been superior in the exchange of views but I find that the network people have sometimes not performed as effectively as I would have liked.

FM Chi: They seem to be doing alright.

Gen Haig: You are too kind. I did have some other followup information to our meetings of early Tuesday morning with the Prime Minister. I immediately reported in great detail that morning to Dr. Kissinger the results of the discussions with the Prime Minister. And he replied to me first that he received my report with no little nostalgia and he felt that in replying to my message that he wanted to again extend his personal greetings to each of you that had worked with him so cooperatively and in such a friendly spirit in October and July.

FM Chi: We would also like to thank him.

Gen Haig: One of the first items I mentioned to the Prime Minister was our hope that we could strengthen the positive actions of the Draft Communique. And when the Prime Minister replied to me he mentioned that this was primarily a problem of trade. I wanted to reemphasize that we were thinking also of cultural and scientific exchanges between the two sides -- that we might wish to consider improved language with respect to these two items as well as trade. In line with this, when Dr. Kissinger and the President come in February, they will have some additional proposals for exchange in the cultural and scientific area, as well as some ideas for your consideration in the area of trade, recognizing that this must come very slowly and it is not the kind of thing we would anticipate immediate action on but maybe some words of future promise. And we would welcome if between now and the visit you care to communicate further on this, perhaps in the Paris channel or, if you prefer, to wait until the party arrives and there could be some further discussion.

Concerning the draft alternative language I left ad referendum with respect to the U.S. portion of the paragraph on Taiwan, we would

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

welcome any additional views which your side might have before I return to the United States and we would be prepared to accept and consider any additional or alternate language that you might care to give before I leave. In any event, we would anticipate that this subject would always be the result of direct exchanges here in Peking between you and myself while I am here or Dr. Kissinger and the President after they arrive.

Now, also, during the meeting on Tuesday morning, the Prime Minister conveyed the thought that he would welcome any additional views we have on the subject of South Asia and the subcontinent before any meetings with President Nixon. With your side's approval, we would like to send some additional views on this subject through the Paris channel between now and the 21st of February. And for now, I would like to emphasize that our policies there will focus on efforts to buy time and to strengthen the defense capabilities of Pakistan. We certainly share the Prime Minister's concern that that situation is far from settled and is still in a period of dynamism which will require the most careful watching and perhaps action on both our parts. We have been using our influence just before and since the cease-fire to get Turkey and France to help in the arms situation in Pakistan.

FM Chi: Turkey and France?

Gen Haig: Yes. Turkey and France and this was a topic discussed between Presidents Nixon and Pompidou in the Azores. Concurrently, we are starting up our economic program for Pakistan at a greater level of assistance than heretofore. Now, turning to the topic of Southeast Asia which was also discussed with the Prime Minister on Tuesday morning, Dr. Kissinger has asked me to reiterate our government's view that it is Moscow which is blocking the arrival at a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict. He has asked me to recount in somewhat greater detail the sweeping proposals which we have made in search of a settlement of the conflict. We had, as I stated earlier, a meeting scheduled for the 20th of November with representatives of Hanoi in Paris. They cancelled that meeting and since that time, we have heard nothing from Hanoi.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

Vietnam, as Dr. Kissinger stated in October, is an anguishing problem for our government. In this sense, it was not the Nixon Administration that got us into the conflict but he, of course, has the problem of terminating the conflict.

Dr. Kissinger has also asked me to emphasize that when he met with Mr. Le Duc Tho in Paris in July, after the visit to Peking, he informed Mr. Le Duc Tho that the United States wished to end the war in Hanoi and not in Peking. During the past year, we have done the following specific things with respect to the conflict:

. On May 31st of last year, Dr. Kissinger met with Minister Xuan Thuy and proposed seven U.S. points for ending the war. One of these points was an offer on our part to set a deadline for our withdrawal.

. Then, on June 26th, Mr. Le Duc Tho came to Paris and met secretly with Dr. Kissinger. At that time, Hanoi proposed nine points in reply to the seven points we had proposed in May.

. Then, on July 1st, Madame Binh published her seven points and as Dr. Kissinger pointed out to the Prime Minister in October it was very odd procedure from our perspective to be given nine points secretly and seven points publicly.

. So, on July 12th, on his return from Peking, Dr. Kissinger met with Mr. Le Duc Tho in Paris, again secretly, and at this meeting we inquired of Mr. Le Duc Tho which we should deal with -- the nine points or the seven points and Mr. Le Duc Tho said the nine points were more significant -- the ones we had gotten secretly. In view of that response, it was very difficult for us to deal publicly with the seven points of Madame Binh when we were told that the more significant points were the nine secret points given by Mr. Le Duc Tho.

. Despite the confusion that came from these different views, on August 16th, we made a formal eight point proposal which constituted our reply to the secret nine points, as well as a reply to the seven points made publicly by Madame Binh. In this reply in August, we actually

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

went very far toward the seven and nine points of the other side and even included their specific language in our proposal on several of the key points.

On September 13th, Dr. Kissinger again went to Paris secretly. On this occasion, as on the preceding occasion in August, Mr. Le Duc Tho found it inconvenient to come from Hanoi to meet with Mr. Kissinger and, instead, he met with Mr. Xuan Thuy. Nevertheless, at this meeting, Mr. Xuan Thuy rejected two of the eight points Dr. Kissinger had forwarded in August. As a result of this rejection, we then reformulated those two points and submitted eight new points on October 11. Of those eight points, six are identical to those already accepted by Hanoi, and the other two points constituted reformulation of the points which Hanoi had rejected in September.

We then requested a secret meeting on November 1. As I pointed out earlier, since then we have had no substantive reply or exchange from Hanoi. In our view, our proposal of October went as far as anyone could possibly go. So, we were faced with intransigence not after we struck North Vietnam in December but well before. Among the proposals we offered in October were the following:

1. A specific offer for a fixed date for the withdrawal of our forces.
2. The provisions for new elections six months after a peace treaty would be signed.
3. A specific offer that all American troops would be withdrawn one month before this election.
4. The specific offer that the President and the Vice President of Vietnam would resign one month before the election so that they would not run it.

In addition to this proposal, the United States reiterated to Hanoi and reiterates here, our readiness to accept a post-settlement nonaligned

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

6

Southeast Asia. Specifically, what we visualized under our proposal would be the immediate signature of a statement of principles by both sides on which a settlement would be based. We would then withdraw all American forces except a few thousand within seven months of the signing of these principles. And we would do this even before the signature of a final peace treaty. There is also the provision for an all-around cease-fire and the resignation one month before the election of President Thieu and his Vice President. Therefore, in the broadest sense we feel we have replied positively to every demand that Hanoi has made that is reasonable and does not constitute a direct humiliation of the United States as a world power. It is this sequence of events which has led to the conclusion on our part that the war continues in Southeast Asia only for Soviet aims. Certainly, no Asian power or no patriotic Vietnamese element can fear our eventual domination. It is interesting that just this week we have learned that New Delhi is going to upgrade its representation in Hanoi very soon. And certainly this is an ominous further clarification of what Soviet aims must be along the southern flank of the People's Republic of China. I will not elaborate further on this topic during my visit but I would hope that there could be some very frank exchange of views on some of the more recent indications of increased Soviet strategy of encirclement.

Now, also during Tuesday morning's meeting, the Prime Minister raised the December 16, 1971 issue of the Japanese Weekly Shuhan Gendai, a copy of which was furnished to me yesterday (attached). This was an article allegedly written by the Director of Propaganda for the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. The article also allegedly portrayed the substance of a discussion between Mr. Kasuga and Dr. Kissinger in Washington. As I confirmed on Tuesday morning to the Prime Minister, Dr. Kissinger had met with Mr. Kasuga in Washington. However, that meeting lasted just 30 minutes, not two hours as the article indicates. During the meeting, Mr. Kasuga raised several questions associated with the President's visit here to Peking and persisted strongly in attempting to get some U.S. view on Taiwan from Dr. Kissinger. I have informed Dr. Kissinger of the contents of this article following the discussion Tuesday morning with the Prime Minister, and he has replied by providing me with a text of the precise minutes of his meeting with Mr. Kasuga. Dr. Kissinger also has

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

7

reiterated personally to me, in addition to providing me with the minutes, that he gave no reply to Mr. Kasuga with respect to the future status of Taiwan. My personal review of the minutes of that meeting confirm categorically that Dr. Kissinger deflected all questions on the subject. Instead, he referred to his press conference which occurred on the Tuesday before the December 3rd meeting with Mr. Kasuga and offered to give him a copy of that press conference, with which I know you are familiar. In commenting on the Japanese press article, Dr. Kissinger asked me to convey the following message to the Prime Minister. In Dr. Kissinger's view, the only press which is less reliable than our own is that of the Japanese. He also asked me to reiterate again what I stated on Tuesday morning to the Prime Minister and in somewhat more detail concerning our view on the future of Taiwan. Tuesday morning, I cited three specific policies of the United States with respect to Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger has reformulated these assurances in terms of five specific points. First, the United States will withdraw Southeast Asian-related forces within a reasonable period after the end of the Indochina war. Second, the United States will gradually withdraw the remainder of its forces as tensions ease. Third, the United States will give no support to the return of the Japanese presence in Formosa or to the introduction of Japanese troops in that location. Fourth, the United States will make no further reference to the status of Formosa as being undetermined. And, fifth, the United States will offer no encouragement to the so-called Taiwan independence movement. This is the essence of the guidance I have received from Dr. Kissinger and I think completes the response to all of the untended issues which arose on Tuesday morning.

FM Chi: First of all, I would like to thank General Haig for conveying Dr. Kissinger's message. And I will convey it to Premier Chou En-lai. And if Premier Chou En-lai has any considerations of any other discussions or any other messages we will further inform you. So, there is nothing further on our side.

Gen Haig: Very good.

(following as we were walking out)

FM Chi: After all the groups have finished their meetings, do you think there is any further need for a meeting between us?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

8

Gen Haig: I am just a little concerned about the networks portion. Everything else has gone beautifully and I think we are in very good shape. There are some unsettled problems in terms of television coverage. I am hoping it will be resolved this morning. If not, we may have to delay 24 hours. I hope this does not occur because I know this is a terrible burden on you and I am very anxious for us to finish on schedule.

FM Chi: I believe it may be solved very quickly. I do not believe there is any great obstruction.

Gen Haig: That group is commercially oriented. This is business to them. They are not conscious of the political details. I would hope they would not attempt to play your side off against us.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

PLACE: The Great Hall of the People
Peking, China

TIME: 11:45 PM, January 7, 1971

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Mr. CHI P'eng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister
Mr. HSIUNG Hsiang-hui, Secretary to the Premier
Mr. HAN Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA
Mr. CHANG Wen-chin, Director of the West European, American and Australian Affairs, MFA
Miss Nancy T'ang (Interpreter)

Chou En-lai: We gave you too much wine today? Our hosts did not know how to make conversation, so they just drowned you in wine. I believe Mr. Chapin can down quite a few cups. General Haig has quite a capacity. It is alright -- you are quite young.

This afternoon, Acting Foreign Minister Fei conveyed to me the message from Dr. Kissinger that you conveyed to him. I thank you for your information. I already said, on the morning of the 4th, that after I reported to Chairman Mao Tse-tung I would discuss it with my colleagues and give you a formal reply. So I would like, first of all, to give a reply to the former message you gave on the morning of the 4th and then to deal with the latter message given this morning -- later on.

We have studied the message conveyed by General Haig. Your straightforwardness has helped us to attain a clearer understanding of the views of the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

U.S. side on the current situation and Sino-Soviet ways. We would like to express our views in a similarly frank way.

1. The high level talks to be held between China and the United States to seek normalization of the relations between the two countries accord with the desire of the Chinese and American people and if positive results can be achieved they will also be conducive to the easing of tension in the Far East and in conformity with the interests of the people in Asia and the world. As the time for the talks draws near, certain hostile forces have been intensifying their destruction and sabotage. This is something within our expectations and we are prepared for it.

2. After the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Government hastily made concessions in Europe and came to agreement with the West on the Berlin question. While in Asia, it concluded with India a Treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation in name but it was a military alliance in substance. Following that, the Soviet Government took advantage of the situation to support India, to commit armed aggression against Pakistan and occupy East Pakistan. This is a continuation, under new circumstances, of the consistent Soviet policy of contending for hegemony. There is no shift of strategy to speak of. China is under no commitment to Pakistan. However, proceeding from its current principal stand, China has rendered and will continue to render political support and also materiel assistance within our capacity to Pakistan in its struggle against division and aggression. The Soviet Union has supported India to invade and occupy East Pakistan. They appeared arrogant and unbridled for a time but in fact they have further opened their

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

expansionist situation and, in fact, have become isolated from the entire world. The development of events are proving that the subcontinent will be in continuous turmoil. India and its supporter have the nooses around their own necks. They will certainly suffer from the consequences of their own doing.

3. There exist fundamental differences between China and the U.S. on the question of Vietnam and Indochina. After Christmas, the United States wantonly bombed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This has shocked world opinion and aroused world opposition. The self-justification made by the United States side is utterly untenable. As victims of the war of aggression, the Vietnamese people have the right to take every necessary action in self defense. China firmly supports their struggle. If the United States truly has the desire to withdraw all its forces and end the war in Vietnam, there is no reason for them to refuse to accept the reasonable seven-point proposal put forward by the North Vietnamese side. In fact, it is not Hanoi that is humiliating the United States but the United States that is insulting Hanoi. By what logic may a big country willfully commit aggression against a small country while the self-defense by a small country be described as aggression? This policy of the U.S. can in no way shape the firm resolve of the peoples of Vietnam and other Asian countries to fight and win. On the contrary, it has created obstacles to the U.S. to the withdrawal of troops and to its efforts to obtain release of the POWs. And has also brought an unfavorable element into the visit of the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China.

4. China is a big country but not yet a very strong one. Economically, we are still very backward. One half a year ago, President Nixon described China as one of the five great powers of the

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

world but now in its message the United States side, all of a sudden, expresses doubt over China's viability, asserting that it wants to maintain China's independence and viability. We are surprised at this. We hold that no country should ever rely on external forces to maintain its independence and viability. If it does so, it can only become a protectorate or a colony. However small a country may be, so long as it fears no brute force and dares to struggle, it will be able always to stay on its own feet in the family of nations. Vietnam is a vivid case in point. Socialist New China was born and has grown up in continuous struggle against foreign oppression and aggression and will continue to live on and develop. We have long stated that we are prepared to meet enemy invasions from all sides and fight to the very end -- not flinching from undertaking the greatest national sacrifice and make contribution to the human progress. Facts have proved and will continue to prove that all schemes to isolate, encircle, contain and subvert China will only end up in ignominious defeat.

5. The relations between China and the United States have not been normal. Nevertheless, the Chinese side will receive President Nixon with due protocol and courtesy and will make its efforts to seek positive results in the Sino-United States talks. In its message, the United States side expressed the wish that the image of the President as a world leader should be enhanced through the visit. This we find it difficult to understand. The image of a man depends on his own deeds and not on any other factors. We do not believe that any world leader can be self styled.

6. In its message, the United States side indicated that certain forces in the United States

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

are opposed to the normalization of Sino-United States relations and the Sino-United States high level talks and asked the Chinese side to reconsider the language of the Draft Communique with regard to a certain portion on Taiwan. Of course, we do not object to further consultations but we would like to point out that we have already done our best to take your difficulties into consideration in our draft. As you know, the Chinese people feel very strongly about the Taiwan question. If the United States side truly has the desire to improve Sino-United States relations, it should adopt a positive attitude of settling this issue which is the crucial question in Sino-United States relations. If there is yielding to certain forces opposed to the normalization of Sino-United States relations and backing down from the former position, that will bring no benefit to China and the United States.

So that is our comment to the oral message you conveyed on the morning of the 4th. Of course, you mentioned some new matters this morning. The first thing is that of trade and I remember very clearly that your Excellency conveyed in your message the wishes of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger with regard to that matter. And I said that we had noted the opinion of the United States side and we would consider putting it into the Joint Communique. There is no question that the relations between China and the United States have not been normalized and that the development of trade will be limited and slow. However, we should look further to the future and the relations between China and the United States -- should proceed in a direction headed for normalization and the matter of trade should be viewed as a positive factor in this progress. And since Dr. Kissinger has mentioned cultural and scientific exchanges, if he has any specific idea,

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-6-

of course we would be willing to exchange opinion on these matters during the discussions.

The second question is the matter of the South Asian subcontinent that you mentioned in the message you conveyed from Dr. Kissinger. We appreciate the part of the message in which you mentioned that the United States side at present would wish to count on gaining time to enhance the self-defense of Pakistan and that the United States was willing to undertake an economic assistance towards Pakistan. As for the other portions, they were a sort of explanation and as I have already answered them previously, I feel them to be redundant. And as General Haig has in the early hours of the 4th very straightforwardly conveyed President Nixon's and Dr. Kissinger's message to us, I would like to request your Excellency to report the reply we have just given you in a similarly straightforward manner to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.

Haig:

I am very grateful for the very detailed and very frank views which I will convey precisely as received to Dr. Kissinger and to the President. As I pointed out at the time I gave those views, they were views which were largely conveyed in my own language as I understood the general thrust of my instructions. In several instances, I believe the simple language of a soldier might have been more blunt than it might have been. I believe some of my words may have been misinterpreted. I would also like to briefly discuss your reply from a personal point of view because I have not been able to discuss the matter personally with the President or Dr. Kissinger.

First, with respect to the situation in Southeast Asia, I believe it is very helpful to exchange views

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-7-

even though it appears we basically disagree on this subject. From our perspective, and this is a problem I have been very very close to for the last three years, it is not United States forces that are in Laos or United States forces that are in Cambodia but North Vietnamese forces. We have expressed our desire to withdraw our forces and we have made honorable conscientious proposals that would lead to that withdrawal and a settlement. It is the other side that has not responded to these proposals. I think I explained that we were told to pay attention to the nine points given to us secretly by Hanoi and that is the way we have proceeded, based on advice from Hanoi's spokesman. Even so, this is a topic that I think warrants more extensive exchange at the time of the President's visit. I do believe that in the long run our perception of the convergence of the interests of the United States and the People's Republic of China in the area of Southeast Asia is the ultimate truth.

The second point is the terminology that I used concerning the viability and independence of the People's Republic of China. Certainly, we would not presume to infer that we were assuming the role of the protector or the guarantor of China's viability. On the other hand, we did want to make very clear, and perhaps I did it clumsily, that in our perspective China's viability and future health is of interest to the United States. This is a matter of our own national interest in the context of the world situation as it has developed.

The third point I would like to mention is the again unfortunate language which suggests that the imagery of the President was an important item. This was meant only in the context of the preparations we are making for the President's visit. I

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-8-

think it is important that we do not afford our enemies an opportunity to attack the President either in terms of his motivation or his effectiveness during his visit. The worst disservice I could do to President Nixon would be to suggest that his public image is a matter of concern to him or a matter which influences his decision on any given substance. Certainly, his performance in the international arena thus far suggests that popularity has never been, nor will ever be, the criteria by which he makes his decisions.

With respect to the issue of Taiwan, I immediately conveyed to Dr. Kissinger the reply that I received from you on Tuesday morning and he is, I think, very much aware of that reply. He did provide this additional information today, primarily to answer the questions that came up Tuesday and not to elevate our discussions here to a dialogue that would go on continuously but, hopefully, to elaborate on those issues which might have required clarification based on the discussion of Tuesday morning.

On the three subjects that we discussed that our side hoped could be more positive in the communique, i. e. , trade, scientific and cultural matters, I am confident that Dr. Kissinger will come up with some very modest proposals because he realizes that that portion of the communique is balanced and very well worked out. I do not expect any drastic revision to the communique in this respect and we recognize the issue of trade is a long term one.

And finally, on the subject of the South Asian subcontinent, I think recent events have confirmed one thing to me from my humble perspective and that is that while forces are sometimes under way

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-9-

that we would like to think our own good intentions may somehow control, the facts are sometimes quite to the contrary. In South Asia, certainly the United States was slow in recognizing the dangers. I think it behooves both our sides to be equally cognizant of future dangers there and elsewhere and I would hope it would not be a question of looking back on a situation that had turned sour for the lack of timely action which might have prevented that.

I again thank the Prime Minister for his very thoughtful treatment to me and my party while we have been here in Peking. One thing has characterized any exchanges I have been involved in with your officials and that has been the degree of candor and frankness which is very encouraging to me. I think both of us have had long standing positions on controversial issues on which we do not agree and would hope those will not be translated too readily into -- and to use your term -- "empty canons of rhetoric" but rather to the kind of frank language that will minimize misunderstanding even though the disagreement might remain at the conclusion of the discussion.

Chou En-lai:

Your Excellency has just now commented a bit on our reply and I think I should also like to add a few words. Of course, the reply I gave you just now in itself is a complete answer. And what I am now adding, of course, is additional and it was led to by your comment.

And on the question of Southeast Asia, our current opinion has been, to put it simply, that the United States is in the wrong. This is not only the words of the Chinese but also of the other people in the world. I have heard American friends themselves

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-10-

speak of this. And, in addition, this is not something that was created by President Nixon himself. It was his predecessors. And President Nixon has already decided to withdraw his troops. And as I have said to Dr. Kissinger before, I would wish that the United States would withdraw completely as General DeGaulle did in Algeria and do it in one strike and cleanly, wholly, without any remainder and immediately. And to find various excuses to drag on in a messy way will only finally end up in losing the initiative. With a subjective wish for a glorious and honorable withdrawal while in reality there may not be such honorable and glorious withdrawal and if you only have the subjective wish but reality is not a glorious and honorable withdrawal, then on the contrary, this might give rise to difficult predicaments that are difficult to extract ones self from. Have you read the Soviet News? That is upon your present visit to China, the Soviet press has done some reporting in which they have given some special descriptions of you as saying that you are especially in charge of Vietnamese and Indochina Affairs. Of course, we do not pay attention to that. It is precisely because you may be in charge of this that I would like to speak to you with special earnestness. That is that your excuses will not carry over with the people of the world. For instance, you said that it was not the United States troops that went first into Laos and Cambodia but North Vietnamese troops. The question is that your troops should not have gone to Vietnam in the first place. The sending of United States troops into Vietnam itself is aggression. For instance, we have a common point in opposing the sending of Indian troops into East Pakistan. Then, how can we agree to your sending troops into South Vietnam. That is why the Soviet Ambassador criticized you on the issue of Vietnam when the question of the war in Pakistan was under debate in the United Nations. That is the first point.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 11 -

The second point is -- take Laos for instance -- the troops of Thailand went into Laos. That is also foreign aggression. And your CIA has given often air support to the Laotian bandits in the form of ammunition or money or food. They have given this to the Lao bandits of the minority Nationality, the forces of Vang Pao in the area that is under the control of Laos and this is something that is recognized in the American press. Then, since the United States and Thailand can give air support to bandits in Laos, then why can Vietnam not give patriotic assistance to the forces of liberation? For instance, it is the same as the situation in which you assisted South Korea and advanced your forces up to the very banks of the Yellow River. It was only then that we sent our volunteers to assist the Democratic Republic of Korea and when we now coolly assess that situation -- was that not very clear? And the case is similar in Cambodia. If the Lon Nol - Matak clique had not subverted Sihanouk, then how would the war in Cambodia have come about?

Later on, your President himself decided to send troops on an intrusion into Cambodia. That was at the end of April 1970 and later on in the early part of 1971, United States troops entered into Laos and this was even further aggression and at Christmas last year, you launched a massive air strike against North Vietnam. Your President and your Pentagon have called those successes but, in my opinion, they are not successes. You are a soldier and I also have been one in the past -- not now of course. I have also been in military action and I know that this kind of fighting cannot bring victory. It can only give rise to dissatisfaction on the part of ones own people. And these actions on the contrary are giving the Soviet Union an opportunity. And if you want some news, I can tell you a bit that if you do not leave that place, then Southeast Asia which does have the possibility of being turned into an area of nonalignment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 12 -

will become an area of contention between the two superpowers. We are very clear about that. And then Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the subcontinent, the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia will be linked together and how can tension be relaxed and wouldn't that be completely contrary to the ideals of your President. On the morning of the 4th, you told us of the strategic thinking of the President. And you once again mentioned that your President wished to relax the tension but if things go on like that, then the situation that will appear will be completely contrary to those subjective wishes. And the result will be that the situation will continue in continuous turmoil not only in the subcontinent. Of course, the settlement of the Vietnam question will be reached between the United States and the DRV, either in Paris or Hanoi or perhaps in other places. Of course, we, as the third party, cannot meddle in this but we must state clearly our stand and there must be no ambiguity about that. I have dealt in rather great detail on this question in the hope that you will convey this to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. This itself, in fact, constitutes an initial exchange of opinion. Of course, it is probably too long to send in your cables so you can talk about them when you get back and Mrs. Hartley will be tired working on them until tomorrow morning.

As for the other two questions, there is no need to pay too great attention to the wordings and terminology. We would like you to know that although our country is backward, we have our independence. In our country, we have relied on our own initiative and self-reliance and have relied on these to fight until today. We have our self-dignity and so have you and if we mutually respect each other that is equality. So the erroneous terminology that you just now mentioned is not only a matter of terminology but a matter of attitude. We are not a superpower and we refuse to be a superpower. Your President has mentioned that China is a potential strength power. There is a degree of reason in that.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 13 -

The third point you mentioned was the image of your President and our reply would be as we have mentioned in the third point of our reply -- that the image of a man depends on his own deeds. And since we have invited your President to China, we will certainly give him the protocol and courtesy due him. I don't think there is any question of this and do not believe we have to say more about this because I believe you will understand this through the technical discussions we have had. Of course, it is impossible to go beyond that because we have not established diplomatic relations and you still recognize Taiwan. You must not forget that. It is important to us. The good thing about it is that Chiang Kai-shek also only recognizes one China. He also says Taiwan is a Province of China. It is a good thing because Taiwan would have long ago become a puppet of yours and become another Thieu or Sigmund Rhee and if such a situation had occurred wouldn't that make it even more impossible for us to come together and that would bring even more difficulty in the normalization of relations. So now, we have come to the question of Taiwan. So as to the question of Taiwan, I have already dealt with it in the official answer to you and if there is further discussion -- if there is still room for individual changes in that part -- then they should await the arrival of President Nixon or Dr. Kissinger. As for the present, we believe that in our draft we have already given very great consideration to your difficulties. As for other specific wordings and various measures, just as I mentioned about trade, cultural and scientific matters, they are rather minor matters and can wait until the arrival of your President. And my secretary has just now called my attention to the fact that you mentioned the fact to pay attention to the danger developing in the sub-continent and you mentioned in the past you had been late in recognizing the danger there. You just now mentioned that in the past you had come to the realization of this danger too late to avoid danger.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 14 -

As to that question, I have already answered on the morning of the 4th and we have identical views.

Haig:

I am very grateful for this lengthy discussion. It is presumptuous of me to speak for President Nixon or Dr. Kissinger. I think on the subject of Southeast Asia there will be many useful exchanges during the President's visit. The past history you referred to should be a source of wisdom and learning. It does not necessarily provide the answers to current situations.

Chou En-lai:

Of course, this answer must be given by your President. I cannot do that for him. For instance, in the instance of the Korean War. We entered into the war against aggression. During that time, the President was Truman who was a Democrat and not a Republican. He still put forth the suggestion of negotiation, so actually they fought one year without negotiations but later on, with your Republican President Eisenhower, he ended the war in Korea. I think it is useful to recall that part of history but the situation in Korea was different from that in Vietnam so it would not do to dogmatically copy that. The war that began in Vietnam has brought the whole of Indochina together, has merged it into one but we have not entered that war so the situation is different. And only with determination and resolve can that situation be settled. Otherwise, you will only lose the initiative.

Haig:

I think we are convinced that it is going to take bold action and I think we have taken it by offering sweeping proposals. It is somewhat of a puzzle that we have not received a response to those proposals. Perhaps that is where the trouble lies. That is why alternative means must be pursued.

Chou En-lai:

That is a question that I cannot answer because the war in Indochina is different from the war in Korea. In the case of Korea, on our side the Democratic people of

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 15 -

Korea were the main representatives and our representatives were their deputies. On the other side, the United States was the main representative while Sigmund Rhee was the deputy, so actually there were four sides and in that circumstance it was easier for us to get an opinion. Now you are discussing face to face. So, I will not take up more of your time from your sleep.

Haig:

Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister.