

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

INFORMATION  
October 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
FROM: PETER RODMAN PWR  
SUBJECT: Who Invited Whom?

The attached chronology gives the full record of public and private statements relevant to the question of which side took the initiative to propose a Presidential visit to China. The record suggests that the invitation evolved out of initiatives on both sides:

- The U.S. took the initiative and pressed for the idea of sending a U.S. special representative to Peking or receiving a Chinese special envoy in Washington. (This began in the Warsaw talks in January 1970, and we later raised it in special channels. The Chinese responded positively on December 9, 1970.)
- Aside from a casual comment by the President in an October 1970 TIME interview, the first mention of a Presidential visit came from the Chinese on January 11, 1971. (They repeated it on April 21, 1971, following the President's public remark about his daughter's honeymoon.)
- Chou En-lai's message of May 29, 1971, treats the idea of a Presidential visit as Mao's "suggestion" which the President "accepts."
- Chinese playmanship about our seeking the invitation seems to have begun in Chou's talks with you in Peking. (Chou told you the President's honeymoon remark in April prompted the invitation.) He has been getting the sequence wrong, too: Last week he told a group of Americans that the special-envoy idea was agreed to after the Presidential-visit idea was broached.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

The key steps in the process are marked in red on the attached chronology.

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State Dept., DIA, review  
completed

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WHO INVITED WHOM?

Date

Jan. 20, 1970

Amb. Stoessel at Warsaw meeting tells PRC Charge' that U.S. "would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions . . . or receiving a representative from your Government in Washington." PRC Charge' expresses interest. (Tab 1)

Feb. 20, 1970

At next Warsaw meeting, PRC Charge' states that "if the USG wishes to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy of the U.S. President to Peking for further exploration of questions of fundamental principle between China and the United States, the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him." (Tab 2)

May 3, 1970

U.S. assures Chinese following Cambodia operation (thru Winter and Walters in Paris) that U.S. has no aggressive intentions, and that "Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the Communist Chinese side if this can be done secretly." (Tab 3)

June 15, 1970

U.S. (thru Walters) suggests creation of a regular channel thru Walters, and states our readiness "to send a high-level personal representative of the President to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location, for direct talks on U.S. - Chinese relations." (Tab 4)

Oct. 5, 1970

President, in TIME interview following Jordanian crisis, says: "If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't, I want my children to." (Tab 5)

Oct. 25, 1970

President asks Yahya in Washington to tell Chinese in Peking that U.S. is willing to send high-level personal representative (e.g., Murphy, Dewey, or HAK) to Peking or other convenient capital to open direct secret communications. (Tab 6)

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Oct. 26, 1970

Ceausescu tells President he believes PRC wants to improve relations with U.S. President declares U.S. readiness for talks with PRC and exchange of high-level special representatives. (Tab 7)

Dec. 9, 1970

PRC replies to oral message delivered by Yahya: Chou En-lai, after coordinating with Mao and Lin Piao, states that "in order to discuss this subject [U.S. vacating Taiwan], a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking." Chou notes that this was first U.S. message sent "from a Head thru a Head to a Head," and Chinese attach importance to it because Pakistan is a great friend of China. (Tab 8)

Dec. 16, 1970

U.S. replies thru Pakistani channel welcoming Chinese willingness (as expressed at Feb. 20, 1970 Warsaw meeting) to receive U.S. representative to discuss outstanding issues. U.S. therefore "believes it would be useful" to begin discussions at an early convenient moment on bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. (Tab 9)

Dec. 24, 1970

HAK, in end-of-year backgrounder, says: "We remain prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to talk to the Communist Chinese about differences that divide us." (Tab 10)

Jan. 11, 1971

Amb. Bogdan delivers message from Chou En-lai declaring that "if the U.S. has a desire to settle the [Taiwan] issue and a proposal for its solution, the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking." Chou added the comment that since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking. (Tab 11) <sup>25X1</sup>

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April 16, 1971

President tells American Society of Newspaper Editors of a recent conversation he had had with his daughters on the possibility of their going to China someday. "I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope sometime I do." (Tab 13)

April 21, 1971

Message from Chou En-lai delivered April 27 "reaffirms [PRC] willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions." (Tab 14)

April 27, 1971

U.S. message dispatched via Walters proposes setting up reliable channel and says that HAK would be prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on U.S. - Chinese relations." (This message dispatched before receipt of above; received by Chinese April 29.) (Tab 15)

April 29, 1971

President in news conference says: "I hope, and, as a matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China sometime in some capacity -- I don't know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long term." (Tab 16)

April 30, 1971

LIFE publishes Edgar Snow report of Dec. 18, 1970, interview with Mao. The PRC foreign ministry, Mao had said, was considering the matter of admitting Americans, including the President, to China. "He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President." (Tab 17)

May 10, 1971

President, replying thru Pakistani channel to Chou's message of April 21, says he "is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China." President proposes preliminary secret meeting between HAK and Chou to exchange views and explore possibility of Presidential visit. (Received by Chinese May 17) (Tab 18)

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May 20, 1971

U.S., in note informing PRC of May 20 SALT announcement and pledging to make no agreement directed against PRC, suggests arms control as agenda item for proposed preliminary secret meeting. (Received by Chinese May 22) (Tab 19)

May 29, 1971

Chou En-lai, in formal response (received June 2), says he "has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit . . . Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U.S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high-level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking." (Tab 20)

June 4, 1971

President, in reply, says he "looks forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meeting and discussions with the leaders of the People's Republic of China," and he "appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou En-lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger." (Tab 21)

July 9-11, 1971

Chou En-lai tells HAK in Peking that "from the very beginning, [the President] took the attitude that he was willing to come to Peking." He says President's remark about daughter's honeymoon prompted invitation. HAK tells Chou that "this idea resulted first from your initiative which we are happy to accept." (Excerpts from Peking MemCons, Tab 22)

July 15, 1971

Joint announcement of Peking summit: "Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC, Premier Chou En-lai . . . has extended an invitation to President Nixon . . . [who] has accepted this invitation with pleasure." (Tab 23)

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July 16, 1971

HAK, asked at San Clemente backgrounder if he knew before his trip that President would be invited, replies: "Essentially, yes. I knew, and of course the President knew that there was an interest, a mutual interest in a visit." (Tab 24)

July 19, 1971

Chou En-lai, in interview with delegation from Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, explains Nixon visit by saying that "at the present date, in contacting your government to normalize relations we must contact those who are in authority in your country. But in your country, your system is that you have a president, and your president said that he wishes to move towards friendship and he also has said that he hopes to visit China. And of course, naturally we can invite him . . ." (Tab 25)

August 5, 1971

Chou En-lai tells James Reston, in interview published August 10: "He [the President] expressed a desire to come and we have invited him to come." (Tab 26)

October 5, 1971

Julian Schuman, in UPI dispatch from Peking, quotes Chou En-lai as saying: "He [the President] publicly expressed his willingness to come to China and negotiate. We had made no response. It would not have been proper for a state so antagonistic. Therefore we agreed to Kissinger's coming." (Tab 27)

ORIGIN/ACTION				No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29 : LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4				C1 POL CH/COM-45	
ALRG RAM									
Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.				FILE DESIGNATION					
				PRIORITY				SECRET/NODIS	
				HANDLING INDICATOR				A-25	
TO				Department of State				NO.	
				COPY NO. 1				SERIES A	
FROM				Amembassy WARSAW				DATE: January 24, 1970	
SUBJECT				Stoessel-Lei Talks: Report of 135th Meeting, January 20, 1970					
REF									
NO DISTRIBUTION									
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION									
The American side was met at the front door of the PRC Embassy by staff members and led to the second floor where the Charge, LEI Yang, and his staff were waiting. Both sides introduced themselves and there were handshakes all around.									
Participants on both sides were:									
United States									
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.									
Paul H. Kreisberg - Advisor									
Donald M. Anderson - Interpreter									
Thomas W. Simons, Jr. - Scribe									
People's Republic of China									
Charge d'Affaires Lei Yang									
Li Chu-ching - Advisor									
Ch'ien Yung-nien - Interpreter									
Yeh Wei-lan - Scribe									

\* \* \*

Amb. Stoessel:

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires. If as these talks progress it would seem to be useful and your Government would so desire, my Government would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative from your Government in Washington for more thorough exploration of any of the subjects I have mentioned in my remarks today or other matters on which we might agree.

In any event, in closing, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I would like to restate once again my Government's hope that regular contacts between us can take place at frequent intervals and that these talks will enable us to move toward a new phase in Sino-American relations based on mutual respect.

This concludes my statement.

\* \* \*

Lei Yang:

Mr. Ambassador, the talks between China and the U.S. have gone on for over ten years. In the course of these talks, the U. S. Government has invariably advanced an evasive attitude toward the questions of fundamental principles between the two countries and has confined itself to side issues, thus preventing the talks achieving results on fundamental issues between the two countries. Now that the U.S. Government wishes to increase the dialogue with our country and improve Sino-US relations, presumably the question of how to deal with the fundamental principles of the relations of our two countries is already under your consideration. The Chinese Government has always stood for the peaceful settlement of disputes between China and the U.S. through negotiations; it has done so in the past and is prepared to do likewise in the future. We would welcome studies and explorations on the fundamental question of how to settle relations between the two countries. We are willing to consider and discuss whatever ideas and suggestions the U.S. Government might put forward in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, therefore really helping to reduce tensions between China and the U.S. and fundamentally improve relations between China and the U.S. These talks may either continue to be conducted at the ambassadorial level or may be conducted at a higher level or through other channels acceptable to both sides. I have carefully listened to the statement the Ambassador just made. We will study it and set forth our views at the next meeting.

Lei said:

Mr. Ambassador, I would only like to add a few points. With regard to Mr. Ambassador's proposal regarding sending a representative either to Peking or to Washington, I will transmit the proposal to my Government. As I already pointed out, the position of my Government on the question of Taiwan is very clear and known to everybody. The so-called treaty concluded by the U.S. and the Chiang Kai Shek clique is not recognized by the whole Chinese people. And I must point out that Taiwan is not a state; it is part of the People's Republic of China. Mr. Ambassador must be aware that there is only one China: this is the People's Republic of China. If Mr. Ambassador has nothing more to say, may I make a proposal for the date of our next meeting?

I said:

I have heard with attention what you have said. I understand your views concerning Taiwan, and I hope that you have understood the point of view that I have presented in my statement. I will report to my Government everything you have said today, including what you mentioned regarding meetings at a higher level. I believe the Charge also mentioned that the meetings might be in another channel, and I would like to inquire what might be involved. Any explanation from the Charge would be useful.

Lei said:

Concerning the question of the Chinese territory of Taiwan, which Mr. Ambassador has mentioned, I have already explained in clear terms the position of my Government. Therefore I would not like to repeat them. Mr. Ambassador also mentioned the question of talks at a higher level or through other channels. If the U. S. Government is interested in talks at a higher level or through other channels, you may put forward your draft proposal, or a draft proposal may be worked out through consultation of the two sides at these ambassadorial talks. If Mr. Ambassador has nothing more to say, may I make a proposal for the date of the next meeting? I propose that the date of the next meeting be decided on later through consultation via the liaison personnel of our two sides. Mr. Ch'ien will be liaison officer of our side.

# AIRGRAM

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AGR	COM	FRB
LAB	TAR	TR
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USIA	NSA	CIA

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Decentralized Files.

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
PRIORITY

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A-84

HANDLING INDICATION

TO : Office of Asian Affairs, Department of State



GROUP 1. Excluded from automatic STATE downgrading and declassification 1970

RS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH  
DATE: February 21, 1970

FROM : Amembassy WARSAW

SUBJECT : Stoessel-Lei Talks: Report of 136th Meeting, February 20, 1970

REF :

NO DISTRIBUTION

The American side met the Chinese side in the lobby of the American Embassy. The two principals shook hands and, after the two sides had stood briefly to allow press photography, proceeded together by elevator to the Embassy fourth floor and to the conference room.

Participants on both sides were:

## United States

Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.  
Paul H. Kreisberg - Advisor  
Donald M. Anderson - Interpreter  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr. - Scribe

## People's Republic of China

Chargé d'Affaires Lei Yang  
Li Chu-ching - Advisor  
Ch'ien Yung-nien - Interpreter  
Yeh Wei-lan - Scribe

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Lei Yang:

In order to resolve this important contradiction "more thorough exploration is indeed necessary", as said by Mr. Ambassador at the first meeting. There are certain difficulties in undertaking this task in the ambassadorial talks between the two countries. It appears that our two sides have both foreseen this situation. At the first meeting both came forward separately with the same view, that talks at a higher level might be held, and you went even further putting forward the idea of sending a representative to Peking or to Washington for discussion. If the U. S. Government wishes to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy of the United States President to Peking for further exploration of questions of fundamental principle between China and the United States, the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him. \* \* \*

Amb. Staessel:

In conclusion, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I would like to express my Government's pleasure that this series of ambassadorial-level meetings has been resumed and that we have met again after only one month. As I indicated in our previous meeting, the United States is prepared to consider with you the possibility of sending a representative to your country or receiving your representative in the United States, should progress at these talks indicate that this would be useful in improving relations between our two countries. I have noted your specific statement today, about receiving a representative in Peking, and I will transmit it to my Government. As you know, it is my Government's view that these exchanges can make a valuable contribution toward the gradual resolution of the problems between our two countries. I believe we have made a useful start, and I hope that we will be able to make further progress based on a spirit of mutual understanding.

SECRET/NODIS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

May 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*  
SUBJECT: Communication with the Communist Chinese

As I mentioned to you at the time on the phone, Professor Ernst Winters, a naturalized American working with UNESCO in Paris, and an old acquaintance, called me on May 3 to relay the reaction of personnel in the Communist Chinese Embassy in Paris to your decision on the Cambodian sanctuaries. This reaction was obtained on April 30, i. e., before your speech. Thus, the Chinese were aware of only South Vietnamese ground operations in Cambodia, not our own.

On hearing the gist of his information, I asked Professor Winters to come to my office right away. We met at 2:00 p. m. that afternoon for about fifteen minutes.

I asked Professor Winters what had transpired in Paris. He said that on Thursday, April 30, at 11:30 a. m. (i. e., before your speech) one of his contact people with the Chinese, a Frenchman who arranges exchanges between Chinese and French students, called to say that the Chinese wanted to see Professor Winters. He went to the Embassy for a two-hour lunch.

He met with several young low-echelon personnel, such as the chauffeur and a switchboard operator, who are imbued with the cultural revolution and in a sense run the Embassy. The Ambassador and a young man from the Foreign Service were also there but, as usual, were not very articulate. The Chinese immediately asked Professor Winters what he thought of the President's decisions on Cambodia.

Professor Winters replied that he supposed that the United States thought that its national interest was at stake and was acting accordingly. The Chinese immediately began to harangue him with invective, a marked departure from their previous polite dealings, and lumped him together with all other Americans. They claimed that the U. S. wished to conquer China, that we were considering preventive war, that we were in collusion with the Soviets in a pincer movement on China, and that our Vietnam withdrawals were a ruse.

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TOP SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

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Professor Winters was struck by the enormous, un-Chinese intensity of their reaction. Clearly, a nerve had been touched. He took the Chinese reaction in stride and asked how the United States was to know how the Chinese felt without any contact. The Chinese did not allow American visitors and the Warsaw meetings were not really productive.

The Chinese asked Professor Winters who in America they could talk to and trust, the significant groups. In his only intervention, the Foreign Service officer said, "Don't say the student movement." Professor Winters replied that the President and his Cabinet were the policy makers and the ones to talk to.

He left the Chinese Embassy very depressed, with a feeling of hopelessness after seven years of cultivating the Chinese. Since he was going to New York that afternoon anyway for a meeting, he thought it would be useful to go to Washington and give me his information in case it fit into our overall strategic mosaic.

I asked Professor Winters whether they would see him, and he replied that they never refused to do so. They did not know that he had been in New York or that he knew me.

I then asked Professor Winters to see the Chinese the next day on May 4 and to tell them that he had seen me, and had put their questions to me. I asked Professor Winters to pass a message to the Chinese along the lines of the attachment at Tab A. I told him to contact General Walters as soon as he had seen the Chinese and give him any message from them.

Professor Winters added that he had observed during the past few weeks that the Soviets in UNESCO circles were moving away from the U.S. and that there was a growing Soviet-U.S. tension.

Our meeting closed with Professor Winters assuring me that he would act on this the next day and my observing that if the Chinese refused to receive him, this would be an interesting development also.

We have not heard back from Winters or Walters on this subject.

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TOP SECRET/NODIS  
EYES ONLY

Message to be Passed to the Chinese

The United States has no aggressive intentions concerning Communist China. On the contrary, we would like to establish regular relations with her, recognizing our differences in ideology.

We have no interest in establishing military bases in Vietnam, and we believe a peace that takes into account everyone's interests in that area can be achieved.

Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature  
on the Communist Chinese side if this can be done secretly. The Chinese can reply by getting in touch with Major General Vernon Walters, Senior U.S. Military Attache, American Embassy, Paris. No one but the President is aware of this message and the Chinese reply should be through General Walters and nobody else.

May 3, 1970

June 15, 1970

TOP SECRET/NODIS  
SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VERNON WALTERS

FROM: Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig  
SUBJECT: Sensitive Message to Chinese Communist Government

Pursuant to your discussions with my friend, attached is the text you should use in your discussions in Paris. As I understand it, you will not hand this text to the other side but will follow it literally in your discussions.

Jim Fazio, who is carrying this memorandum and its enclosure, will also provide you with an additional supply of one time pads.

Best regards,

Enclosure

AMH:mlc 6-15-70

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MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED BY  
MAJOR GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS  
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

The United States Government wishes to continue the exchanges that are taking place through the Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. However, it is difficult to maintain complete secrecy in these talks due to their formal nature, the large number of officials involved and the great public interest that they have generated.

If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks that are strictly confidential and not known by other countries, the President is ready to establish an alternative channel directly to him for matters of the most extreme sensitivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an improvement in US-Chinese relations fully recognizing differences in ideology.

We are prepared to activate such a channel through the bearer of this communication, Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attache accredited to the French Government in Paris. We are also ready to send a high-level personal representative of the President to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location, for direct talks on U.S.-Chinese relations.

Knowledge of these talks would be confined to the President, his personal advisors, and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed.

June 15, 1970

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## And Other Presidential Reflections in a Crisis Week

RICHARD NIXON did not watch television once during the Middle East crisis. He scanned the morning newspapers, but he did not dwell on them. Lingered too long in the headlines, he feared, would raise his blood pressure. "There is an old Quaker saying," he said: "The most important quality in a crisis is peace at the center."

For those eight days the center was the White House warren, where he roamed in the cool and very calm corridors from his hideaway in the Executive Office Building to his small study, to the Oval Office, into the Rose Garden, to the staff quarters, on over to the mansion. But the outside world was let in only in controlled doses. He had the reports and memos of his men on the crisis itself. He relied on his own special news summary. "I did not want the hot words of television. Anyone watching television would have thought that war was declared eight times. Just so the man here doesn't think that."

In 20 months of stewardship, the President has grown some deeper crevices around his eyes and his hair is a shade more silver. Those who watched Nixon during this time found him calm and confident, still with that element of cunning that has always been part of him.

Nixon ordered that neither his time nor his mind was to be cluttered with the details of how many ships should go where. "It is very important to take the long view," he cautioned. "That has to be conveyed to everybody. I am not going to get bogged down in details. Look down the road. I want to pound that into the whole bureaucracy."

In the aftermath he credited his strategy with cautious success. It was a crisis, but not, perhaps, as great as reckoned earlier. It was like others before it. It will not be the last of its kind. "Russia is going to continue to probe."

Nixon stands face-to-face with his old adversary again. In a way it is somewhat of a comfort to grapple with naked power, to hear the names of men he has known for more than a decade. He has laid all the pieces of this crisis out around him for deeper study. The Soviet cooperation in the later stages he rated better than their actions in previous times of tension. But their initial violations of the cease-fire is another matter. The issue will come up again, the President believes. "It will not be overlooked," he told one of his visitors.


U.S. foreign policy, the President reflected, has long been "provincial rather than global. They talk about neo-isolationism. That's not new. We've always been isolationist. The role we have

is not a role we would have preferred. The Marshall Plan and other acts of help were reactions to problems rather than calculated moves in a master plan of world dominance like those devised in other generations by Germany and France. The Peace Corps touched the heartstrings of America." But more than idealism is needed. The U.S. must make certain that other nations have the chance to develop as they wish, "whether it be left, right or center."

He sees the world as five key areas—the U.S., a Western Europe grouped

When dealing with Russia, "it doesn't serve the cause to say that if only we get to know each other better our differences will disappear. Great nations are going to have different views." The President is keenly conscious of differing political and economic systems, but the fundamental difference he sees is that while the U.S. seeks peace, the U.S.S.R. seeks dominion.

When Nixon talked of these gigantic gulfs between the two powers, he did not grow excited and angry as he did years ago: It is a fact of his life now. His job, as he sees it, is to convince the Soviet



PRESIDENT NIXON PHOTOGRAPHED FOR "TIME" DURING MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

around Germany, the Soviet Union, Red China, Japan. "Whether we have a world war will depend on how we go about developing the programs and the leadership now to defuse the problems of these nations." Nixon is troubled about the situation of Japan and West Germany, both denied nuclear weapons and thus a major role in their own defense. "What do you say to them? That we won't help? If we don't, it is inevitable that they will have to make arrangements with someone else."

The President hopes to improve relations with China. A dialogue, essential if Peking is ever to assume a normal world role, has begun. "Maybe that role won't be possible for five years, maybe not even ten years. But in 20 years it had better be, or the world is in mortal danger. If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't, I want my children to."

There remains the problem of the Soviet Union; "the big one—currently."

Union that it can still have its goals but must compete for them in the peaceful ways of commerce, ideas, even diplomacy. Bringing this about is not a matter of verbal persuasives, however; American power must be used to make it impossible for Soviet expansionism to succeed other than in peaceful contention.

In the uncluttered minutes Nixon looked out the windows of his office down the south lawn. In some ways it is unchanged since Thomas Jefferson, but beyond those serene acres almost everything has changed. Nixon sometimes brooded out loud about the United Nations and NATO and the other institutions that now must be replaced or altered to fit reality. Reading history, he has been impressed by the fact that "we are always ending wars but never winning the peace." His fervent hope was "to do now what we didn't do then. I would rather be known not for the fact that I ended a war but for the fact that I won a lasting peace."

TS-HK-MA 9830

→ WL FYJ

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President and Pakistan President  
Yahya

TIME & PLACE: October 25, 1970; The Oval Office

President Yahya was in the United States on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. Yahya is tough, direct, and with a good sense of humor. He talks in a very clipped way, is a splendid product of Sandhurst and affects a sort of social naivete but is much more complicated than this.

The President said, "I understand you are going to Peking." Yahya explained how it came about. He said Chou En-lai had originally been slated to go to Pakistan and had said he would make no other foreign visit until he had visited Pakistan. However, he had had to go to North Korea for a ceremonial visit and had communicated with Yahya before leaving, telling him that he was aware of his promise and apologizing for not keeping it. He had, however, hoped that Yahya would pay him a visit and therefore he was going to Peking. The President said "It is essential that we open negotiations with China. Whatever our relations with the USSR or what announcements are made I want you to know the following: (1) we will make no condominium against China and we want them to know it whatever may be put out; (2) we will be glad to send Murphy or Dewey to Peking and to establish links secretly."

Yahya said he had once been told to establish secret links and had communicated it to the Chinese who had replied whether this meant that the United States was thinking of a hot line to Peking similar to the one that existed to Moscow. The President said, no, that wasn't what he meant; he was willing to send ambassadors.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -2-

I interrupted to say when we talked about secret links we meant a form of communication less visible than Warsaw. One more susceptible to enabling the parties to say what was really on their minds and yet have absolute discretion. If we could find some mutually convenient capital such as, for example, Rawalpindi or conceivably Paris, the President might consider sending a senior person. The President said he would be prepared to send me or since I was too busy he might send somebody else, but at any rate he was prepared to establish a high level contact.

Yahya said he would explain this to the Chinese. He continued, "The Chinese are going to change with affluence. Mao talked to me on my previous visit to Peking of permanent revolution; he had said 'Americans hope we will die out, but no, I will teach every child from the day he is born to be a revolutionary.' And I must say he kept his word in the cultural revolution." Yahya said he had been fascinated when he was in China, but when he left Canton he said, "Thank God." It was an oppressive experience.

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME: 12:30 - 1:00 p.m., October 27, 1970

PLACE: Blair House

PRESENT: Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Council of State  
of the Socialist Republic of Romania  
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Sergin Celac, Interpreter  
David R. Young, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: President Nixon was very pleased with the discussions yesterday. He has asked me to come over and to clarify three specific points to be sure that there is no misunderstanding.

## III.

My third point relates to your conversation with President Nixon on the Peoples' Republic of China. The President wanted me to reiterate that we have great interest in establishing political and diplomatic communications with the Peoples' Republic of China. We do not believe that we have any long-term clashing interests. We are prepared to set up channels to the Peoples' Republic of China which are free from any outside pressures and free from any questions of prestige.

If the leaders of the Peoples' Republic of China want to tell us something through you and your Ambassador brings the communication to me, I can assure you that such communication will be confined to the White House. (Or if you wish to communicate with us through any other emissary, that is also acceptable.)

President Ceausescu On the subject of Vietnam, I must regretfully add that the last part of your communication is not very helpful. It adds a threat while proposing negotiations and this does not leave much room for an acceptable solution from the other side's point of view.

With regard to China we will inform the Chinese leaders of our conversation and if there is any communication we will pass that to you as we have in the past.

Ambassador Hilaly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at 6:05 pm, December 9:

The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's reply given after three days of deliberations was as follows:

"This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan for conveying to us orally a message from President Nixon. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means. Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."

Chou En-Lai said, in the course of the conversation:

"We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."

President Yahya's comments:

"I think it is significant that Chou En-Lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu also made no reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United States."

AMH:wgh:10 Dec 70 (Retyped for original copy)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

FROM: Col. Richard T. Kennedy *RTK*

Dr. Kissinger gave the original of the attached memorandum to Ambassador Hilaly of Pakistan for delivery to President Yahya Khan during a meeting with Ambassador Hilaly in Mr. Kissinger's office on December 16, 1970.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

RTK:jlj

Dec. 16, 1970

The U.S. representative at the meeting between the two sides in Warsaw on January 20, 1970, suggested that direct discussions be held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues which lie between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., including the issue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the consistent policy of the United States Government to seek opportunities for negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues between the two governments. The United States therefore welcomed the remarks of the representative of the People's Republic of China at the Warsaw meeting of February 20, 1970; in expressing the willingness of the Government of the People's Republic of China to receive in Peking a U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy.

In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En Lai to President Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S. -China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States Government is to reduce its military presence

- 2 -

in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.

The United States therefore proposes that representatives of the two Governments meet together at an early convenient moment in a location convenient to both sides to discuss the modalities of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of the delegations, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would enjoy while in the People's Republic of China.

This Copy For \_\_\_\_\_

B A C K G R O U N D B R I E F I N G

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CONTENT OF THIS  
BRIEFING IS STRICTLY  
EMBARGOED UNTIL  
6:00 P.M. EDT  
DECEMBER 26, 1970.  
IT MAY BE ATTRI-  
BUTED TO ADMINIS-  
TRATION OFFICIALS.  
DIRECT QUOTATION  
IS NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 10:25 A.M. EST

DECEMBER 24, 1970

THURSDAY

With respect to Communist China, and other of the major Communist countries, our position has been quite similar to the one that I have just described towards the Soviet Union.

Early in the Administration, the President ordered an examination of the possibilities of easing some of the irritations in the relationship, especially in the field of trade and travel. And we, therefore, took a number of steps which removed some of these restrictions and which beyond that made clear to the Communist Chinese that the United States was prepared to talk seriously and to enable them to re-enter the international community.

We are in the process now of again reviewing the still existing restrictions. We remain prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to talk to the Communist Chinese about differences that divide us. There were some talks in Warsaw last year that were interrupted, but we stand prepared to resume them, applying the same principles that I have indicated govern our relationship to the Communist world, which is to seek, on the basis of equality, to remove the causes that have produced the tensions.

MORE

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 12, 1971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN..... ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Conversation with Ambassador Bogdan,  
Map Room, January 11, 1971

Ambassador Bogdan told me that after the conversation with the President, Ceausescu sent his Vice Premier to Peking and Hanoi. In Peking he had extensive talks with Chou En-Lai. Chou En-Lai handed him the following message:

"The communication from the U.S. President is not new. There is only one outstanding issue between us -- the U.S. occupation of Taiwan. The PRC has attempted to negotiate on this issue in good faith for 15 years. If the U.S. has a desire to settle the issue and a proposal for its solution, the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking. This message has been reviewed by Chairman Mao and by Lin Piao."

Chou En-Lai added the comment that since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking.

The Vice Premier found nothing new in Hanoi.

Comment: (a) The Chinese note indirectly refers to the Yahya<sup>\*</sup> communication. It also validates it because it is almost the same.

(\* attached)

(b) It is free of invective.

(c) It strongly implies that the war in Vietnam is no obstacle to U.S. -Chinese rapprochement.

(d) It remains to be seen whether Peking will accept a proposal for a solution with a long time-fuse.

(e) If they answer our communication through Yahya, we may get a clue.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

*I believe we may appear too eager. Let's cool it - Wait for them to respond to our invitation.*

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"We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."

President Yahya's comments:

"I think it is significant that Chou En-Lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu also made no reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United States."

AMH:wgh:10 Dec 70 (Retyped for original copy)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET

April 27, 1971

Major General Vernon A. Walters  
Senior U.S. Military Attache  
American Embassy  
Paris, France  
APO New York 09777

Dear Vernon:

Mr. David McManis of Dr. Kissinger's staff will deliver to you, together with this letter, two documents. The first (at Tab A) is a letter from Dr. Kissinger to Mr. Jean Sainteny and asks him to assist us in a sensitive matter which you will, in turn, explain to him when you deliver the letter. You should, therefore, contact Sainteny, show Henry's letter to him and ask him to arrange a private meeting between you and the Ambassador to France of the Peoples Republic of China or with some other appropriate Senior Chinese Communist representative in Paris. In the meantime, Dr. Kissinger will alert Sainteny by telephone. It is important that Mr. Sainteny merely read Henry's letter to him and that you reclaim it after he has read its contents. Hopefully, Sainteny will then arrange a private meeting between you and a designated representative of the Chinese.

The second document (at Tab B) is a note which you should subsequently deliver to the designated representative of the Peoples Republic. The contents of this note should, under no circumstances, be divulged to Mr. Sainteny and you should merely tell Sainteny that you have been instructed to deliver a note, without further explanation of its nature or content.

In sum, we visualize the scenario as follows:

-- You are to contact Mr. Sainteny who will have been alerted by Henry.

-- Allow him to read Henry's letter to him, being sure to reclaim the letter at the end of the meeting and being sure not to

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TOP SECRET


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divulge the content of the second note which is destined for the Chinese representative. At this meeting, flesh out Henry's letter by telling Saintony that we hope he can arrange a private and secure meeting alone between you and an appropriate representative of the People's Republic assigned to France.

-- Mr. Saintony, in turn, will arrange an appropriate secure rendezvous between you and the Chinese representative. At this private meeting, you would then deliver the note at Tab B.

Please keep us posted on the scenario as it unfolds.

Best regards,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Enclosures

TOP SECRET

## American Society of Newspaper Editors

*The President's Remarks at a Question and Answer Session With a Panel of Six Editors and Reporters at the Society's Annual Convention. April 16, 1971*

### PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

MR. DEDMON. Mr. President, when you last appeared before this convention prior to becoming President, you mentioned that laying the groundwork for future relations with the People's Republic of China would be one of the primary goals of your administration.

In light of recent events, as well as the trade review which you have ordered, it looks like this is one area where you are considerably ahead of schedule.

Do you think that we can anticipate an establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Dedmon, since you have been so kind to me, I will be kind to you.

Let the record show—and some of you will remember that time I was here in 1968—that Mr. Dedmon was the one that asked me the question about the People's Republic of China or Mainland China, if you want to call it that, and also let the record show, as you may recall, that at an editorial conference at the Chicago Sun-Times last year you asked me the question again.

The first two times I struck out. The third time we got a hit. That is all we can say.

Let me put it all in perspective, however.

What we have here is the result of a long process that began in my own thoughts even before 1968, the spring of 1968, when I answered that question at this convention. I wrote an article for Foreign Affairs—as a matter of fact, I think your question played off of that article at that time—in which I pointed out that we could not have what will be by the end of the century a billion of the most creative and able people in the world isolated from the world and that whoever was President of the United States had to develop a policy which would bring the isolation of a billion Chinese from the rest of the world to an end.

I also pointed out that that was a long-range goal. The long-range goal of this administration and of the next one, whatever it may be, must be two things: one, a normalization of the relations between the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and two, the ending of the isolation of Mainland China from the world community.

Those are long-range goals.

Let's begin with what we have done then. We can't go that far that fast in one jump. We cannot do it now. I will not speculate on it now, because it is premature to talk about either of those subjects, either recognition or admission to the United Nations.

But I can point to the goal and what we have done to get toward that goal and what it can mean to the future.

Over a year ago we relaxed, as you know, our travel conditions with regard to going to China, and also we made some relaxation with regard to trade.

Finally, we had a response from the Chinese, as you know, last week. Then, on Wednesday of this week, I announced an additional relaxation with regard to trade restrictions and a relaxation with regard to Chinese who wanted to come to the United States.

Now it's up to them. If they want to have trade in these many areas that we have opened up, we are ready. If they want to have Chinese come to the United States, we are ready. We are also ready for Americans to go there, Americans in all walks of life.

But it takes two, of course. We have taken several steps. They have taken one. We are prepared to take

other steps in the trade field and also with regard to the exchange field, but each step must be taken one at a time.

I know that as editors and as reporters, looking for that, you know, that hot lead or headline for the morning, this is not a satisfying answer. But from the standpoint of policy, it is the right answer. Because to try to make a headline by saying that tomorrow we are going to do this or that or the other thing would be misunderstood among many countries of the world where this matter has to be discussed and also might have exactly the reverse reaction with the Chinese.

I think the steady ordered process that we have engaged on now begins to bear fruit. I will just conclude with this one thought:

The other day was Easter Sunday. Both of my daughters, Tricia and Julie, were there—and Tricia with Eddie Cox—I understand they are getting married this June—and Julie and David Eisenhower.

And the conversation got around to travel and also, of course, with regard to honeymoon travel and the rest. They were asking me where would you like to go? Where do you think we ought to go?

So, I sat back and thought a bit and said, "Well, the place to go is to Asia." I said, "I hope that some time in your life, sooner rather than later, you will be able to go to China to see the great cities, and the people, and all of that, there."

I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope sometime I do. I am not sure that it is going to happen while I am in office. I will not speculate with regard to either of the diplomatic points. It is premature to talk about recognition. It is premature also to talk about a change of our policy with regard to the United Nations.

However, we are going to proceed in these very substantive fields of exchange of persons and also in the field of trade. That will open the way to other moves which will be made at an appropriate time.

Mr. Risher.

MR. RISHER. I just want to follow up on that if I could. Do you think that this might lead to a resumption of the meetings in Warsaw that were broken up about a year ago, I think?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Risher, as you recall those meetings were resumed after we came into office. That, again, was a result of an initiative that we took. And then they were broken off again. We are ready to meet any time they are ready to meet.

I cannot—I don't have any information indicating that they want to resume them at this time, but we certainly have the door open. We are not pressing them, although we would welcome them opening them.

Message from Premier Chou En Lai dated April 21, 1971 (Delivered to Mr. Kissinger - 6:15 P.M., April 27, 1971).

Message from Premier Chou En Lai

Premier Chou En Lai thanked President Yahya for conveying the message of President Nixon on 5 January 1971. Premier Chou En Lai is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President Yahya conveys the following verbatim to President Nixon:

"Owing to the situation of the time it has not been possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the U.S.A. to the Premier of Peoples Republic of China.

"At present contacts between the peoples of China and the United States are being renewed. However, as the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored fundamentally, the U.S. must withdraw all its Armed Forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Strait area. A solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries. Therefore, the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions. Of course, if the U.S. President considers that the time is not yet right the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other

- 2 -

details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that it is entirely possible for public arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Kahn."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.


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Dear Jean:

Once again, the President and I would like to impose on your invaluable good offices to assist us in a matter of the greatest sensitivity. The bearer of this message, Major General Vernon Walters (our Defense Attache in Paris), will explain to you our specific need for your intercession. The project is one requiring the kind of skill and delicacy which have characterized your earlier efforts in our behalf and no one, other than the President, myself and General Walters is aware of it. Therefore, it is important that after talking to General Walters you inform no one of the nature of your conversation with him, with the exception of President Pompidou.

Both the President and I hope you will find it possible to help. It would increase our already large debt of gratitude to you.

Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Jean Sainteny

  
Paris, France

STAT

April 27, 1971

In the light of recent events, it seems important to have a  
reliable channel for communication between our two Governments.

If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires  
talks that are strictly confidential, the President is ready to establish  
such a channel directly to him for matters of the most extreme sensi-  
tivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an improvement in US-  
Chinese relations fully recognizing differences in ideology. On the  
United States side, such a channel would be known only to the President  
and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and would not be  
revealed to any other foreign country.

If you are interested in pursuing this proposal, initial contact should be made with the bearer of this communication, Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attache in Paris. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, would be prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on US-Chinese relations with whomever might be designated by the People's Republic of China to explore the subject further.

## THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL 29, 1971

Q. Mr. President, the Commission on the United Nations that you appointed, headed by your 1960 Vice Presidential running mate, has come out rather strongly for a two-China policy. The last time we saw you you weren't prepared to talk about that. I wonder if tonight you could say how you feel about those proposals?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Cormier, that recommendation by that very distinguished committee, of course, is being given consideration in the high councils of this Government, and I am, of course, considering it along with recommendations which move in the other direction.

I think, however, that your question requires that I put, perhaps, in perspective much of this discussion about our new China policy. I think that some of the speculation that has occurred in recent weeks since the visit of the table tennis team to Peking has not been useful.

I want to set forth exactly what it is and what it is not.

First, as I stated at, I think, one of my first press conferences in this room, the long-range goal of this administration is a normalization of our relationships with Mainland China, the People's Republic of China, and the ending of its isolation from the other nations of the world. That is a long-range goal.

Second, we have made some progress toward that goal. We have moved in the field of travel; we have moved in the field of trade. There will be more progress made.

For example, at the present time I am circulating among the departments the items which may be released as possible trade items in the future and I will be making an announcement on that in a very few weeks.

But now when we move from the field of travel and trade to the field of recognition of the Government, to its admission to the United Nations, I am not going to discuss those matters, because it is premature to speculate about that.

We are considering all those problems. When I have an announcement to make, when a decision is made—and I have not made it yet—I will make it.

But up until that time we will consider all of the proposals that are being made. We will proceed on the path that we have been proceeding on. And that is the way to make progress. Progress is not helped in this very sensitive area by speculation that goes beyond what the progress might achieve.

I would just summarize it this way: What we have done has broken the ice. Now we have to test the water to see how deep it is.

I would finally suggest that—I know this question may come up if I don't answer it now—I hope, and, as a matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China sometime in some capacity—I don't know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long term. And I hope to contribute to a policy in which we can have a new relationship with Mainland China.

\* \* \*

Q. Mr. President, the State Department has said that the legal question of the future of Taiwan and Formosa is an unsettled question. Would you favor direct negotiations between the Nationalist and the Communist Governments to settle their dispute?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I noted speculation to the effect from various departments and various sources that the way for these two entities to settle their differences was to negotiate directly. I think that is a nice legalistic way to approach it, but I think it is completely unrealistic. I am only saying at this point that the United States, is seeking to in a very measured way, while maintaining our treaty commitments to Taiwan—we are seeking a more normal relationship with the People's Republic of China.

There is one other thing I think it's very important to make.

There has been speculation to the effect that the purpose of our, or one purpose of our normalizing our relations or attempting to normalize our relations with Mainland China is to some way irritate the Soviet Union. Nothing could be further from the truth.

We are seeking good relations with the Soviet Union and I am not discouraged by the SALT talk progress. I can only say that we believe that the interests of both countries would be served by an agreement there. We seek good relations with the Soviet Union. We are seeking good relations with Communist China and the interests of world peace require good relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would make no sense for the United States, in the interest of world peace, to try to get the two to get at each other's throats, because we would be embroiled in the controversy ourselves.

# A CONVERSATION WITH MAO TSE-TUNG

by EDGAR SNOW

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Mr. Snow, author of *Red Star over China* and a number of other books, has known Mao since 1936. He recently returned from a six-month stay in Communist China.

*During a five-hour discourse with me in Peking on Dec. 18 last year, Chairman Mao Tse-tung expressed some of his views on Sino-American, Sino-Russian and other problems of foreign relations as well as on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.*

*The chairman criticized the ritualism of the Mao "personality cult," explained why it had been a necessary nuisance during the Cultural Revolution and forecast its gradual modification. He said that the government of the People's Republic would shortly admit to China some visitors representative of a broad spectrum of American political and press opinion from the right, the middle and the left. He spoke in favor of opening conversations with American officials at the highest level, including Mr. Nixon. He expressed admiration for American achievements in production, science, technology and universal education and said that he held great hopes for the American people as a potential force for good in the world.*

\* \* \*

If the Soviet Union wouldn't do [point the way], then he would place his hopes on the American people. The United States alone had a population of more than 200 million. Industrial production was already higher than in any other country and education was universal. He would be happy to see a party emerge there to lead a revolution, although he was not expecting that in the n

In the meantime, he said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President.

I, unfortunately, could not represent the United States, he said; I was not a monopoly capitalist. Could I settle the Taiwan question? Why continue such a stalemate? Chiang Kai-shek had not died yet. But what had Taiwan to do with Nixon? That question was created by Truman and Acheson.

**I**t may be relevant to mention—and this is not a part of my talk with Chairman Mao—that foreign diplomats in Peking were aware last year that messages were being delivered from Washington to the Chinese government by certain go-betweens. The purport of such communications was to assure Chinese leaders of Mr. Nixon's "new outlook" on Asia. Nixon was firmly determined, it was said, to withdraw from Vietnam as speedily as possible, to seek a negotiated international guarantee of the independence of Southeast Asia, to end the impasse in Sino-American relations by clearing up the Taiwan question and to bring the People's Republic into the United Nations and into diplo-

matic relations with the United States.

Two important Frenchmen were in China in 1970. The first was André Bettencourt, the minister of planning, the second was Maurice Couve de Murville, premier under De Gaulle's regime. M. Couve de Murville completed arrangements for a visit to China by General de Gaulle which was to have occurred this year. It was to General de Gaulle, I was authoritatively informed, that Mr. Nixon had first confided his intention to seek a genuine *détente* with China. Some people had anticipated that De Gaulle, during his visit, would play a key role in promoting serious Sino-American conversations. Death ruled otherwise. Chairman Mao's tribute to the general, sent to Mme. de Gaulle, was the only eulogy which he is known to have offered for any non-Communist statesman since Roosevelt died.

Meanwhile, other diplomats had been active. The head of one European mission in Peking, who had already made one trip to see President Nixon, returned to Washington last December. He bypassed the State Department to confer at the White House, and was back in China in January. From another and unimpeachable diplomatic source I learned, not long before my departure from Peking in February, that the White House had once more conveyed a message asking how a personal representative of the President would be received in the Chinese capital for conversations with the highest Chinese leaders. About the same time, I was enigmatically told by a senior Chinese diplomat who had formerly maintained quite the opposite, "Nixon is getting out of Vietnam."

I must once more stress that none of the above background information was provided to me by Mao Tse-tung.

LIFE, 30 July 1971

# China will talk from a position of strength

by EDGAR SNOW

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When Chou En-lai led my wife and me to stand beside Chairman Mao's side last October, and to be photographed at the anniversary parade, no American had ever been so noticed. Nothing China's leaders do publicly is without purpose. Discerning people realized that something new was happening. Then came the Ping Pong gesture. Chairman Mao had talked to me in December, and after the Ping Pong gesture I was able to report that he would welcome Mr. Nixon or his personal representative to Peking. A new horizon was already in sight.

*Handed by Mr. Kissinger 12<sup>th</sup>, 5/10/71*

President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21, 1971, from Premier Chou En-Lai conveyed through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries, President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-Lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.

In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President Nixon proposes a preliminary secret meeting between his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest. If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking publically between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of

- 2 -

Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.

It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. For secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In case the People's Republic of China has not been apprised, the United States Government wishes to inform it of the following statement made by the President of the United States on May 20, 1971:

"The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

"The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

President Nixon wishes to emphasize that it is his policy to conclude no agreement which would be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to include this issue and related questions on the agenda of the proposed meeting with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL

May 20, 1971

FOR: AMBASSADOR FARLAND

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Please deliver attached message to Yahya personally  
for immediate transmittal by him to PRC Ambassador.

Best regards.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAK:AMH:mlh:typed 5/20/71

May 29, 1971

"Premier Chou En Lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President Nixon.

"Premier Chou En Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's messages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd 1971, and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse Tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U. S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area.

✓ "Premier Chou En Lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U. S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking.

"Premier Chou En Lai suggests that it would be preferable for Dr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in

-2-

China, and that he may fly direct from Islamabad to a Chinese airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from China, if needed. The talks plus the flights on both ways will probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in China he may do so.

"As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger's trip strictly secret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy is still desired the Government of the Peoples Republic of China will on its part guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have yielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be made after the meeting, if it is so desired.

"As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.

"Premier Chou En Lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with Dr. Kissinger in China in the near future."

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H-10-1-4 530, 6/4/71

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meeting and discussions with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft from Islamabad to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China, and to make all arrangements for the President's visit. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China will maintain strict secrecy

- 2 -

with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to settle on a possible communique to be issued sometime after his return to the United States if this is mutually desired.

Dr. Kissinger warmly looks forward to his visit to China and to his meeting with Premier Chou en-Lai. President Nixon considers this trip a very positive first step in improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

(Tab A)

Announcement

Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.

Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.

DRAFT

(Tab B)

ANNOUNCEMENT

Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.

In view of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China in the spring of 1972. On behalf of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger has accepted this invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.

DRAFT

(Tab c)

ANNOUNCEMENT

Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Envoy of the President of the United States of America, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.

In order to seek the normalization of the relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, President Nixon has expressed the wish to meet the leaders of the People's Republic of China. The Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes and agrees to extend an invitation to President Nixon for a visit in the spring of 1972. President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China  
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs  
Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC  
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada  
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American  
Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
One Other Chinese Official, and Deputy Chief of Protocol  
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters  
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Place:

Chinese Government Guest House, Peking

Date and Time:

July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening  
(4:35 p.m. - 11:20 p.m.)

\* \* \*

Dr. Kissinger: As I have already pointed out to you, President Nixon has asked me to convey to you and Chairman Mao his high personal regards. He looks forward to meeting with the leaders of the People's Republic of China personally to exchange ideas.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his regards. As Chairman Mao has already said, we welcome President Nixon to our country for a visit, no matter whether he comes as President or as a private person. Of course, he now is still in his capacity as President.

Dr. Kissinger: He expects to remain there for some time.

PM Chou: That's good.

PM Chou:

However, since President Nixon came into office he has expressed a willingness to settle fundamental questions with us. From the very beginning, he took the attitude that he was willing to come to Peking to meet us, either to send his special envoy or to come himself.

Of course, after he expressed this opinion there was a cessation of contacts for a period of time. As you know, one reason was last year's Cambodian incident, and this year there was the Route 9 battle. This could not but affect our contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree. That is why I wanted the opportunity to express our views concerning peace in Indochina, so that these differences can be settled, both in Indochina and in our relationship.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China  
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs  
Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC  
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada  
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American  
Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Hsu Chung-Ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC  
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC  
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters  
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Place: Great Hall of the People, Peking

Date and Time: July 10, 1971, Afternoon (12:10 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.)

\* \* \*

Dr. Kissinger: But I would like to reply now. You, Mr. Prime Minister, followed very faithfully the presentation which I made yesterday, and dealt with both topics, that is the visit of the President, and each of the other topics I put down to narrow our differences on substantive matters.

As for the visit of President Nixon to Peking, you will remember that this idea resulted first from your initiative which we are happy to accept, and therefore, of course, you must decide when the time is opportune and when it is not opportune. If you judge that the time is opportune now, then this is a better opportunity to agree on it than through whatever other channels which we will need to rely upon after my departure and which would be more complicated, bureaucratic and less related to the general direction of our policies. But since this is your invitation, I will say no more about it and we will have to decide at the end of our discussion whether this is an item we would wish to include in our announcement if there is an announcement.

\* \* \*

- 4 -

\* \* \*

PM Chou: And you will also understand why it was when President Nixon expressed willingness to come to China for a visit, we expressed willingness to invite him. You have read Edgar Snow's article and from this will know that we believe the President does have the desire to resolve issues of relations between China and the U.S. Of course, he must rely on his advisers, such as you, to work out the ways to do so. Therefore, you can see a lot of politicians we have not invited to come here. I have a great pile of letters from them on my desk asking for invitations, which I have not answered.

Dr. Kissinger: What you have done is greatly appreciated by President Nixon.

PM Chou: This is done under the instructions and wisdom of Chairman Mao.

\* \* \*

We are fortunate that out of our great people has risen the great leader Chairman Mao. So in this sense we agree to have President Nixon come to China and to have conversations with Chairman Mao.

After President Nixon expressed a desire to come, this was put forward by Chairman Mao himself. At that time the President said he might come in his capacity as President, or maybe after he had retired. In fact, President Nixon even said that his daughter might spend her honeymoon here. Shortly after your President said that, our message was sent to you.

That is all I have to say to you.

\* \* \*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission,  
Chinese Communist Party, PRC (Second Session Only)  
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada  
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American  
Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters  
Chinese Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Place: Chinese Government Guest House, Peking

Date and Time: July 11, 1971, Early Morning and Morning  
(12:00 midnight - 1:40 a.m.; 9:50 a.m. - 10:35 a.m.)

At the working session which began about 12:00 midnight on the night of July 10-11, both the U.S. and the PRC sides presented preliminary drafts of a joint statement announcing the visit of Dr. Kissinger and the summit meeting between President Nixon and the Chinese leaders.

Present on the Chinese side were Ambassador Huang Hua, Chang Wen-chin, and the two interpreters, Mr. Chi and Miss Tang. On the U.S. side were Dr. Kissinger and Messrs. Holdridge, Lord and Smyser.

Both sides agreed that the announcement should be kept simple. Dr. Kissinger, finding the wording of the Chinese draft in certain respects to be in accordance with what the U.S. had in mind, soon took this language as the basis of the discussions (attached at Tab C).

The first significant issue which emerged was the Chinese desire to make it appear that the President had asked for an invitation to visit China. Dr. Kissinger reminded the Chinese of the fact that it was the Chinese who had actually proposed such a visit in their communication to the U.S., although the President admittedly had commented on visiting China during a press conference. After some discussion, the Chinese agreed that there should be a mutually expressed desire for a summit.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

A second issue which then arose was a proposal by Dr. Kissinger that the announcement not set the purpose of the summit meeting only as seeking the "normalization of relations" between the U.S. and the PRC. The Chinese, who had submitted this formulation, objected when Dr. Kissinger wanted to broaden the summit scope to state that the meeting would be beneficial to Asian and world peace. There was considerable discussion concerning this issue. The Chinese acknowledged that in the President's message of May 19, 1971, to Prime Minister Chou, the President had suggested that each side should be free to include topics of principal concern to it in the summit discussions. Thus, something in addition to the normalization of relations was in order.

At 1:40 a.m. the Chinese asked for a thirty minute recess to permit them to consider wording which would be responsive to these two issues. They did not, however, return that night -- at 2:55 a.m. the U.S. side was informed that they would not return until about 9:00 a.m. the next morning.

On Sunday morning, the Chinese returned at 9:50 a.m., accompanied this time by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying. (Prime Minister Chou remained outside pending approval of the draft announcement.) From the U.S. standpoint, the wording of the new Chinese draft (attached at Tab B) was a great improvement over that of the preceding day. The Chinese, on their own initiative, then changed the date for the summit from "in the spring of 1972" to "before May 1972." Dr. Kissinger said this was a better formulation. With respect to the initiative for the invitation, the Chinese draft said "in view of" President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC. However, after a certain amount of give-and-take the Chinese agreed to a formulation in which Prime Minister Chou, "knowing of" the President's desire, had extended the invitation. As to the purpose of the visit, they had included in addition to seeking a normalization of relations, the phrase "and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides." Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. preferred the phrase "peace in the world" but accepted the Chinese formulation since it met the principal U.S. concern of broadening the scope of the summit.

After further brief discussion the two sides agreed on an announcement in English and Chinese (attached at Tab A). In working during the night on a new draft to meet the U.S. concerns, and in the verbal exchanges at these sessions, the Chinese clearly made an effort to find mutually acceptable compromises. This attitude was reciprocated by the U.S. side.

There was a brief exchange on when the joint announcement should be made. Dr. Kissinger suggested the evening of July 15, U.S. time, while the Chinese preferred July 19. Dr. Kissinger explained that a Thursday evening announcement would allow for more intelligent coverage of the event in the American Sunday newspapers and weekly news magazines. Prime Minister Chou then entered the room to continue the discussion at 10:35 a.m.

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## THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

*The President's Remarks to the Nation Announcing His Acceptance  
of an Invitation From Premier Chou En-lai To Visit China.  
July 15, 1971*

*Good evening:*

I have requested this television time tonight to announce a major development in our efforts to build a lasting peace in the world.

As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over the past 3 years, there can be no stable and enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people. That is why I have undertaken initiatives in several areas to open the door for more normal relations between our two countries.

In pursuance of that goal, I sent Dr. Kissinger, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, to Peking during his recent world tour for the purpose of having talks with Premier Chou En-lai.

The announcement I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Peking and in the United States:

"Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972.

"President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.

"The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

In anticipation of the inevitable speculation which will follow this announcement, I want to put our policy in the clearest possible context. Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends.

It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy.

I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I deeply hope will become a journey for peace, peace not just for our generation but for future generations on this earth we share together.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 7:31 p.m., P.d.t., at NBC studios, Burbank, Calif. His remarks were broadcast on radio and television.

This Copy For \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER,  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS: AND  
RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO  
THE PRESIDENT

9:15 A.M. PDT

JULY 16, 1971

FRIDAY

(San Clemente, California)

\*\*\*

Q Can you tell me if you knew about the invitation for President Nixon to visit Peking when you went there? Did you know it was going to be forthcoming?

DR. KISSINGER: Essentially, yes. I knew, and of course the President knew that there was an interest, a mutual interest in a visit. What remained to be determined was whether it would be useful, whether it would contribute to conditions in the world, peaceful conditions in the world.

The President had given me detailed instructions before I left. He personally had gone over, contrary to the normal procedures where the instructions are more general, he had gone in great detail over a voluminous book that had been prepared. He went over it for several weeks and had prepared a good part of it himself.

This was one of the things which we felt would come up and he had given me detailed instructions in which way I was authorized to react to it, depending on the general framework.

THE PHOENIX, AUGUST 10, 1971

*This text is excerpted from tape recordings made by members of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars Friendship Delegation to China during their four-hour interview with Premier Chou En-lai on July 19th in the Great Hall of the People, Peking. As Chou himself pointed out, there is lots of room for error and misquotation in an interview of this nature. "Maybe I will say something wrong, or the interpreter might interpret wrong." Therefore, he expressly stated: "If you are going to show your recordings when you get back to the United States, you must make a statement at the beginning and say there are bound to be some wrong statements in this recording."*

*The following transcript is issued by Pacific News Service on behalf of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars.*

CHOU: See, he's criticizing me. Yet I have tried my utmost to pay attention to the fact. I have paid relative attention to it. When I invited the comrades from Tsinghua University, I invited one man and one woman. The second question . . . let's not just talk about the first aspect of this question. That is how the barriers have been broken. But the development of the contact between people, in itself alone, is not enough because in the world of today, the state structures of various countries still exists. That is different states still exist in the world today, and if there is no normalization or no restoration of the relations between the two states then it would be impossible for the contact between the two peoples to develop completely unhindered. And the governments of the two countries will bear the main responsibilities for the normalization of relations between the two countries and the restoration of these relations.

If Susan Shirk was the president of the United States, then the matter would be easy to solve. But the problem isn't so simple. Isn't that so? That is, it still takes a process of continuing cognition, that is, there still needs to be a process of practice and understanding. A process of the combination, the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the United States. There still must be such a process before things can develop. It will take process and time. Isn't that so? And your Committee also says so. And I believe that it was also Miss Susan Shirk who said that though the revolutionary movement in the United States is developing, it cannot be said that it would be able to transform the entire system at the present date. For instance, the opinions in your family differ, don't they? So you can see it will take time to transform society.

In recent years, Chairman Mao himself has paid attention to the American situation and has also asked us all to note the fact that it can be said that the United States is now on the eve of a great storm. But the question of how this storm shall be developed exactly is your task, not ours. We can only tell you about something of your hopes. But now, at the present date, in contacting your government to normalize relations we must contact those who are in authority in your country. But in your country, your system is that you have a president, and your president said that he wishes to move towards friendship and he also has said that he hopes to visit China. And of course, naturally we can invite him, in order to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries, and also to discuss questions concerning both sides. And this can promote the solution of the normalization improvement of the relations between the two countries.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1971

# Official Transcript of Reston's Conversation With the Chinese Premier in Peking

Special to The New York Times

*PEKING, Aug. 9—Following is a transcript of a recorded conversation with Premier Chou En-lai of China conducted Thursday night by James Reston, vice president and columnist of The New York Times. The conversation took place in Mr. Chou's reception hall here, and the translator was Chi Chao-chu, a former Harvard student who is on the Premier's staff. Mr. Chou authorized the official transcript on the condition that both questions and answers be printed verbatim.*

## Preliminary Talks 'Possible'

MR. RESTON—I understand. It is clear, I think, since the differences over Rogers's statement, that there is a lot of underbrush to be cleared away before you and the President are to meet. I wondered what ideas you have about whether preliminary technical talks at a lower level should take place and where, between now and the President's arrival?

MR. CHOU—It is possible. But if these questions are to be solved, they can only be solved when the President himself comes. He expressed a desire to come and we have invited him to come.

WASHINGTON STAR, WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 11, 1971

# Thaw Move Was Mao's, Chou Says

By JULIAN SCHUMAN

**PEKING (UPI)** — Premier Chou En-lai said last night that despite U.S. and Chinese diplomatic reluctance Mao Tse-tung was responsible for inviting the American ping pong team to China, an invitation which signaled a thaw in Sino-American relations.

During his two-hour meeting with the Americans, including

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai invited every American living in or visiting China to a meeting last night in the Great Hall of the People. Among the 60 Americans reported present was Julian Schuman, who has been living in Peking for some time. His report of that meeting is transmitted by United Press International.

Black Panther party leader Huey P. Newton and former U.S. State Department officer John Service, Chou conducted a free-wheeling discourse on China's foreign policy.

Chou said:

• China agrees with President Nixon that this is now an era of negotiations, but Chinese leaders also feel that, if necessary, it is an era of armed struggle.

## Border Dispute

• China is willing to negotiate its border dispute with Russia, using the 19th Century territorial treaties as the basis for talks.

• China is keeping an open mind on Nixon's visit: "It is all right if the talks succeed and it is all right if the talks fail."

• No matter how far negotiations go, China will never let her guard down and stop preparing for war.

Chou said the decision to invite the American ping pong players was made by Mao at a time when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. State

Continued From Page A-1

Department attitude was to wait for a while.

Chou said he himself was looking over a preliminary Foreign Ministry dispatch regarding the American table tennis team in Japan when Mao decided on an immediate invitation.

"There were two messages, but the world only knows the second," Chou said.

## Tells of Second Visit

Discussing Nixon's visit, Chou said, "He (Nixon) publicly expressed his willingness to come to China and negotiate. We had made no response. It would not have been proper for a state so antagonistic. Therefore, we agreed to (presidential adviser Henry) Kissinger's coming."

"For us, it is all right if the talks succeed and it is all right if they fail," Chou said.

At this point, about 30 minutes before a simultaneous announcement was to be made in Washington and Peking about Kissinger's second trip to Peking, Chou told the Americans of the presidential assistant's visit.

"This time Kissinger is coming openly," Chou said.

The Chinese premier said China's willingness to negotiate was nothing new. "We did this (negotiate) with the archenemy Chiang Kai-shek for almost 10 years."

Although critical of the stationing of Russian troops on the Chinese borders, Chou said China's basic policy is to negotiate with Moscow.

"There are 1 million troops on our borders — army, air force, naval units in the coastal areas, nuclear weapons and guided missiles," Chou said. "They have sent 300,000 troops into the Peoples Republic of Mongolia, including missile units. The Mongolian government did not behave like the Czechs, so what is the purpose? It obviously is against China, to create a state of tension along our borders."

"Nevertheless, our policy is to negotiate to solve the boundary questions and bring about good neighborly relations," Chou said.

Even though the 19th Century territorial treaties imposed on China by the Czarists were unequal and did not agree with China's maps, Chou said that with a few exceptions those treaties should serve as a basis for continued negotiations.

## No Threat to Long Island

"As for us, we do not like armed struggle and we do not provoke others. Not only have we not gone to Long Island, we have not gone to Honolulu. Even with the U.S. Navy in the Taiwan Strait, we are for negotiations," he said.

Chou said, "If we are only prepared for negotiations without preparing against armed war, that is not good. If a war is launched against China, what should be done? How have we prepared? It may sound impossible to our friends, but we must think of it."

"We are ready. We are building underground tunnels, and this has been done in every big and small city."

"Only when one dares to engage in war, can one negotiate, and if one wants peaceful negotiations, he must be prepared."

Chou briefly mentioned the United Nations situation, saying there had been no change from the Foreign Ministry statement issued Aug. 20—China firmly opposes two Chinas, one China, one Taiwan; and any independent Taiwan. All were unacceptable, he said, and if anything the third even less so.

Chou said, however, he hopes to see more Americans visiting China. "More and more have been coming," he said. "Though Japanese visitors have been the most numerous, the number of Americans coming should catch up with them in the 1970s."