

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

DOS, ARMY reviews
completed.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Chi Chiao-chu, PRC Liaison Office

Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 26, 1973
3:00 - 3:15 p.m.

LOCATION: The Map Room
The White House

General Scowcroft began the meeting by briefly noting that Mr. Han was in charge in the absence of Ambassador Huang. Mr. Han observed that the Ambassador had arrived in Peking about last Friday.

General Scowcroft then handed the Chinese the message attached at Tab A concerning Vietnam. After reading the message, there was a brief whispered conversation in Chinese between Mr. Han and Mr. Chi.

Mr. Han: We will report this to our Government. We, of course, reserve the right to comment.

General Scowcroft: I think the note is self-explanatory. We simply wanted to let you know of our concerns.

Mr. Han: With regard to housing, you probably know that we have already signed the contract on the 15th of this month. We plan to move in on the 4th of December.

General Scowcroft: That is good news.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

Mr. Han: We want to take this occasion to thank you for the help which you offered in this matter.

General Scowcroft: I wish we could have helped to the extent that you would have been able to move in months ago.

Mr. Han: One small problem is the direct phone connection.

General Scowcroft: Yes. I believe it would be a good idea to still retain that.

Mr. Han: So, at the appropriate time after we move in, we will let you know in what room we wish to have it placed.

General Scowcroft: We will have it taken care of at that time.

There was then a brief discussion about the pleasant weather on that day and the temperatures which could be expected during the winter. In taking their leave, Mr. Han commented that they would let the State Department know when they were actually moving. General Scowcroft offered any assistance we might be able to give in connection with the Chinese move.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

*Handled in Asia by
Sen. Schweart at brief meeting
3:20 p.m. Mon 23, 1973*

1. With reference to the conversation between Prime Minister Chou and Secretary Kissinger regarding the prospects in Vietnam, the U.S. side would like to bring to the attention of the Chinese side the following information:

A. The United States Government is deeply concerned over what it sees as unmistakable signs of North Vietnamese preparations to resume armed conflict on a large scale in South Vietnam. The United States side regards the present situation with the utmost seriousness, and cannot stand idly by if North Vietnam continues its present activities.

B. The following evidence has convinced the United States side that North Vietnam is in fact preparing to launch a major offensive. (On each point below, the evidence is strong and is fully accepted by the U.S. side.)

(1) The North Vietnamese have sent more than 22,000 military personnel south since 1 September of this year to strengthen their armed forces in South Vietnam and adjacent border areas. Since 1 January 1973 they have sent a total of over 75,000 troops to the south.

(2) The U.S. side has been reliably informed that the North Vietnamese are planning to send almost an equal number of additional troops into various parts of South

- 2 -

Vietnam during the 1973-1974 dry season -- starting in December 1973. The U. S. side can see no reason why the DRV would plan to dispatch these additional troops to South Vietnam, in complete violation of the Paris Agreement and Protocols, except to assemble the manpower and reserves necessary to launch a major military offensive.

(3) The North Vietnamese have moved into South Vietnam and adjacent border areas enough stocks of munitions and military equipment to sustain heavy combat activity for at least eight months. (Some of these stock-piles were already in position when the Paris Agreement was signed last January, but they have been greatly expanded since that time.) They are now preparing -- as the weather improves in southern Laos -- to bring still more munitions and military equipment into South Vietnam.

(4) As of mid-November, North Vietnamese Army units in all of southern Laos were preparing to move large quantities of war materiel further south. Such activity, as well as the very presence of North Vietnamese military units in Laos, is a clear violation of the Paris Agreement.


(5) The North Vietnamese have augmented their logistic forces in northern South Vietnam by some 15,000 men in recent months. They would not need these logistic forces unless they planned to expand the support to their combat units in this area.

(6) The North Vietnamese are making major improvements on roads in southern Laos, and have nearly completed a parallel road from North Vietnam through western South Vietnam from the DMZ to South Vietnam's Military Region 3. These two road nets have no discernible civilian purpose but they obviously make it much easier for the North Vietnamese to prepare for and support an offensive than was previously the case.

(7) The measures which the North Vietnamese are now taking can be compared with those they took in the months prior to March 1972, when they launched their last offensive. The military capabilities of the DRV in the south are now at least as great as they were at the end of March 1972, and in some areas they are greater. The South Vietnamese government since that time has also improved its capabilities, and would be in a better

position to withstand a North Vietnamese offensive without U.S. air support. Under a heavy North Vietnamese attack, however, U.S. air support might again prove necessary.

(8) It is impossible to interpret this North Vietnamese buildup as prudential, as a response to South Vietnamese provocations, or indeed as anything but preparation for major North Vietnamese offensive action. 25X1



C. In addition to the evidence above, the U.S. side in recent months received repeated reports that new artillery pieces, tanks and other armored vehicles have been observed at various points inside North Vietnam along the major rail lines from China. These reports are of great concern because if true they would indicate that North Vietnam is receiving additional military equipment from China and the Soviet Union.

2. These unmistakable signs that the DRV is planning a military offensive in South Vietnam cannot be ignored by the U.S. side. Such a

development would raise problems of another diversion of attention which could only be of value to hegemonial powers. Under these circumstances, the U.S. side sincerely hopes that means can be found to avert a development which would have such adverse consequences.