

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

HAKTO- 40
July 8, 1973

TO: DICK KENNEDY

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

[Redacted]

25X1

TO: AMBASSADOR BRUCE

State Dept. review completed

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: San Clemente Meeting with Huang Chen

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

1. Huang and I met today for approximately 1 1/2 hours, and then broke for a 45 minute meeting with the President. This was followed by further conversations in my office and a luncheon for the Chinese party (including Mrs. Huang). While we were with the President, Mrs. Nixon met with Mrs. Huang.

2. During my talks with the Ambassador we covered the following:

(a) My visit to Peking -- I suggested arrival in Peking on August 6 for a visit of 3 to 4 days. Huang promised to contact his Government and let me know if the dates I had suggested were acceptable.

-- Huang said that he has been recalled to Peking and will be leaving on the 10th. He expects to be in Peking to receive me when I arrive.

-- I suggested we announce my trip soon, since speculation is high. I proposed an announcement on July 12 or alternatively July 16. Huang promised me an answer as soon as possible.

MORI/CDF
C03363673

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY

2

-- I noted that their Vice Minister had been talking to diplomats about my trip, and indicated that we would have preferred that nothing be said. I admitted, however, that given our own press reports he had had provocation.

(b) Chou Visit to the U. S. -- Huang, pointing to press speculation re a Chou visit to the Western White House, said that we must understand that since we maintain relations with the "Chiang Group" it will not be possible for the Premier to come to the U. S. A visit to San Clemente, Huang said, would only be a "side door or back door" approach to the issue. Further, Chou has no plans to visit the UN this year. I replied that the press reports had not come from here. I noted that the President was prepared to make another visit to China in 1974, but that this would be difficult if there were no intervening visit from Chou. We agreed to discuss the question further during my visit to Peking.

(c) Cambodia. -- On Cambodia, Huang handed over the attached statement, emphasizing that it preceded Sihanouk's return to Peking.

-- I pointed out that we had made some proposals to the Chinese, of which Sihanouk had apparently not yet been informed. Huang said that he was sure our thinking would now be passed to Sihanouk.

-- I then reviewed our position on Cambodia:

- We cannot control what Lon Nol's people say, but we have not been consulting with them on these matters.
- We seek a ceasefire, if necessary of only 90 days duration.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

3

Our objective for Cambodia is the same as that expressed by Chou in his first conversation with you.

- We would not object if the Government in Phnom Penh were friendly to Peking.
- Our problem is how to manage the transition without being pushed into an undignified position. We take care not to embarrass the PRC publicly, and expect the same in return.
- If Prince Sihanouk could propose a ceasefire before I arrive in Peking, then we could stop our bombing and move on to a solution satisfactory to all parties.

-- Huang promised to report all of the foregoing, but said that the PRC was not prepared to negotiate with us over the future of Cambodia. Negotiations would have to be between the U.S., Sihanouk and the present government.

- Before moving on the these issues I chided the Chinese side for the remarks made upon Sihanouk's return to Peking, as well as Chou's comments to our Congressional delegation. During the course of our discussion your very good report of that latter meeting reached me and I had to admit to Huang that Chou had been provoked and we could hardly expect him to be less than honest when pushed to give the PRC's view on Cambodia.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4

(d) Nuclear Agreement with the USSR. -- I told Huang we did not the PRC expect/to support the agreement (in fact, it was better that they did not), but that we would be grateful if they did not characterize it to our Congressmen as a scrap of paper. We hope to use it with the Congress as a means of strengthening our relationship with China. For example, speaking in the context of the Agreement I was able to say that an attack on China would be international peace. a threat to / Without the Agreement such a statement would have caused an uproar on the Hill; with the Agreement my comment went largely unnoticed.

(e) Brezhnev Visit. -- I briefed Huang on what had transpired since my earlier meeting with him, and then turned to points raised by Chou in his last conversation with you.

-- I said that should the Soviets attack China we would certainly not provide arms or other supplies; in fact, we would cut off all credits and other economic ties. It would be absurd for us, in such a circumstance, to support the stronger over the weaker power.

-- I also assured Huang that we had not exchanged any nuclear information with the Soviets, nor would we agree to do so.

3. We discussed one other item I do not want to commit to paper, but will discuss with you next month.

4. Huang and I met with the President for some 45 minutes, during which the President emphasized the following: our rejection of any idea of a US-Soviet

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/ EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

5

condominium; the strong interest of the U. S. in an independent and secure China; and our strong desire to resolve the Cambodia issue in a way we believe consistent with the views Chou expressed to you on the nature of a future Cambodian regime. The President pointed out that the influence of all interested parties would be required to enable a settlement to be reached. Huang promised to convey the President's thoughts to the Prime Minister.

5. I would be grateful if you would provide me with your thoughts on subjects I should cover during my August visit, points I should make and avoid, your estimate of PRC positions and concerns, plus anything else you think would be helpful. Since we will begin next week to plot our strategy and begin work on my briefing papers, I would appreciate your thoughts as soon as possible. You can then follow-up over the course of the month with other suggestions as they develop.

Warm regards. I look forward to seeing you.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

*Embassy Hanoi
10:30 am July 6, 1973*

The Chinese side informed the U.S. side earlier that as Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Africa and Europe, it was yet infeasible for the Chinese side to communicate to him U.S. tentative thinking on a settlement of the Cambodian question. Although the Chinese side had informed the U.S. side that negotiations between Samdech Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh traitorous clique would be impossible, the U.S. side nevertheless openly refused to negotiate with Samdech Sihanouk, which enraged him all the more. However, according to news reports, U.S. government officials have recently made some disclosures on this question, which have given rise to various speculations. At the same time, it is learned that the Lon Nol clique has gone to the length of spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens. In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, wildly attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question. The Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble. The Chinese side cannot but bring this to the serious attention of the U.S. side.