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UNDERSTANDING ON LAOS

1. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and the Agreement on restoring peace and achieving national concord in Laos signed on February 21, 1973, the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm their strong desire that the current negotiations between the two Lao parties will promptly come to a success.

2. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been informed by the Lao parties that:

(a) The formation of the Provisional Government of National Union would be achieved by July 1, 1973 at the latest.

The U.S. and DRV will exert their best efforts in that direction.

(b) Within a period of no more than 60 days after the date of the establishment of the Provisional Government of National Union, the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign military personnel, regular and irregular troops, and the dismantling of military and paramilitary organizations of foreign countries, including the

"special forces" organized, equipped, trained and commanded by foreign countries, must be completed.

(c) After the return of all persons, regardless of their nationality, who were captured, and those who were imprisoned for cooperating with the other side in wartime, each Lao party has the obligation of getting and supplying information to the other party about the missing in action in Laos.

June 13, 1973.

UNDERSTANDING ON CAMBODIA

1. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cambodia that recognizes the Cambodian people's fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm that the settlement of the Cambodian problem falls under the sovereignty of the Cambodians.

2. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm the obligations of Article 20 of the Paris Agreement. All foreign troops, military advisers, and military personnel shall be withdrawn from Cambodia, as required by Article 20(b) of the Agreement.

3. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will exert their best efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem.

The United States side is prepared to support a proposal for the suspension of UNCURK at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. side understands that the Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to make such a motion for suspension. The U.S. side will exert its best efforts to have this proposal framed to call for the dissolution of UNCURK. If the proposal for dissolution cannot be achieved, the proposal for suspension will be made at this next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. side then will seek to have a proposal for dissolution presented to the General Assembly at its next following meeting. This is the two-step process to which the U.S. side has referred. The U.S. side understands that neither the suspension or dissolution of UNCURK shall in any way call into question the validity of its original establishment or of its original purposes.

After this has been completed, and before the 1974 session of the United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. side will be prepared to discuss with the PRC side ways in which the question of the United Nations Command might be resolved. The U.S. side does not believe the present moment to be an appropriate time for such discussions.

BILATERAL COOPERATION

The US-USSR bilateral agreements to be signed during General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States embody the following understandings.

--US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean

The agreement recognizes that oceanographic research provides information and data of great importance not only to the US and USSR but to all people. Under the agreement, a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies is to be established to oversee the joint planning, development and implementation of US-USSR basic and applied ocean research programs. Cooperative projects will initially deal with ocean-atmosphere interaction, ocean currents, geochemistry and marine chemistry, deep sea drilling, biological productivity and intercalibration and standardization of oceanographic instrumentation and methods.

--US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation

The agreement expresses the belief that the combined efforts of the two countries can contribute to more rapid and efficient solutions of transportation problems than would be possible through separate parallel national efforts. A US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in Transportation will be established to oversee implementation. Initially, the focus of bilateral cooperation will be on such projects as bridge and tunnel construction, including the problems of cold climate construction; rail-road transport; civil aviation, including cooperative projects aimed at increasing efficiency and safety; marine transport; and automobile transport, including problems of traffic safety.

--US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture

This agreement is still under negotiation as of June 11. With successful negotiations, the agreement would be as follows.

The agreement recognizes the desirability of expanding in the field of agricultural research and cooperation as well as the desirability of laying a stable foundation for an expanded relationship in agricultural trade. It provides for the establishment of US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation. In the research and development field, cooperation will focus on livestock sciences, mechanization of agriculture, soil sciences and plant science and entomology. A side letter accompanying the agreement deals with agricultural economics and trade, in which both

sides make a commitment to exchange information on current and forward estimates of production, consumption, demand and trade of major agricultural products.

--US-USSR Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

As augmented, this agreement will run for six years and will provide the overall umbrella for US-Soviet contacts, information exchanges, cultural activities and bilateral cooperation -- replacing the earlier two year cultural exchanges agreement. The agreement includes an annex providing detailed provisions with regard to bilateral exchanges during 1974-1976, and provides in Article XVII for amendments to the list of exchanges for the period 1977-1979.

--US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The agreement takes note of the need to satisfy rapidly growing energy demands in the US and USSR as well as in other countries of the world and recognizes that the development of certain nuclear technologies such as controlled thermonuclear fusion and fast breeder reactors may offer solutions to the energy problem. The agreement provides for the establishment of a US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to oversee initial cooperative efforts in the fields of controlled thermonuclear fusion, with the aim of developing prototype and demonstration-scale thermonuclear reactors; fast breeder reactors; and research in high, medium and low energy physics on the fundamental properties of matter.

--US-USSR Convention on Matters of Taxation

As the result of negotiations carried out under the aegis of the US-USSR Commercial Commission, a tax treaty has been negotiated providing detailed provisions for US-USSR tax relations, aimed at avoiding double taxation and promoting expanding US-USSR relations in economic and other fields.

--Augmented US-USSR Agreement on Civil Air Transport

Negotiations have been undertaken on the possible augmentation of the US-USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement. The issues being considered include possible bilateral increases in the number of Aeroflot and PanAm flights between New York and Moscow each week; possible expansion of services to Leningrad and Washington; improved charter arrangements; use of different sized aircraft on different legs of the flight; and agreement

by the USSR on use of wide-bodied aircraft such as the 747 on the NY-Moscow run. It is not certain that an augmented agreement will be concluded in time for the meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
L.I. Brezhnev, and the President of the United States, Richard Nixon,

Having thoroughly considered the question of the further limitation
of strategic arms, and the progress already achieved in the current
negotiations,

Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adoption of further
limitations of strategic arms would be a major contribution in reducing
the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening inter-
national peace and security,

Have agreed as follows:

First. The two Sides will continue active negotiations to work out
a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation
of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction,
proceeding from the Basic Principles of relations between the USSR
and the United States signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, and from the
Interim Agreement between the USSR and the United States of May 26,
1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms.

Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious
efforts to complete the provisions of the permanent agreement on more

complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974.

Second. New agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments will be based on the principles of the Soviet-American documents adopted in Moscow in May, 1972 and the agreements reached in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each others equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the USSR and the United States.

Third. The limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement.

Fourth. Limitations on strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means.

Fifth. The modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms would be permitted under conditions which will be established in the agreements to be concluded.

Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972.

Seventh. Each Side will continue to take necessary organizational and technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control in accordance with the agreement of September 30, 1971 between the USSR and the United States.

Washington, D. C., " " June, 1973

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

President of the United
States of America

The negotiations that have produced this agreement have lasted for more than a year during which we have had many frank exchanges on the complex and delicate issues involved. Both of us will of course be expected to assess and interpret the meaning and significance of our agreement.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, let me therefore tell you briefly the view that I shall express. It would be my hope that we could both express ourselves in similar terms since any significant differences would detract from what we have been able to accomplish.

My view is that we have set forth an objective and certain modes of conduct applicable to the policies of each of our countries in the years ahead. In doing this, we have not agreed to ban the use of any particular weapons but have taken a major step toward the creation of conditions in which the danger of war, and especially of nuclear war, between our two countries or between one of our countries and others, will be removed. In short, the obligations we have accepted toward each other we have also accepted as applicable to the policies which each of us conducts toward other countries. In subscribing to the agreement and, in particular, in agreeing to consult with each other in certain circumstances, we have made commitments to each other but have in no sense agreed to impose any particular obligation or solution upon other countries. At the same time, we have left the rights of each of our two countries, and obligations undertaken by each of them, unimpaired.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
herein after referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and
international security,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences
for mankind,

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the
danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be
reduced and ultimately eliminated,

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat
or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the
agreements to which either Party has subscribed,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of relations between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
signed in Moscow on 29 May 1972,

Reaffirming that the development of relations between the USA and
the USSR is not directed against other countries and their interests,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

ARTICLE II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

ARTICLE V

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

- (a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
- (b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and
- (c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or third countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Done at the City of Washington, D. C. on June , 1973,
in two copies, each in the English and in the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

For the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

President of the United States
of America

General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU

Received
14 June 1973

In its message of May 27, 1973, the Chinese side made clear its view of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. It still maintains this view. The Chinese side disagrees to U.S. signing of the agreement out of its own consistent position, fearing that the United States would create a great posture of peace for the Soviet Union and arouse a false sense of security in the world, which would lead Europe to feebleness and demoralization instead of strength. The European countries would then either become Finland or lean on the United States, and there would be still less security and balance to speak of. China fears neither isolation nor hegemony by nuclear powers. The Chinese people have long been prepared to accept such a challenge. It is Dr. Kissinger's firm belief that this movement will serve to gain time and that the Soviet Union can be enmeshed by peace and commitments. But we believe that this precisely meets Soviet needs, making it easier for the Soviet Union to mask its expansionism, attack soft spots and take them one by one. The joint declaration proposed by Dr. Kissinger on May 29 does not go beyond the scopes of the Shanghai Communique in principle, but on the contrary would, in effect, provide the Soviet Union with a pretext to peddle its bi-lateral agreements and Asian security system. It is therefore inappropriate to adopt this course.

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Authority 7012955

By SW NARA Date 7/9/07

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY HK
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE 1, EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office
Han Hsu, Officer in the PRC Liaison Office
Chi Chao-chu, Officer in the PRC (interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Council Operations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, June 14, 1973
6:35 - 7:40 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House

Kissinger: I told your Foreign Minister I knew you speak English.

Huang Chen: We also heard about your talk.

Kissinger: Your communications are good. We met in your old residence

Huang Chen: You had mao-tai in the Red Room. It was a secret.

Kissinger: We couldn't continue negotiating! We immediately yielded on everything.

I wanted to see you about a few things. First, about our meetings in Paris. I told your Foreign Minister we had concluded an understanding about Laos and Cambodia. [Hands over Tab A.] These will not be published. Their existence will in fact be denied.

Huang Chen: Thank you.

Kissinger: I have never understood, since your allies don't keep signed

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-2-

Huang Chen: We hope that both of you will keep the Paris Agreement.

Kissinger: We can't reiterate enough that the key element in Indochina is now Cambodia, and everything else will be easy once that is settled. But we have given you our ideas and we had an opportunity to discuss it briefly with your Foreign Minister. We understood further action has to wait until Prince Sihanouk returns to Peking.

Huang Chen: He yesterday was still in Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: Yes, we understand it will take about 10 days.

Huang Chen: He will visit Romania after Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: He has already been in Albania.

Huang Chen: You follow his movements well!

Kissinger: On one trip we were looking after him for you! Our intelligence services thought I had lost my mind. You remember, when your Prime Minister asked me to see what we could do. Last year.

Also, on the previous conversations we have had. The President is of course extremely pleased with your invitation and accepts in principle, and we will discuss it in the next months what an appropriate day will be. Of course everything would be simpler if there were a return visit here first. If for any reason Washington is difficult, we could arrange it at the Western White House in California.

Huang Chen: You discussed this matter with Minister Chi Peng-fei.

Kissinger: Not the Western White House; that is a new idea. I invited you to the Western White House. Because we will go out at the end of next week before the conclusion of the Brezhnev visit. And we will stay there two weeks, and maybe three. So if you and any members of your Liaison Office wanted to come out for an evaluation of the visit, you would be very welcome. Or any other discussions we might want to have. I will even offer you a Chinese meal if you come.

Huang Chen: That is right, you mentioned that last time. Yes, I know you mentioned that to Minister Chi Peng-fei in Paris and he said that a reply will be coming.

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-3-

Kissinger: I am astonished at your communications. I couldn't get this much information from this office to my outer office in 24 hours.

Huang Chen: I am sure it is quicker.

Kissinger: I also want to give you a message to show how we propose to handle the Korean question. [He hands over Tab B]

Huang Chen: I was just about to ask you about this. [Chi translates the n

Thank you, and I will convey this to my Government,

Kissinger: I wanted to go over with you various items we are planning to discuss at the Summit with Brezhnev.

First of all, we want to reaffirm again that all the principles--first of all the Shanghai communique, and the strategy we discussed with the Prime Minister in February--remain in full force as far as we are concerned. And we have to implement this strategy in our own way. And the basic strategy is to maneuver the Soviet Union into a position of the aggressor if it uses military force--without encouraging it to be the aggressor. Which is a difficult exercise.

We will sign a number of bilateral agreements, which I have summarized for you here. [Hands over Summary of Bilateral Agreements, Tab C.]

Huang Chen: Some of them have been discussed in your press already.

Kissinger: [laughing] Exactly. Our press is not very disciplined. There is no great novelty in any of them.

Huang: That is right.

Kissinger: Then we will announce some principles for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. We will not have a specific agreement.

Huang: There will be no agreement on the SALT.

Kissinger: There will be no agreement on the SALT. There will be an agreement on the principles of SALT. But no concrete agreement. I give you the exact text of what we will agree upon.

Huang: It is two things. One is SALT and the other one.

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-4-

Kissinger: I will talk about the other one in a moment. On SALT, all we are saying is we will try to reach an agreement next year. The rest of it is generalities without precise significance. If you have any question about any of these principles, please ask us. But if they have any operational significance except the one that says we will try to reach an agreement in 1974, it will be accidental, and unintentional. [Huang laughs. Kissinger hands over SALT Principles, Tab D.]

Huang: Please go on.

Kissinger: Let me talk about the other document. We have decided to proceed even though we take your views extremely seriously. It is important for you to understand our position. If we want to establish hegemony with the Soviet Union, we don't need an agreement. We have many offers without an agreement. If we want to put you in an isolated position, we can make many concrete steps with the Soviet Union.

The only thing we have changed in what you have seen--and we will give you correct text--is where we say "The United States and the Soviet Union agree that it is the objective of their policy," we now say "of their policies", to make it two separate policies. We have also taken out the word "solemnly."

In order to avoid any misunderstanding on the consultation clause, the President has written a letter to Brezhnev, of which I am giving you three paragraphs. [To Chi:] Would you read this to the Ambassador? We have not marked it, but it is a letter from the President to Brezhnev. [He hands over Tab E, Chi translates. Dr. Kissinger also hands over a copy of the final text, Tab F.]

I want to repeat again: We will not change our vote in the United Nations on any of the proposals on nuclear war that you have objected to.

Huang: That is, abstain.

Kissinger: We will do the same as we did last year, that is, abstain. We will not join in any other resolutions of a similar nature. And we will be glad as I have pointed to you before, to formalize our refusal to participate in any consultation that affects Chinese interests in any manner you deem appropriate.

Huang: We have something to say on this matter.

Kissinger: Well, the only other thing that will happen is a communique,

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- 5 -

which in effect summarizes the other events and has no new elements. We have no text yet, but we hope to have it early next week. But it will have new elements in it. It is not of the same significance as the Shanghai Communique. It states no new issues of principles; it in effect states all the things I have given you here orally.

With your permission, I would like to see you at least once during the Brenev visit, to bring you up to date on any concrete discussions that occur beyond what I have told you. If you are willing.

Huang: We will think it over.

Kissinger: We hope that if we do things with which you disagree, that you state your opposition in such a way that we can respond in a positive manner.

Huang: [Nods yes.] In order to save time--we have a message in reply to the point you just mentioned--but we will just give it to you. [Chi hands over PRC note on nuclear agreement, Tab G.]

Kissinger: [reads it] Well, we understand. We disagree, but we understand your position. It is a different evaluation of the situation. Because we certainly do not want European countries to become Finlands. It is totally against our policy. We also don't want them to become totally dependent on the United States--because this is also against our long-term interests. And it is absolutely against our policy to isolate China.

As we look around the world, we don't see what "soft spot" the Soviet Union can attack at which we would not resist. Because it is our intention to resist.

Our strategy is essentially that which I described to President Pompidou, which I gave you a copy.

Huang: I read that.

Kissinger: It can be that sometimes we have a different evaluation of the situation.

I am not certain intellectually why the Soviet Union can peddle its Asian security system on the basis of what we have discussed here. Really, intellectually it would help me to know; perhaps we can discuss it some time when I am in Peking.

Huang: We hope our discussion will be fleshed out in your discussions in Peking. Because it is obvious our evaluations are different.

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By SLW NARA Date 7/9/07

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-7-

Huang: Yes, we do consider the progress made since the Shanghai Communique, 15 - 16 months ago, quite encouraging. And the establishment of Liaison Offices in the capitals after your February visit was important progress.

Kissinger: We are determined to continue on this course and accelerate it.

Huang: We hope so.

Kissinger: You can count on it. Are you making some progress?

Han Hsu: We are making some progress in finding a residence! When we settle down we will invite you.

Kissinger: I am counting on it. You have a residence?

Huang: Yes. The real difficulty is to find a large building for our chance. I am just thinking out loud, but it maybe possible to consider the long-range possibility of the two countries to exchange large tracts of land on which to set our quarters.

Kissinger: In principle we are prepared. Of course we already have our quarters. I agree in principle. Is it possible?

Eagleburger: We did it with the Soviets. It is possible.

Kissinger: If it is possible, we will arrange it.

I wish you to tell Peking the following: Maybe this proposition is not the most suitable one, the one I made on May 29. On the consultations. The one to which you gave me this reply. But we can tell you in advance, since we have people who are much more imaginative than we, that if you make a proposal that symbolizes the objectives to which we have committed ourselves we are almost certain to accept it. [They laugh.] A proposal designed to symbolize the concern we feel, which was expressed in the President's letters.

You don't have to answer it now. It can wait until August or any other time. But I want your leaders to understand this would not be a subject of bargaining.

[They talk among themselves.]

Huang: I will report this to our Government.

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-8-

Kissinger: Of course. I didn't think you would make an immediate decision.
[Laughter]

Huang: August is coming around quite quickly.

Kissinger: Yes. Will you be coming back there for my visit?

Huang: I don't know yet!

Kissinger: If you want, I will give you a ride in my plane.

We have the Shah of Iran and Mr. Bhutto coming.

Huang: You told me, in July.

Kissinger: July the 17th and July the 24th.

Huang: And Prime Minister Tanaka at the end of July.

Kissinger: Yes, Prime Minister Tanaka is coming July 31st--together with two divisions of photographers and newsmen.

Huang: You are a very busy man, we can see. We heard from your associates before that although you travel so much, because of your good health and the special plane with sleeping arrangements, you can do it.

Kissinger: I will probably collapse all at once. This is all I have. Have you committed all your reserves? [Laughter]

Huang: I have. As a general, I am not very accustomed to using reserves.

[The meeting then ended.]