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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

ACTIONCONFIDENTIAL

June 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *PHS*

SUBJECT: Huang Chen's Request that His Wife
Call on Mrs. Nixon

During a tour of the Presidential monuments on July 11, PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen approached me and inquired whether it might be possible for his wife to call on Mrs. Nixon and to present her with a gift. Huang noted that his wife had already called on the wives of the Secretary of State, Under Secretary Porter, and Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Arthur Hummel. He said that if it was no trouble and according to American custom, his wife would also like to pay a courtesy call on the First Lady. I said I would report his request to you.

Huang's request can be seen as both a polite gesture and an effort to sustain the high visibility which we have already accorded his mission. The visibility is obviously one dimension of the PRC's effort to overshadow our relations with the ROC; and knowledge of such a call would undoubtedly add to Taipei's sense of being out in the cold. In addition, the Indian Government has protested the President's prompt reception of Huang Chen at a time when their new ambassador was continuing his long wait to present credentials. Despite such points of objection, however, an informal inquiry of Protocol at State regarding such a call drew no strong objection. My own judgment is that such a call should be granted, given the President's goal of normalizing relations with the PRC, but that it would best be carried out without press visibility.

You will recall that you invited Ambassador Huang to come to San Clemente after the Brezhnev visit for discussions. Perhaps he might bring his wife along, and have her call on the First Lady at that time.

On the assumption that you would approve such a courtesy call, we have drafted two memoranda from General Scowcroft to Lucy Winchester, the first (at Tab A) suggesting a call by Mme. Huang on the First Lady in

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Washington at some convenient time after the Brezhnev visit, the second (at Tab B) suggesting that the call might be timed with Ambassador Huang's visit to San Clemente in late June. In both cases it is requested that there be no press coverage.

Recommendations:

That we arrange a call by Mme. Huang on the First Lady:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That such a call be coordinated with Ambassador Huang's trip to San Clemente in late June:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. WINCHESTER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Call on the First Lady by Mme. Huang Chen

Mme. Huang Chen, wife of the Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China in Washington, has expressed the desire to pay a courtesy call on the First Lady at her convenience, and to present her with a gift. We believe such a courtesy call would be useful, and recommend that it be arranged at a convenient time after the Brezhnev visit when Mrs. Nixon is in Washington. Press publicity on the call should be avoided.

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Authority 901a DDDBy SW NARA Date 7/9/02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLYTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

June 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *OWR*

SUBJECT: Checklist for Meeting with Huang Chen,
Map Room - June 14, 1973

1. Indochina: The folder marked "Indochina" has copies of:

- the Joint Communique
- your press conference in Paris
- all the understandings

Also included, for your reference, are the file of recent exchanges with the PRC on Cambodia (up through your talk with Chi P'eng-fei yesterday) and the PRC-DRV communique.

2. Brezhnev Summit: The folder marked "Brezhnev Summit" has copies of:

- the nuclear agreement, final text annotated version
- the letter to Brezhnev with our interpretation
- SALT Principles, summary and current U. S. and Soviet drafts
- a description of the bilateral cooperation agreements that will be signed
- the communique, current draft, indicating disagreed portions. [N. B. Sonnenfeldt and Hyland recommend not handing this over while key sections are still disagreed.]

3. Korea/UNCURK: Memo from Dick Kennedy with our scenario is attached at Tab 1. It includes talking points.TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1

DECLASSIFIED

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-462-5-6-7

Authority 50127DD

By SW NARA Date 7/9/07

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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4. Huang Chen's wife seeks call on Mrs. Nixon: A memo from Solomon, at Tab 2, reports Mme. Huang's request and recommends that you seek to arrange such a courtesy call, either in Washington or San Clemente.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Authority 7010700

By SW NARA Date 7/9/07TOP SECRET

June 13, 1973

SUBJECT: UNCURK, the UNC and the General Assembly

UNCURK could be suspended or dissolved without major effect on our own position or that of the ROK. The ROK up to now has had a privileged position in the UN because of UNCURK; and the ROK has not wanted to have the question raised because it would result in demands -- hard to refuse -- by North Korea to participate in debate. But North Korea's accession to the WHO has all but assured it observer status at the UNGA; and the ROK as part of its new proposals is prepared to take the initiative to suspend UNCURK. The PRC (and North Korea), however, have wanted UNCURK dissolved and in a way which would have the effect of asserting that its original constitution was without justification.

We have indicated that we had a two-step process in mind: (1) adjournment sine-die, and (2) final dissolution. The ROK is clearly prepared to move now to the first step. It possibly can be pushed to accept dissolution (particularly since Australia may now intend to drop its membership -- the third to do so; Chile left in 1969, Pakistan in 1972) provided that it is done without prejudice to that body's original purposes.

The UNC is a more complex problem:

- It looms larger in the calculations of the North Koreans (and the PRC and the USSR as well) than does UNCURK and therefore is a more significant bargaining chip.
- The ROK sees it as, in a sense, an international guarantee of its security. The ROK would be unlikely to accept a major change in its status or its ultimate disposition except in the context of a security guarantee and continued commitment of U.S. forces coupled with security assurances from concerned powers including the USSR and the PRC.
- There are subsidiary relationships which would have to be worked out (the Military Armistice Commission, the Agreements with Japan for use of bases there in defense of UN forces in Korea, third country status-of-forces agreement for the use of certain U.S. bases in Japan in support of UN operations, U.S. operational control of ROK forces, etc.)

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Authority 9012955

By SW NARA Date 7/9/02

TOP SECRET

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- We will want to assure continued U.S. force presence at least for a time (this can be done under the U.S.-ROK bilateral but will be a point of contention with the USSR, PRC and North Korea.
- Our allies should be consulted.

All of this will take time. It is unlikely that this can be accomplished in a way which would protect our interests and meet the ROK's concerns before the next UNGA.

To proceed on UNCURK alone requires only that the ROK propose suspension or dissolution to the UNGA. There is little doubt that the proposal would be approved. There could be a move by some opponents of UN presence in Korea to couple this with an attack on the UNC. Such a move would be unlikely to succeed though there could be some acrimonious debate. Even if it did succeed, an UNGA resolution would be without effect -- The Security Council created and would have to terminate the UNC.

Mr. Rush's paper lays out a scenario which would effect the dissolution of both UNCURK and the UNC, get assurances for the security of South Korea, and see both Koreas admitted to the UN this fall. As a total package to be achieved ultimately this recognizes the realities and makes sense. But it is a very large bite to take for one swallow. It is doubtful that the intense negotiations required could be accomplished in the time available between now and this fall. Moreover, the ROK has moved a giant step forward in recognizing the realities in its new proposals. To push them to the ultimate now, even before their own new proposals have been fully aired, might cause retrogression on their part -- they could see this as a move by the United States toward withdrawal of support and disengagement.

Though UNCURK has been a bone in the throats of the North Koreans and the PRC, giving it up now costs us no important bargaining leverage. The UNC is the major question. We have not committed ourselves except in the most general sense to move on the UNC. We can move now on UNCURK thereby indicating to the PRC the good faith of our undertakings. And we can hold out the prospect for a broader advance encompassing some change in the UNC over the coming year. We are committed to providing a scenario by which the UNCURK question will be resolved and we can do so now.

TALKING POINTS to present this position are attached.

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Authority 2012958

By SW NARA Date 7/9/02

The United States side is prepared to support a proposal for the suspension of UNCURK at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. side understands that the Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to make such a motion for suspension. The U.S. side will exert its best efforts to have this proposal framed to call for the dissolution of UNCURK. If the proposal for dissolution cannot be achieved, the proposal for suspension will be made at this next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. side then will seek to have a proposal for dissolution presented to the General Assembly at its next following meeting. This is the two-step process to which the U.S. side has referred. The U.S. side understands that neither the suspension or dissolution of UNCURK shall in any way call into question the validity of its original establishment or of its original purposes.

After this has been completed, and before the 1974 session of the United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. side will be prepared to discuss with the PRC side ways in which the question of the United Nations Command might be resolved. The U.S. side does not believe the present moment to be an appropriate time for such discussions.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. WINCHESTER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Call on the First Lady by Mme. Huang Chen

Mme. Huang Chen, wife of the Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China in Washington, has expressed the desire to pay a courtesy call on the First Lady at her convenience, and to present her with a gift. We believe such a courtesy call would be useful, and suggest that it be coordinated with a trip which Liaison Office Chief Huang may take to San Clemente in late June. Mme. Huang could accompany her husband. Press publicity of the courtesy call should be avoided.

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