MEMORANDUM

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

### ACTION

June 13, 1970

#### TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT:

Actions on Cambodia

The report for the President of actions on Cambodia through 6:00 p.m. June 12 is enclosed. The reports submitted by State, Defense, and CIA are at Tabs for your information.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the report at Tab A to the President.

Enclosures

JCS, NSA, DIA, OSD, NSS, DOS reviews completed.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20 : LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2

### MEMORANDUM

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

#### TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT:

Actions on Cambodia

The following is a report on actions taken or underway on Cambodia through 6:00 p.m. last night.

Military Operations: Search and clear operations netted one small cache. There were two significant engagements.

Foreign Aid: Lon Nol has told the press that five Thai T-28s have been loaned to the GOC, and that Thai troops are "on the way." In fact, Thanat and Praphat Thursday reversed their field and indicated publicly that Thai troops might be sent; our discussions with the Thai have not yet resulted in a definite agreement, but they now seem prepared to put a Black Panther battalion into the Phnom Penh area even without U.S. allowances and logistic support.

- -- The RLG has covertly sent a token shipment of 447 carbines and other weapons to the GOC.
- -- Shortage of recruits required that there be only two additional Khmer Krom battalions. Target date for their readiness has slipped to July 14 or before.
- -- Arrangements have been made with the GOC to give them 40 trucks, to be driven to Phnom Penh about June 25.

Internal: The enemy strategy seems to be to harass or deny communications into Phnom Penh. Kompong Speu, astride Route 4 to Sihanoukville, is under attack. An attack is expected on Kompong Chhnang, on Route 5 to the Thai border.

- -- Pressure on Siem Reap eased, though some VC/NVA forces are reported dug in at Angkor Wat -- presumably recognizing that they will not be attacked there.
- -- Some shellings of Tonle Bet and Kompong Cham. Enemy movements reported in the environs of Phnom Penh.

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20 : LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2



#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

# TOP SECRET/NODIS/KHMER

June 12, 1970

# MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Daily Report on Cambodia No. 48

# Military and Economic Assistance

- 1. FANK Request for Supplies at Bung Lung (Labansiek). Embassy Phnom Penh June 12 requested immediate grant on an emergency basis, without charging cost to MAP, of the request by Cambodian general at Bung Lung for ammunition, equipment and food. DATT had visited the scene and verified the need for the items requested. The FANK director of logistics had approved the request and assured DATT that he would ensure FANK's compliance in the future with MACV's requirement that future requests pass through DATT and that field requirements be related to identified lines in the MAP program.
- 2. Cache Identification. An Indonesian officer has told the Charge in Djakarta that Les Kossem had information on arms and ammunition caches well inside the Cambodian northeast provinces but that he was unwilling to give this information to GOC or GVN for fear of being accused of being pro-VC. The Indonesian knew that one of Kossem's officers was working with MACV in current operations and was uncertain whether this meant all of Kossem's information had been turned over.
- 3. <u>Bandung Munitions Factory</u>. The Indonesians hoped to have an answer June 13 to our request to send technicians in on the Bandung factory project.
- 4. Trucks for Cambodia. The Charge and ARMA have informed General Sak Sutsakhan of the planned delivery of 40 M35A2 trucks and the proposed training of drivers and mechanics. The general agreed to ask ARVN to start the training effort and to have 50 drivers and 5 mechanics ready to leave Phnom Penh June 16. The Embassy will ask VNAF to fly the men to Vietnam. FANK will be responsible for the convoy when it reaches Neak Luong.

## TOP SECRET/NODIS/KHMER

### TOP SECRET/NODIS/KHMER

5. Further Employment of Khmer Krom. GVN cessation of recruiting requires reconfiguring the proposed 3 battalions into 2 battalions of Khmer Krom. General Vien prefers to commit them directly to Phnom Penh and General Abrams concurs. General Abrams proposes to train the men in SVN rather than in the Parrot's Beak and to deploy them to Phnom Penh as soon as possible after July 1 and not later than July 14. Cost where possible will be met out of FY 70 MAP, addon funds and/or programed into FY 71 MAP. General Abrams has requested approval of this proposal.

2.

6. Possible Australian Assistance in Improving GOC Broadcasting Capabilities. The Australian Ambassador is expecting the visit of a high-ranking expert in the radio broadcasting field. However, he is notifying Canberra that unless GOA is prepared to follow this visit with an offer of concrete assistance, he would prefer to omit the visit. He strongly favors assisting Cambodia in this field.

#### Diplomatic |

- 1. Historic Monuments. U Thant told Ambassador Yost June II that he believed damage to sites such as Angkor Wat was more likely to occur from aerial bombing than from ground action and that he hoped the U.S. would avoid any attacks on such sites. Yost replied that the U.S. had already indicated its operations in Cambodia would be limited to approximately 20 miles beyond the Vietnam frontier and pointed out that Angkor Wat was several hundred miles distant. Moreover, U.S. forces operate under standing orders to take protection of cultural monuments into account as much as possible in their operation. Ambassador Yost personally urged the Department that there be no bombing of the Angkor Wat complex by U.S. aircraft and that we insist to GVN and RTG that they not use any substantial weapons, aircraft or artillery against Angkor Wat. An instruction has been sent to the field on this subject.
- 2. ROK/GOC Relations. The Minister for Political Affairs in the ROK Saigon Embassy recently visited Phnom Penh to review the situation and make recommendations to Seoul regarding re-establishment of diplomatic relations. He has recommended delay in the actual establishment of an embassy until certain local problems, mostly administrative, can be clarified. He nevertheless believed his government wanted to move ahead in providing assistance to Cambodia and that the establishment of formal relations was not a precondition to progress in this effort.

## TOP SECRET/NODIS/KHMER

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20 : LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2

### TOP SECRET/NODIS/KHMER

3. Thai Parliamentary Delegation. The Thai delegation visited Phnom Penh June 11; met the President of the National Assembly; and received a briefing from the Deputy Chief of Staff. The latter asked them to work so that international opinion would know that Cambodia was fighting against aggression for its survival and that it lacked arms.

### <u>Internal</u>

1. Proposed Increase in Mission Size. Rives, after consultation with DATT reported that he assumed operations and intelligence personnel to be assigned would restrict themselves to that field leaving the present DAO staff free to perform regular attache functions and assist the political-military counselor. Since operations are virtually limited to Phnom Penh because of insecurity in the countryside, he wondered if that many people were needed to work the limited sources available. In any event, the increase in size meant we would have to forget "low visibility." It would also require the addition of 3 administrative positions, 2 file clerks, 1 secretary and 9 more locals. DATT would need 1 Army officer and either 1 secretary-stenographer or a warrant officer who could type. Rives pointed out that 3 SSO personnel are already on board in TDY status and are using the present communications facilities as agreed . He reported 17 permanent Americans on board now plus 11 TDY and 5 Marines expected July 1 for a total of 33. Even without the proposed increase, he assumes he will eventually be instructed to talk to GOC on this subject and hopes to

2. Rumors of Government Changes. The Embassy expects some sort of government change in the form of "widening" and "division of responsibilities." The Embassy does not foresee major changes but feels that senior government figures are carrying too many government portfolios to manage effectively. For example, the Foreign Minister also holds Justice, Public Health, Social Welfare and Public Works portfolios.

receive press guidance on how to explain the increase.

## Press Briefing

Department Spokesman's Comments. The Spokesman June 12 declined to comment on an AP report that half of Cambodia would be ceded to the communists. Asked the size of the Mission in Phnom Penh, he said he would provide the figures. Asked if we had military advisors with the Phnom Penh government, he said he did not want to use the word advisors but that our Mission was aware of what was going on militarily.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Executive Secretary No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20: LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20 : LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2 III 2723 JENERAL

EYES ONLY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

June 12, 1970

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the daily report you asked to be provided on the status of activities related to the situation in Cambodia.

Navid Packard

Attachment

### .TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

121600 EDT Jun 1970

#### A. MILITARY OPERATIONS

# 1. US Support to RVNAF

a. Ground. The following artillery support (all calibers) was provided in Cambodia during this period:

(BA 367/706)	263 rds
(BA 352/353)	570 rds
(BA 351)	0 rds
(BA 350)	0 rds
(Riverine, BA 704/709)	0 rds
(BA 704)	0 rds
(BA 740)	0 rds
	(BA 352/353) (BA 351) (BA 350) (Riverine, BA 704/709) (BA 704)

#### b. Air

(1) The following tactical air sorties were provided in Cambodia:

	This <u>Period</u>	Cumulative
Toan Thang 42 Toan Thang 43 Toan Thang 45 & Cuu Long I Cuu Long III Binh Tay III	0 22 4 0 0 2	104 1,554 502 . 0 0 265

(2) The following ARC LIGHT sorties were provided in Cambodia:

	This <u>Period</u>	Cumulative
Toan Thang 42 Toan Thang 43 Toan Thang 45 Toan Thang 46 Cuu Long I Cuu Long III Binh Tay III	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 315 85 120 0 0

#### TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

#### TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

121600 EDT June 1970

c. Sea. The surveillance group off the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) reported no contacts during the reporting period.

## 2. CAMBODIAN (KHMER KROM):

- a. Troops in Cambodia: 1,787
- b. Total Supply of Special Items: 197,072 pounds

#### - B. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

## 1. Total Military Assistance

a. AK-47s:

6,018 rifles 434,050 rounds of ammunition

b. M-2 CARBINES:

15,025 carbines 2,876,800 rounds of ammunition

c. 1000-MAN PACKS:

A total of 4 have been delivered

d. UNIFORMS:

114,904 lbs delivered

e. AIR MUNITIONS:

746 incendiary, anti-personnel, and napalm bombs; 45,000 rounds of 50 caliber ammo; 764 2.75 inch rockets; and igniters

f. MAPS:

1,100 pounds

g. COMM EQUIP:

15 AN/PRC 25 radios

h. TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL CARGO AIR LIFTED (including special items for Khmer Krom but not including troops): 787,983 pounds

#### TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

121600 EDT June 1970

#### C. PRESS POLICY

There are no major public affairs problems or significant developments today. Some members of the press have begun to call to our attention the implication they have drawn from the words of several Administration officials to the effect that while all of our forces will be out of Cambodia by the end of the month the "bulk" or "most" of them will be out by the middle of the month. These reporters are noting that the middle of the month is upon us and looking for evidence that additional U.S. withdrawals have occurred. At the moment our statistics show only a slight down trend in our strength inside Cambodia. From the public affairs point of view it is important that this down trend continue in a steady fashion so that we may meet the public expectations not only that all troops will be out on the 30th but that "most" of them will be out before that.

### D. CUMULATIVE TONNAGES

Cumulative tonnages of captured enemy materiel as of 120400 EDT:

Category		Tonnages
Food		6,384
Weapons		138
Ammunition		1,598
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	GRAND TOTAL	8,120

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

te: 12 June 1970

## TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

Date as of 120400 EDT

	Base S	ate pn tarted EDT)	Max. No. US Involved in Cambodia This Opn	No. US Involved in Cambodia This Opn Now	Date 1st US Units/ Pers Out	Date All US To Be Out	Actual or Planned Termination Date
		28 Apr	930	370	12 May	NLT 30 Jun	*20 May 70
	(TT 42) 352/353	30 Apr	10,700	6,000	9 May	NLT 30 Jun	29 Jun 70
354	(TT 43) 354 (TT 44)	5 May	2,300	0	8 May	14 May (Opn terminated)	14 May 70
	351 (TT 45)	5 May	6,200	5,800	23 May	NLT 30 Jun	30 Jun 70
	350 (TT 46)	5 May	19	13 .	15 May	NLT 30 Jun	*12 May 70
٠.	702 (Binh Tay		3,869	0	13 May	24 May (Opn terminated)	24 May 70
. :	701 (Binh Tay		83	0	26 May	27 May (Opn terminated)	
	740 (Binh Tay		71	0	**12 Jun	NLT 30 Jun	**12 Jun 70
	<b>704/</b> 709 <b>(Cuu</b> Long		2,313	321	13 May	NLT 30 Jun	30 Jun 70
	704 (Cuu Long		86	0	22 May	24 May (Opr terminated)	24 May 70
•	704 (Cuu Long		59 -	25	28 May	NLT 30 Jun	30 Jun 70
	•					•	

<sup>\*</sup> Date based on planned operation. Termination date subject to prevailir tactical situation.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Phase I of Binh Tay III terminated. Planning for Phase II is continuing

LEVEL OF EFFORT (Personne No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20 : LOC-HAK-459-5

) Cumulative totals shown include previously unreported adjustmen

	PARROT'S BEAK (BA 706/367)	FISH HOOK (BA 352)	BINH TAY III (BA 740)	GIONG TO (BA 351)	HAC MA (BA 350)	CUU LONG I" (BA 704/709)	CUU LONG III (BA 704)	** TERMINATED OPERATIONS	
Enemy KIA	2,512	2,403	137	944	55	1,116	216	2,430	9,813
Enemy PW/DET	1,115	283	3	50	9	164	190	346	2,160
ARYN KIA	253	. 93	24	0	17	94	27	126	634
ARVN WIA	1,041	579	65	o	87	348	118	583	2,821
US KIA	9	111	0	104	0	6	. 0	56	286
US WIA	. 65	679	7	#238	0	4	1	249	1,243
Individual Wons Captured	1,809	4,559	586	2,335	317	2,661	. 505	3,395	16,167
Crew-Served Wpns Captured	457	717	133	355	31	142	12'.	441	2,288
*Rice (Tons)	877	2,838	411	1,077	68	38	17:	926	6,252
Rice (Man/Months)	38,588	124,872	18,084	47,388	·2,992.	1,672	748	40,744	275,088
Bunkers/Structures.	852	5;250	316	390	176	. 0	0	2,384	9,368
Vehicles	25	234	22	96	2	8	0	6	393
Boats	0	0	. 0	0	0	50	0	40	90
Radios	50	137	8	0	0	2	1	38	236

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>Operation ROCK CRUSHER IV, TIA CHOP (BA 354), BINH TAY I (BA 702), BINH TAY II
\*\*\*This amount is lower than previously reported and dehotes field adjustment.

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	PARROT'S BEAK (BA 706/367)	FISH HOOK (BA 352)	BINH TAY III (BA 740)	GIONG TO (BA 351)	HAC MA (BA 350)	CUU LONG I (BA 704/709)	CUU LONG III (BA 704)	TERMINATED OPERATIONS	GRAND TOTAL
-*Small-Arms Ammunition	3,177,900	3,744,708	2,400	5,620,670	17,800	25,000	340,000	313,422	13,241,900
Rifle Rds (less than .50 cal)	2,076,950	3,353,262	2,400	3,213,810	17,800	15,000	340,000	239,111 .	9,258,333
Machinegum Rds (.50 cal or							•	74 711	
larger) . Grenades	1,100,950	391,446 4,654		2,406,860 32,763	•	10,000	0 34	74,311	3,983,5 51,750
Antiaircraft Rds	o	25,352		140,104	1 0	0	697	0	166,153
Mortar Rds	28,923	7,524	10	12,754	2,222	630	1,784	8,248	62,095
Rocket Rds (107-mm and larger)	152	695	3	695	0	0.	. 19	370	1,934
Rocket Rds (B-40/B-41)	16,515	6,937	0	8,197	592	500	0	" 5,711	38,452
Recoilless Rifle Rds	2,932	10,223	٥	10,951	1,090	4	207	1,978	27,385
Mines	#1,208	2,005	* 0 ##20	770	144	150 ##17	19 ##3	925 ##30	# 5,221 ##70

<sup>\*</sup>Figures are the sum of rifle rounds and machinegun rounds.

\*\*Operation KOCK CRUSHER IV, TIA CHOP (BA 354), BINH TAY I (BA 702), BINH TAY II (BA 701), CUU LONG II (BA 704).

\*This amount is lower than previously reported and denotes field adjustment.

\*\*Tons of ammunition - no breakdown reported.


CUMULATIVE TOTALS SHOWN INCLUDE PREVIOUSLY UNREPORTED ADJUSTMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

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
"Special Report on Cambodia" published by the NMCC 1450 EDT 12 Jun 70 for the period ending 120400

SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20:LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2



# THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

12 June 1970 1218 EDT



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Air Operations in Cambodia

The attached information on Cambodia Air Operations and associated map for the period 101201 to 111200 EDT June 1970 are provided.

2 Atch a/s

Distribution:

DDO ADDO CCOC

PAC DIV, J-3
PAC DESK

W. S. MILLER

Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

SEC No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/20 : LOC-HAK-459-5-5-2

## AIR OPERATIONS

Following is a summary of tactical air and ARC LIGHT operations in Cambodia for the period 101201 to 111200 EDT June 1970:

		•		ַ <u></u>	S/VNA	<u>F</u> .					
ZONE		Н	J	K	L	М	U	v	W	DAILY TOTAL	CUM TOTAL
	STRIKE	32	18	61	31	. 4	0	23	8	177	8,394
TACTICAL -	RECCE	15	13	21	21	1	0 .	· 2	3	76	1,426
B-52 ARC L	IGHT	Ó	0	12	0 ,	0	0	0	0	12	684
		<u> </u>	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	DAILY		ROYED CUMU	LATIV	<u>E</u> .	DAILY	DAMAGED CUMU	LATIVE
STRUCTURES WBL CRAFT GUNS TRUCKS ROAD/TRAIL CAVES/TUNN STORAGE AR	S ELS			66 0 6 2 0 0	•	8	,728 30 136 41 0 0	•	15 0 0 0 0 0	1	,492 23 10 100 100 25 0
TROOP KBA SECONDARY SECONDARY		0 NS -	1				,179 312 387			•	

