

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*[Signature]*  
ACTION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge *JH*  
SUBJECT: Actions on Cambodia

*Why can I  
see report HK-47  
in my office?*

Your daily report for the President of Actions on Cambodia through 1800 hours May 29 is enclosed. The reports submitted by State, Defense and CIA are at Tabs for your information.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the daily report to the President (Tab A).

Enclosures

*Don't forward  
memo to Pres*

*Can I get article  
attacking Pres?*

JUN 3 1970

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NSA, DIA, JCS, OSD,  
DOS, NSS reviews  
completed.

A

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger  
SUBJECT: Actions on Cambodia

The following is a report on actions taken or underway on Cambodia as of 6:00 p. m. , May 29, 1970.

Military Operations

- Seven operations remain underway, generally with only light contacts reported. On Operation Cuu Long I the ARVN units involved continued river and security activities along the Mekong and have raised two sunken ferries. Vietnamese Marine units have been introduced into Prey Vieng and have encountered moderate resistance.

Military and Economic Assistance

- e -- Air Chief Marshal Dawee has returned from Phnom Penh and reports that the Thai are very anxious to start shipment of weapons and equipment of all kinds to Cambodia. Dawee has pressed Unger on the question of the U. S. shipping 30-50 trucks to Cambodia, or to agree to replace an equal number of trucks if the Thai transferred them to Cambodia. He was disappointed at Unger's inability to give an answer, and Unger believes this idea deserves support. General Praphat has promised the Cambodians a first shipment of supplies by mid-June, and has told the press that a Thai division may be deployed to help protect Phnom Penh, and that 50,000 individual equipment kits will be sent as well as 20 small speedboats to patrol the Mekong.
- Rives has sent in a long shopping list for military assistance to Cambodia, asking how much of the \$7.9 million Cambodian MAP has been used, and also asking for AK-47 ammunition,

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trucks, and help in moving aviation gasoline to Phnom Penh as priority items. In addition, he calls for more Khmer Krom troops from Vietnam, and for use of FY 1971 funds in an organized program for supporting specific military units to replace the present ad hoc system. He suggests replacement of Cambodian T-28's, A-1's, and C-47's, and a training program for Cambodian military personnel (air and ground) in the U. S. , Thailand, South Vietnam, and possibly Australia.

- CINCPAC has informed Rives that the new B-52 operations about which he expressed concern will not take place without Embassy coordination with the Cambodians. The only B-52 operations in Cambodia are those in accordance with directives and guidance currently provided by JCS and higher authorities in Washington.

Diplomatic and International

- A May 29 Pravda article attacked you in particularly harsh terms, hinting at worsened U. S. -Soviet relations and warning that our actions in Cambodia aggravate world problems generally. Embassy Moscow comments that this may reflect Soviet irritability over the pro-Peking orientation which has taken place in Communist policy in Indo-China, and possibly a Soviet attempt to appear as "principled" as Peking in its attitude toward Washington.
- Following a Soviet hiatus in reporting on Sihanouk, Pravda on May 28 reported his presence in Hanoi. However, Embassy Moscow has heard that the Soviet Foreign Ministry continues to deal at the Desk level with Lon Nol's representative in Moscow despite protests from the pro-Sihanouk Cambodian Ambassador.
- We have told the GRC that we believe it should defer its moves to open diplomatic relations with Cambodia until Cambodia firms up its relations with as many Afro-Asian nations as possible. The GRC has been anxious to set up a mission in Phnom Penh in order to assert influence in the large Cambodian Overseas Chinese community. Meanwhile, according to Embassy Djakarta the Indonesians

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would prefer any deep GRC involvement in Cambodia to be deferred while the three-nation committee is lobbying on behalf of the Djakarta conference decisions.

Internal

- A senior Cambodian officer has told the Air Attache' that some of the civilian population who had earlier refused weapons offered to them by the government for their defense now, in areas liberated from VC/NVN, are asking for weapons to be used for self-defense.
- Sirik Matak has instructed the Cambodian UN Representative to thank the people who demonstrated in New York in support of your policy.
- In a speech in Hanoi May 27, Sihanouk came close to admitting responsibility for providing well known aid sanctuaries to VC/NVN in Cambodia. The official Cambodian press described this as a "criminal confession."
- There is a report that Sihanouk received a 24-gun salute on his arrival in Hanoi. According to the editor of Courrier Phnompenhois, these three additional shots above those accorded to a chief of state constitute in the eyes of Cambodians and Buddhists in general a sign of certain and inevitable misfortune.

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STATE



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

TOP SECRET/NODIS/KHMER

May 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Daily Report on Cambodia No. 34

Military and Economic Assistance

1. Thai Assistance. Air Chief Marshal Dawee has told Amb. Unger that the Thai delegation's visit confirmed the Cambodian need for weapons and equipment of all kinds. General Praphat promised the Cambodians a first shipment in the first half of June. Praphat told the press in Bangkok that RTG is considering a COG request to deploy a Thai division to help protect Phnom Penh, and that the RTG would provide fifty thousand kits of individual equipment to FANK in June as well as twenty small speed boats for Mekong patrol. Dawee asked Unger if there had been any decision about his proposal that the U. S. provide 30-50 trucks to Cambodia, or to agree to replace an equal number of trucks if the Thai transferred them to Cambodia. He was disappointed at Unger's inability to give him a favorable answer. Unger recommended a deliberate effort to support an aid program emanating from Thailand and thinks Dawee's truck idea deserves support.

2. Embassy Phnom Penh's Recommendations on Aid. Rives summarized aid to Cambodia from all sources and asked clarification of whether or not the U. S. has given already only part of the \$7.9 million worth announced in Washington. He reported that as of May 27, FANK needed most AK-47 ammunition, trucks, and help in moving aviation gasoline to Phnom Penh. He recommended dispatch of 350,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition as soon as possible and the shipment of 50 military trucks up the Mekong. He said the Thai offer of trucks would be satisfactory provided trucks delivered were in good condition. He suggested provision of additional Khmer Krom troops from Vietnam or at least the dispatch of officers and NCO's who could do training. He recommended that FY 1970 funds be used on an ad hoc basis for urgent needs but that FY 1971 funds be devoted to a more organized program of supporting specific military units. He suggested follow through on replacement of T-28's and perhaps A-1's and C-47's. He thought U. S. might train a few Cambodian pilots and noted that the Thai have already agreed to train eight per year. He recommended training of Cambodian military

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2.

personnel in both South Vietnam and Thailand. He felt the Australians needed prodding.

3. CINCPAC Clarifies Arc Light Operations Plans. CINCPAC has informed Rives that the new B-52 air operations about which he expressed concern will not take place until Embassy coordination with GOC has been completed. Meanwhile, only B-52 operations in Cambodia are those in accordance with directives and guidance currently provided by JCS and higher authorities in Washington.

4. General Pok Sam An Visiting Saigon. General Pok Sam An, Chief of FANK Joint Operations, will remain in Saigon until the night of May 30 conferring with MACV headquarters.

### Diplomatic

1. Pravda Attacks President. A May 29 Pravda article attacked President Nixon over Indochina in particularly harsh terms, hinting at worsened U. S. -Soviet relations with a warning that U. S. actions in Cambodia affect and aggravate world problems generally. Embassy Moscow comments that the attack may in part reflect Soviet irritability that Moscow's Southeast Asian interests are under threat from a Peking reorientation of Communist policy in Indochina. It is also possible Pravda is attempting to balance the current Soviet attack on Peking policy by showing Moscow as equally "principled" and outspoken in opposition to "chauvinism" both from Peking and Washington.

2. Pravda Comments on Sihanouk and Cambodia. Pravda May 28 reported Sihanouk's presence in Hanoi, this being the most attention accorded his activities in some time. Embassy Moscow increasingly hears reports that the Foreign Ministry is dealing at the Desk level with Lon Nol's representative from the Cambodian Embassy in Moscow. Pro-Sihanouk Ambassador Chea Son has reportedly complained to the Soviets without satisfaction. Embassy Moscow comments that the Soviets may indeed be maneuvering to induce Sihanouk to come further away from Peking.

3. Indonesian Reaction to GOC-GRC Relations. Embassy Djakarta believes Indonesians would prefer that GOC and GRC delay any formal relations and any deep Chinese involvement while the 3-nation committee pursues its diplomatic lobbying in behalf of the Djakarta conference decisions. Indonesia, while recognizing in principle valid reasons for establishing relations with the GRC, is purposely delaying action itself in this regard in order to avoid jeopardizing other more immediate policy requirements.

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4. Japanese Position on Cambodia After Djakarta. Ambassador Meyer discussed Cambodia with Prime Minister Sato May 28 and concluded that while Sato's version of Djakarta and Cambodia, like Aichi's was somewhat tailored for our consumption, the fact remained that Asia's leading economic power is increasingly becoming involved in Asian responsibilities.


Internal

1. Attitude of Population. A senior Cambodian officer has told the Air Attaché that some of the civilian population who had earlier refused weapons offered to them by the government for their defense now, in areas liberated from VC/NVN, are asking for weapons to be used for self-defense.

2. Sirik Matak Thanks Hard Hats. Sirik Matak has instructed Cambodian UN Rep to thank the people who demonstrated in New York in support of the President's policy.

3. Sihanouk's "Confession". In a speech in Hanoi May 27, Sihanouk came close to admitting responsibility for providing well known aid sanctuaries to VC/NVN in Cambodia. AKP described this as a "criminal confession."

4. 24 Guns for Sihanouk. There is a report that Sihanouk received a 24-gun salute on his arrival in Hanoi. According to the editor of Courrier Phnompenhais, these three additional shots above those accorded to a chief of state constitute in the eyes of Cambodians and Buddhists in general a sign of certain and inevitable misfortune.

  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

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DEFENSE

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
EYES ONLY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

29 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the daily report you asked to be provided on the status of activities related to the situation in Cambodia.



Attachment

Copy 1 of 6 Copies

Page 1 of 1 Pages

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EYES ONLY

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

2977



TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-5239-70  
29 May 1970


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Daily Status - Cambodia (U)

1. The Special Assistant to the President in a memorandum of 25 April 1970, requested that a daily report be provided on the status of actions related to the situation in Cambodia.

2. The attached report covers the 24-hour period ending 1600, EDT 29 May 1970. It contains sensitive information and is supplemented by statistics extracted from the "Special Report on Cambodia," published twice daily by the National Military Command Center. A special report (code word) is attached.

For the Chairman, JCS:

  
JAMES G. SHANAHAN  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations, NMCC

Attachments  
a/s

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-  
GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Copy 1 of 17 Copies

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

A. MILITARY OPERATIONS

## 1. US Support to RVNAF (280400 - 290400 EDT May 1970).

a. Ground. The following artillery support (all calibers) was provided in Cambodia during this period:

Toan Thang 42 (BA 367/706)	228 rds
Toan Thang 43 (BA 352/353)	296 rds
Toan Thang 45 (BA 351)	0 rds
Toan Thang 46 (BA 350)	72 rds
Cuu Long I (Riverine, BA 704/709)	0 rds
Cuu Long III (BA 704)	0 rds
Binh Tay III (BA 740)	116 rds

b. Air

(1) The following tactical air sorties were provided in Cambodia:

	<u>This Period</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
Toan Thang 42	0	93
Toan Thang 43	23	1,116
Toan Thang 45	0	19
Toan Thang 46	8	142
Cuu Long I	0	0
Cuu Long III	0	0
Binh Tay III	14	189

(2) The following ARC LIGHT sorties were provided in Cambodia:

	<u>This Period</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
Toan Thang 42	0	0
Toan Thang 43	24	280
Toan Thang 45	2	69
Toan Thang 46	3	69
Cuu Long I	0	0
Cuu Long III	0	0
Binh Tay III	0	23

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

291600 EDT May 1970

c. Sea. The surveillance group off the Port of Sihanoukville reported the following ship movements:

(1) French ship CYPRIA departed Sihanoukville on 270315 EDT. No response to flashing light query.

(2) Cambodian ship TONLE SAP departed Sihanoukville on 271025 EDT enroute to Singapore without cargo.

2. CAMBODIAN (KHMER KROM)

a. Troops in Cambodia: 1,787.

b. Total Supply of Special Items: 197,072 pounds.

B. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. Total Military Assistance

a. AK-47s: 6,018 rifles  
347,050 rounds of ammunition

b. M-2 CARBINES: 15,025 carbines  
2,116,800 rounds of ammunition 25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1

d. UNIFORMS: 114,904 lbs delivered

e. AIR MUNITIONS: 300 incendiary, anti-personnel,  
and napalm bombs;  
45,000 rounds of 50 caliber ammo;  
400 2.75 inch rockets; and  
appropriate fuses, initiators and  
igniters.

f. MAPS: 1,100 pounds

g. TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL CARGO AIR LIFTED (including special items for Khmer Krom but not including troops):  
736,695 pounds.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY

291600 EDT May 1970

C. PRESS POLICY

1. Major news stories today resulted from meetings with newsmen in Saigon and placed particular emphasis on the growth of the enemy's supply efforts along the Mekong river corridor. We will continue to point out that as the Secretary of Defense has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee we retain the option to interdict enemy supply lines should they endanger US lives or operations in South Vietnam.

2. There also were significant editorial columns today making the point that increased ARVN morale and capabilities exhibited in the sanctuaries is a major plus factor for Vietnamization.

D. CUMULATIVE TONNAGES:

Cumulative Tonnages of Captured Enemy Material as of 290400 EDT May 1970.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
*Food	5043.0
Weapons	113.8
Ammunition	1398.2
Grand Total	6555.0

\*Includes 37 tons of miscellaneous foodstuffs, such as salt, sugar, corn, canned goods, etc, in addition to rice.

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TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

Date: 29 May 1970

Date as of 290400 EDT

<u>Base Area</u>	<u>Date Opn Started (EDT)</u>	<u>Max. No. US Involved in Cambodia This Opn</u>	<u>No. US Involved in Cambodia This Opn Now</u>	<u>Date 1st US Units/ Pers Out</u>	<u>Date All US To Be Out</u>	<u>Actual or Planned Termination Date</u>
367/706	28 Apr	930	338	12 May	NLT 30 Jun	*20 May 70
352/353	30 Apr	10,700	8,400	9 May	NLT 30 Jun	29 Jun 70
354	5 May	2,300	0	8 May	14 May (Opn terminated)	14 May 70
351	5 May	5,300	5,300	23 May	NLT 30 Jun	30 Jun 70
350	5 May	19	11	15 May	NLT 30 Jun	*12 May 70
702 (Binh Tay I)	4 May	3,869	9	13 May	24 May (Opn terminated)	24 May 70
701 (Binh Tay II)	13 May	83	0	26 May	27 May (Opn terminated)	27 May 70
740 (Binh Tay III)	19 May	70	70	**NA	2 June (Estimate)	2 Jun 70
704/709 (Cuu Long I)	8 May	2,313	392	13 May	NLT 30 Jun	30 Jun 70
704 (Cuu Long II)	16 May	86	0	22 May	24 May (Opn terminated)	24 May 70
704 (Cuu Long III)	24 May	49	27	28 May	NLT 30 Jun	30 Jun 70

\* Date based on planned operation. Termination date subject to prevailing tactical situation.

\*\* Will be provided when reported by COMUSMACV.

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A. LEVEL OF EFFORT (Personnel)

In Cambodia: RVNAF 23,166      In RVN: RVNAF 2,959  
 US 14,538      US 10,329

B. CUMULATIVE RESULTS (As of: 290400 EDT May 70) Cumulative totals shown include previously unreported adjustments.

	PARROT'S BEAK (BA 706/367)	FISH HOOK (BA 352)	BINH TAY III (BA 740)	GIONG TO (BA 351)	HAC MA (BA 350)	CUU LONG I (BA 704/709)	CUU LONG III (BA 704)	** TERMINATED OPERATIONS	GRAND TOTAL
Enemy KIA	2,274	2,158	64	714	22	707	22	2,430	8,391
Enemy PW/DET	1,055	267	3	44	6	96	29	346	1,846
ARVN KIA	208	63	20	0	13	57	5	126	492
ARVN WIA	943	321	48	0	33	218	23	583	2,169
US KIA	9	86	0	70	0	6	0	56	227
US WIA	65	#333	7	185	0	4	1	249	#844
Individual Wpns Captured	1,404	4,504	567	1,242	265	735	15	3,395	12,127
Crew-Served Wpns Captured	373	637	131	208	224	114	0	441	2,128
*Rice (Tons)	760	2,307	309	601	57	43	3	926	5,006
Rice (Man/Months)	33,440	101,508	13,596	26,444	2,508	1,892	132	40,744	220,264
Bunkers/Structures	852	3,611	157	160	176	0	0	2,384	7,340
Vehicles	24	202	20	67	2	8	0	6	329
Boats	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	40
Radios	0	137	8	0	0	0	1		

\*1 ton of rice will feed 1,333 NVA/VC for 1 day (1.5 lbs/Man/Day).

\*\*Operation ROCK CRUSHER IV, TIA CHOP (BS 354), BINH TAY I (BA 702), BINH TAY II (BA 701), CUU LONG II (BA 704).

#This amount is lower than previously reported and denotes field adjustment.

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NOTE: Extract  
 From "Special  
 Report on Car  
 Bodian" pub-  
 lished by the  
 NMCC 1430 EDT  
 29 May 1970  
 for the period  
 ending 290400  
 EDT May 1970

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C. AMMUNITION BY TYPE

	PARROT'S BEAK (BA 706/367)	FISH HOOK (BA 352)	BINH TAY III (BA 740)	GIONG TO (BA 351)	HAC MA (BA 350)	CUU LONG I (BA 704/709)	CUU LONG III (BA 704)	TERMINATED OPERATIONS	GRAND TOTAL
*Small-Arms Ammunition	2,475,360	3,495,813	2,400	3,187,280	17,800	25,000	0	313,422	9,517,075
Rifle Rds (less than .50 cal)	1,389,010	3,154,007	2,400	1,523,235	17,800	15,000	0	239,111	6,340,563
Machinegun Rds (.50 cal or larger)	1,086,350	341,806	0	1,664,045	0	10,000	0	74,311	3,176,512
Grenades	8,845	3,715	13	12,194	285	502	0	1,778	27,332
Antiaircraft Rds	0	25,222	0	109,079	0	0	0	0	134,301
Mortar Rds	20,716	6,203	10	6,074	2,222	630	22	8,248	44,125
Rocket Rds (107-mm and larger)	34	220	3	480	0	0	0	370	1,107
Rocket Rds (B-40/B-41)	10,498	1,116	0	5,926	595	500	0	5,711	24,346
Recoilless Rifle Rds	1,890	6,711	0	9,342	1,090	4	0	1,978	21,011
Mines	918	1,695	0	5	256	150	0	925	3,949
			##20			##17	##1	##90	##128

\*Figures are the sum of rifle rounds and machinegun rounds.

\*\*Operation ROCK CRUSHER IV, TIA CHOP (BA 354), BINH TAY I (BA 702), BINH TAY II (BA 701), CUU LONG II (BA 704).

#This amount is lower than previously reported and denotes field adjustment.

##Tons of ammunition - no breakdown reported.

CUMULATIVE TOTALS SHOWN INCLUDE PREVIOUSLY UNREPORTED ADJUSTMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

"Special Report on  
 Cambodia" published  
 by the NMCC, 1430  
 EDTF 29 May 1970 for  
 the period ending  
 290400 EDTF May 1970