

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506**

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ATTACHMENTS

May 9, 1975

Dear Mr. Belin:

In response to your letter of April 17, we have collected and reviewed all records of the National Security Council relating to Cuba and the Dominican Republic for the period 1960-64.

As a result of this review, we have identified seven items which might be considered, although quite indirectly, to bear on the issues of domestic intelligence or of assassination. A list and copies of the items are at Tab A.

With the exception of these items, there is no material in the NSC records on Cuba and the Dominican Republic pertaining in any way to the issues of concern to the Rockefeller Commission.

We have no files belonging to either McGeorge Bundy or Richard Goodwin. We understand both the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries have files identified as coming from Mr. Bundy, and the Kennedy Library has files identified as those of Mr. Goodwin. In addition, we understand there is some material on Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the Eisenhower Library. Access to these collections is, of course, subject to the terms of the instrument of conveyance. You may wish to enquire directly of the Libraries concerning the availability of this material. A list of Presidential Library contacts is at Tab B.

The question of access to any pertinent material from the records of the Special Group or the Special Group Augmented is still

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
DHS, DOJ, NSS, reviews completed.

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under review. We will be in touch with you on this aspect of your request.

Sincerely,



Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

Mr. David Belin  
Executive Director  
Commission on CIA Activities  
within the United States  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Chun

(1)

B. Political

79. Castro. A political vulnerability of the regime lies in the person of Castro himself. It is not clear whether the regime could continue to operate for long without him. There is no question that the bureaucracy operates relatively freely, and probably makes many decisions without consulting Castro. However, it is equally certain that the Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an important element in maintaining popular

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support for the regime. If Castro were removed from the scene the regime might collapse for lack of this central rallying point. On the other hand, the bureaucracy may now be so firmly entrenched that it could function independently -- although admittedly without the degree of popular support now enjoyed. Further, by using Castro as a martyr it might be possible to generate at least a temporary support for his successor.

80. A further possibility attendant upon the death of Castro would be the attitude of the PSP. The party would like to assume a more open and dominant role in the Cuban Government. Castro's death might force or encourage <sup>the party</sup> into a precipitate move to seize power. If this happened it would probably have an adverse reaction on Latin American opinion, though principally at the governmental level.

81. Castro's control of Cuba is highly dependent upon mass media communications for propaganda and utilization of his magnetic appeal for much of the voluntary support now accorded the regime. Destruction of radio and television services would do much to remove this powerful and cohesive force.

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ANNEX ACONTROL OF EXILE MOVEMENT

1. As of 1 April 1961 the total Cuban alien population in the United States was 116,700, broken down as follows:

	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Florida</u>
Immigrants (Permanent residents)	65,000	26,000
Visitors, students, etc., in status	29,500	20,000
Refugees	<u>22,200</u>	<u>13,600</u>
	<u>116,700</u>	<u>59,600</u>

We continue to inspect and to admit temporary visitors and students from Cuba. These alien Cubans had been issued visas (stamps placed in their Cuban passports) by the United States Consular Service up until the time of the break in relations. Most of these visas were valid for a period of four years from date of issuance and provided for multiple entries into the United States during the period of validity. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 such multiple entry type visas are outstanding.

2. Since no current information can be obtained about given individuals in Cuba, the Service has honored every request for refugee status and no Cuban has been returned to Cuba against his will since January 1959, when the Batista regime fell.

3. Most refugees still live in a hope and expectation that they will return to Cuba when governmental sanity is restored. They represent in large part the professional middle class. To give them permanent residence now is not to their advantage or to the long range interest of this country or to Cuba. As refugees they have the rights and privileges of resident aliens except that their residence cannot be computed for citizenship purposes and they may not leave and re-enter the United States at will.

4. Following the break with Cuba, the Secretary of State published regulations preventing the departure from the United States of any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien except on the express approval of the Secretary of State. Since January 19, 1961, through April 22, 1961, the following have departed:

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United States citizens (with permission)	192
Cuban resident aliens (with permission)	425
Resident aliens who elected to abandon residence	328

5. In order to restrict the hitherto unrestricted international movement of Cuban nationals with consequent flow of vital information to the Castro government, the attached recommendations are made to strike a balance between our national security interests and our sympathy for the true refugee.

#### Recommendations

1. Cuban holders of visitors visas who apply for admission to the United States and who seek temporary admission shall be admitted for a maximum period of one month. Those who seek refugee status at time of admission shall be paroled into the United States indefinitely (sec. 212(d) (5) of the Act).

2. At the time of admission all visitors visas shall be cancelled. Those presently in the United States as visitors shall have their visas cancelled at the time of departure.

3. At the expiration of one month Cuban visitors who do not desire to return to Cuba may be given refugee status on application therefor.

4. All applicants for refugee status shall be fingerprinted and biographical data furnished with the prints to the FBI. Biographical data shall be furnished to other selected intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

5. On receipt of information from a reliable source that a Cuban national is engaging in activity in support of the Castro Government formal deportation proceedings shall be immediately instituted under the administrative warrant of arrest.

6. No Cuban national shall be issued an immigrant visa during the existence of the present Castro regime.

7. Legislation shall be sought to confer permanent resident on any Cuban national who shall have resided in the United States for a period of five years subsequent to January 1, 1959 and been physically present in the United States during that period, retroactive to the date of his actual entry.

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8. Permission for United States citizens to depart for Cuba under Department of State Regulations (22 C.F.R.53) and for resident aliens to depart (22 C.F.R.46) shall be authorized only after full interrogation and investigation by Immigration Departure Control Officers, upon Department of Justice recommendation, and solely for reasons deemed strictly in the national interest.

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4/22/61

Action Memo  
sent to HEW  
and CIA

- e. Discussed the support of refugees, and noted the President's directive that levels of support should be reported to him with recommendations for their improvement, and his desire that such support should be open and overt. The President also directed that the adjustment of Cubans to life in the United States should be given particular attention by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.



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2406. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

Action Memo  
sent to Justice  
and CIA

4/22/61

1. Noted that the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence would examine the possibility of stepping up coverage of Castro activities in the United

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2413.  
4/29/61

- b. Noted the President's request that the Attorney General should prepare recommendations regarding control of Cubans entering or residing in the United States.

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March 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION ON CUBA, March 11, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 31

The President directed that the following actions be taken:

1. Every effort should be made to assist patriotic Cubans in forming a new and strong political organization, and in conjunction with this effort a maximum amount of publicity build-up should be sought for the emerging political leaders of this organization, especially those who may be active participants in a military campaign of liberation. Action: Central Intelligence Agency.
2. The United States Government must have ready a white paper on Cuba, and should also be ready to give appropriate assistance to Cuban patriots in a similar effort. Action: Arthur Schlesinger in cooperation with the Department of State.
3. The Department of State will present recommendations with respect to a demarche in the Organization of American States, looking toward a united demand for prompt free elections in Cuba, with appropriate safeguards and opportunity for all patriotic Cubans. Action: Department of State.
4. The President expects to authorize U. S. support for an appropriate number of patriotic Cubans to return to their homeland. He believes that the best possible plan, from the point of view of combined military, political and psychological considerations, has not yet been presented, and new proposals are to be concerted promptly. Action: Central Intelligence Agency, with appropriate consultation.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

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April 25, 1951

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 45

TO: The Attorney General  
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Coverage of Castro Activities in the United States

In approving the Record of Actions of the April 22, 1951, meeting of the National Security Council, the President noted that the Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency would examine the possibility of stepping up coverage of Castro activities in the United States (NSC Action 2406 1).

Accordingly, it is recommended that the above agencies undertake this study as soon as possible and present through this office any recommendations requiring the President's approval.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Bromley Smith  
Mrs. Lincoln  
McG' B's file ✓

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**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

Add-on 2434

ACTION

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May 9, 1975

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** SECRETARY KISSINGER  
**THROUGH:** BRENT SCOWCROFT  
**FROM:** Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*  
**SUBJECT:** Rockefeller Commission Request  
for Material on Cuba and Dominican  
Republic, 1960-64

Following the decision last evening not to provide David Belin with the collection of NSC material on Cuba and the Dominican Republic, I notified Belin by telephone. His reaction was polite but predictable. He asked that I reply to his letter in writing today, since he planned to prepare a report on "this episode" for presentation to the full Commission when it meets on Monday, May 12.

Subsequently, Dick Ober and I have reviewed all the material once more to see if any of it could be considered to pertain, even indirectly, to domestic intelligence activities or assassination. We have identified seven items which could conceivably be so construed, and we recommend that you consider making these available to Belin. His argument has been that a review of the files by interested parties (CIA or NSC employees) which produces nothing would lack credibility. Although we may find this personally insulting, it could carry some weight with Commission members. Producing these seven items, harmless in themselves, will present evidence of our bona fides and may de-fang Belin's argument.

I have prepared a reply (Tab I) to Belin's letter (Tab II) which encloses the seven documents, refers him to Presidential Library contacts for

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the Bundy and Goodwin material, and tells him the question of access to Special Group and Special Group Augmented material is still under review.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my letter to Belin at Tab I.

Approve BD *The relevance of some of the items escapes me.*

Alternatively

That my letter be revised to indicate that a review of the NSC files has produced no material pertaining to domestic intelligence activities or to assassination.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

*so*  
Mr. Ober concurs.

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**COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES**  
**Washington, DC 20500**

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

April 17, 1975

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
375 Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mrs. Davis:


In connection with the inquiry of our Commission, it is necessary for certain members of the staff to have access to all files and documents relating to operations affecting Cuba and the Dominican Republic during the period 1960-64. In particular we would like access to the records of the National Security Council, the Special Group, the Special Group Augmented, and the files of Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Richard Goodwin for this period.

Access to these files will be restricted to me and two members of my staff, Marvin Gray, Jr., and Mason Cargill.

Because of the severe time pressure under which we are operating, we would like to begin our examination on Friday morning, April 18.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,



David W. Belin  
Executive Director

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7 May 1975

Mrs. Davis,

Re Rockefeller Commission Request for  
Material on Cuba and Dominican Republic,  
1960-64

I would certainly recommend against granting Mr. Belin access to all SG and SGA files on Cuba and the Dominican Republic. These files are not segregated by country and contain information I would consider not applicable to his immediate interests. It would also establish a precedent which might affect access to more recent files.

On the same basis, I would question the necessity for some "NSC Staff member" to examine the files--but, of course, defer to General Scowcroft and Dr. Kissinger on this.

I would support denial of access to the files, with the possibility that we could supply excerpts ~~dealing~~ directly with the subject of paramount interest to Mr. Belin to the Commission Chairman.

FVI, I have had related correspondence with General Scowcroft and will remind him of it in connection with the submission of your memo to him.

  
Rob Roy Ratliff

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
THROUGH: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*  
SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Request for  
Material on Cuba and Dominican Republic  
1960-64

Dave Belin has written me (Tab II) requesting "all files and documents relating to operations affecting Cuba and the Dominican Republic during the period 1960-64." In particular, he wants access to all of Mac Bundy's and Dick Goodwin's files and to the records of the NSC, Special Group and Special Group Augmented.

I have discussed the request on the phone with Belin and various of his assistants, explaining that a good bit of the material is in Presidential Libraries, not here, and indicating some of the difficulties in granting unlimited access to the SG and SGA files. Belin has now narrowed the latter request to material on possible assassination targets in the two countries. He is still insisting on access to the files (for himself personally, not necessarily his staff) on the grounds that a selection of material by a CIA representative would not have sufficient credibility. I understand Rob Roy Ratliff has reviewed the material recently and has made some items available to General Scowcroft.

There appear to be five options in dealing with the latter request:

- 1) Grant Belin personal access to SG and SGA material on Cuba and the Dominican Republic;
- 2) Have the SG and SGA material screened by an NSC staff member for relevant items, which would then be supplied to Belin, after review by General Scowcroft.

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- 3) Offer to let Belin read the items identified by Mr. Ratliff.
- 4) Deny any access to the SG and SGA files, but agree to supply excerpts dealing with the subject of primary interest directly to the Vice President as Chairman of the Commission.
- 5) Deny any access to or material from SG and SGA files.

Mr. Ratliff recommends Options 5 or 4. If you select Options 4 or 5, you may wish to discuss the matter with the Vice President.

We have identified quite a number of relevant NSC documents for the 1960-64 period which we believe might be made available to the Commission on a classified basis. The list and the documents are at Tab A (The documents are in a separate folder because of their bulk.)

I have prepared a reply to Belin's letter forwarding the NSC material, and referring them to Presidential Library contacts for other records. I plan to address the question of access to SG and SGA records in the last paragraph of my reply, to reflect your decision among the options.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) That you approve transmission of the documents at Tab A to the Rockefeller Commission.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Approve except for \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

- 2) That you indicate your preference as to the request for access to Special Group and Special Group Augmented files:

Option 1 -- Grant Dave Belin personal access to all SG and SGA files on Cuba and the Dominican Republic

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

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Option 2 -- NSC Staff member to screen SG and SGA files for relevant material, which would then be supplied to Belin after review by General Scowcroft.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Preferred Staff member \_\_\_\_\_

Option 3 -- Offer to let Belin read the items identified by Mr. Ratliff.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Option 4 -- Deny any access to the SG and SGA files, but agree to supply excerpts dealing with the subject of primary interest directly to the Vice President as Chairman of the Commission.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Option 5 -- Deny any access to or material from SG and SGA files.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

3) That you approve the draft letter at Tab I with the addition of a final paragraph reflecting your decision on Recommendation 2.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

As amended \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer \_\_\_\_\_

Steve <sup>YMD</sup> Gw, Rob Roy <sup>YMD</sup> Ratliff and Dick <sup>YMD</sup> Ober concur.

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DRAFT

Dear Mr. Belin:

I apologize for the delay in responding to your April 17 letter requesting access to "all files and documents relating to operations affecting Cuba and the Dominican Republic during the period 1960-64!" As I have explained to you and your assistants, this required extensive research in NSC files, some of which are maintained outside of Washington.

In response to your specific requests, we have reviewed the NSC material for the period indicated and have identified the documents on the list at Tab A which appear relevant to your enquiry. Copies are attached.

We have no files belonging to either McGeorge Bundy or Richard Goodwin. We understand both the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries have files identified as coming from Mr. Bundy, and the Kennedy Library has files identified as those of Mr. Goodwin. In addition, we understand there is some material on Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the Eisenhower Library. Access to these collections is, of course, subject to the terms of the instrument of conveyance. You may wish to enquire directly of the Libraries concerning the availability of this material. A list of Presidential Library contacts is at Tab B.

I regret that we cannot grant unlimited access at the staff level to the records of the Special Group or the Special Group Augmented.

[Balance of paragraph to reflect HAK's decision on the matter.]

Sincerely,

A.

**NSC 5902/1, 2-16-59 with Notice of Recission, 1-2-62 -- U. S. Policy  
Toward Latin America**

**Memorandum for NSC, 8/5/60 -- U. S. Policy Toward Cuba**

**Memorandum for NSC, 5/4/61 -- U. S. Policy Toward Cuba**

**NSAM 10, 2/6/61 -- Cuba**

**Bundy Memo to SecState, 2/13/61 -- Cuba and Dominican Republic**

**NSAM 19, 2/15/61 -- Embargo on Imports from Cuba**

**NSAM 23, 2/21/61 -- Embargo on Imports from Cuba**

**NSAM 31, 3/11/61 -- Cuba**

**NSAM 42, 4/25/61 -- Assistance to Cuban Refugees**

**NSAM 43, 4/25/61 -- Training of Cuban Nationals**

**NSAM 44, 4/25/61 -- Caribbean Security Agency**

**NSAM 45, 4/25/61 -- Coverage of Castro Activities in the U. S.**

**NSAM 46, 4/25/61 -- Attitude of Various Governments during the Cuban Crisis**

**NSAM 47, 4/25/61 -- Soviet Assistance to Cuba**

**NSAM 54, 6/26/61 -- Service of Cuban Volunteers in U. S. Armed Forces**

**NSAM 100, 10/5/61 -- Contingency Planning for Cuba**

**NSAM 153, 5/15/62 -- Policy Statement on Dominican Republic**

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**NSAM 194, 10/2/62 -- Policy Toward Non-Bloc Ships in Cuban Trade**

**NSAM 200, 10/28/62 -- Acceleration of Civil Defense Activities**

**NSAM 208, 12/6/62 -- Cuban Overflights**

**NSAM 213, 1/8/63 -- Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs**

**NSAM 220, 2/5/63 (and amendment of 12/16/63) -- U. S. Government  
Shipments by Foreign Flag Vessels in the Cuban Trade**

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NSAM 274, 12/20/63 -- Cuban - Economic Denial Program

NSAM 311, 7/10/64 -- Review of the Problem of Assurance Against Any Missile Crisis in Cuba

Memo from NSC Staff, 6/1/61 -- References to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

State Department Memo, 6/20/62 -- Status of Compliance with NSAM 153

NSC Action 2166, 12-16-59 -- Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the NSC

NSC Action 2177, 1-14-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2178 1-14-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic

NSC Action 2191, 3-10-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2195, 3-17-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2201, 3-24-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2206, 4-1-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2212, 4-7-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic

NSC Action 2213, 4-7-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2217, 4-14-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2218, 4-14-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic

NSC Action 2228, 5-5-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2229, 5-5-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic

NSC Action 2239, 5-24-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2259, 7-7-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic

NSC Action 2261, 7-15-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2269, 7-21-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

NSC Action 2273, 7-25-60 -- Meeting of the OAS With Respect to Cuba and the Dominican Republic

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- NSC Action 2283, 8-12-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2285, 8-12-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic
- NSC Action 2309, 9-29-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2322, 10-20-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2329, 11-7-60 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2370, 1-5-61 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2403, 2-9-61 -- Discussion of Crisis Areas
- NSC Action 2406, 4-22-61 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2413, 4-29-61 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2422, 5-16-61 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2457, 10-20-62 -- Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba
- NSC Action 2458, 10-21-62 -- Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba
- NSC Action 2459, 10-22-62 -- Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba
- NSC Action 2463, 4-2-63 -- U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
- NSC Action 2486, 5-2-64 -- Overflights of Cuba
- NSC Action 2487, 5-5-64 -- Overflights of Cuba
- NSC Action 2492, 7-28-64 -- Ninth OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting

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RESIDENTIAL LIBRARY CONTACTS

JFK Library  
Bowdin Street  
Waltham, Mass.

617/223-7250  
or 742-1777

Mr. William Moss  
Sr. Archivist for Nat'l  
Security Affairs

Megan Desnoyers, Asst.

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LBJ Library  
2313 Red River St.  
Austin, Texas

512/397-5137

Mr. Charles Corcoran  
Archivist

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DDE Library  
Abilene, Kansas

913/263-4751

Dr. Wickman, Director  
Dr. Don Wilson, Asst. Dir.

Dr. George Curtis, Super-  
visory Archivist (for  
class. documents)

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HST Library  
Independence, Mo.

816/833-1400

Dr. Zebriest, Archivist  
Mr. Lagerquist, Supervisory  
Archivist

Mr. Harry Clark

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