

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

REFER TO OSD

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

November 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Major General John Wickham, Jr., USA  
Military Assistant to the Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: JCS Assessment of Cambodia

I appreciate your forwarding the recent JCS assessment of the situation in Cambodia, and have passed it to Secretary Kissinger for his review.

In the condition of stalemate now being experienced it may be assumed that the GKR and GRUNK will continue their political and military struggle to alter the existing balance. With regard to the military balance, it would appear that the GKR is particularly vulnerable in its ability to maintain secure LOCs. Although the GKR has maintained a sufficient flow of goods to sustain the population and to carry on the necessary operations, to date, the outlook is uncertain. In view of the relatively small enemy investment required for a successful interdiction program -- particularly on the Mekong River, it would appear useful to examine the threat posed by a concentrated KC effort to interdict Cambodian LOCs and to explore alternative U.S. responses to such an effort.

OSD REVIEWED 30-Nov-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

DOS REVIEWED 08 AUG 2011 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION



Brent Scowcroft  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1974

Bill Stearman

The General has reviewed the attached along with my comment on the vulnerability posed by the vital role of the Mekong as the Cambodian lifeline LOC. He has asked for an acknowledgement to Wickham thanking him for sending the JCS paper over and posing the LOC problem for his consideration and asking for comment on how to deal with the contingency of an effective siege. Could you prepare such an acknowledgement please?

By *[Handwritten Signature]*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1974

*[Handwritten Signature]*

General

In the stalemate that obtains for the moment in Cambodia, it would seem to be only a matter of time until the Khmer Communists focus their effort on interdicting the Mekong. I am surprised that they haven't already done so. In our own government, no one seems to be interested in looking at that contingency however, and how we would attempt to cope with it. Were they to try it, I believe it could well be decisive in effecting ultimate KC victory. I believe it would be useful to ask Defense to give some thought to how we would react to such a problem.

By *[Handwritten Signature]* Part this in procedure  
can with the Mekong as an example

4526

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

October 18

Les:

We have discussed your recommendations with Stearman and company, and although we would normally agree with you, on this particular paper the consensus is that neither a more meaty summary nor an acknowledgement to Wickham is necessary.

Despite its length, the paper breaks no new ground, and there is nothing to add to the summary other than what is already presented. It is rather a worthless paper.

Usually, we would not even forward a paper of this kind to the Secretary. We get similar assessments all the time from CIA, State, etc. The only reason for forwarding this ~~as~~ paper is to protect the Secretary in the event Schlesinger or General Brown should ask him about it at some informal moment.

JEB

4526

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

JWD —

In light of Whitehouse  
requests for comment —  
would a brief acknowledgment  
at least be in order?

I think a more meaty  
summary is warranted by a 60  
page study unless we want to  
read it all — or it is worthless,  
then we should so. Sean

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

October 29, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT:

JCS Assessment of the Situation in  
Cambodia

The Assessment of the Current Situation in Cambodia prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which you have already reviewed is at Tab A. A memorandum transmitting it to Secretary Kissinger is at Tab II. Per your request, at Tab I is a letter from you to General Wickham thanking him for transmitting the study to you and asking him to have Defense consider the problems that would arise if the Communists cut the Mekong River.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the memorandum at Tab II to the Secretary and that you sign the letter at Tab I.

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GDS


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4526

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN   
SUBJECT: Joint Chiefs of Staff Assessment  
on Cambodia

Attached at Tab A is an assessment on Cambodia completed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on August 28, 1974.

The assessment, which covers the period from the present through the end of FY 75, concludes inter alia that:

-- A military stalemate has been achieved with neither side capable of defeating the other.

-- The Communists have greater tactical mobility and motivation, but this is offset by FANK firepower.

-- Lon Nol is the only leader capable of exerting the necessary leadership on the Phnom Penh side.

-- U.S. economic and military aid is essential to survival.

The assessment sees the U. S. as having three policy options vis-a-vis Cambodia: (1) increase our aid; (2) gradually decrease assistance; and (3) maintain assistance at proposed levels.

The JCS recommends that the United States Government continue to provide support at levels requested for FY 75, while simultaneously undertaking an intensive diplomatic campaign to effect a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement.

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We concur in the basic conclusions and recommendations of the JCS assessment, though we are skeptical whether an intense diplomatic effort to start negotiations would bear fruit until the other side becomes convinced it cannot break the present military stalemate.

Dick Smyser concurs.

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**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

1 October 1974

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: Cambodia Assessment (U)**

I am forwarding you a copy of an assessment on Cambodia recently completed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A copy of the assessment has been provided to the Executive Secretary, Department of State.

While the recommendation is not unique, it is significant that in an unconstrained search for solutions to our Cambodian dilemma, the conclusions developed draw us back to recurring themes of maintaining the best possible military, economic and political posture in Cambodia while seeking a negotiated settlement.

I hope this assessment will be of some use to you and your staff, and would appreciate any comment you may have in relation to it.

**John A. Wickham, Jr.  
Major General, USA  
Military Assistant**

**Attachment  
Cambodian Assessment - 1 cy (TS/Sen)**

RECEIVED  
SEC DEF CONTR No. X-2855

Upon removal of attachments  
this document becomes

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**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-362-74

28 August 1974

**DECLASSIFIED**

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cambodia Assessment (U)

1. (TS) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 June 1974, subject as above, which requested the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nature of future US Government (USG) support for the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) and the actions which would be required by such support.

2. (TS) The Appendix hereto contains an assessment which provides the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning future USG policy in Cambodia through the end of FY 1975. It also provides suggested actions for the USG to apply in order to implement the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In arriving at this recommendation, the following three broad options concerning future USG support for Cambodia were considered:

a. OPTION I: Initiate action to disengage US support for the GKR by reducing the levels of military and economic funding.

b. OPTION II: Initiate all actions necessary to increase US assistance to the GKR.

c. OPTION III: Continue to provide support at essentially those funding levels requested for FY 1975, while simultaneously undertaking, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to effect a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement in Cambodia as rapidly as possible.

3. (TS) Generally, this assessment concludes that the failure of the 1973-1974 Khmer Communist (KC) dry season offensive, combined with unproductive results of the recent GKR peace effort,

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heralded the very real possibility of a protracted war in Cambodia. While the military situation has stabilized, the gains being made by the KC in the international arena are significant. More countries today recognize the Sihanouk government-in-exile rather than the GKR, and the forthcoming UN battle over representation may expel the GKR. The loss of the UN seat may not affect internal affairs in the GKR, but, externally, it is bound to affect foreign assistance to the GKR, including that of the United States. Economically, the GKR has serious problems and is almost totally dependent on the United States for support. In short, there is no assurance at this time that continued high levels of US support alone will result in either a military victory or a negotiated settlement. However, such support is essential to the survival of the GKR through FY 1975.

4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States continue to provide support for the GKR at essentially those funding levels requested for FY 1975, while simultaneously undertaking, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to effect a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. The actions that would be required for such support include the following:

a. Undertake, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to achieve a negotiated settlement of the war.

b. Insure that levels of military and economic assistance are provided, within current program levels, to support the diplomatic campaign.

c. Encourage the GKR to conduct appropriate military operations in support of the diplomatic initiatives.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Robert N. Ginsburgh*

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH  
Major General, USAF  
Deputy Director  
Joint Staff

Attachment

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CAMBODIA ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (TS) Objective. This study responds to a request by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide recommendations on the nature of future US Government (USG) support for the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) (through FY 1975) and the actions which would be required by such support.

2. (S) Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. Statements of USG Objectives in Cambodia

(1) The short-term emphasis since inception of the Lon Nol Government in March 1970 has been a Cambodia which would cooperate with and reinforce US policy in South Vietnam. This is reflected in the statement of US Government Objectives found in the response to the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 99) and confirmed in National Security Decision Memorandum 89 (October 1970):

(a) Assist Vietnamization.

(b) Support the principle of self-determination in Southeast Asia.

(c) Promote the security of Thailand (as a longer term objective).

(2) The following statement is found in the response to NSSM 152 (September 1972): "For the next 18 months, as long as the United States continues to support the defense of South Vietnam, our primary objective in Cambodia will be to maintain a friendly neutral government which is amenable to USG influence and supports US objectives in Indochina and which denies a substantial portion of Khmer population, territory, and economic resources to Vietnamese and Khmer Communist Forces."

Classified by... *Quinton, J.S.* .....  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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Appendix

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(3) Key to pursuit of these objectives continues to be firm and often repeated support for Lon Nol, President of the Khmer Republic.

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b. Congressional Constraints

(1) Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (PL 91-652) as Amended

(a) Section 7 places a restriction on the use of US ground forces and military advisers in Cambodia by stipulating that none of the funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of US ground combat troops into Cambodia or to provide US advisers to or for forces in Cambodia.

(b) Section 7 also provides that military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambodia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.

(2) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Section 656 established a ceiling of 200 on the number of US personnel and 85 on third country nationals paid by the United States in Cambodia at any one time.

(3) Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 636 Established a Continuing Resolution for FY 1974). Section 108 states:

"Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia."

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(4) Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) for FY 1  
1975 (H. J. Res. 1062) 2

(a) With the passage of the FY 1975 CRA, 3  
Congress authorized the expenditure of funds to 4  
satisfy continuing worldwide security assistance 5  
requirements. 6

(b) MAP Cambodia has been authorized to plan on 7  
the availability of \$70 million for the 1st quarter 8  
FY 1975, which constitutes its share of the FY 1975 9  
CRA. 10

3. (S) Discussion 11

a. Military (For a more detailed assessment, refer to 12  
Annex A.) 13

(1) General. The Khmer Armed Forces' (FANK) greatest 14  
strength lies in its resilience and superior firepower. 15  
These two factors will more than likely enable the GKR 16  
to survive militarily through FY 1975, given a continuing 17  
high level of US military and economic assistance. The 18  
overriding strength of the Khmer Communists (KC) is their 19  
ideological motivation to topple the Phnom Penh Government. 20  
The KC failed to achieve a decisive victory in the Phnom 21  
Penh area or the GKR's collapse this year and have not 22  
scored significantly in efforts against secondary targets 23  
in the provinces. Nevertheless, the KC will probably 24  
retain the initiative throughout FY 1975. 25

(2) Command and Control. FANK continues to suffer 26  
from deficiencies that inhibit effective command and 27  
control mechanisms such as leadership shortcomings at 28  
all levels, a defensive mentality, a reluctance to 29  
impose discipline, and, in many cases, poor staff and 30  
logistic support. While the KC have recently expanded 31

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and improved their command and control structure throughout the country, they are still plagued by deficiencies, especially in coordinating operations in different areas. Their improvement efforts have included the upgrading of tactical units to larger elements and a new, albeit limited, capability to maneuver multiregimental forces in a given geographic area.

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(3) Leadership. The leadership of the KC is probably no better or worse than FANK's in the aggregate; however, their ideological motivation has gone far in overcoming individual leadership inadequacies. At present, both FANK and the KC lack experienced senior military personnel capable of commanding the larger military units and lack well-trained noncommissioned, company, and field-grade officers.

(4) Mobility. In moving from a Phnom Penh to a provincial strategy, the KC emphasized tactical mobility and increased their opportunities to mass superior forces and gain surprise--as occurred when the KC captured the provincial capital of Oudong. Later in the year, however, timely intelligence and effective use of air and riverine assets gave FANK time to reinforce and successfully defend Kampot. The enemy's subsequent moves on Prey Veng and Kompong Thom were also detected well in advance and effectively stymied. Isolated small FANK positions in outlying areas will remain vulnerable to enemy initiatives, however, because FANK lacks sufficient mobility assets and adequate general reserve forces to counter the enemy attacks against them.

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(5) Manpower. The FANK possess a larger manpower base than the KC, although the KC have steadily moved to mobilize and establish tighter control over the population. An increasingly efficient FANK conscription/recruitment campaign has not only enabled FANK to replace combat losses but has given them a net gain of 10,000 troops since January 1974. Although the KC are estimated to have suffered three times as many killed in action as FANK, they retain the capability to replace their losses because they can coerce, recruit, and impress the population under their control to meet their military objective.

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(6) Morale. Most FANK and the KC ground combat units suffer from low morale. Although the morale of the individual KC soldier is low, good discipline enables him to fight well. While the individual FANK soldier's morale is low, the lack of good discipline throughout FANK makes this a more significant problem for the GKR than the KC.

(7) Firepower. FANK firepower advantages over the KC are great, and the gap between the two is widening. Artillery, air, and naval forces have inflicted heavy casualties on the KC, and firepower was the single most important element in the failure of the KC's dry season offensive. However, the KC have made progress in development of their own firepower capability with the acquisition of heavy mortars and the use of captured 105mm howitzers.

b. Political (For a more detailed assessment, refer to Annex B.)

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(1) General

(a) The past year has seen a modest strengthening of the weak GKR leadership. President Lon Nol has appeared willing to maintain the coalition nature of his government and has demonstrated that he will work with others in preserving political equilibrium. Despite recent improvements, however, the GKR is not popular. Lon Nol and his principal assistants have become closely identified with the increasing hardships of war, and the relative dynamism of the Long Boret government has often gone unnoticed against the background of worsening economic conditions. The loss of buying power by most Phnom Penh inhabitants has, in fact, sharply lowered traditional tolerance for the high living standards and corruption of many civil and military leaders.

(b) The KC's principal political problems come from the rural population. With an ideological singlemindedness, the KC are attempting to uproot the passive Khmer peasantry from their traditional culture and mold a new generation of revolutionaries. More than 100,000 people have fled from KC-controlled to GKR territory since the beginning of the calendar year, and voluntary support for the KC has declined. But the KC hold on the countryside has not been significantly shaken; nor is there much evidence that their confidence in ultimate victory has dropped.

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(2) Leadership

(a) Unaccustomed to privations and lacking in national discipline, the Khmer population and many Cambodian politicians seem to have been worn down by the war to the point of apathy. Some signs that peace is obtainable in a short timeframe may well be required to sustain public morale and discipline at a level required for national survival.

Vitalization of the GKR leadership would, of course, help overcome popular apathy. Most of the top civil and military leaders have been in their current or similar positions since the beginning of the war and are now showing the strain. In the case of the presidency, Lon Nol appears to be the only leader that is capable of exerting the authority and retaining that degree of public support which is required to hold the Republic together under wartime conditions.

(b) The KC's campaign to replace Sihanouk with Khieu Samphan as an international spokesman is proceeding smoothly. They have been aided by Sihanouk's uncharacteristically quiet acceptance of his loss of prestige, by the recent willingness of key neutrals to receive KC delegations headed by Khieu Samphan, and by extensive Chinese promotion.

(3) International Acceptance

(a) Loss of its representational seat at the upcoming UN session in the fall of 1974 would add an important destabilizing factor to the GKR political equation. The UN seat has assumed a psychological and a political significance greatly disproportionate to the benefits UN membership actually bestows on the GKR. Its loss would not only add to the impetus

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of current antigovernment agitation and political maneuvering in Phnom Penh but could result in the diminution or loss of critical international political and financial support.

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(b) The KC's greatest gains have been in the international arena. The number of countries recognizing the Sihanouk Government has increased to 55 over the past year (number recognizing the GKR is 50). The enemy's shelling of Phnom Penh contributed to the erosion of diplomatic representation in Phnom Penh as several governments took the occasion to join the USSR and some of its allies in closing or downgrading their embassies. Although there is a close identity of interests between the KC and Peking, the USSR would seem to have no recourse but to give at least passive support to the present KC team.

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c. Economic (For a more detailed assessment, refer to Annex C.)

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(1) The Deteriorating Economy

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(a) The tenuous political situation in the GKR has caused the government to avoid making hard economic decisions that are designed to redress the deteriorating economic situation. While the GKR has had to continue to print money to finance its commitments, its fiscal and monetary policies have not kept pace with the deterioration of the economic situation.

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(b) The GKR is plagued by hyperinflation caused by reduced tax and import revenues at a time when military and civilian budgetary requirements have skyrocketed. Until the GKR's dependence on foreign imports (military and civilian) can be reduced and a more rational economic system implemented, which in turn requires significant military successes, Cambodian economic problems will remain largely unsolved. For the short term, the chances of either of these developments are poor.

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(2) Commodities, Goods, and the Distribution System

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(a) Internal food production within the GKR has continuously decreased since the war began. Because of an influx of refugees into GKR-controlled areas, the demand for vegetables, fruits, and meats has increased while the supply has diminished. One-fourth of the GKR population is categorized as refugees and, as such, are not producing foodstuffs for the population.

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(b) Imported commodities and goods such as rice and POL are arriving in Phnom Penh regularly via the vital Mekong River LOC. The sustained interdiction of the Mekong River LOC would cause the eventual collapse of the GKR, but to date the GKR has shown the ability to keep it open. The continued interdiction of Route 5, and to a lesser extent Route 4, has also caused serious economic problems for the GKR. The agricultural and fisheries production region in the northwest remains isolated from the rest of the GKR, and, except for the recent Tonle Sap River convoys from Kompong Chhnang to Phnom Penh, commodities produced there cannot reach the bulk

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of the population in the Phnom Penh area. Manufactured  
 goods must come to Phnom Penh on Mekong River convoys  
 because the land route (Route 4) to the country's  
 only deepwater port, Kompong Som, remains interdicted.

(3) The KC Economic Situation. The KC have only a  
 rudimentary economic infrastructure in areas they control  
 (latest estimate is that KC control about 60 percent  
 of the land and 30 percent of the population). While the  
 KC are capable of feeding their population, they do  
 not possess the economic resources to win a military  
 victory without outside assistance. Military assistance  
 comes primarily from the PRC and North Vietnam  
 while North Korea provides an annual grant of about \$1  
 million. KC control of rice- and rubber-producing areas  
 permits them to maintain limited commercial aid and  
 trade agreements with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam  
 (DRV).

d. Policy Implications to the United States

(1) General. Although there is no formal commitment  
 on the part of the USG toward Cambodia, present  
 assistance efforts in behalf of Cambodia commenced in  
 April 1970. Assistance was provided in furtherance of  
 the Vietnamization process and to protect the withdrawal  
 of US troops in Vietnam. With the accomplishment of  
 these objectives, it has been found that substantial  
 assistance was still necessary to enable the GKR to  
 maintain its neutrality and independence against PRC-  
 and DRV-supported aggression.

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(2) Congressional Constraints 1

(a) ~~Examination of~~ congressional restrictions 2

governing the number and activities of US official 3

personnel assigned to the US Mission, Cambodia, US 4

in-country assistance to the GKR principally takes 5

the form of economic assistance and MAP equipment 6

that is programmed, funded, and delivered to FANK. 7

Military training activities in support of various 8

FANK programs occur either in CONUS or in a third 9

country under the auspices of the MAP. 10

(b) Although improbable, congressional relief 11

from the binding constraints would pay dividends to 12

the GKR by allowing the in-country personnel 13

authorization (200 personnel) an increase to a 14

reasonable level to permit the introduction of 15

individuals who possess a capability to advise/16

instruct the Cambodians. In the absence of such 17

congressional relief, increasing handicaps to the USG 18

security assistance effort will incur as the 19

Cambodians seek greater technical knowledge and as 20

the funding situation becomes more restrictive. 21

(3) MAP 22

(a) Military assistance funds for Cambodia are 23

essential to the survival of the GKR. Funding 24

requirements have gone steadily upward, culminating 25

with the FY 1974 MAP outlay of \$375.012 million, 26

which was accumulated only by mortgaging MAP in 27

other countries (e.g., Thailand, Korea, Turkey, 28

Indonesia, and the Philippines). This included the 29

entire Presidential drawdown authority (\$250 million 30

in Sec. 506 drawdown authority) which had to be 31

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made available to the Cambodian MAP to see the GKR through the end of FY 1974.

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(b) Since the FY 1975 MAP Cambodia funding request of \$362.5 million was formulated 6 months ago, intervening price increases, coupled with a continuing high ammunition consumption rate, may necessitate a FY 1975 MAP of almost \$500 million. For example, ammunition costs constituting nearly 85 percent of the program are increasing funding requirements through increased prices due to inflation, recent high ammunition consumption rates, and poor Cambodian ammunition management procedures.

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(c) If the FY 1975 MAP funding level is not increased from the current budget request level of \$362.5 million to meet inflationary price increases and if the tempo of combat does not substantially subside, a reduction in ammunition deliveries may be mandatory. Survival of the GKR could well be at stake if such delivery curtailments are effected.

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(d) Under CRA funding, MAP Cambodia will be able to meet only its minimum requirements. For example, ammunition support during the 1st quarter FY 1975 will require approximately \$59 million; POL is anticipated to cost \$3 million; and the balance, \$8 million, will be used to fund essential supply items and training.

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(4) Economic Support Programs. The US economic support program is designed to make available sufficient essential commodities and goods to prevent a collapse

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of the Cambodian economy. Additionally, economic assistance is provided the GKR by allocation of local currency to the GKR budget through counterpart funding. Essential commodities provided by the United States through economic assistance programs in FY 1974 amounted to almost \$266 million and have been sufficient thus far to satisfy the GKR demand. Curtailment of US economic assistance programs could have serious consequences to the GKR as they are almost totally dependent on economic assistance from the United States.

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(a) Principal FY 1975 economic support programs for Cambodia are the following:

1. The Commercial Import Program (CIP) which provides credits for the importation of goods to meet local demand and the generation of revenues to help reduce the budget deficit and limit inflation.

2. The Food for Peace Program (PL 480, Title I) which furnishes surplus US agricultural products to the local economy. Sales of these agricultural products help reduce the budget deficit and limit inflation.

3. The Exchange Support Fund provides a multilateral fund of hard currency for financing imports which are ineligible for financing under CIP. Contributions from seven donor countries (including the United States), Cambodia's own contribution, and a compensatory financing drawing on the International Monetary Fund comprise the fund. The United States contributes the largest annual share to the fund

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which is anticipated to be approximately \$18 million in FY 1975. This important contribution to the GKR economy could be jeopardized if the GKR loses its UN representational seat in the fall of 1974.

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(b) Congress has shown an increasing interest in restricting economic assistance which can be used for military purposes by Southeast Asian countries. GKR revenues that have been generated by the above programs have been an important part of the Cambodian military budget. Under the close scrutiny of the US Mission, Cambodia, counterpart funds have been used to provide support for military pay and allowances, construction of dependent housing, training center construction, personnel accounting computer support costs, printing plant operations, etc.

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(c) Current congressional concern has focused on the PL 480, Title I, support program in Southeast Asia which consists of food sales to needy people in the region while simultaneously generating local revenue. Congress has recently enacted the following two restrictions as part of the FY 1975 Department of Agriculture authorization request which are applicable to Cambodia.\*

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1. As of 1 July 1974, no funds developed from PL 480, Title I, assistance may be applied to defense programs without the specific approval of Congress.

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2. The total amount of PL 480, Title I, funds that any country can receive is restricted to 10 percent of the total appropriation (\$425 million for FY 1975.)

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\* PL 480, Title II, food grants for humanitarian purposes remain unrestricted.

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(d) The restriction on the use of PL 480, Title I, funds for military programs in the absence of congressional approval, while not critical, could cause a further handicap to the GKR military budget. Other sources of funds will have to be sought to finance military projects that have previously been financed by counterpart funds generated through PL 480, Title I, transactions.

(e) FY 1975, PL 480, Title I, Cambodia requirements are projected to be \$77 million. The 10 percent restriction leaves a shortfall for Cambodia of \$34.5 million in FY 1975. Restrictions on the use of PL 480, Title I, rice shipments and the above 10 percent funding restriction could cause serious problems to an already hard-pressed economy.

(f) Not affected by the congressional restrictions on the PL 480, Title I, funds are the US Agency for International Development (AID) programs projected for Cambodia. To cover these programs in FY 1975, USAID estimates a funding requirement of \$110 million.

4. (TS) US Options for the Future

a. OPTION I--Gradual Disengagement

(1) The upward spiral of military and economic funding support for Cambodia could be turned around by instituting a policy of gradual reduction of the support. This would clearly indicate that the large-scale and long-term US commitment to Cambodia has limits. It would recognize that in the longer term, Cambodia has become less critical with respect to US interests throughout the world. In addition, further recognition would be made of the fact that

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continued high levels of US support alone give no assurance that either a military victory or a negotiated settlement will occur in Cambodia.

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(2) With careful USG preparation in advance of such a disengagement, the GKR could be forced into making concessions to the KC that might result in a negotiated settlement. While such a settlement may not be totally favorable, at a minimum the war could be terminated and the savings in US assistance funds could be shifted to fulfill obligations elsewhere in the world. A policy of gradual disengagement in Cambodia would generate bipartisan congressional support as it would, in the view of many, be in keeping with proper USG policy in Southeast Asia in the post-Vietnam war era. In addition, a gradual reduction in the level of US support for Cambodia might even produce a salutary effect by shocking the GKR into instituting governmental reforms which conceivably could result in greater efficiencies with less assistance from the USG.

(3) It is clear, however, that US military and economic supporting assistance programs have provided the substance of Cambodia's war effort. The GKR's devastated economy and developing Armed Forces are almost totally dependent on US support. An announcement that US security assistance would be reduced could cause panic within Cambodia and could ultimately cause the downfall of the GKR. All of the many positive gains thus far made by the GKR would be lost, and the one victor would be the KC, who were unable to win on the battlefield.

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Actions:

- (1) Establish reduced funding levels. 1
- (2) Initiate a diplomatic effort to forewarn the GKR 2  
of the change in US policy. 3
- b. Option II--Increase Assistance 4
- (1) While it is recognized that congressional 5  
constraints on the level and the type of US assistance 6  
to Cambodia are presently binding, it is not 7  
inconceivable that an appropriate and aggressive 8  
legislative campaign could result in relief from 9  
congressional constraints. A reasonable 10  
expansion of the in-country personnel authorization, 11  
combined with a relaxation of the prohibition against 12  
advisors/instructors, would be sought. Also, 13  
additional military and economic assistance funds 14  
would be requested. 15
- (2) Since the present levels of security 16  
assistance have not resulted in either a military 17  
victory or a negotiated settlement, an increase in 18  
security assistance levels is necessary to shift the 19  
military and political balances in favor of the GKR 20  
to create a favorable negotiating atmosphere. 21  
Moreover, favorable reaction to an increase in 22  
security assistance levels might be more readily forth- 23  
coming if emphasis were placed on increased 24  
economic supporting assistance, coupled with a heavy 25  
humanitarian relief solicitation. 26
- (3) The failures suffered by the KC during the 1973- 27  
1974 dry season offensive offers an opportunity for the 28  
GKR to exploit its success with a well-developed 29  
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economic development plan supported by the United States. 1  
 Increased US support for humanitarian relief activities 2  
 in a nation where 25 percent of the population is 3  
 categorized as refugees would not only be appropriate 4  
 but should be favorably received in Congress. Large- 5  
 scale economic supporting assistance and humanitarian 6  
 relief undertaken by the United States in behalf of 7  
 Cambodia would indirectly aid the military effort and 8  
 create a positive international image of the United States. 9

(4) No matter how tempting it might be to consider 10  
 an increase in US support for Cambodia, congressional 11  
 intransigence, competition for limited security 12  
 assistance funds, and traditional Cambodian apathy 13  
 provide little encouragement for the success of such 14  
 an effort. In many cases, such as in FANK, near- 15  
 saturation levels exist in quantities of onhand 16  
 equipment, and additional training absorption capabilities 17  
 are strained. This would serve to degrade any increased 18  
 US efforts. In addition, past experience indicates that 19  
 any increase in US support to the GKR is matched by an 20  
 increase in KC capabilities, thus nullifying any gains. 21

Actions: 22

- (1) Attempt to gain relief from all or any part of 23  
 congressional constraints on US assistance. 24
- (2) Attempt to gain additional military and economic 25  
 assistance funds for Cambodia. 26
- (3) Initiate diplomatic contacts with third countries 27  
 to encourage military and economic assistance-- 28  
 especially neighboring friendly countries. 29

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(4) Assist in the development of an active GKR campaign to improve its international image. 1  
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(5) Develop jointly with the GKR a long-range comprehensive strategy for US support in Cambodia. 3  
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c. Option III--Continue Present Course, Combined With Diplomatic Effort to Achieve a Negotiated Settlement. The 5  
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The inability of the KC to achieve a military victory during the 1973-1974 dry season offensive has given rise to the view that, unless a negotiated settlement occurs, a protracted war will result. For the future, if the KC continue their strategy at essentially the present level, the intensity of combat will rise and fall with each succeeding dry and wet season. The present war in Cambodia has already gone on for more than 4 years with no relief in sight. Neither side seems capable of achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield. US assistance to the GKR has made it possible for the Lon Nol Government to survive, while DRV and PRC assistance has assured the survivability of the KC. Economically, the GKR is in serious trouble while, at a minimum, the KC's agrarian infrastructure appears able to feed its population. While US efforts to maintain the integrity and viability of the GKR have been successful, to date GKR initiatives aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement of the war have been unproductive. Under these terms, the international gains being made by the KC and the high level of present US military and economic assistance to Cambodia would appear to warrant an all-out US diplomatic initiative, on an urgent basis, to achieve a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of the war as rapidly as possible.

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Actions:

(1) Initiate, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to achieve a negotiated settlement as rapidly as possible.

(2) Insure that levels of military and economic assistance are provided, within current program levels, to support the diplomatic campaign.

(3) Encourage the GKR to conduct appropriate military operations in support of the diplomatic initiatives.

5. (TS) Conclusions

a. A military stalemate has been achieved in Cambodia, with neither side capable of defeating the other.

b. The FANK continue to give evidence of deficiencies in the form of leadership shortcomings, lack of initiative, failure at all levels to impose discipline, poor morale, and an inadequate technical base.

c. The KC are plagued with a lack of experienced military leaders and an inability to exercise simultaneous coordination of tactical operations in more than one area. Ideological motivation and harsh disciplinary measures minimize the fact that the morale of the KC fighting man is poor.

d. Superiority of FANK firepower offsets KC tactical mobility and initiative.

e. While Marshal Lon Nol is not universally popular in the GKR, he appears to be the only leader capable of exerting the necessary wartime leadership.

f. The continuing evidence of popular apathy and a noticeable wartime strain on the people pose potentially serious problems for the GKR.

g. The recent attempts by the GKR to gain a cease-fire and negotiated settlement have not been productive.

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- h. The loss of the GKR representational seat in the UN could result in critical political and financial difficulties. 1  
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- i. Although many people have recently fled to GKR population centers from KC-controlled areas, the KC still retain firm control over the remaining population in areas they control. 4  
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- j. The contest for leadership between Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan continues, with the latter gaining ascendancy. 8  
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- k. Recent international political gains by the KC have been significant. The number of foreign countries recognizing the KC continues to increase. 11  
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- l. Hyperinflation in an agrarian economy disrupted by a war could cause a collapse of the GKR unless outside economic assistance continues. 14  
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- m. The Mekong River remains vital to the survival of the GKR. The continued interdiction of Routes 4 and 5 exacerbate the GKR's deteriorating economic situation. 17  
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- n. The KC possess a rudimentary economy that functions to the extent that it is self-sufficient in food production. 20  
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- o. Congressional constraints governing the number and activities of USG personnel stationed in Cambodia are counterproductive to US efforts. Congressional relief would produce significant results. 23  
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- p. US military assistance funds for Cambodia are essential to the survival of the GKR. The FY 1975 Cambodia MAP budget request of \$362.5 million may be insufficient to meet requirements imposed by increased ammunition prices and increased ammunition consumption rates. 27  
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q. The KC are dependent upon the DRV and PRC for munitions, weapons and equipment. Without this materiel support and the political support provided, the KC could not maintain its present capability. 1  
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r. Economic support programs provide vital assistance to the GKR by providing essential commodities and goods as well as generating local currency to help reduce budget deficits and limit inflation. Recent congressional restrictions on PL 480, Title I, commodities pose potentially serious problems for the GKR. 5  
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6. (TS) Recommendation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the USG continue to provide support for the GKR at essentially those funding levels requested for FY 1975, while simultaneously undertaking, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to effect a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement (OPTION III). The actions that would be required for such support include the following: 11  
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a. Initiate, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to achieve a negotiated settlement of the war. 18  
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b. Insure that levels of military and economic assistance are provided, within current program levels, to support the diplomatic campaign. 21  
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c. Encourage the GKR to conduct appropriate military operations in support of the diplomatic initiatives. 24  
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ANNEX A

CAMBODIA MILITARY ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (S) Background

a. Communist insurgency in Cambodia dates back to the early post-World War II period when the Viet Minh were active in trying to expel the French from Indochina.

b. For the purposes of this assessment, however, the buildup of Communist forces occurred in the 1962-1970 period when small groups of Khmers moved to and from North Vietnam for training; a few were sent to the USSR and PRC for advanced instruction. Organized Communist warfare against the government of Prince Sihanouk broke out in Battambang Province in 1967. Although short-lived, Communist-inspired insurgency reappeared with renewed vigor and scope in 1968 in Koh Kong, Kompong Speu, and Kampot Provinces; in 1969 it spread to areas contiguous to the Republic of Vietnam.

c. In the initial stages of the insurgency, external military support apparently was received from the Vietnamese Communist forces operating along the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. After Prince Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970, however, the Vietnamese Communists accelerated their efforts to organize an effective, indigenous political-military apparatus in Cambodia. In so doing, they moved large numbers of experienced Vietnamese cadre into the country to organize an infrastructure along the lines of that existing in South Vietnam.

d. This shift in Vietnamese Communist strategy toward Cambodia emphasized Hanoi's desire to develop a political military apparatus capable of seizing control of the

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652,  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
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country. With the departure of most Vietnamese Communist  
 combat forces in May 1972, the Khmer Communists (KC) were  
 forced to fill the void and gradually assumed more of the  
 overall military responsibility. By early 1973 the KC  
 had demonstrated ever-increasing military capabilities  
 and greater staying-power in combat. An indigenous  
 infrastructure had also been formed down through the  
 village and hamlet level in every province. At this point,  
 North Vietnam-trained KC filled many of the key positions  
 in the infrastructure, and the KC, by and large, were  
 responsible for their own war effort.

2. (S) Current Military Situation

a. Since Prince Sihanouk's ouster, the Government of the  
 Khmer Republic (GKR) has been hard-pressed to hold its  
 own militarily. At present, it controls only Phnom Penh,  
 outlying provincial capitals (including the important  
 northwest region), and some vital LOCs, primarily the  
 Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers. Without the prompt delivery  
 of large-scale US military and economic assistance, the  
 GKR would have long since collapsed.

b. The Cambodian Army's progress in some areas of the  
 country over the past few months, highlighted most  
 recently by the reoccupation of the historical and  
 religiously significant provincial capital of Oudong,  
 has taken much of the sting out of KC victories this  
 year and last. After a 3-week drive up Route 5,  
 Government troops entered Oudong on 9 July 1974 to find  
 the shattered city abandoned by the KC.

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Moreover, security along the nearby Tonle Sap is 1  
sufficient to permit the regular movement of badly 2  
needed agricultural goods down river to Phnom Penh. 3  
The rest of Cambodia has become fairly quiet militarily. 4  
Only at Kompong Seila in the far southwest are the 5  
KC noticeably active. Here they are continuing 6  
to shell the surrounded defenders with heavy indirect 7  
fire. 8

c. The GKR's recent success northwest of Phnom Penh 9  
underlines the problems facing KC military forces 10  
throughout most of the country. Long-standing command and 11  
control difficulties are now compounded by frequent 12  
ammunition shortages and an apparent reluctance by 13  
battle-weary infantry units to fight. Indeed, the lack 14  
of direction in insurgent military activity probably 15  
reflects a certain degree of indecision among the 16  
Communist leadership, plus combat losses of at least 17  
temporarily irreplaceable cadre and experienced troops. 18

d. On balance, recent military developments in Cambodia, 19  
in which the GKR not only defended Phnom Penh but launched 20  
several local initiatives, brought the Communists 21  
little or no return for their effort. Indeed, after 22  
failing to win a victory in the Phnom Penh area in 23  
January and February, they were forced to shift their 24  
effort to the provinces. Although GKR Forces were routed, 25  
in the Oudong area in March and the enemy won a string of 26  
cheap victories along the lower stretch of Route 4, the 27  
insurgents were repulsed in their assaults on Kampot, 28  
Kompong Thom, and Prey Veng. 29

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e. Overall, the KC remained largely on the offensive throughout the dry season and technically netted a small gain in territory. But since March, the Communists have increasingly fallen short of their goals. Their own problems, and the GKR's resilience and superior firepower, have enabled the Government to inflict heavy losses and to demonstrate the transient nature of the such publized Communist victory at Oudong last spring.

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3. (S) Enemy Threat

a. Analysis of Capability. The Communists have been successful in establishing a viable insurgency in Cambodia. Since early 1970, KC combat forces have increased from less than 3,000 to approximately 50,000-60,000 strong. In addition, the number of KC regiments has increased from three in January 1973 to 19 in January 1974 and to at least 25 as of June 1974. As many as four division-size units and 13 battlefield command committees have been identified.

b. Ongoing organizational changes in the KC force structure attest to extensive efforts to improve country-wide command and control. Political considerations, however, continue to impinge on strategy, thus causing the KC to set overly ambitious combat objectives. Setbacks, notably in this year's Phnom Penh offensive, seem to have created interregional command problems and some animosity among the military and the Party hierarchies.

c. On the battlefield, the KC have thus far been unable to counter FANK's superior ground, air, and naval firepower. The KC artillery inventory, which includes an estimated 17-20 105mm howitzers, 20 to 25 120mm mortars, and an unknown number of 107mm and 122mm rockets, is small in relation to the force structure, making it

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difficult to mass fires against individual targets. 1  
 The Government's advantage in artillery, along with improved 2  
 air support, has resulted in an enhanced GKR capability 3  
 to mass fires. This, in turn, has made the KC even more 4  
 reluctant to concentrate weapons because of the danger 5  
 of losing scarce resources. Until they can successfully 6  
 integrate artillery and infantry operations, the KC will 7  
 remain essentially a guerrilla force attempting to engage 8  
 in main force warfare. Nevertheless, KC manpower reserves 9  
 and apparent continuing logistic support from North 10  
 Vietnam and the PRC should at least enable the KC to 11  
 continue fighting. 12

4. (S) GKR Military Capabilities 13

a. Mission of the Armed Forces (FANK). The primary 14  
 mission of the FANK is to defend the country against 15  
 external aggression and maintain internal security. 16

b. Capabilities (Army) 17

(1) The ground forces have the capability to conduct 18  
 multibrigade/division operations and can generally bring 19  
 superior combat power to bear at different locations 20  
 fairly rapidly. FANK's ability to generate firepower 21  
 continues to increase; improvement has also occurred in 22  
 its ability to coordinate fire and maneuver elements. 23

The establishment of a Combined Combat Operations Center 24  
 and Fire Coordination Center has contributed materially 25  
 to this operational improvement. 26

(2) Sustained ground force operations are handicapped 27  
 by the lack of a well-organized personnel replacement 28  
 system and almost complete dependence upon the United 29  
 States for logistic support. Moreover, the High Command 30  
 has not yet demonstrated the ability to coordinate, 31  
 manage, and execute well thought-out operations. 32

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(3) Personnel Strength. The Army's reported strength 1  
 is about 217,000; combat strength is about 120,000. 2  
 Strength accountability is one of the primary problems 3  
 facing the Armed Forces. The old personnel system was 4  
 adequate for an Army of 35,000 men in 1970, but control 5  
 of strength accountability was lost during expansion. 6  
 Strength statistics reported to the Personnel Section, 7  
 the Logistics Section, and the Paymaster of the General 8  
 Staff have, in the past, shown considerable variance. A 9  
 recent major restructuring of finance and personnel 10  
 systems has resulted in considerable improvement in 11  
 finance procedures and personnel accountability, but 12  
 weaknesses still remain. 13

(4) Force Structure. The Army is composed of two 14  
 forces: the General Reserve and the Territorial Forces. 15  
 The General Reserve, the primary mobile intervention 16  
 force, is under the direct control of the FANK 17  
 General Staff; it consists primarily of a Presidential 18  
 Guard Division, four light infantry divisions, various 19  
 separate infantry brigades, and one armored and one 20  
 artillery brigade. Territorial Force units are under 21  
 the administrative control of the Commander, Army 22  
 Ground Forces, but are normally operationally 23  
 subordinate to the military region in which they 24  
 operate. In the main, Territorial Force consists of 25  
 10 infantry brigades and some 160 infantry battalions. 26

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(5) Organization, Deployment 1

(a) The Cambodian Army is under the operational 2  
control of the FANK Chief of Staff. The FANK 3  
General Staff also serves as the Army Staff. 4

(b) Cambodia is divided into nine numbered 5  
military regions (MR), the Phnom Penh Special 6  
Military Region (PPSMR), and the Takeo Special 7  
Military Region. MRs are further divided into 35 8  
subdistricts which correspond roughly to provincial 9  
or district boundaries. 10

(c) The ground forces are deployed in all MRs 11  
except the fifth (MR 5) in northeastern Cambodia, 12  
which is occupied by the Communists. 13

(6) Status of Equipment 14

(a) The US M-16 rifle has replaced the 15  
Communist T-56/AK-47 assault rifle as the basic 16  
infantry weapon in all General Reserve units and 17  
most of the Territorial Forces. The M-79 grenade 18  
launcher is also extensively issued. Basic mortars 19  
include the 50mm, 81mm, and 82mm models. The US 20  
75mm pack howitzer, 105mm howitzer, and 155mm 21  
howitzer are the artillery pieces now operational. 22  
The Army currently has eight M113 armored personnel 23  
squadrons. Four are assigned to four of the five 24  
infantry divisions. Each squadron is authorized a 25  
total of 25 armored personnel carriers. 26

(b) The armor regiment of the armor brigade 27  
is equipped with seven M-24 and 12 AMX-13 French tanks, 28  
five M-8 armored cars, and 20 modified halftracks. 29

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(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention. Sixteen to  
 18 years of age is the lower limit for recruitment,  
 and the term of military service is indefinite. During  
 the 1970-71 Army buildup, regional and unit commanders  
 were authorized to recruit locally. All recruiting was  
 halted on 14 February 1972, however, by the FANK Chief  
 of Staff in view of the inflated strengths being  
 reported through the then inadequate personnel system  
 and the need to reorganize the Army. Since October  
 1973, however, FANK has instituted a conscription/  
 recruiting program that has provided FANK with a net  
 gain of approximately 10,000 personnel accessions  
 thus far in 1974. Although the program has been  
 plagued by mismanagement and has never reached its  
 goal, it has generated much needed manpower for FANK.  
 The GKR has yet to come up with an adequate replacement  
 system, but some improvement has been noted. Pay  
 remains low, but combat pay and a free rice issue for  
 intervention units has improved the lot of the low-  
 ranking enlisted men and junior officers.

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(8) Training. Recruits receive their initial  
 training at one of Cambodia's five training centers or  
 "on-the-job" in a battalion. The best infantry units  
 are those trained in South Vietnam before instruction  
 there was discontinued in January 1973. The war is  
 hampering the conduct of effective training in Cambodia,  
 but inadequate aids, an insufficient number of qualified  
 instructors, and inadequate facilities also contribute  
 to marginal in-country training. Some specialist  
 training is conducted in Thailand and, to a lesser  
 extent, in the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the  
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(9) Logistics

(a) The Army is essentially dependent on outside logistic support. At present, the United States is the sole supplier of ordnance and munitions, although Japan and Australia have supplied a small number of trucks.

(b) Army supply capabilities are improving slowly, and the logistic system has shown an ability to react to the demands placed upon it during a period of accelerated growth. A supply procedures manual has been published and is being implemented at the technical service depot level. Increased emphasis is being placed on making the distribution system more responsive to tactical requirements. As increased quantities of supplies have been received by the depot system, assistance rendered under the Technical Assistance Contract with the US Government has become more important. Highly qualified third country nationals (contractor personnel) are helping the Army acquire managerial skills and familiarity with the US-type logistics procedures.

(c) The Army is continuing to refine a number of manual supply management systems and is developing a system to report ammunition consumption rates. A central file of equipment densities and status has been compiled. The need to establish supply priorities and to centralize control of movements, however, has only recently been appreciated.

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c. Capabilities (Navy)

(1) The Khmer Navy (MNK) has for the last year or so demonstrated an outstanding capability in meeting its responsibilities in keeping the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers open to vital traffic; in short, the MNK's performance has been an important factor in the continued survival of the GKR. MNK capabilities were most notably revealed during the KC seige of FANK enclaves at Kampot, on the Gulf of Thailand, and Lovek, on the Tonle Sap River. MNK assets were employed on an extended basis at these locations to provide needed gunfire support as well as critical troop transport and resupply. In addition, Cambodian Naval Infantry forces have occupied key chokepoints along the lower Mekong to preclude the interdiction of shipping, an especially important achievement since the GKR's principal land LOCs, Routes 4 and 5, have been continually interdicted for about a year.

(2) Force Structure. The MNK is about 13,000 strong, including 11 Naval Infantry battalions. About 165 craft of the nearly 240 in the MNK inventory are operational. Principal types are: coastal patrol (10); riverine patrol (71), mine warfare (3); amphibious warfare (59); and service (22). They are employed in the seven riverine regions and the maritime region.

(3) MNK Organization and Deployment. The MNK Chief of Staff, assisted by a deputy and a small staff, exercises direct control over the MNK and its three operational components: the Coastal Command; the River Command; and the Naval Infantry. Navy Headquarters and the River Command are located at Chrui Chang War; the Coastal Command is at Ream.

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(4) Naval Infantry. Eleven battalions of Naval Infantry (approximately 400 men/battalion) provide protection for shore installations and come under command authority of the operational force commanders. Two battalions are in the formative stage; six of the remaining nine are employed as intervention units.

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(5) Status of Equipment. Ships are of US post-World War II vintage. Maintenance is generally poor due to an inefficient logistics organization, inadequate support facilities, and shortages of spare parts.

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(6) MNK Personnel Procurement and Retention. The MNK relies on voluntary enlistments and does not have enough personnel to meet present requirements, but MNK recruiting efforts are continuing. The minimum length of service is 5 years.

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(7) MNK Training. Training facilities are located on the Chroi Chang War Peninsula for officers, petty officers, recruits, and technicians. The basis for choosing trainees is directly related to the degree of formal civilian education, as is their rank upon completion of course work; there is, therefore, a commensurate lack of expertise throughout the rank structure. An increase in overall expertise can be anticipated as the quality of instruction increases and formally trained instructors return from CONUS schools. A yearlong officers electronic course and 4-month advanced officers course have been developed, and training has become more formalized. US MAP training for both enlisted men and officers is being conducted in the Philippines and the United States.

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(8) MNK Logistics Bases at Ream and Chruai Chang

War are the main logistic centers and handle most craft  
 repair and maintenance. The repair facility at Chruai  
 Chang War is capable of minor repairs to smaller craft;  
 some minor repair work is also done at Ream. The Khmer  
 Navy also possesses floating crane and drydock capability  
 and operates two mobile support bases for the maintenance  
 and repair of river patrol boats (PBRs). Extensive  
 repairs to larger craft are performed overseas. A small  
 base at Lem Dam and commercial facilities at the port  
 of Kompong Som can also be used.

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d. Capabilities (Khmer Air Force (KAF))

(1) Tactical aircraft are primarily used for  
 interdiction and close air support and, in these roles,  
 have shown considerable improvement in the last 6  
 months' operations. Other tactical capabilities,  
 including reconnaissance and forward air control for  
 artillery adjustment and airstrikes, are improving as  
 more trained personnel enter the inventory. A major  
 weakness, which reduces the overall KAF capability, is  
 the low aircraft serviceability rate caused by  
 inadequate number and low skill level of maintenance  
 personnel and limited facilities. There is, however,  
 a current trend of improvement in the aircraft  
 serviceability rate. The quality of maintenance has  
 shown improvement. This has been the result of more  
 effective training, better management, and contract  
 maintenance. Additionally, the successful execution of  
 two major US assistance efforts (Tactical Air Improvement  
 Plan and ROTORHEAD EXPRESS) have contributed immeasurably  
 toward KAF recent overall improvement.

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(2) KAF Force Structure

(a) Personnel strength approximates 10,000 (1,250 officers). There are about 670 aircrew members, of which approximately 200 are pilots.

(b) The KAF presently consists of one wing, with five subordinate groups--fighter, forward air control, training, helicopter, and transport. Almost all aircraft and personnel are at Pochentong Air Base, Phnom Penh.

(c) Principal equipment types are C-123K transports (12), AU-24/AC-47/UH-1 gunships (34), T-28D fighters/bombers (67), and miscellaneous trainer/observation/utility types (61). A few of these aircraft are deployed to Thailand for maintenance or pilot training.

(3) KAF Organization and Deployment

(a) The KAF, with headquarters at Phnom Penh, is under the operational control of the FANK Chief of Staff but organizationally falls directly under the Minister of National Defense. Three Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Operations, Logistics, and Plans) report directly to the KAF Chief of Staff. Traditional staff functions are subdivided under the individual deputies.

(b) Aircraft are of US design but are generally overage. In-country upgrading and training programs are conducted with US equipment. Aircraft in-commission and serviceability rates average about 60-70 percent. Airfield maintenance is adequate, but there are few navigation aids.

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(4) KAF Personnel Procurement and Retention.

Personnel retention remains a problem in the KAF as in the other Services. Inflation over the past year has created a very unfavorable wage/price relationship for the salaried employee, and pay scales have not been increased significantly enough to cope with the situation. Desertion is not uncommon, and, though enlistment rates have generally exceeded losses, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain and retain qualified personnel.

(5) KAF Training. An in-country pilot training capability exists at the KAF Air Academy at Battambang. Maximum pilot output at the academy is estimated at about 120 per year, involving some 60 hours of flying in the T-41 with additional upgrade training as required in selected aircraft; limited pilot upgrade training is also conducted at Pochentong Airfield. This total pilot training capability will not be fully utilized until at least FY 1976 when ongoing out-of-country aircrew training programs terminate. Basic training is currently conducted at Battambang.

(6) KAF Logistics

(a) Cambodia presently has no aircraft industry and is entirely dependent on foreign sources for aircraft, aircraft parts, and logistic support. The United States is the primary supplier; French aircraft which remain in service are rapidly becoming unusable due to the lack of parts and a maintenance capability at the depot level.

(b) The shortage of skilled maintenance personnel, a lack of special tools, and the proliferation of aircraft types have resulted in low

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aircraft in commission rates. However, recent trends  
 indicate a significant improvement of aircraft in  
 commission rates for the KAF. Indications are that  
 this improvement trend will be sustained. Routine  
 maintenance is performed at workshops in Phnom Penh  
 with assistance/instruction provided by an Air America  
 contract team. The inspection/repairs and  
 necessary maintenance on T-28D, C-47, AC-47, and  
 C-123K aircraft are accomplished by the Thai-  
 America Corporation in Bangkok, Thailand. While  
 KAF mechanics have demonstrated a capability for  
 maintaining all types of aircraft and perform the  
 vast majority of normal KAF maintenance, the  
 increase in numbers and types of aircraft under the  
 combat environment has made it necessary for much  
 of the heavy maintenance to be accomplished out-of-  
 country.

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5. (S) Future Trends. The fighting in Cambodia over the  
 past year or so has demonstrated that the KC lack both the  
 military expertise and the force structure to achieve either  
 decisive victory or the collapse of the GKR. In short, a type  
 of military stalemate has evolved in which the KC are unable  
 to achieve their objectives and the GKR has been able to do  
 little more than react to KC initiatives.

a. At this point, the KC have rejected the GKR's latest  
 bid (without preconditions) to negotiate an end to the  
 conflict. But the KC have problems of their own. They  
 have been unable to inculcate their revolutionary  
 ideology into the Khmer peasantry. The KC's battlefield  
 losses have stripped their forces of the most motivated

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and qualified personnel. Also, the KC are probably not receiving sufficient arms and ammunition from North Vietnam to get the job done. Currently, prospects point to a continuation of these trends through FY 1975.

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b. For its part, the GKR is hamstrung by political and economic inadequacies which are reflected in weak leadership and popular apathy toward the war effort and by a near-exclusive dependence on the United States for the wherewithal to continue resisting the KC. The military and economic assistance factor will, of course, be a key ingredient in GKR survival through FY 1975. At a minimum, such assistance would necessarily include rice, POL, ammunition, and essential equipment replacement/repair to enable the GKR to withstand KC offensive operations at the 1973-1974 dry season level.

c. For the remainder of the wet season (at least through October); military action in Cambodia will probably remain at a fairly low level, during which both sides will have a breathing spell to correct deficiencies and plan next year's fighting. If the GKR takes advantage of the time available and can move effectively to solve or reduce its domestic problems, and the requisite US aid is forthcoming, the Phnom Penh Government will probably survive through FY 1975. In so doing, it should control approximately the same amount of territory and people that it does now. There appears, however, to be slim chance of the GKR undertaking major offensives with the view of reoccupying substantial territory and placing the KC on the defensive. Thus, a continuation of the present military stalemate is the most likely outcome for FY 1975.

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ANNEX B

CAMBODIA POLITICAL ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (S) Background. On 18 March 1970, both houses of the Cambodian legislature met at the Government's request and voted to withdraw confidence in Prince Sihanouk as Chief of State. The Prince, who was in Moscow at the time, flew to Peking where he decided to return to power with Communist support, which Hanoi and Peking readily offered. He subsequently established his Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK) and an umbrella-type political organization called the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), of which Sihanouk is chairman. For its part, the new leadership in Phnom Penh changed Cambodia from a monarchy to a republic and equipped it with the necessary accouterments. In effect, however, the Khmer Republic is largely the creature of Lon Nol and his confidants, whose main prop is the military. Political parties represented in the Government are, by and large, responsive to one or other of the political elite, and their influence does not extend much beyond major urban areas.

2. (S) The Current GKR

a. In the nearly 4 years of its existence, the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) has been plagued by internecine political infighting, a problem which has often adversely affected the war effort. Despite all the sniping and backbiting, however, President Lon Nol remains the single most effective and popular leader on the scene, and his presence at the head of the GKR assures a measure of stability and solidarity. As long as his health holds out and he can sustain his activities, the Khmer political situation will likely remain under control. In view of their preeminent

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position, the Armed Forces, particularly Chief of Staff  
 Sosthane Fernandez who ranks high in GKR councils, will play  
 a pivotal role in the choice of any successor to Lon Nol.

b. The GKR has been in fairly good shape politically for  
 the last year or so. Barring several periods of student-  
 teacher dissidence, primarily over economic issues,  
 Phnom Penh has remained relatively calm. Thanks largely  
 to the efforts of Prime Minister Long Boret, who has  
 close ties with Lon Nol, relations between civil and  
 military officials have improved. Nevertheless, power  
 struggles within the ruling Socio-Republican Party and  
 interparty squabbling at the national level remain serious  
 and could undermine the viability of the GKR. Moreover,  
 corruption and maladroit leadership, endemic in all  
 Southeast Asian countries but frequently widely publicized  
 in Cambodia, remain pervasive. A growing problem  
 derives from the fact that Lon Nol and his chief aides  
 have become more and more identified with the war and the  
 worsening economic situation. Without aggressive action  
 to reverse these trends, they could in time produce  
 irresistible pressure for violent political changes/  
 the GKR's collapse.

3. (S) Khmer Communist (KC) Political Infrastructure

a. Political Organizations

(1) The key organization with the KC infrastructure  
 is the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Control of  
 the insurgency at the national level is exercised by the  
 Central Party Committee. This committee probably con-  
 ducts political liaison and coordination with the North  
 Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi. It is  
 also likely that there is military liaison and coordination

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with the supreme Vietnamese Communist organization (COSVN) in South Vietnam and, possibly, the North Vietnamese High Command. 1  
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(2) The Standing Committee of the Central Party Committee handles day-to-day administrative, military, and political decisions; more sensitive policy decisions are deferred to the Central Committee, some of whose members probably also function as the key leaders in the six KC military regions in Cambodia. 4  
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(3) Standing Committee directives are passed down to the six KC regions, which are subdivided into sectors (roughly equivalent to province in echelon), districts, subdistricts, villages, and hamlets. At each echelon, control is exercised by a local committee responsible for political, military, and administrative matters. 10  
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(4) CPK members fill virtually all key positions within the infrastructure, especially at the higher levels. Only at village, and possibly district, level are non-Communist officials found. According to recent reports, however, even these few personalities are being retrained or replaced by CPK cadre. Purges of non-Party military leaders in all areas of the country since January 1974 have further strengthened the grip of the CPK on the insurgent movement. 16  
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b. CPK Leagues 25

(1) The control and social organization of the populace under KC rule is also implemented by KC leagues. These leagues, structured along CPK lines, are covert Party organizations which organize and direct the populace through their control of a number of front organizations. In KC-controlled territory, all persons 26  
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are categorized by age, sex, and occupation and placed  
under the responsibility of the various front groups.

(2) Like other Southeast Asian Communist insurgencies,  
the Cambodian Communists have also made use of national-  
level front organizations.

(a) FUNK. The most important of the front  
organizations is the FUNK, which will supposedly  
serve as the replacement instrument for the Lon Nol  
Government. FUNK, which exists in little more than  
name only, was established in 1970, primarily to  
units and incorporate under one umbrella organization  
the various components of the insurgency in Cambodia.  
Thus, the front encompasses such organizations as the  
GRUNK and the Cambodia People's National Liberation  
Armed Forces (CPNLAF) and serves to tie together the  
divergent Communist and non-Communist forces  
in-country.

(b) GRUNK. Sihanouk formed his GRUNK in Peking  
in 1970 after he was ousted as Khmer head of state.  
In practice, it is little more than a figurehead  
leadership group giving a facade of legality to  
Communist activities in Cambodia and serving as a  
rallying point for international opinion.

(c) CPNLAF. The CPNLAF is the front organization  
for KC-led military forces in Cambodia. Like FUNK,  
the CPNLAF exists in little more than title only.  
Actual control resides in the Military Affairs  
Committee of "High Headquarters," an alias for the  
CPK Central Committee.

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c. Role of Outside Powers. The KC depend on North Vietnam and the PRC for materiel and political support. However, few specifics are known about the mission and structure of the liaison/advisory effort existing between the KC and these two important supporters.

(1) Vietnamese/KC Relations. COSVN is the primary Vietnamese Communist headquarters that coordinates with and advises the KC. To this effect, a liaison section in COSVN was established in 1970 with the following missions: to exchange planning data; to train KC forces in military techniques and tactics; to assist the KC in their budget and finance systems; to provide medical training and establish dispensaries; and to collect intelligence data.

(2) Liaison committees subordinate to the COSVN liaison section serve as the primary and official point of contact between the KC and Vietnamese Communist elements throughout most of Cambodia. In addition, a limited number of liaison/advisory cadre assist KC personnel at regional and sector training centers, although it is unlikely that any of these personnel are actually instructors.

(3) In northeastern Cambodia, the North Vietnamese apparently have their own organization to deal with the KC. Some reports have indicated that an NVA security group, located in Kratie Province, serves in this capacity and that it has the following missions: to control the activities of NVA military units and Vietnamese civilian residents in the area; to maintain good relations with KC in order to facilitate the

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purchase and shipment of supplies; to advise local KC 1  
 military and administrative organizations; and to 2  
 settle conflicts between NVA and KC regional forces. 3  
 Another NVA security group trains medics for KC 4  
 regional forces. 5

(4) Few, if any, Vietnamese Communist advisers have 6  
 operated with KC tactical units since the withdrawal 7  
 of North Vietnamese combat forces from Cambodia in 1972. 8  
 Although the Vietnamese Communists were instrumental in 9  
 establishing an infrastructure and expanding the KC 10  
 insurgency in 1970, they currently retain little direct 11  
 influence over the movement. How this occurred is not 12  
 clear, but it is certain that the insurgency grew 13  
 quickly and, perhaps, became too large to be effectively 14  
 influenced by a relative handful of Vietnamese advisers. 15  
 In any case, the KC have established firm control over 16  
 the movement, remaining dependent on the Vietnamese 17  
 for munitions and equipment. In return, the KC provide 18  
 rice and travel rights to Vietnamese Communist units in 19  
 Cambodia. 20

(5) High-level KC cadre are aware of the possible 21  
 limitations on their autonomy by overreliance on 22  
 Vietnamese. The latter, on the other hand, are aware 23  
 of Khmer resentment toward their presence in Cambodia 24  
 and have apparently instructed the liaison committees 25  
 (estimated at 1,000-2,000 personnel) and all military 26  
 units to cooperate with the KC. This policy does not, 27  
 however, preclude the use of force or disruptive tactics 28  
 when the KC block Vietnamese Communist objectives. 29  
 Thus, the reported NVA support of Khmer insurgent 30  
 splinter groups in northeast Cambodia and the fighting 31

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which has occurred between the KC and the now deactivated  
 NVA 1st Division elements in the southwest may  
 have resulted from the failure of more peaceful means  
 of achieving NVA goals. In any case, it is likely that  
 common needs and ideology will override traditional  
 animosities and suspicions and will insure a lasting, if  
 somewhat strained, relationship of mutual support. There  
 is some evidence that the North Vietnamese, concerned  
 about the long-term reliability of the KC, have placed  
 a ceiling on their military aid for the Khmer insurgents.

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d. PRC/KC Relations. While the KC depend on both  
 North Vietnam and the PRC for support, they are reportedly  
 aligned politically with the Chinese. Beginning with  
 open Chinese support for Sihanouk's government in exile  
 in 1970, the PRC has consistently given vocal support to  
 the KC and has funneled munitions and funds to the KC  
 through the North Vietnamese. Although few details of  
 Chinese aid are available, there is some evidence that much  
 of the equipment previously thought to have been provided by  
 the North Vietnamese may have been sent by the PRC, with  
 the North Vietnamese acting only as transporting agents.  
 As KC leader Khieu Samphan's China visit in April-May 1974  
 demonstrated, the PRC has publicly increased its support  
 of the KC, apparently even at the expense of Prince  
 Sihanouk. This new prestige for KC leaders provides them  
 a political boost and could ultimately mean increased  
 financial and logistical support from the PRC.

e. USSR/KC Relations. Moscow, in effect, signed on in  
 support of Sihanouk in 1970 but has little influence with  
 the KC. At present, there are no known Soviet-KC trade  
 or military aid agreements; however, this could change if  
 the Soviets wish to increase their influence with the KC.

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4. (S) Sihanouk/Khieu Samphan Contest for Leadership. For 1  
the first time since Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970, a 2  
real alternative to the exiled Prince's leadership has 3  
emerged in the person of Khieu Samphan, KC in-country 4  
Commander in Chief and "Defense Minister." Khieu Samphan 5  
was given a post on the FUNK Politburo and the title of 6  
Minister of National Defense in Sihanouk's Peking-based 7  
government-in-exile in May 1970. He was appointed 8  
commander in chief of the military arm of Sihanouk's united 9  
front organization in June 1971 and acting Prime Minister in 10  
November 1973. 11

a. Khieu Samphan's recent 2-month tour, which took him 12  
to Peking, Hanoi, Pyongyang, and several Eastern European 13  
and African states, represents a significant step in his 14  
steady rise to prominence at Sihanouk's expense. Long 15  
before this, however, Sihanouk had acknowledged the leading 16  
role of the KC in the Cambodian insurgency, especially of 17  
Samphan and other ministers in the "interior." This 18  
was further evidenced when Sihanouk transferred all of the 19  
remaining GRUNK ministerial portfolios to in-country KC 20  
leaders in November 1973 in a move that was also designed 21  
to remove the stigma of "exile" from his Peking-based 22  
government. The KC leadership quickly snatched this 23  
opportunity to assert an added degree of independence 24  
from their head of state, and Sihanouk's personal 25  
influence on the KC has declined even more since then. 26

b. Although Samphan's recent trip abroad was apparently 27  
designed to enhance both his and the KC's international 28  
stature, it was probably also intended to sell the argument 29  
that the KC represent the primary political force in 30  
Cambodia and that their views, not Sihanouk's, must be 31  
reckoned with before any negotiated solution to the war is 32  
possible. 33

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c. While the KC most likely believe that they will have to live with Sihanouk at least temporarily after the war, the buildup that Samphan has received casts a shadow over Sihanouk's political future and will make it easier for him to be dumped. At this point, however, Sihanouk is by no means out of the picture, and it is doubtful that either the insurgents or Peking can jettison the Prince while the fighting continues, since he has appeal to the Cambodian peasantry. For his part, Sihanouk knows he is in a poor position to contest the KC threat to his position and may in fact have resigned himself to the fact that they have gained permanent ascendancy. Sihanouk is remaining active in the political scene to retain what influence he can. He has volunteered to represent the KC at the UN session this fall, perhaps in an attempt to preserve what remains of his prestige.

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5. (S) Current Developments in the Political Situation

a. The GKR's July 1974 Peace Initiative

(1) On 9 July 1974, the Cambodian Government issued a new statement on peace negotiations. The formal declaration invited the KC to enter immediately into discussions at a mutually agreeable time and place to find a solution to the conflict. The proposal also expressed Phnom Penh's hope that such talks would in turn lead to a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation. In addition, it appealed to all countries to assist in effecting a dialogue.

(2) This was the GKR's first major peace initiative since 6 July 1973 when it issued a proposal that stressed the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops and a cease-fire before negotiations could start. Phnom Penh is

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optimistic that its more flexible approach to negotiations will elicit favorable world reaction and gain support for this fall's contest over the Cambodian seat in the United Nations.

(3) The KC response, however, has been wholly negative. Prince Sihanouk, for example, lashed out immediately at continued US involvement in Cambodia and categorically ruled out negotiations with the Lon Nol Government. He had previously contended that a peaceful solution to the conflict could be reached after US support for the GKR had been terminated, and then by direct talks with the United States.

(4) The KC, who have the final say on the matter, also reacted negatively, but more guardedly, than Sihanouk. In the past, the KC have consistently rejected any negotiations with the present Phnom Penh leadership. Recognizing that a withdrawal of US aid would likely cause the fall of the Lon Nol Government, they have also insisted on an end to US aid for the GKR as a precondition.

(5) Peking's comments on the GKR's peace bid have been straightforward and descriptive, and the PRC has thus maintained a public "hands off" attitude. Hanoi has also been cautious. So far, the United States, South Vietnam, and the United Kingdom are the only countries that have publicly endorsed the GKR's 9 July initiative.

b. Teacher/Student Unrest and the GKR

(1) During the past year, the scene within the Khmer Republic has been marked by teachers' strikes and other public protests to dramatize demands for higher wages. The teachers were joined on occasion by students airing such familiar grievances as the government's

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failure to reduce corruption and control inflation. On 1  
4 June, such demonstrations resulted in the abduction and 2  
murder of the GKR Minister of Education and a Presidential 3  
adviser. Although the exact circumstances of their death 4  
are not clear, Communist complicity is suspected. 5

(2) Although the security forces kept the lid on in 6  
the wake of violence triggered by agitators, the political 7  
situation in Phnom Penh could deteriorate drastically if 8  
the GKR does not demonstrate that it is taking effective 9  
action to satisfy widespread demands that the runaway 10  
inflation be brought under control. 11

(3) Partly as a result of machinations by the Secretary 12  
General of Lon Nol's ruling Socio-Republican Party and 13  
partly because of the student disorders and murders of 14  
early June, opposition party members and independents in 15  
the cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Long Boret was 16  
ultimately forced to tender the resignation of his entire 17  
cabinet to resolve the impasse, but he succeeded in putting 18  
together a new government in mid-June. 19

c. Prospects for the New GKR. 20

(1) Long Boret has exhibited vigor and executive 21  
initiative but, as was the case with his predecessors, 22  
has had little success in controlling divisive political 23  
infighting, fueled by continued feuding between the 24  
Cabinet and National Assembly and compounded by recurring 25  
student-teacher activism, that resulted in the dissolution 26  
of Long Boret's first cabinet. 27

(2) President Lon Nol and the Prime Minister were 28  
irritated over the Assembly's harassment of the Cabinet 29  
and were also displeased over its refusal to give the GKR 30  
a vote of confidence for its handling of student-teacher 31  
unrest. Although all 126 Assembly deputies are members 32

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of Lon Nol's Socio-Republican Party, they have shown an increasing disregard for party discipline. In addition, many have tended to their own political ambitions first and have seriously strained the delicate alliance between the ruling Socio-Republicans and minority Republicans.

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(3) The composition of the 17-man Cabinet announced on 16 June reflects a carefully contrived formula for damping political antagonisms, but it is questionable whether it will be more effective than its predecessor, since professional qualifications were largely subordinated to partisan political considerations in choosing the new ministers. The Cabinet consists of eight members of the dominant Socio-Republican Party, seven independents, and two military men (including FANK Chief of Staff General Fernandez). The exclusion of the minority Republican Party, which held four portfolios in the previous Cabinet, was designed to placate the Socio-Republican-controlled Assembly. Although the Republicans were given increased representation on the Executive Council, the country's top policymaking body, the GKR has been weakened by inclusion of key ministers who are critics of Long Boret. Thus, the future of the most recent GKR is tenuous and its prospects for a long life doubtful.

d. The 1974 UN Representation Battle

(1) Once again the Phnom Penh government is preparing for an autumn contest over the Cambodia seat in the UN. Last year's challenge by the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNK) was deferred, but this guaranteed that a pro-Sihanouk resolution would be inscribed on the Assembly agenda this year.

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(2) The PRC and other countries supporting the GRUNK's claim to the Cambodian UN seat passed up opportunities to contest Phnom Penh's credentials at the special UN session this spring, apparently in the view that a victory at the Assembly session this fall would be better publicized. For its part, the GRUNK has been preparing for the UN battle for some time, and KC "Defense Minister" Khieu Samphan devoted considerable effort to gaining Third World support during his 2-month international tour earlier this year. Samphan was able to sign joint communique in many capitals that either specifically mentioned the UN issue or referred to an earlier endorsement of the GRUNK claim to the UN seat.

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(3) At this point, the GKR's prospects for retaining its seat are poor. A recent preliminary assessment by the Department of State indicated that the Lon Nol government was behind by a margin of seven votes, an assessment which springs in part from the fact that the GRUNK now leads the GKR in official recognition. As of June 1974, 55 countries had established diplomatic relations with or recognized the GRUNK, compared with 50 for the GKR.

(4) Phnom Penh's efforts to improve its international position have not been as effective as hoped. Prime Minister Long Boret and Foreign Minister Keiky Lim have worked hard to gain international support during various trips abroad this year but have been unable to offset KC political gains. For example, attempts to line up or regain support in Africa and the Middle East, where Phnom Penh has lost the most ground, have not been very productive. GKR efforts have been limited for the most part to countries that cast favorable votes last year and, even in these

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circumstances, there has reportedly been some erosion of  
Phnom Penh's position.

(5) The support of Cambodia's Asian neighbors is critical  
to Phnom Penh's retention of its UN seat. Last year a  
number of these nations formed an Asian Working Group that  
helped lead the fight to postpone debate. Since then,  
Phnom Penh's standing with some of these nations has  
slipped somewhat because they believe the GKR has made no  
significant economic or military progress. Although many  
may ultimately vote for Phnom Penh, there is a certain  
regional reluctance to campaign for the Lon Nol side.

(6) The GKR would pay a high price for failing to retain  
its UN seat. If that institution were to endorse the  
GRUNK as the legitimate government of Cambodia, KC leaders  
would have little incentive to negotiate. On the contrary,  
they would likely view an international vote of no  
confidence in the GKR as significantly offsetting their  
own failure to win any lasting victories during the 1973-1974  
dry season military campaign. KC resolve to achieve a  
military solution to the conflict would probably be  
reinforced.

(7) A defeat at the UN would also adversely affect the  
domestic political situation in Phnom Penh. The inevitable  
loss of vital international support and recriminations  
within the Cambodian Government might well be enough to  
topple Long Boret. In more tangible terms, Phnom Penh  
would probably stand to lose a considerable portion of  
its non-US foreign economic aid. Although such aid  
amounted to about only \$20 million last year, not great in  
relation to the overall US economic and military aid  
expenditures, its loss would cause Cambodia's isolation

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in more stark terms. In the final analysis, the GKR's 1  
loss of its UN seat could even adversely affect the nature 2  
and type of US support authorized by Congress. 3

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ANNEX C

CAMBODIA ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (S) Background. The Khmer Republic has an agrarian economy based largely on rice and rubber cultivation; rice and rubber have been the usual exports. Industry, consisting mostly of food processing plants and factories producing consumer goods, is small and hampered by the destruction caused by the war. Commercially exploitable natural resources are limited, and the economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The United States has been, and continues to be, the foremost donor of aid to the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR).

2. (S) General Economic Overview. The nearly continuous interdiction of key GKR land LOCs has turned Phnom Penh into an "economic island"; essentially, the capital is dependent on Mekong River convoys for POL, rice, and other essential commodities needed for survival. Some domestic supplies of food are available but cannot be properly distributed. Production of agricultural commodities as well as manufactured goods has declined in recent years, which in turn has shrunk the tax base. Prices throughout the country, especially in Phnom Penh, have soared as steadily increasing military expenditures in the face of reduced tax revenues have led to a severely imbalanced budget. Export earnings in 1973 amounted to an estimated \$15 million, \$73.5 million lower than the 1968 level. Import requirements have increased, especially for rice, resulting in enormous trade deficits. Government foreign exchange holdings remain under severe pressure. Indeed, the economic situation in Phnom Penh over the past year can only be characterized as governed by "hyperinflation." (Rate of inflation for 1974 could reach well over 200 percent.) A more

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Classified by *Director 55*  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
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detailed discussion of GKR economic problems is contained in paragraph 4.

3. (S) Khmer Communist Economic Base. The Khmer Communists (KC) control approximately 60 percent of the land--30 percent of the total rice crop area. The exodus of refugees to the GKR-controlled cities has, however, reduced the capacity of the insurgents to maintain rice production. The KC evidently trade rice, salt, sugar, animal fats, soy beans, and gasoline to the Vietnamese Communists for arms, ammunition, and medicine. Rice is the most important KC commodity for sale, and KC in the northern provinces have made profits of up to 500 percent on transactions.

a. Population Control. It is estimated that 30 percent of Cambodia's population of 8 million is in enemy-controlled areas. Harsh population-control measures have, however, induced more than 100,000 people to flee to GKR-occupied areas this year alone. But this trend has not yet significantly affected the Communist hold on the countryside.

b. Assistance from Outside Powers

(1) PRC. A new open-ended military aid agreement between the KC and the PRC was publicly announced in Peking on 26 May 1974. The agreement states that the aid remains "at previous levels, with no intention of new programs." Most Chinese aid is believed to consist of crew-served and individual weapons, ammunition, uniforms, medicines, and medical instruments.

(2) North Vietnam. North Vietnamese aid includes communications equipment, weapons, and vehicles. North Vietnam also serves as a conduit for Chinese aid.

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Some NVA supplies are believed to be tied to "arms for rice" agreements with the KC, reportedly made during late December 1973. Other aid arrangements are believed tied to KC assistance for NVA personnel in and transiting southern Cambodia. As previously stated in the political assessment, there is some evidence that Hanoi is providing less aid than it could to the KC.

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(3) North Korea. Pyongyang reportedly provides the KC an estimated \$1 million in military and economic aid annually.

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(4) USSR and Other Communist Countries. No meaningful data are available on the amounts of economic and military aid provided by the USSR and other Communist donors.

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4. (S) GKR Economic Base. The GKR's economic problems are compounded by the refugee problem, interdicted LOCs, and shortages of goods.

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a. Refugees. The population of Phnom Penh has doubled in the last 4 years and now contains approximately 1.6 million people; some 800,000 of these are refugees. There are not enough jobs or other constructive activities for the population, and many are completely dependent on the government for support. This same problem prevails on a smaller scale in provincial capitals, particularly as people flee from the countryside to escape being caught up in the fighting and, more recently, to be free of the KC.

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b. Interdicted LOCs. For all essential purposes, the only LOC available to resupply Phnom Penh is the Mekong River. This means that the city's reliance on imported rice has increased since 1970 as the land LOCs between

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the capital and the major rice growing area in the north- 1  
west have been either cut or blocked by the KC. For 2  
example, the railroad linking Battambang with Phnom Penh 3  
has been effectively closed to through traffic since 1970; 4  
Route 5 to the rice-rich northwest has been closed since 5  
September 1973; and Route 4, between the port of Kompong Som 6  
and Phnom Penh, has been closed, except for a very brief 7  
period, since November 1973. During 1973, 103,100 metric 8  
tons of milled rice had to be transshipped from Kompong 9  
Som and Saigon to Phnom Penh via the Mekong to insure 10  
GKR survival. During the first 6 months of 1974, 158,000 11  
metric tons of rice and 108,300 metric tons of POL were 12  
transported up the Mekong to the capital. 13

c. Shortage of Goods. Until 1972, Cambodia was a net 14  
exporter of rice. Since that time the country has 15  
periodically experienced food shortages, including rice, 16  
thereby increasing its reliance on imported commodities. 17  
In 1972, total rice imports amounted to 120,000 metric 18  
tons; in 1973, 207,000 metric tons. Projections for 19 19  
1974 indicate 291,000 metric tons of rice will be required. 20  
In addition to rice and POL, the major nonmilitary 21  
commodities that must be imported include iron and steel, 22  
pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, machinery, textiles, 23  
motor vehicles, plastics, sugar, chemicals, and dairy 24  
products. 25

d. Lack of GKR Control Over the Economy. Measures 26  
taken by the GKR to stabilize the domestic economy in 27  
1973 and 1974 have been aimed at such anti-inflationary 28  
goals as checking monetary expansion, reducing expenditures 29  
in the civil sector, and increasing the availability of 30  
consumer goods. These programs have had little success. 31

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Since January 1973, the Phnom Penh Working Class Consumer Price Index has risen over 500 percent. The shortage of consumer commodities was a major factor in this inflationary increase. The Government's efforts to hold the lid on prices did little but encourage the operation of a black market. There is very little prospect of a substantial improvement in the GKR economic situation through FY 1975.

e. Dependence on US Aid. The GKR receives a nominal amount of aid from countries other than the United States--mainly Singapore, Hong Kong, France, Australia, and Japan--but for all practical purposes is totally dependent on US support. Comparative values of US economic aid to Cambodia follow:

	(US \$ MILLIONS)			
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75 (PROPOSED)</u>	
Humanitarian	1.2	13.4	20.0	<u>16</u>
Commercial Import Program	45.0	62.1	71.0	<u>17</u>
Exchange Support Fund	20.5	18.3	17.5	<u>18</u>
Technical Support & Training	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>19</u>
SUBTOTAL	67.3	95.0	110.0	<u>20</u>
Public Law 480	<u>27.5</u>	<u>170.9</u>	<u>77.0</u>	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	94.8	265.9	187.0	<u>22</u>

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