

OSD REVIEWED 30-Nov-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

DIA REVIEWED 15-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: REFER TO DIA

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: REFER TO OSD ^{CHAIRMAN}

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1/23/73

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF

Elliot,

This paper has been prepared in response to your questions concerning US actions in the event of Ceasefire Violations. I recognize it is broad in content but, I believe it would be helpful in understanding the plans we have with respect to organization and force levels subsequent to the Ceasefire.

After you have had an opportunity to read this paper I will be very happy to go into detail with respect to any aspect which you find unclear or incomplete.

Very respectfully,

Tom

*from
Lee Richardson*



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~Top Secret~~

23 JAN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SEAsia Cease-fire Violations

1. (TS) This paper discusses the reporting and handling procedures for possible cease-fire violations. In order to describe the procedures and our response capabilities, discussion is included concerning command and control arrangements and US forces that will be available in the area.

2. (TS) Command and Control Arrangements in Southeast Asia. The following are the command and control arrangements which will exist in Southeast Asia after X+60:

a. US Support Activities Group/Seventh Air Force USSAG/7th AF. During the period X-Day to X+60, Headquarters MACV will be phased down and Headquarters USSAG/7th AF will be established at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. USSAG/7th AF will be under the operational command of CINCPAC and will plan, and be prepared to conduct as directed, combat air operations in Southeast Asia. In addition, when USSAG/7th AF is established it will exercise command of the Defense Resource Support and Termination Office (DRSTO), located in Saigon. Cease-fire violations will be reported by MACV until that command is disestablished; thereafter they will be reported by DRSTO through USSAG/7th AF. (See Tab A)

b. Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon: With the exception of the US military participation in the Four Party Joint Military Commission discussed below, the remaining US military presence in the RVN will be in

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY NOT DETERMINED

the DAO, Saigon. The DAO, Saigon, consists of an Attache Element and a Defense Resource Support and Termination Office. The Attache Element performs normal Attache functions. The DRSTO will be under the command of USSAG/7th AF and will be responsible for carrying out those in-country (RVN) military matters within the purview of COMUSSAG/7th AF and CINCPAC, to include coordinating service managed MASF programs for the RVNAF, maintaining liaison with the RVNAF JGS; monitoring, evaluating, and reporting current operational activities; monitoring, coordinating, and supporting psychological operations, Joint Casualty Resolution Center operations, and in- and out-of-country RVNAF training; coordinating and supporting intelligence operations conducted in or from the RVN; and developing and reporting intelligence information. Included within the functions of the Operations and Intelligence Division, DRSTO, are the maintenance of a unilateral capability to determine compliance with the military terms of the settlement, detect cease-fire violations, assess any threat to US national security interest, and provide intelligence information to residual US military personnel in the RVN. In addition to maintaining close liaison with the RVNAF JGS, this Division will establish and maintain liaison with other US agencies in the RVN in order to monitor and report all cease-fire violations and RVNAF reactions. The DRSTO will operate a command center on a 24-hour basis providing a direct link with USSAG/7th AF over which cease-fire violations will be reported. (See Tab B)

c. Four Party Joint Military Commission. Current plans provide for US participation in the Four Party Joint Military Commission, whose primary mission is to assist the parties to the agreement in verifying compliance with the terms of the cease-fire agreement. Each party will provide one Major General plus 50 other personnel for the Commission's headquarters; one Colonel plus 25 other personnel for each of the four military regions; and one field grade officer for each of five Joint Control Teams in each of the four military regions. The Commission will assist and maintain effective liaison and coordination with the ICCS and the Two Party Joint Military Commission, respectively, as appropriate in accordance with the terms of the agreements and protocols signed by the four parties. It is anticipated that unilateral reports by the US contingent to the Commission will be made to MACV and Embassy, Saigon, thereafter until such time as the Commission is disestablished.

3. (TS) US Force Availability

a. US forces presently deployed consist of 22 TACAIR squadrons, 205 B-52s, 6 CVAs, plus supporting assets. This force level is capable of generating 12,000 TACAIR, 3,000 B-52 and 8,400 naval TACAIR (4 CVAs on station) sorties per month.

b. A plan for phased withdrawal of forces has been developed which will provide for an adequate force structure capable of providing maximum security for remaining forces and reacting to possible contingencies (Tab C). The plan can be executed within a 60 day time period; however, phasing should be keyed to the situation and developing events rather than a predetermined time table. The increments shown for each individual force (i.e., TACAIR/B-52/Naval forces) are not necessarily related as to time of execution. Upon completion of redeployment, US forces remaining will consist of 9 tactical fighter squadrons, 52 B-52, 3 CVAs (1 on station), plus supporting assets. This force structure could provide 4,700 TACAIR, 1,000 B-52 and 2,200 naval TACAIR sorties per month.

c. US resurgence forces could be introduced back to present levels as follows: 30 days for land-based TACAIR, 3 to 7 days for B-52s and 15 to 27 days for naval forces depending upon their location.

4. (TS) Consideration Related to Possible Violations of the Cease-fire Provisions/Protocols

a. For purposes of this discussion a cease-fire violation is any act, intentional or non-intentional, which infringes upon or clearly breaches any article of the cease-fire protocol/agreement once it is implemented. Based on experience gained through performance of the NVA/VC during Christmas, New Years and TET cease-fire periods of the past it appears prudent to assume that deliberate violations of the provisions/protocols attendant to a future cease-fire agreement will occur. Such violations might be initiated in a variety of forms ranging from minor harassment activities to massive

invasion of RVN by main force NVA units with attacks directed against the RVNAF. Examples of a few alternatives that are available to the NVN/VC could be categorized as follows:

(1) Low Level Violation. Minor violations or skirmishes between local forces which do not significantly threaten destruction of the local government. A small group of NVA/VC (4-8 personnel) enter a rural hamlet and assassinate the hamlet chief.

(2) Medium Level Violation. Violations of the cease-fire agreements which result in armed conflict of such a scale that local government agencies are endangered. A group of NVA/VC sappers (5-10 personnel) conduct an attack on a small logistical installation and destroy equipment and supplies, or an attack against a District Headquarters.

(3) Gross Violations. Violations of the cease-fire agreement which seriously endanger the local governments or provinces and if continued would endanger the Government of the RVN. A main force NVA/VC unit (company or larger, 150 - 400 men) attacks and overruns an RVNAF or other government installation of some significance.

b. Although the above examples are defined and limited in scope to provide an illustrative categorization, there are many possible variants and combinations of enemy actions that would not so fit. For example, an isolated instance such as used to illustrate the low level violation could, by virtue of the enemy's institution of an RVN-wide campaign of selected assassinations of key GVN officials, escalate to a gross violation category of major import to the GVN. Likewise, the sapper attack used as an example of a medium level of violation could take the form of an attack against and destruction of ENHANCE PLUS materiel critical to planned RVNAF operational capability. Conversely, a main force attack such as used to illustrate a gross violation could conceivably

be contained and defeated by RVNAF with minimal adverse impact on the RVNAF and GVN. Other variants not categorized herein might include violation of agreements/protocols related to infiltration of men and materiel, upgrading of weapons or illegal occupation of RVN territory.

c. Possible US reaction to cease-fire violations of all categories would depend primarily on the time frame in which they occurred. During the period X Day - X+60 days US/FWMAF would be in the process of withdrawing from the RVN and would be particularly vulnerable to attack. Specific rules of engagement for this period have been promulgated and permit immediate reaction to insure the safety of withdrawing forces. After all US/FWMAF are withdrawn (subsequent to X+60 days) the rules of engagement change; the level of decision as to US reaction to cease-fire violations will be held at a relatively high level, most probably Washington.

d. Current planning envisions that identification of cease-fire violations while MACV is still in existence and total US military withdrawal not yet completed, will be accomplished by elements of the MACV command still present in the military regions and reported to MACV through US command channels. Violations occurring in areas without US presence will be made known to MACV through liaison with the JGS. Once the DRSTO is operational and MACV has phased out identification of violations will be accomplished by the ICCS, Four Power Commission and through field representatives of the DRSTO. Although the exact manning level of the DRSTO will not be known until a cease-fire agreement is concluded, it is anticipated that the Operational and Intelligence (O&I) Branch of the DRSTO will have some representatives in the field distributed among the four military regions who could be utilized for identifying violations for the DRSTO. In addition, the O&I Branch will maintain close liaison with the JGS and other agencies for the development of this information and reporting violations through the appropriate channels to national authorities.


e. Reporting cease-fire violations, will be the responsibility of agencies such as ICCS, Four Power Commission and DRSTO. Unilateral reports will normally flow from the DRSTO through MACV until disestablished then through USSAC/7th AF to CINCPAC. Routine reports on low level violations will be passed by daily summary, while violations of a more serious nature will be dispatched immediately to CINCPAC and JCS by a flash message, Pinnacle reporting procedures.

5. (TS) Possible US Response. If the NVN abrogate the cease-fire agreement, sufficient US forces will be available in Southeast Asia to provide a wide range of military responses. These forces will have the capability to mine, to provide close air support, to interdict LOC, to provide naval gunfire support, to bomb with precision using guided weapons, to bomb in any area in NVN or RVN, to conduct psychological warfare, and to resupply indigenous forces. However, the precise character of our response cannot be fully determined at this time without knowledge of all the factors pertaining. A central point, however, is the fact that our threshold of response will change drastically when our withdrawal is complete. Before that time our reactions to violations which threaten the safety of US forces must be timely and deliberate. After withdrawal is complete the threshold of provocation as viewed through US eyes which would result in a military reaction will undoubtedly rise considerably. How high will depend upon economic, political and military stability in RVN; the success of the South Vietnamese in handling similar incidents and provocations; available intelligence indicating North Vietnamese capabilities and intentions; and the internal political situation in the United States. For these reasons a priori judgments concerning likely responses to specific acts are not possible at this time.

T.H. Moore

Attachments
a/s

TOP SECRET



COMUSMACV COMMAND

ASSIGN TGTS FOR CBT AIR OPNS IN 7AF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

OPN CON FOR COMBAT AIR OPS

* CMDR (USAF G.O.) OF USSAG ALSO CMDR 7TH AF

** SERVICE ELEMENTS PROVIDE MASF SUPPORT THROUGH SERVICE CHANNELS

*** SEE TAB B FOR RELATIONSHIP OF THE DAO TO THE ERSTO




TOP SECRET

TAB A

TOP SECRET

ATTACHE ELEMENT AND
DEFENSE RESOURCE SECTION ATTACHMENT OFFICE (DRSTO)
DEFENSE ATTACHE SERVICE STATION



Legend:
 M - Military
 C - Civilian
 OIC - Officer in Charge of Construction
 MCSOPE - Military Sealift Command, Far East
 DIRCON - Director of Construction
 --- Service Logistics Responsibility

Classified by: Director, I-1
 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31 1983

* Defense Attache (DATT), NO Army is also Chief, DRSTO
 ** Ch, OICID is EG, Air Force
 *** Includes 5 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) (Comptroller) (Audit) spaces
 **** Includes DCS, DSA, US Army Materiel Command, Air Force Logistics Command, STRACOM spaces assigned or attached, as appropriate
 # Includes 161 National Security Agency spaces
 ## Distribution of spaces indicated is tentative pending JCS approval of the DRSTO joint table of distribution

TOP SECRET

LAND-BASED TACAIR REDEPLOYMENT

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/02/13 : LOC-HAK-452-5-8-6

THAILAND BASES	CURRENT FORCES NO. TYPE	INCREMENT #1 LOSS GAIN	INCREMENT #2 LOSS GAIN	INCREMENT #3 LOSS GAIN	TOTAL REMAINING NO. TYPE
UDORN	4 F-4 Sq 1 RF-4C Sq			2 F-4 Sq	2 F-4 Sq 1 RF-4C Sq
UBON	6 F-4 Sq 1 AC-130 Sq		3 F-4 Sq (From Korat) 1 A-7 Sq		3 F-4 Sq 1 A-7 Sq 1 AC-130 Sq
KORAT	1 F-4 Sq 2 F-105 Sq 3 A-7 Sq 1 EB-66 Sq 1 HC-130 Det 1 EC-121 Det 1 ABCCC Det		1 F-4 Sq 1 F-105 Sq 3 A-7 Sq		1 F-105 Sq 1 EB-66 Sq 1 HC-130 D 1 EC-121 D 1 ABCCC D
TAKHLI	2 F-111 Sq				2 F-111 Sq
AM PHONG	1 A-6 Sq 2 F-4 Sq 1 KC-130 Det 1 CH-46 Det				CLOSES
VN. BASES					
TIEN HOA	2 A-4 Sq		2 A-4 Sq		

/ If Increment #3 occurs after NVN monsoon, total may be 4 F-4, and F-111 may not be retained.
/ Without Takhli, F-111s will be based at Korat.

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/02/13 : LOC-HAK-452-5-8-6

B-52/KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT

BASE	CURRENT FORCES	INCREMENT #1 LOSSES	INCREMENT #2 LOSSES	INCREMENT #3 LOSSES	TOTAL ^{1/} REMAINING
U-TAPAO	53 B-52D 53 KC-135	4 KC-135	11 B-52D	20 KC-135	42 B-52D 29 KC-135 ^{2/}
GUAM	98 B-52G 54 B-52D 6 KC-135	98 B-52G 6 KC-135	44 B-52D		25x5
KADENA	56 KC-135		23 KC-135	6 KC-135	27 KC-135
TAKHLI	20 KC-135	4 KC-135. (Gained from U-Tapao)		24 KC-135	
TOTALS	98 B-52G 107 B-52D 135 KC-135				52 B-52D 56 KC-135

1/ A/C beddown may vary from that shown.
 2/ If a surge to 6700 TACAIR sorties/month is required, 7 additional a/c would be deployed from CONUS to U-Tapao

25x5

NAVAL FORCES REDEPLOYMENTS

TYPE	CURRENT FORCES	INC #1 LOSS	INC #2 LOSS	INC #3 LOSS	TOTAL REMAINING
CVA	6	2	0	1	3
CRUISERS	1	0	0	0	1
DD TYPES	50	10	6	8	26
AMPHIB	16	2 (LPH/LPD)	0	0	14 <u>1/</u>
MLSF	23	4	2	6	11

NOTE:

1/ Increment for deployment is dependent upon Mine Counter Measure (MCM) operations.