

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Gen Haig

INFORMATION

15 November 1971

REFER TO OSD

REFER TO DOS

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
FROM: ADMIRAL WELANDER *low*
SUBJECT: Military Situation in Cambodia

HK

With the FANK operations stalled at Rumlong, Admiral McCain sent a message to both Ambassador Swank and General Abrams on 12 November soliciting their thoughts on any courses of action, not yet used but available through U.S. military efforts, that CINCPAC could sponsor to bring the operation to a successful conclusion.

On 13 November, Admiral McCain also inquired as to the status of Lon Nol's request to President Thieu for a combined RVNAF/FANK operation to attack the enemy's sanctuary areas between Krek and Chup.

General Abrams response is attached; I believe you will wish to read it in its entirety. The RVNAF/FANK operation has been "approved in principle" and planning is going forward based on initiation of the attack on 20 or 22 November.

Ambassador Swank's response is also attached.

DOS REVIEWED 16-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Copy to:
Colonel Kennedy
John Holdridge

Holdridge/Kennedy?
HAK - READ

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

OSD REVIEWED 28-Nov-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

AC - what is state doing about equipment requested by Lon Nol?

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

DE RHMSMYA #9752 3190540

ZNY AAAAA

O 150535Z NOV 71 ZFF-3

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC HAWAII

INFO RUEKJCS/CHAIRMAN JCS WASH.DC

RUEASTA/AMEMB PHNOM PENH

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCAIN-~~INFO~~ ADM MOORER, AMB SWANK FROM GEN ABRAMS. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

SUBJ: FANK OPERATIONS (U)

REF: A. CINCPAC DTG 120400Z NOV 71 (TS/SPECAT)

B. CINCPAC DTG 130357Z NOV 71 (TS/SPECAT)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A REQUESTED RECOMMENDATIONS ON ADDITIONAL COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE THROUGH US MILITARY EFFORTS WHICH COULD BE SPONSORED BY CINCPAC TO BRING CHENLA II BATTLE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. REFERENCE B EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER RECENT EVENTS IN CAMBODIA WHICH SIGNAL A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND INITIATIVES AGAINST FANK UNITS AND LOCS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. MESSAGE FURTHER REQUESTS INFORMATION CONCERNING STATUS OF LON NOL'S PROPOSAL FOR A COMBINED RVNAF/FANK OPERATION TO ATTACK INTO THE ENEMY'S SANCTUARIES NORTH OF

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE TWO RHMSMVA9752 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

ROUTE 7 BETWEEN KREK AND CHUP.

2. (S) ON 12 NOVEMBER, SENIOR MACJ2 AND J3 REPRESENTATIVES VISITED PHNOM PENH TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. ON 13 NOVEMBER GEN WEY AND CONVENED A MEETING OF THE TRIPARTITE DEPUTIES IN PHNOM PENH TO EXPLORE WAYS TO ASSIST FANK.

3. (S) THE FANK LEADERS WERE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THEIR SITUATION NOT ONLY IN THE RUMLONG AREA BUT ALSO WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE 1ST NVA DIVISION TO THE WEST OF PHNOM PENH. THEY ARE REDEPLOYING THEIR UNITS AROUND PHNOM PENH TO COUNTER THE THREAT. THE UNITS THAT WERE IN RUMLONG AND TRIEL HAVE EVACUATED THEIR POSITIONS AND JOINED OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES ON ROUTE 6. AS OF THIS MORNING, THE TWO RELIEF COLUMNS WHICH HAVE BEEN HALTED NORTH AND SOUTH OF RUMLONG HAVE NOT EFFECTED LINKUP. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS IMMINENT DANGER OF A DISASTER ON ROUTE 6 ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION IS STILL NOT FAVORABLY RESOLVED.

4. (S) THE FORCES ALONG ROUTE 6 HAVE SUFFICIENT STRENGTH, SUPPLIES AND COMBAT SUPPORT. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IS ONE IN WHICH THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL BATTALIONS WITHOUT THE NECESSARY COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OVER

PAGE THREE RHMSMVA9752 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET

THEM TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS. THEY DO NOT KNOW HOW TO COORDINATE THEIR FIRE SUPPORT AND MANEUVER, THEY SEEM UNABLE TO DEVELOP TARGETS FOR THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF FIRE SUPPORT. ALL OF THESE PROBLEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF GENERAL SAK SUTSAKHAN WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR SOLUTION. WE HAVE PROVIDED FOUR ARCLIGHT STRIKES ON TARGETS EAST OF RUMLONG AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL STRIKES IF FANK CAN DEVELOP PROFITABLE TARGETS. TACAIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN MORE THAN ADEQUATE AND WILL BE CONTINUED ALTHOUGH THE EFFORT IS HAMPERED BY LACK OF GROUND MANEUVER NECESSARY TO LOCATE TARGETS. AT THE TRIPARTITE DEPUTIES MEETING, GENERAL MANH WAS REQUESTED TO INCREASE THE VNAF TACAIR SUPPORT.

5. (S) A MEMBER OF THE JGS HAS INFORMED US THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE MARSHAL LON NOL'S REQUEST FOR AN RVNAF ATTACK INTO THE CHUP AREA. GENERAL MINH, III CORPS, HAS BEEN TASKED TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR SUCH AN OPERATION AND HE HAS DONE SO. THE DATE BEING CONSIDERED FOR INITIATION OF THE ATTACK ARE 20 AND 22 NOVEMBER, THE MAIN FORCES THAT WOULD BE COMMITTED ACROSS

PAGE FOUR RHMSMVA9752 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THE BORDER ARE ONE REGIMENT OF THE 5TH DIVISION, THE 81ST AIRBORNE GROUP AND THE AIRBORNE DIVISION MINUS ONE BRIGADE. PRESIDENT THIEU'S APPROVAL IS DESCRIBED AS BEING "IN PRINCIPLE" AT THIS POINT BECAUSE THERE ARE ARRANGE-

TOP SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/02/13 : LOC-HAK-450-6-10-4

MENTS THAT MUST BE WORKED OUT WITH CAMBODIA CONCERNING

AREA CLEARANCE AND CLEARANCE TO BOMB IN THE CHUP RUBBER PLANTATION.

I HAVE BEEN PRESSING IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL VIEN AND THROUGH THE TRIPARTITE DEPUTIES TO GET AN RVNAF OPERATION GOING AGAINST THE 5TH, 7TH AND 9TH ENEMY DIVISIONS AND HOPE THAT THIS OPERATION WILL GO.

6. (S) ON 12 NOVEMBER 1971, MARSHAL LON NOL REQUESTED THAT PRESIDENT THIEU PROVIDE ENGINEER SUPPORT AND ONE OR TWO ARTILLERY BATTALIONS TO BE PLACED UNDER FANK OPERATIONAL COMMAND FOR OPERATIONS IN THE CHENLA II AREA. THE JGS STAFF INDICATES THAT PRESIDENT THIEU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HONOR THIS REQUEST.

7. (S) I AM TAKING EVERY REASONABLE ACTION THAT I KNOW OF TO ASSIST THE FANK. THEIR MAJOR PROBLEMS APPEAR TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORT WHICH WILL TAKE TIME AND HARD EXPERIENCE TO

PAGE FIVE RHMSMVA9752 T O P S E C R E T S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E

CORRECT.

GP-1

BT

#9752

ANNOTES

REF A IS 51720

REF B IS 53373

REQUEST DISTR INSTR FROM OCJCS

TOP SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/02/13 : LOC-HAK-450-6-10-4

DE RUEAMAF 0885 3191222
ZNY TTTT ZOC STATE
SUP162R
096695 MJA293 CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJNO 5801 3190455
ZNY TTTT ZZH
P 150430Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUHHQA /C INCPAC
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5562
RHSMVA/COMUSMACV SAIGON
RHSMVA/CHMEDTC SAIGON
RUEKJCS/JCS

BT
TOP SECRET PHNOM PENH 5801

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

FOR ADM MCCAIN INFO GEN ABRAMS AND ADM MUYRER FROM AMB SHANK

SUBJ: FANK AND RVNAF OPERATIONS RELATED TO SITUATION IN GKR

- 1. REF A: CINCPAC 120400Z NOV 71 (NOTAL)
- B: CINCPAC 130357Z NOV 71 (NOTAL)

2. MACV AND VNAF SUPPORT OF PAST AND PRESENT FANK OPERATIONS IN THE CHENLA II AREA HAS BEEN EXCELLENT AND RESPONSIVE TO

PAGE 1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

00000000

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

MESSAGE CENTER

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

55668

FANK NEEDS.

3. WE BELIEVE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS THAT INHIBIT MORE EFFECTIVE FIELD LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL AND TACTICAL INITIATIVE OF FANK FORCES ARE CAUSED BY CERTAIN INEXPERIENCED COMMANDERS. SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS ARE INTERNAL IN NATURE INVOLVING MARSHAL LON NOL HIMSELF AND A FEW RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE COMMANDERS WHOM HE SUPPORTS FOR OTHER THAN MILITARY REASONS. IT IS A DELICATE AND DIFFICULT TASK FOR US TO EXERT VERY MUCH INFLUENCE IN THESE MATTERS BUT YOU MAY BE SURE WE ARE TRYING TO DO SO. AS RECOMMENDED BY ADM MOORER DURING HIS VISIT TO PHNOM PENH, MARSHAL LON NOL HAS REQUESTED THAT PRES THIEU AUTHORIZE AN ARVNAF OPERATION IN THE ROUTE 7/KREK/CHUP AREA TO RELIEVE PRESSURES ON CHENLA II. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARVNAF STAFF WAS PREPARING PLANS FOR A PROPOSED OPERATION WHICH WAS TO BE BRIEFED TO PRES THIEU ON SUNDAY, 14 NOV. ON 12 NOV MARSHAL LON NOL DISPATCHED ANOTHER LETTER TO PRES THIEU REQUESTING THAT HE CONSIDER PROVIDING ONE OR TWO ARTILLERY BNS AND SOME ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO FUNCTION UNDER FANK OPERATIONAL CONTROL IN THE CHENLA II AREA. WE HAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY REACTION FROM PRES THIEU TO THE SECOND LETTER OF 12 NOV. 4. ON 13 NOV, GEN WEYAND, LTGEN MANH OF THE VEITNAMESE GEN STAFF, AND MGEN SLAY OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE VISITED PHNOM PENH FOR A FEW HOURS. GENS SLAY AND WEYAND MET INITIALLY WITH ME AND CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE EMB STAFF TO REVIEW THE SITUATION. GEN WEYAND ADVISED THE GROUP OF RECENT ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS IN THE PLAIN OF JARS AREA OF LAOS. IN A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION THE GROUP REFLECTED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY MIGHT BE CHANGING HIS STRATEGY WITH A VIEW TO PUTTING SERIOUS PRESSURE ON BOTH LAOS AND CAMBODIA RATHER THAN EXPENDING A PRIMARY EFFORT IN RVN. GEN WEYAND INDICATED THAT TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AND IN CONSIDERATION OF OTHER HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS, MACV WOULD ATTEMPT TO STRIKE HARD INTERDICTION TARGETS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CHANLA II OPERATION.

5. GENS WEYAND, MANH AND SLAY THEN MET WITH GEN SAK SUTSAKHAN, SRMA, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DAO. GEN SAK SUTSAKHAN PRESENTED AN UPDATE ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE CHENLA AREA AND ASSURED ALL PRESENT THAT AREAS SELECTED FOR INTERDICTION STRIKES WERE CLEAR OF CAMBODIAN POPULATION. GEN WEYAND SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO REDEPLOYING CERTAIN TROOPS FROM THE CHENLA II AREA TO MEET THE THREAT THAT APPEARED TO BE BUILDING UP FROM THE WEST AND NORTHWEST OF PHNOM PENH BY

PAGE 2

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
00000000

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

MESSAGE CENTER

TOP SECRET

55668

TOP SECRET

ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST NVA DIVISION.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT THE VISIT SERVED A TIMELY PURPOSE IN REASSURING FANK THROUGH GEN SAK SUTSAKHAN THAT BOTH MACV AND ARVNAF ARE DOING ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST THE GKR AT THIS TIME OF TEMPORARY MILITARY DIFFICULTY.

7. IN ADDITION TO THREE INTERDICTION STRIKES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CHENLA II AREA WHICH WERE EXECUTED DURING THE EARLY HOURS OF 14 NOV, 7TH AF AND VNAF HAVE INITIATED GUNSHIP AND FAC OPERATIONS TO THE WEST AND NORTHWEST OF PHNOM PENH ON A 24-HOUR BASIS. ON 14 NOV SRMA HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT WITH MARSHAL LON NOL AND FOUND HIM TO BE IN EXCELLENT HEALTH AND QUITE RELAXED ABOUT THE MILITARY PROSPECTS. HIS ONLY DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION WAS A STATEMENT THAT HE INTENDED TO RELIEVE SOME OF THE UNITS IN THE TANG KOUK AREA TO PERMIT THEM TO REORGANIZE AND REST.

8. WE EXPECT THAT COMUSMACV WILL REPLY TO REFTELS SEPARATELY.

9. WE ARE CONTINUING TO COUNSEL FANK ON THE IMPORTANCE OF REASONABLE LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANS FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE CHENLA II OPERATION AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REQUIREMENT OF NOT PERMITTING THE ENEMY TO CAUSE THE CLOSING OF CIVILIAN TRAFFIC THROUGH POCHENTONG AIRPORT. IN THIS REGARD, THERE HAVE BEEN TWO SEPARATE ATTACKS BY FIRE ON THE AIRPORT AREA WITHIN THE PAST 48 HOURS. NEITHER ATTACK CAUSED DAMAGE BUT THE SCHEDULED AIR FRANCE FLIGHT FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 14 NOV WAS DIVERTED AND OVERFLEW PHNOM PENH LANDING AT BANGKOK.

10. IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT DATED 12 NOV, MARSHAL LON NOL REVIEWED THE SITUATION AND AGAIN REQUESTED ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY, ARMOR, HELICOPTERS AND CONSIDERATION OF AN INCREASED FORCE STRUCTURE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE FANK HAS THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING CREWS AND MAINTENANCE FOR ONE OR TO ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS. IN A DISCUSSION WITH GEN SAK SUTSAKHAN ON 13 NOV, I INFORMED HIM THAT IT WAS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THAT THE MARSHAL'S REQUEST FOR INCREASED FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD RECEIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION AS PRESENT MAP FUNDING AND THE GKR CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT FORCES IS NOW STRAINED AT THE 220,000 FORCE GOAL LEVEL.

11. YOUR DEDICATED INTEREST IN OUR PROBLEMS AND THOSE OF THE

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3

TOP SECRET

00000000

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TOP SECRET
5668

T O P S E C R E T

GKR ARE DEEPLY APPRECIATED AND YOU MAY BE SURE I SHALL CALL UPON YOU IF WE CAN ISOLATE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE WITHIN CINCPAC'S CAPABILITY TO INFLUENCE. WE ARE ALSO COORDINATING VERY CLOSELY WITH GEN WEYAND AND THE MACV STAFF ON ALL OF THESE MATTERS. WARMEST REGARDS.

GP-1.

SWANK

BT

ANNOTES

HEG 401

NUMBER COPIES

STAMP

EXDIS EXCLUSIVE

CEV

PAGE H
NNNN