

THE WHITE HOUSE  
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January 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Working Paper: "Measuring Strategic Power: A Possible Soviet View"

Your Deputy Director for Intelligence, R. J. Smith, recently sent me a working paper entitled "Measuring Strategic Power: A Possible Soviet View." It provided some useful insights into the possible Soviet viewpoint on the strategic balance. Like any good study, it also raised new questions. I would hope that the next draft of the paper or a complementary study would seek to answer these questions:

(1) Expand the discussion of what we actually know about how Soviet planners analyze the strategic balance. The article refers to the SALT experience and unspecified Soviet articles to show that many Soviets have a sophisticated view of strategic force policy. Only one article--by a Soviet general of unspecified influence--is discussed in detail.

-- Who are the more influential Soviet planners and what do we know about their views?

-- How much weight do Soviet planners give to dynamic models over static measures?

-- Besides the now obvious scenarios of massive first or retaliatory strikes, what other scenarios do the Soviets foresee as especially critical for planning? Do they believe certain limited-exchange scenarios offer the possibility of favorable results?

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(2) What do we actually know about the strategic views of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and other top decision-makers in the Soviet Union? (Their preconceptions might only be marginally affected by the analytical work of Soviet planners.)

-- Are they familiar with dynamic models and the concept of assured destruction capability?

-- What possibility do they assign to a limited strategic exchange and what results do they expect?

-- What influence do the strategic planners have on them?

-- What importance do they attach to limiting strategic arms either through SALT, informal agreements, or unilateral decision? What motivates their views on limitation--need for resources elsewhere, recognition of the possibility of a renewed arms race, etc.?



Henry A. Kissinger

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