

TS - HR 165a

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE**

April 29, 1970

**MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER**

**FROM: Winston Lord**

**SUBJECT: President's Speech**

**Attached are suggestions for the President's speech from Alex Johnson (Tab A), Mr. Helms (Tab B) and Mr. Karamessines (Tab C).**

**I have sidelined and clipped those sections which seem to me to contain material that is both new and appropriate, and might therefore be worth considering for inclusion in the speech.**

**In addition, attached at Tab D is some suggested language from Hal Sonnenfeldt for handling the Soviet angle.**

**Finally, if the President uses your suggestion about citing reduction of air operations in Vietnam (page 5), he should say that air sorties (as well as B52 operations) have been reduced by over 20 percent, rather than 30 percent as the draft now states. This was what he said November 3 and the authorized levels remain the same although there have been fluctuations for various reasons.**

MORI/CDF C03319307 pages 1-9, 11-18  
C03232965 page 10

State Dept. review completed

OSD review completed

**Attachments**

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE**

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 29, 1970

NODIS/KHMER

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cambodia

Attached are some thoughts of Marshall Green on the subject and a copy of a draft "Diplomatic Scenario." The first item on the message to Pompidou is entirely our own and if the President wants to really get something special across to him, this seems to me the only way of doing it. It is, of course, up to the President whether he wants to do so. Otherwise, we can treat him substantially the same as the others and have Blake go around to the Foreign Office the morning after the speech, if there is anything special at that time.

The Secretary has not seen this--if, after he has done so, there are any additional thoughts or modifications we will pass them on to you.

  
U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosures:

1. Paper from Mr. Green
2. 2 copies of "Diplomatic Scenario"

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET

I.

During the past several years, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces have used sanctuaries in Cambodian territory immediately adjacent to the border of South Viet-Nam. In these sanctuaries, they have built up extensive caches of weapons and have developed sophisticated base complexes which are used as springboards for attacks on U.S. and other allied forces in South Viet-Nam.

In the last few months, the Vietnamese communists have adopted new strategies to cope with our policy of Vietnamization. These strategies have involved the break up of their forces within South Viet-Nam into smaller units devoted to the tactics of protracted warfare. Their main force units, on the other hand, have been largely drawn back into the Cambodian sanctuaries, where they are building up their power for launching massive attacks at any time against our forces in South Viet-Nam.

This development has meant that the sanctuaries, which formerly were used primarily for transient purposes by the communists, have become permanent zones of occupation and invasion by these alien forces on Cambodian territory. It was this development which has led to mounting emotional resentment of Cambodians against Vietnamese communists. This

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was not an issue amongst Cambodians. Even Prince Sihanouk, you will recall, was on his way to Moscow and Peking to urge the removal of the Vietnamese Communist forces when events in Cambodia brought about his downfall.

Now, in recent weeks, the Vietnamese communists have also used their forces from the sanctuary areas to attack westward into Cambodia. In these attacks, they have operated out of the bases and used the supplies cached in the areas adjacent to the South Vietnamese border. The apparent communist purpose in launching these attacks is to destroy Cambodian forces, to overwhelm the authority of the Cambodian government, and to replace it with a Hanoi-controlled regime.

Were Hanoi to succeed in this purpose, it would pose a far graver menace than before to the lives of United States soldiers in the area. This danger could become so acute that we would have to reconsider our troop redeployment schedule. In short, Vietnamese communist military successes in Cambodia would not only widen the war, they would also prolong it.

II.

It is for this reason that we have endorsed all efforts

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that have been sponsored by various world leaders to seek the removal of these Vietnamese communist invaders from Cambodia by negotiation. In the hope that these diplomatic efforts would succeed, we have counselled patience to our Vietnamese allies and have enjoined the utmost restraint on our own military commanders. But this patience and restraint have been in vain. Rather than agreeing to negotiate, the invaders have brazenly struck out westward against the Cambodians. Rather than withdraw, the communists have sought to consolidate their positions, to augment their supplies and to expand their control.

Moreover, during the seven weeks that <sup>THE PRESENT CAMBODIAN</sup> ~~Lon Nol's~~ Government has been in power, it has made repeated efforts to negotiate with the Vietnamese Communists regarding the presence of their forces on Cambodian soil. All these efforts have been rejected. During that same span of time, international efforts have also been made with regard to some form of action by the United Nations or by the Geneva Accords machinery, including the International Control Commission, to promote the cause of Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity. These moves

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have been rejected by Hanoi.

On the contrary, "The Indochinese Peoples Summit Conference" of April 24-25, sponsored by Hanoi, pledged the delegates to fight to "total victory" and condemned all proposals for an international conference on Cambodia.

It is increasingly evident that a principal tactic of Hanoi is to maximize US casualties and to use its sanctuaries in Cambodia to that end. An unusually candid exposition of Hanoi's belief that US withdrawal can be hastened by increasing American casualties was recently spelled out in Hanoi's official Army paper which said:

"The southern revolutionary armed forces continue to attack U.S. troops; to direct vigorous and painful blows at them; to inflict heavy casualties on them; to undermine their morale so they will be unable to provide a prop for the puppet troops and for the Vietnamization policy; to annihilate their strength very extensively; to increase their casualties far beyond the 100-a-week level, which the U.S. ruling clique has considered bearable; to extensively destroy U.S. war equipment; to shoot down aircraft, especially helicopters; to attack enemy tanks and armored cars; to fire at and sink enemy riverine craft; to destroy

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U.S. troops' storage facilities so as to create many difficulties in logistic supply movement; and to restrict their strongpoints."

III

In the face of harassed pleas for help from the Cambodians, and in the light of increasing concern expressed by the South Vietnamese and our own military commanders, we could be patient and restrained no longer. We had to accept the need for action by our allies in their own defense and by our own commanders in the defense of our men's lives.

This action has been carefully taken against limited objectives, employing limited means. Every effort has been made to assure the safety of the <sup>RELATIVELY</sup> few Cambodian civilians who were <sup>LEFT</sup> in the area of operations. Every step has been used to direct the military force against the bases and the caches which are the objective of the operation: ~~AS THE GVN HAS ANNOUNCED~~ <sup>ALLIED</sup> forces will withdraw from cross-border Cambodian territory upon completion of the operations.

It is our aim that the successful execution of this action will eliminate <sup>CERTAIN</sup> supplies and key bases which have supported the Vietnamese communists. With the destruction of these

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facilities, the communist force will be at least reduced and may be forced to disperse and withdraw. The Cambodians will be able once again to regain control of their own territory. There will be a reduction in the threat to South Viet-Nam as well as to United States forces. As a result, we expect the war to be limited rather than widened, the fighting to be shortened rather than prolonged, and prospects enhanced for our Vietnamization program.

At the same time the door to peace is open. We hope that our adversaries will, at long last, see the wisdom of engaging in serious negotiations with us and with the Government of South Viet-Nam to bring this tragic war to an end. For our part, as I have said before, we are ready for a settlement fair to everyone. The time to agree on that settlement is at hand.

In sum, our decision to move against some of these sanctuary areas was reached only after the most painstaking and prayerful thought. The deciding factor was our concern for the lives of American soldiers in South Viet-Nam and our determination to proceed with Vietnamization. No final decision has been reached with regard to our response to Lon Nol's request for

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military hardware, but I propose to keep you informed of our actions, in the same way that I am speaking to you frankly this evening.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

SUBJECT: The President's Forthcoming Speech

1. I submit the following suggestions for possible consideration:


a. A hint or an allusion to the fact that "sanctuary" has been used by the enemy to our considerable disadvantage not only in Cambodia but in North Vietnam also. The forbearance which has stayed our hand has now come to an end with respect to Cambodia.

b. A simple, easy to read map, which would particularly point up the proximity of the Cambodian sanctuary to the city of Saigon if nothing else would be effective with an audience which is probably not entirely familiar with the geographic location of Cambodia. I recall that President Kennedy made very effective use of this kind of map in connection with Laos.

c. Madame Binh was quoted yesterday on the radio as having said either yesterday morning or the day before that the time had now come for a general offensive against the Americans in all the Indo-Chinese countries. A reference to her statement might be useful.

2. The only other suggestion, and I make it even though it may seem presumptuous, is that the Presidential statement be imbued with, and be made in, a spirit of quiet confidence in the justice of our position and our actions rather than in a spirit of anger or desperation.

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Thomas H. Karamessines  
Deputy Director for Plans

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Here is part of a briefing which I gave yesterday to the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services (Rivers, Arends, Philbin, Bob Wilson, Mel Price, etc.). Perhaps some of the language would be useful in the President's speech.

*Rich*

Richard Helms  
Director

29 April 1970  
(DATE)

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1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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The Military Picture

I. Recent developments in Cambodia have added a new dimension to the war in Indochina. The 18 March deposition of Sihanouk set in motion a chain of events whose final outcome is still uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the situation is changing and that in these changes Hanoi sees both new opportunities and the potential for major problems.

A. Over the past several years, and particularly since 1968, Cambodia has become increasingly important to Hanoi's war effort in South Vietnam. Cambodia has been a source of food for Communist forces in the South and a secure route for the shipment of military supplies. It is obviously much easier to send heavy supplies such as weapons or ammunitions by sea via Sihanoukville and thence by truck or barge to Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army depots in South Vietnam than to carry these supplies overland via Laos under continual aerial harassment.

B. Cambodia's most important contribution to the Communist war effort, however, has been that of

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providing sanctuaries to Communist forces. By using Cambodian territory, the Communists have been able to set up an elaborate set of bases largely immune to allied attack. These bases house supply depots, hospitals, training camps, troop replacement centers and the major command elements through which Hanoi runs the war in South Vietnam.

C. Over the past two years, the role of the Cambodian sanctuaries has become increasingly important. Since Tet 1968, the allied military effort has progressed to the point where the Communists have no base areas in South Vietnam that are not vulnerable to ground sweeps as well as aerial attack. Furthermore, The Communists cannot now mass large forces anywhere in South Vietnam without running the severe risk of taking heavy casualties from allied air strikes and ground operations. Thus the Cambodian sanctuaries have become Hanoi's indispensable safety valve. Whenever Communist units in South Vietnam get too hard pressed or begin to take losses, the Communist high command considers unacceptable, these units can be -- and are -- pulled back in Cambodian sanctu-

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aries where they are virtually immune to further harassment. In these sanctuaries, Communist units rest, refit, pick up fresh personnel and equipment and are readied to sally forth to fight again in South Vietnam at times and places of Hanoi's choosing.

D. The Cambodian sanctuaries also play a key role in Hanoi's response to the Vietnamization and pacification programs. Because of their existence, especially the sanctuaries in southern Cambodia along the III and IV Corps frontiers, Hanoi can always mass large hostile forces in close proximity to major South Vietnamese population concentrations. This ability enables Hanoi to pose a continuing threat to South Vietnam's internal security that no amount of progress in pacification or Vietnamization can ever eradicate.

D. In short, Hanoi's whole present manner of fighting the war makes great use of the availability of sanctuary areas in Cambodia relatively immune to serious hostile attack. Current events in Cambodia thus present Hanoi with the deeply disquieting prospect that these essential sanctuaries may no longer remain inviolate.

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E. The Communists also face new uncertainties in the logistics field, but these are probably of somewhat lesser importance. Communist forces will almost certainly be able to seize, requisition or even purchase enough food stores or supplies in the Cambodian countryside to meet their major requirements. Hanoi can also eventually develop new supply channels to replace the extremely useful, but not absolutely critical, port of Sihanoukville -- either by augmenting the overland routes through Laos and/or by capturing a part of the southeastern Cambodian coastline for some continued resupply by sea.

F. Because the final outcome of current events in Cambodia is so uncertain, we must avoid either exaggerating or minimizing the implications of Cambodian developments or jumping too quickly to judgments about their ultimate impact on Hanoi's overall strategy.

1. The new situation in Cambodia means that at least for the time being, the Communists will now have to concern themselves with protecting their bases in Cambodia -- that they have lost this element of sanctuary.

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2. It also means that they cannot count on the unimpeded movement of supplies through Cambodia, <sup>through</sup> but this supply line, of course, was challenged or disrupted on occasion even before the Lon Nol government took over.

II. Despite the new difficulties, it is clear that the Vietnamese Communists hope to turn the events in Cambodia to their own advantage. The Communists have already used sufficient military force to drive the Cambodian armed forces back away from the border, and they have made a number of penetrations into the interior of the country, striking at road junctions, provincial towns, and government installations.

A. Over the long run, if the Vietnamese Communists should overthrow the Lon Nol - Sirik Matak government and install a Communist-controlled regime in Phnom Penh, Communist prospects in South Vietnam would certainly be enhanced.

1. Insofar as sanctuary and unimpeded supply are concerned, they would be even





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C. On balance, then, the Cambodian crisis appears to hold out many difficulties for the Communists, and the promise of great advantage only after much time and effort has been expended in guiding and nourishing a new client insurgency.

1. The Communist problems in Cambodia can be magnified by the intervention of South Vietnamese forces. So far, these raids probably have caused only moderate and temporary damage to a few Communist units and base areas, but there are signs that the South Vietnamese may soon become more adventurous.

III. In South Vietnam, meanwhile, the Communists recently carried out their most widespread attacks in about six months.

A. The recent enemy operations--carried out mainly by sappers, guerrillas, and artillerymen while the big infantry units continued to lie low--were similar to the periodic surges of activity mounted by the Communists during the spring and summer of 1967.



HAK

Soviets and Cambodia -- The President's Speech.

In terms of your exchanges with the Soviets, I think it would be desirable to include a line such as the following in the speech. This may, incidentally, be desirable for Chinese reasons. It is admittedly only a line and may or may not affect what the Soviets do and say; I realize it also resembles what the Soviets said at the time of Czechoslovakia and Hungary but that may get the point across to the Soviets that much more effectively.

" The actions I have authorized today are solely for the protection of American forces in Vietnam. They will be terminated immediately when that mission has been accomplished and effective neutrality has thereby been restored in Cambodia. These actions are in no way directed at the security interests of any other nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for exacerbating relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility and at its own initiative and we will draw the appropriate conclusions."

Sonnenfeldt.