

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Current South Korean Domestic Political Situation

It is requested that an assessment be made of the current South Korean internal political situation, accompanied by a projection of the prospects for the next two to three months. The following questions should be addressed in particular:

-- What is the nature of President Park's opposition, and what are its objectives and strategy? What risks is it prepared to take to bring Park down? What change in the character and magnitude of the opposition has there been since last October?


-- How does President Park perceive the opposition threat to him? What is Park's strategy for dealing with the opposition? Especially, how does Park view the constraints (including those of the U. S.) on him? How does Park see his opposition problem in terms of the North Korean challenge?

-- What is the extent of Park's support within his own government, especially among the security services and the CIA?

-- What information do we have on North Korea's attitude toward Park's opposition, and whether the North Koreans are playing or attempting to play any role in the South's domestic turmoil?

It would be helpful if the above assessment could be forwarded by January 31, 1974.

NSS review completed.


Henry A. Kissinger

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONSECRET

January 16, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Request for CIA Assessment
of Current South Korean Internal Political
Situation

At Tab A is a request for a CIA assessment of the current South Korean internal political situation. I believe such an assessment is needed in light of the intensified challenge to the Park Government from its domestic opposition, and President Park's consequent effort to prohibit criticism of the tighter political controls which he imposed a year ago. Embassy Seoul and State's EA Bureau are disposed to try to put constraints on Park's handling of the situation, an approach that we feel is at best problematic. A balanced intelligence assessment of the situation would therefore be highly useful to us at this time in assessing how best to respond to the Park Government in the light of our overall movement on Korean security issues. The requested analysis should, like a similar assessment we requested last October, be an internal CIA -- rather than an intelligence community -- effort.

Recommendation:

That you sign the draft memorandum at Tab A.

Concurrence:

Mr. Smyser *WRS* *JAF*Mr. Solomon *RHS* *JAF*