THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SEGRET/SENSITIVE

August 22, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

Lt. General Vernon A. Walters Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT:

Strength of CIA Station in South Vietnam

The reduction of CIA personnel in South Vietnam proposed in your memorandum of July 24, 1973, is approved provided that this reduction does not reduce the Station's intelligence coverage, especially of Communist activities in the area.

Initial reductions should, however, be delayed, until the end of calendar 1973, when we should know better whether or not the Communists are planning major attacks in the coming dry season.

Henry A. Kissinger

NSS review completed.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

No Objection to Declass	ification i	in Part	2013/03/22	: LOC-HAK-3	8-3-3-3

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

August 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT:

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Reduction of CIA Personnel in South Vietnam

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deneral watters has sent you a memorahum (rab b) bonceting your
concurrence in reducing CIA personnel in South Vietnam by
by July 1, 1974 and by July 1, 1975.
represent about 25% of current CIA personnel.) Walters notes that this
reduction would not sacrifice the Station's ability to provide adequate
intelligence cover and is based on the assumption that there will be no
sharp rise in military operations nor a nationwide political crisis over
the next two years. Should these assumptions prove invalid, reduction
will be reconsidered. George Carver has assured us that there is presently
a built-in redundancy in CIA personnel in South Vietnam to compensate for
those on leave. The amount of leave taken is expected to decrease now
that families will accompany those assigned to Vietnam. Carver, therefore,
does not believe the reductions (which will include a number of clerical
personnel) will decrease the Station's capabilities.

At Tab A is a memorandum replying to Walters by concurring in this reduction providing that it does not reduce the Station's intelligence coverage, especially of Communist activities. It also suggests delaying the reductions until the end of 1973, since by that time, we should know better whether or not the Communists are planning major attacks in the coming dry season.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Approve	Disapprove

Mr. Kennedy concurs

SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS By CLA

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-38-3-3-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

24 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

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Strength of CIA Station in South Vietnam

1. The strength of the CIA Station in South Vietnam was fixed at pursuant to your approval of the "Recommendations Regarding the U.S. Intelligence Posture in a Post-Hostilities South Vietnam" forwarded to you in a memorandum from Mr. Helms dated 10 November 1972, which included a recommendation of this strength figure. The changed situation in South Vietnam since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement has led the Agency to reassess the requirement for continued maintenance of a Station of this size in the country, particularly given current budgetary considerations. The conclusion of the reassessment, in which our Chief of Station in Saigon took the leading role, is that by 1 July 1974 and by an equal the Station can be reduced or greater number by 1 July 1975, without sacrificing the Station's ability to provide adequate intelligence coverage of the situation in South Vietnam. We would therefore propose to implement the conclusions of this reassessment by making these reductions incrementally over the next two years. This proposal is of course based on the planning assumptions that there will be no sharp rise in active military operations in South Vietnam over the next two years nor any major, nationwide political crisis in that country. If the actual course of events should render either of these planning assumptions invalid, we would naturally have to reconsider the strength reductions envisaged in this proposal.

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(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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2. Inasmuch as the existing strength figure received your approval, I am soliciting your concurrence in undertaking the strength reductions indicated above.

> Vernon A. Walters Lieutenant General, USA Acting Director