

*Chron*NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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August 16, 1973

DOS REVIEWED 16 MAR 2011 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: PHIL ODEEN *PO*  
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Schlesinger

You are scheduled to have breakfast with Jim Schlesinger, Friday, August 17. This memo covers the range of subjects you should raise with him. I understand the primary subject is to be SALT; however, if you have time you may wish to touch on the planned DPRC review of the Defense program and the Naval Forces study.

SALT

On SALT your discussion should cover:

- The impact on the U.S. SALT position of recent Soviet MIRV testing, and the likely Soviet reaction to our proposals.
- Where we go from here in SALT.

U.S. SALT Position

You may recall that the U.S. SALT position has three main elements:

1. Permanent agreement with equal aggregates in central systems at 2350 level. This would include:

- permanent qualitative limitations;
- freedom to mix constrained by ceilings on the number of ICBMs and MLBMs;
- non-circumvention assurances on FBS;
- ban ASMs with range over 3000 kilometers (1600 nm).

2. A willingness to consider reductions and Soviet proposals to ban intercontinental cruise missiles, strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms on the sea beds etc.

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3. Provisional agreement freezing ICBM MIRVs. In this connection the permanent MIRV deal could be modified to reflect the degree of equality achieved in the aggregates. Additionally we could accept a ceiling on throw weight if MIRV controls are adequate.

#### Soviet Actions and Positions

The Soviets have recently begun testing MIRVs on their ICBMs. (This fact alone constitutes a de facto rejection of the U.S. MIRV proposal.) It does not give the Soviets a MIRV capability but in time will undermine the validity of our freeze proposal (CIA says after 10 successful tests). In addition, the Soviets have made it quite clear that they will reject the U.S. MIRV freeze proposal when SALT resumes.

You may want to ask Schlesinger whether in this light it would be better to seek a new MIRV position or hold to our present position until the Soviets make a formal reply to it.

#### Where Do We Go from Here?

While we should not let the MIRV testing or imminent Soviet rejection of our proposal stampede us into a hasty revision of our position, we must begin to take a hard look at our objectives for SALT and develop a new SALT position that takes account of this fact.

Schlesinger's arrival in the Pentagon has led to some moderating of the OSD position on SALT. The OSD SALT position has gradually diverged from the JCS to where OSD now essentially supports our SALT position.

However, Schlesinger's call to you on equal aggregates and Clements' prattling on reductions yesterday raises the question of what they expect out of SALT. You should probe Schlesinger's views on SALT. We suggest you raise the following questions:

-- Can we limit Soviet MIRVs now that they've started testing? If the Soviets fully MIRV their missiles it will give them an enormous increase in strategic capability against the U.S. and lead to a highly unstable situation. Should we be prepared to take some risks to avoid this?

-- What does Schlesinger think our MIRV position should be? Can we expect to negotiate an advantage in MIRVed launchers to offset Soviet throw weight? Is there any way to keep MIRVs off all the new Soviet missiles? How can we restrict the numbers of missiles MIRVed?

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-- How can we get some leverage on the Soviet MIRV programs? What about limits on bomber launched cruise missiles? You might mention that the Soviets have repeatedly raised the bomber armaments question with you and then note the recent OSD cancellation of SCAD and your repeated attempts to get Clements to start a new bomber launched cruise missile program. We must not short-sightedly give up what little leverage we have.

-- If we can't limit MIRVs, what good is numerical equality in a fully MIRVed world? Why should we care about equality in launchers, if the Soviets can have thousands of more ICBM RVs with greater yields than we do? Does Schlesinger believe equality is vital in a permanent agreement?

-- What does OSD think can be achieved through reductions? The analyses all show reductions make our forces more vulnerable. What Soviet reductions would not reduce strategic stability? What would we be willing to pay for those reductions?

-- Why does OSD continue to push for land mobiles? Can they come up with a mobility scheme that is acceptable from a verification standpoint?

-- Can SALT contribute to enhancing bomber survivability? Would OSD support bomber survivability measures? How does Schlesinger view the SSBN survivability question? Can we define measures that will eliminate likely threats to submarine survivability?

#### Defense Program Review

You should stress the need for a careful review of the FY 75-79 Defense program. Schlesinger does not want to lay out the program until he completes his internal review and makes decisions. I understand this since he sees many shortcomings in the present Service proposals. But once he makes decisions, changing them will be difficult.

Schlesinger's review will be complete by early September. You might propose a DPRC presentation about September laying out the program. This would permit us to define issues for further discussion during the fall.

The DOD DPRC paper argues that manpower and procurement cost growth is under control and force levels will remain generally level. This is an exceedingly optimistic view, for example:

-- The Air Force plans to cut its tactical air forces from the current 22 wings to 19 in the late 1970s.

-- There are major problems in the Navy in escort ships, fleet support ships and aircraft carriers.

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Our strategic planning is becoming more inflexible, and we are entering the 1970s almost totally dependent on high risk and expensive new weapons systems:

-- The B-1 has been slipped and air-to-surface cruise missile hedge programs are being cut by the Air Force and Navy.

-- Trident I missile has been slipped to the early 1980s -- there is no hedge to Poseidon vulnerability.

-- We have no clear plan for dealing with land-based missile vulnerability.

You may want to ask about the Army manpower situation. Is recruiting as bad as the media has portrayed? Why have we increased quality standards to levels in excess of those during the draft? The problems are probably not as bad as the press dispatches indicate, but Schlesinger needs to stay on top of the problem.

#### Naval Force Study (NSSM 174)

You will recall that we have been trying for over two years to get DOD to study the roles and missions of our naval forces, the adequacy of the present and programmed forces, and the nature of the Soviet naval threat. Unfortunately, progress is still very limited.

DOD is chairing the study effort and to date they have completed the first three parts of the study: (1) an analysis of the threat, (2) the diplomatic presence role of naval forces, and (3) naval forces in the "unilateral intervention role." This work is reasonably well done and of some interest. It fails, however, to get at the fundamental issues which the NSSM raised.

-- What are the key missions that naval forces should perform and how well do our current forces carry them out?

-- Are there alternative naval force postures that would be more effective in meeting security needs and supporting our foreign policy?

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At a Steering Group meeting earlier this week, Len Sullivan (the new head of Systems Analysis) indicated that they could not proceed to address these issues at this time. He said Schlesinger is asking the same kinds of questions and has told him and the Navy that he is going to get answers by the end of the year. This effort will take their full analytic capability.

If Schlesinger is indeed serious about taking on the Navy, we should support his effort and not complicate matters by insisting on some arbitrary date for completion of the NSSM.

I suggest you raise this subject and probe him to ensure that he is serious about taking a hard look at naval force planning. If so, you might indicate that we could work out a new schedule for the NSSM that will tie in with Defense's in-house work. It is important, however, to ensure that at some point these issues are addressed within the NSC system, incorporating the views of State and CIA, and final decisions on overall force levels and strategy are made by the President.

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