

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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PRESS CONFERENCE BY  
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
AT THE BINNENHOF  
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS  
AUGUST 11, 1976

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VAN DER STOEL: Ladies and gentlemen, I will perhaps first of all mention the way the visit of Secretary of State Kissinger to The Netherlands came about. As you know, The Netherlands has at the moment the Presidency of the European Community, and we do feel especially the need to keep in close contact on the number of current international problems with the United States. I therefore, at the end of July, invited the Secretary for a visit to The Hague, and I am very pleased that he found his way on his return from Asia to pay a visit to The Netherlands to discuss a number of current problems early in the Presidency of the Netherlands of the European Community. We have spent time together, in my view, in a very fruitful way, and we have discussed a wide range of issues. We have discussed the problem of southern Africa; we have discussed the developments in the Middle East; we have discussed the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations; and we have discussed the problems which have arisen between Greece and Turkey, a subject on which I have informed the Secretary also of my impressions during my visit the last few days. In essence, we discussed over luncheon in the presence of the Minister of Development and Cooperation the North-South dialogue in Paris and the ways of securing its success. On the subjects which came up, I am not aware of any specific bilateral questions we discussed because the state of our bilateral relations is a happy one, so I think we spent very useful hours together in a very frank exchange of views.

May I now call on you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we take questions, I would simply like to thank the Foreign Minister for the friendly reception we have had here and the very fruitful talks we have conducted. He has enumerated the subjects, and the discussion was conducted in the atmosphere of friends that have similar values and whose disagreements concern how to reach agreed objectives. I consider the talk very fruitful. We will cooperate closely with The Netherlands in its Presidency of

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the European Community. We will stay in close touch with each other, and the Foreign Minister has kindly agreed to visit Washington when he is in the United States during the meeting of the General Assembly and we will continue our dialogue then.

Now I'll be glad to answer questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is the United States position now on the sale of the French nuclear weapons to Pakistan since Prime Minister [inaudible] --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no question of selling French nuclear weapons to Pakistan. There is the concern with nonproliferation. [Sentence partially inaudible] -- the sale of the reprocessing plant. I believe that too much has been said all around on this subject. There are two separate issues involved -- one is the contract between Pakistan and France, which is a matter between Pakistan and France; the second is the question of general non-proliferation in which all nations have an interest. It is of no benefit to any one nation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and we believe still that these two problems -- the problem of any particular contract and the problem of the rebate of the issue of nonproliferation -- can be discussed. We are trying to create a calm atmosphere for it and we will say no more about the subject until everybody has cooled off a little bit and then return to the basic issues.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there is the impression that you had proposed a tripartite conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think there is a misunderstanding. I have never proposed a tripartite conference between France, Pakistan and the United States. I believe that the issues should be discussed among various parties, but I've never proposed a tripartite conference.

QUESTION: We can say there are three fields of possible detente -- the political, the military and the humanitarian one. The humanitarian one is probably Point 7 and Basket 3 of the Final Act of Helsinki. There is some fear, especially among Soviet dissidents, that the United States may give less priority to Point 7 and Basket 3 in order to obtain more success in the other fields. Is this fear justified and how much weight do you attach to Point 7 and Basket 3?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States will not trade concessions in the humanitarian field for benefits in the economic or military field, so that is absolutely out of the question. We attach considerable importance to Basket 3 of the Final Act of Helsinki, and it was one of the principle incentives we had for signing the Final Act. Therefore we will give considerable attention to it, and we expect to work together with our allies in Western Europe on preparing for the Belgrade conference next summer where we will stress this point very much.

QUESTION: This includes Point 7, of course?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, this includes -- frankly, I don't know the individual points, so I don't want to say yes; what is 7?

QUESTION: It involves the free press inside the countries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, the entire Basket 3.

QUESTION: Would you please give us your opinion on how you see the respective roles of Europe and the United States in a potential settlement of the Greek-Turkish problem?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the Greek-Turkish problem, of course, has many aspects. There is the problem of Cyprus, the problem of the Aegean. The United States feels very strongly that both of these problems should be settled by negotiations. We have stated repeatedly with respect to Cyprus that we do not believe that the status quo on Cyprus is an acceptable basis for a settlement and that, therefore, a solution has to be found that takes into account the self-respect and dignity of all of the communities. As it happened, I had an extensive talk with Mr. van der Stoel on this subject, and I would not wish to say who has a greater role to play here -- the United States or the European Community. I believe we both have an obligation to do our utmost to see to it first of all that there are no additional military clashes because this would be a catastrophe for the two countries as well as a misfortune for NATO; secondly, to move the two countries toward equitable solutions on both of these issues. I had the impression that we agreed on these objectives, and we will pursue parallel policies in which each of us in our own way will urge restraint on both sides and will give whatever support we can to peaceful solutions. Is that a fair statement?

MINISTER VAN DER STOEL: I think so, yes. Let me add that the countries of the European Community have been in touch both with Ankara and Athens in order to convey their views. That is, the Nine have agreed on a specific line calling for moderation and restraint. It has been made clear and explained in both capitals -- Ankara and Athens.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And so has the United States, but separately and not with notes that were coordinated. It turned out we had very parallel views on the subject.

QUESTION: What about the case being taken to the International Court at The Hague which was confirmed last night by the registrar of the Court? Would you regard this as a help or as a hindrance to your present policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are basically supporting a peaceful solution. Referring it to the International Court is one of those which we certainly would not exclude and would not consider a hindrance, but it of course has to be accepted by both parties.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there a reasonable chance that a SALT II agreement will be signed before the Presidential election?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: It depends whom you talk to in the United States. Now, I would not want to predict when a SALT II agreement will be signed. The issues that remain to be solved are clearly defined, and they deal substantially with the relationship of CRUISE missiles to BACKFIRE bombers. There are discussions within our Government of various approaches to this problem. Most press accounts of these approaches are incorrect; but nevertheless, there are various approaches to it, and when we have formulated our position and submitted it to the Soviet Union, then it is hard to predict how long it will take to negotiate it.

QUESTION: Have you formulated that position now, already?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, it is still before the National Security Council.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there is a report from Johannesburg saying that there has been a breakthrough on the negotiations on Namibia. One, are you aware of such a breakthrough? Two, does that mean avoiding confrontation at the UN? And three, do you foresee a smooth transition of black majority rule in Namibia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have been talking to South Africa about the problem of Namibia, and we have been urging a solution that moves in the direction of self-determination for Namibia and we have publicly supported self-determination for Namibia and a date for independence. I think it is premature to say that there has been a breakthrough. We have had useful talks with the Prime Minister of South Africa, but I would think it is premature to speak of a breakthrough.

QUESTION: Sorry, may I add one — there's one question here further.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My family thanks you.

QUESTION: Would you consider another term in your present job if whoever was elected President asks you to remain?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I as much as suggested that a Democratic President might ask me, there would be twenty candidates for my position on the Democratic side who would be in a state of extreme agitation. I have stated my view on the subject repeatedly, and I think the time to consider this is after President Ford is re-elected and I have stated my preferences on that subject.

QUESTION: I would like to know if you also discussed with Mr. van der Stoep the type of Puerto Rican meetings you are having from time to time where you exclude the smaller countries of the Common Market by their [inaudible]? Now the last one concerned Italy and aid to Italy, and I understand that Dutch Socialist Prime Minister den Uyl has other views on that than cutting off aid that would be [inaudible] Communists in the government. Could you say more on that? What is your next

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plan for meeting and will you then invite the other countries as well?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I haven't had the privilege of meeting your Prime Minister. I will do that after the press conference, but it would not be the first time in history that his views did not exactly coincide with ours without in any way indicating any lack of friendship on either side.

Now, on the Puerto Rico meeting, there is no Puerto Rico meeting foreseeable during the Presidency of The Netherlands and so this issue did not come up. Also, it is incorrect to describe the Puerto Rico meeting as concerning Italy. It was inevitable that as various leaders met, various ideas were exchanged on the subject. But that was not the purpose of the meeting, and there have been some exaggerated accounts of what it was that was in fact discussed. At any rate, there will be no meeting of the Puerto Rican type during the Presidency of the Netherlands that I can foresee and thereafter; I also don't foresee one, but thereafter I can't preclude it for all eternity, particularly if one of the twenty people that we talked about --

QUESTION: And did you think the statement by Chancellor Schmidt exaggerated?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I understand it, Chancellor Schmidt didn't even make a formal statement. These were accounts of things that he was -- I think they gave it -- it gave an impression of formality to general discussions. That was perhaps exaggerated, yes.

QUESTION: Is the United States still of the opinion that aid should be cut off from Italy if there would be Communists in the government?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have stated the United States view about Communist participation in Italy on repeated occasions, always under extreme provocation. And I have now decided that I will no longer be provoked, so you will have to read my previous statements.

QUESTION: A week ago you spoke about negotiations in southern Africa being in a formative state. That means to say that you will not be expected to give any details. Can you give us a general idea as to what US diplomacy is up to and what role, if any, the European Community will play?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are obviously trying to find a basis by which progress can be made toward self-determination in southern Africa with particular emphasis in this phase on Rhodesia and Namibia. We are in the closest touch with Great Britain on the Rhodesian question because of its historical and legal responsibilities. We also exchanged views on this matter with the Dutch Foreign Minister. We believe that the problems of Africa are not American problems, but first of all African problems. But if any other outside countries take an interest in it, I think Europe, because of its historical relationship to it has a major responsibility as well. So, our basic concern is to defuse the situation that may be drifting toward radical and violent solutions with great rapidity and to find an outcome that respects the dignity of all of the communities involved there and which is achieved by negotiation. But time is clearly running out and this gives a certain urgency to our efforts.

QUESTION: About southern Africa, you spoke about Rhodesia and Namibia. First question: Is the question of self-determination also critical to South Africa? Second question: about the Middle East, you mentioned in the past the responsible role of Syria in Lebanon. Do you think at this moment that Syria is still filling a responsible role in Lebanon or not?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has expressed its opposition to the policy of apartheid and it has repeatedly called attention to the need to heed the warnings of (inaudible) are reflected in such issues and such tragedies as the riots that have recently occurred in South Africa. At the same time, we believe that the problem of South Africa has a different dimension from the problem of Rhodesia and Namibia in the sense that the latter can be called, can be generally put under the category of the vestiges of a colonial period while South Africa, whatever one thinks of the moral quality of apartheid, is not a colonial problem but an African problem and, therefore, it requires a different mode of solution, and a different approach. But we are, in principle, opposed to the policy of apartheid and have stated so repeatedly.

With respect to Lebanon, our view is that the Damascus formula of earlier this year is the best solution to the problem of Lebanon; that is to say, a certain reapportionment of power as between the Christians and the Moslem communities, but nevertheless an essential balance in their political influence. This is what we have considered a responsible solution. As for the individual moves that are being carried out, we are not in favor of interference of any outside country and our present conviction is that there should be a roundtable conference as rapidly as possible among all of the parties to bring about a solution.

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QUESTION: (Inaudible) and do you expect in this regard something from the meeting of the nonaligned countries and the Group of 77?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As a general proposition I cannot accept the argument that whenever there is a deadlock in the North-South dialogue it is up to the US to break it. Nor can I accept as a general proposition the argument that we must always talk on an agenda which is proposed by the Group of 77. On the other hand, I believe we had very good talks here with the Foreign Minister and Minister Pronk about the general direction this dialogue might take. I expect to meet with Canadian Foreign Minister MacEachen who is the Chairman of the Conference -- Co-Chairman of the Conference, next week. I will also invite Minister Perez Guerrero to meet with me, and I think that after I've had those two meetings it will be clearer about what progress can be made.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what do you think about the recent events at the frontier between the GDR and (inaudible) and Mr. Kreisky said events like these must be discussed at the Conference in Belgrade?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the risk of creating another uproar with another friendly government, I have to tell you I have not studied all the details of what happened during my trip. Of course, we believe that the dividing line and the manner in which it is enforced is itself contrary to the aspirations of the German people, and that we deplore this enforced separation of the peoples of the two Germanys. I would believe that it might well be discussed in Belgrade, but I had reserved to study all the incidents when I returned, since I have been travelling for nearly 10 days.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary and Mr. Foreign Minister, did the Lockheed affair come up in your discussions today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have taken the position from the beginning that the Lockheed affair is a legal problem and not a foreign policy problem between the US and any other country. And in pursuit of this we have deliberately not informed ourselves of any of the documents that are involved and have insisted that they be handled strictly between the legal authorities of the US and the countries concerned. This being our position, we have no basis for any discussions on the foreign minister level. The issue was not raised or discussed.

MINISTER VAN DER STOEL: I can only confirm what the Secretary has just said.



QUESTION: You have several times in the past few weeks spoken of a need or a preference for a roundtable conference on the Lebanese situation. First of all, have you ever had any favorable response from any of the parties and secondly, would you consider it advisable for the US to participate in such a conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There have been at various times indications from various parties that they might be willing to do it, but it has never been possible to bring them to the point of fruition. I do not believe that the US should invite itself to such a conference. If all the parties were to agree to invite us, we would have to look at it, but I consider that an unlikely prospect.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said in the beginning that the US will not sacrifice humanitarian issues for economic or military factors. Is it a general principle of your government or is the principle applicable only to the East bloc?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the sense of engaging in a negotiation in which we would sacrifice a humanitarian principle for some other benefit, I would say it is a general proposition. If you apply it in a more abstract way, it is clear we also have to weigh security and economic factors together with humanitarian factors in relation to many issues in the world and that creates the dilemmas of policy making.

QUESTION: In your assessment, does there now exist a real danger of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I cannot believe that those two countries which have already suffered so much from their conflict would resort to armed means to settle an issue which, serious as it is, has far from exhausted all the peaceful means. Greece has taken the case to the Security Council and I would believe this offers one way in which the discussion of the issue can occur. So I do not believe that an armed conflict should occur and the US will use all its influence with both parties to urge them to explore the many means of peaceful resolution that are still available. And I believe that the European Community has a similar attitude.

QUESTION: You said that the time was running out in Namibia and Rhodesia. You said you are in close touch with Britain as far as policy is concerned. Would you say time has come now for Britain for a major initiative?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, we are in the closest touch with Great Britain. I believe that our policies are essentially in harmony on this matter. We are not ahead of Great Britain in the policy we are pursuing. We are not urging it to go any faster. I think matters are proceeding at the pace we consider appropriate, and we and Britain have essentially agreed that is the most effective way to proceed. So we have no private, and even less public, advice



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to extend to Great Britain at this moment. We have to keep one country on this continent, in Europe, on friendly terms.

QUESTION: The Europeans are most concerned about changes of American policy with a change in government. Can you say anything concerning that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, I don't anticipate a change in government, but in the unlikely event that this were to happen, the American foreign policy is determined by the permanent interests and values of the US. I believe that any responsible leader will interpret those in an analogous way, and while there are undoubtedly differences in emphasis, I would think the main lines of American foreign policy are determined by our interests and not by our parties.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

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