

MEMORANDUM

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MORI/CDF per C05138349

INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD T. KENNEDY *RTK*
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH*

SUBJECT:

The Neo Lao Hak Sat's "Article 12"
Territorial Claims

CIA has provided an analysis of the territorial claims contained in the draft military protocol submitted to Souvanna on March 29, 1973, by the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) (Tab A).

The draft military protocol (completely unacceptable to Souvanna) contains a section on ceasefire problems which includes an "Article 12" on the separation of opposing forces at 35 boundary points. The CIA has plotted 33 points (they cannot locate 2 points) on the map at Tab B. The Lao Government fears that the boundary points serve to stake out new Communist territorial claims, noting that if the points are connected by straight lines to form a political demarcation line, the Communists would be claiming much more territory now than in 1962.

Most of the points are obvious land grab attempts. Some examples are:

- Hong Sa (Pt. 2) -- would put the Communist-controlled area south of Mekong in north Laos for the first time.
- Phou Khakhouay (Pt. 14) -- a major Lao Army training camp.
- Muong May (Pt. 15) -- would give the Communists control of the main routes south from the Plaine des Jarres.
- Pak Kading (Pt. 16) -- would give the Communists control of Route 13, the only government route to southern Laos.

The boundary points are probably NLHS maximum claims from which they hope to obtain a few choice points in the final bargaining sessions.

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Article 12 also states that a Joint Commission will work out the location of other boundary points based on the reality of the boundaries controlled by each side. The Lao Government contends that "control" means supervision of the populace or, at least, the patrolling of the mountains and jungle of unpopulated areas. On the other hand, the NLHS (on the basis of an analysis of their claims) appears to equate "control" to anything that falls within the range of their guns or rockets.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William H. Sullivan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

SUBJECT : The Neo Lao Hak Sat's "Article 12"
Territorial Claims

1. The attached package constitutes our response to your 6 April questions on the territorial claims embedded in the draft military protocol submitted by the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and reported [redacted]

[redacted] This package consists of:

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- a. A map depicting the locations of the "Article 12" boundary points.
- b. A list of the boundary points and their coordinates.
- c. A note on Article 12's territorial implications.
- d. A second graphic containing a pair of maps, one showing the general control situation in June 1962, the other showing the general situation as of February 1973. These are provided for comparison purposes.

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2. On the Article 12 map, we have taken the 35 points cited in Article 12, arbitrarily numbered them 1 through 35 (from north to south), plotted them, and connected them -- again arbitrarily -- with straight lines. These lines, in turn, give a general depiction of the boundary of the territory the Communists are claiming -- though not necessarily a precise one (unless the Communists are also connecting their points with straight lines, as they may well be). The

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
line connecting points 11 and 14 is broken because we were not able to pinpoint the locations of points 12 and 13, hence were unable to plot them. Article 12 did not provide coordinates. We were able to solve the geographic riddle with respect to 33 of the 35 points, but could not fix these remaining two.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

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LAOS



- Boundary points of Zone of Control claimed by NLHS
- 12 Muong Om unlocated Xieng Khouang Province
- 13 Pak Namcha unlocated Vientiane or Borikhane Provinces

BOUNDARY POINT LOCATIONS AND COORDINATES

Houa Khong Province

1. Ban Pong - PC 6655

Sayaboury Province

2. Hong Sa - QB 4580

Luang Prabang Province

3. Pak Ou - TH 0919
4. Bo He (Pak Xueng) - TH 1909
5. Pha Thong - TG 1492
6. Pak Bak (Nam Kham) - TG 1586

Xieng Khouang Province

7. Phou Soung Nanane - TG 3653
8. Ban Na - TG 8638
9. Sam Thong - TG 7924
10. Phou Phaxai - TG 9422
11. Chom Tieng - UG 0213
12. Moung Om - unlocated

Vientiane/Borikhane Province

13. Pak Namcha - unlocated
14. Phou Khakhouay - TF 6634
15. Muong May - UF 5946
16. Pak Kading - UF 9526

Khammouane Province

17. Pak Hinboun - VE 6145
18. Khoua Songhong - VE 5659
19. Kouane Phavang (Route 12) - VE 9229
20. Nadon - VE 9118
21. Thadeua - VE 8113
22. Pak Se Bangfay - VD 7373

Savannakhet Province

23. Ban Laophay - VD 9273
24. Ban Nachan - WD 2355
25. Western Phalane - WD 6041
26. Songkhong - WC 3297

Saravane/Vapikhamthong Province

27. La Khone Pheng - WC 6057
28. Bungkham - XC 2237
29. Boualapha (East of Khong Sedone) - WC 8720
30. Houei Champi - XB 0087
31. Keo Nhao (Ban Saphat) - XC 0335

Sedone Province/Bolovens

32. Ban E-Tou (Route 23) - XB 1878
33. Houei Phad (South of Ban Lao Ngam) - XB 0677

Sithandone Province

34. Nalane Phapho - XB 1728
35. Ban Boun - WB 9417

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NOTE ON THE TERRITORIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
NLHS' 29 MARCH MILITARY PROTOCOL'S "ARTICLE 12"

The Lao Patriotic Front (NLHS) draft military protocol, presented to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his government on 29 March 1973 (and which is completely unacceptable to Souvanna on several counts), contains a section on cease-fire problems which includes an "Article 12" on the separation of opposing forces at 35 boundary points. The approximate location of 33 of the boundary points are illustrated on the attached map. Two points, Muong Om in Xieng Khouang Province and Pak Namcha in either Vientiane or Borikhane Provinces, have not yet been found on maps available to us. (The NLHS map attached to the draft protocol is in Lao government hands in Vientiane.) The Lao government understandably fears that the 35 boundary points serve to stake out new Communist territorial claims, noting that if the points are connected in such a way as to form a political demarcation line the Communists would be claiming much more territory than they claimed to be holding in 1962.

Article 12 further states that the Joint Commission to Implement the Agreement will work out other locations of boundary points and that all such locations will be established on the basis of the reality of the boundaries controlled by each side. The Lao government contends that "control" means supervision of the populace or, at least, the patrolling of the mountains and jungle of the unpopulated areas. The NLHS, on the other hand (on the basis of an analysis of their claims) appear to equate "control" to anything that falls within range of their guns or rockets.

The more forward of the 35 points designated by the Communists in their draft -- Hong Sa (Pt. 2) in Sayaboury and Phou Khakhouay (Pt. 14) in Vientiane Province (incidentally, the latter is a major Lao Army training camp) are obvious land grab attempts, as are most of the points along Route 13 and the Mekong River in southern Laos (Pts. 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 27, 29, 34, and 35 on the map). Communist forces have the capability to initiate attacks by fire, sapper, and limited ground attacks in these areas; but they do not control land or people there. It is not likely, therefore, that the NLHS seriously expect that the Lao government will accept this portion of the draft protocol. The boundary points are probably their maximum claim from which the NLHS hope to be able to obtain a few choice points in the final bargaining sessions.

Some of the more blatant land grab stake-out points, in addition to Hong Sa (which would put the Communist-controlled area south of the Mekong in north Laos for the first time) and the Phou Khakhouay training camp, are Muong May and Pak Kading. Having forces at Muong May would give the Communists control of the main route south from the Plaine des Jarres; and control of Pak Kading means control of Route 13, the only government route to southern Laos. Likewise, ownership of Pak Hinboun and Khoua Songhong means control of Route 13 and the junction with Route 81 to North Vietnam, which one day might be completed. Thadeua and Pak Se Bangfai are also fairly blatant claims, since conceding them to the NLHS would give the Communists access to the Mekong River at points where insurgents can be slipped across to Thailand. Farther south, the claims to La Khone Pheng and Boualapha again give the Communists control of Route 13, as well as the route to Saravane; and Nalane Phapho - Ban Boun give the enemy Mekong valley points, on Route 13, which they have not had in the past.


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LAOS: Communist Controlled Areas

June 1962

- Area held by Communist and Neutralist Forces as shown on Communist maps
- Area held by Communists as shown on U.S. maps
- Area held by Neutralist Forces as shown on U.S. maps

The areas shown, particularly for territory held by Neutralist Forces, are approximate. Some neutralist areas were held by joint Neutralist/Pathet Lao Forces. Communist maps make no distinction between areas held by Neutralist and Communist Forces.



February 1973

- Communist-control
- Mixed-control
- Communist-held location
- Government-held location

Communist-control
The Communists have military and/or administrative presence and the RLG has little or no presence.

Mixed-control
Neither side exercises complete control.



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