

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

ARMY REVIEWED 03-Dec-2009: REFER TO DOE

9 January 1970

ARMY REVIEWED 04-Nov-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

TO: MG KNOWLTON *WST*

FROM: Kraemer

SUBJ: Soviet Interpretation of Kissinger

20x file

DOE REVIEWED 21-Jun-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

It is just possible that Dr. Kissinger has not seen the inclosed collection of quotes from his writings that have appeared in Soviet military publications.

[If Dr. Kissinger is already in possession of a copy of the attached, he might wish to retain this copy. Otherwise, return of the paper to me would be appreciated.]

DOS REVIEWED 03-Dec-2009: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

HAK - you have another copy of this but considering source, I wanted you to know it came.

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THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESS INTERPRETS THE WRITINGS

of

Henry A. Kissinger

on

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LIMITED WAR

Harriet East Scott

Report # A - 20

December 10, 1968

Harriet Fast Scott - a

TO: FTD

SUBJECT: Henry A. Kissinger - Through Soviet EyesSOURCES: Soviet Publications since 1959

ANALYSIS:

1. Time after time the names of certain American theorists appear in the Soviet press. This article could have been written about Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Robert Osgood, General Maxwell Taylor, Robert Strausz-Hupe, Bernard Brodie, William Kintner, Stefan Possony, Walt Rostow and a dozen others. And British Air Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry and the Frenchman Raymond Aron are not unknown to the Soviet officer. This paper will take Henry A. Kissinger as an example because he will be influential in the new administration. Since he is known in the Soviet Union, what picture he presents to them may have far-reaching effects on future strategy, and ultimately, technology.

2. Sixteen ^{books} are quoted. ^{in this paper} With the exception of the three-volume series International Relations After the Second World War, all the rest are military books. In many cases, the quotations are from the same author contributing to many different books, for example, Lt. Col. Kondratkov. Quotes from eight magazine articles are given. After May 1967, there are no quotations by name. This occurred for several reasons, one being that the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR was approaching and all themes were directed toward this event. The other was that the general term "American ideologists say that" or "the ideologists of imperialism write" was used instead of individual names. The quotations which followed were similar to the ones given.

3. The change in quotations between the different editions of Military Strategy are most interesting. Two additional quotations were added in the second (1963) edition. These were retained in the third (1968) edition but two other quotations were omitted, one referring to the Red Chinese. In contrast, the quotation in the second edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army is completely different from the quotation from the fourth edition. The third edition of Military Strategy and the fourth edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army are part of the seventeen-volume series, "The Officer's Library", described as being textbooks for home study by the Soviet officer.

4. Kissinger's book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, published in the US in 1957, was published in the Soviet Union in 1959 in Russian. Maxwell Taylor's Uncertain Trumpet, Bernard Brodie's Strategy in the Missile Age, (U.S.-1959, USSR-1961), Robert Osgood's Limited War. British Air Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry's Global Strategy was translated. In 1966, George Lowe's The Age of Deterrence was published by the Soviet Military Publishing House--"Voyenizdat". For example, 4,800 copies were issued; there were omissions and an introduction was added.

5. The question naturally arises: are the Soviets trying to conduct a dialogue with the West? As pointed out earlier, the Soviet officer knows of Kahn, Kissinger, Knorr, Gavin and Hanson Baldwin. Would his US counterpart know as many Soviet writers? Sokolovsky, yes; Rotmistrov, perhaps; Ribkin, Larionov, Lomov, Bondarenko, Korotkov, or Sidelnikov? A General Talensky, who has not

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written for the Soviet military press in fifteen years, became quite well-known in the U.S. through appearing in a Soviet-translated magazine, International Affairs. In desperation perhaps, the Soviets launched a magazine called Soviet Military Review a few years ago, conveniently translated into French and English. Unfortunately, none of the articles originally appeared in the Russian press, and their content makes it clear they were written for foreign consumption and 'disinformation.'

We are not certain if they react to American writings or not. There are indications that weapon systems appear at intervals regardless of what the United States does: The ABM, mobile missiles, and FOBS are part of long-range technological goals. In certain cases, they may react and react strongly, as for instance, in Czechoslovakia. The American concept of 'bridge-building' has been severely criticized as 'subversive export of counterrevolution' and propagandized as the reason Czechoslovakia had to be 'saved' by the Warsaw Pact countries.

If we are to understand the Soviets, it would help to understand Soviet concepts of us, however distorted. The report that follows represents an area of Soviet perceptions that remains largely unexplored in the United States.

SUBJECT: Henry A. Kissinger - Through Soviet Eyes

SOURCES: Soviet publications since 1959

Introduction:

This paper does not pretend to be comprehensive. Sixteen books were found which make reference to Mr. Kissinger in examining some fifty Soviet military books. The process was complicated by the fact that most Soviet books lack indices and search must proceed on a page by page basis. *Communist of the Armed Forces*, the fortnightly publication of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, was examined similarly through its last 90 issues. References turned out to be more than expected.

No attempt has been made to check the original text of Mr. Kissinger's works for the alleged quotations. Rarely does the Soviet author footnote quotations, and when he does, it is often from a translated version of the book and not the original. In this case, what they think Mr. Kissinger said is what is important, for the Soviet reader will not have access in most cases to the original and will lack the ability to read it in English, too, perhaps.

Voyna i Politika (War and Politics) Major Ye. I. Ribkin, Voenizdat, 1959.
p. 108 "The idea of the perniciousness and adventurism of the strategy of atomic-thermonuclear war is developed by the British Marshal Slessor, in the book, Deterrence, and by the American military writer, Kissinger, in the book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, and by others."

Za Shirmoy "Ogranichennykh" Voyn (Behind the Screen of "Limited" Wars), A. Ye. Yefremov, Voenizdat, 1960.

p 21 "Military theoreticians of the West do not hide their irritation over the enormous successes of the Soviet Union in strengthening its defense capability. "The creation in the USSR of long range aircraft which can cover an enormous distance and return, taken together with the growth of Soviet reserves of nuclear weapons was a radical change in the strategic relationship of forces in the post-war period," wrote Kissinger, distressed over the loss by the United States of superiority in 'atomic air power.'"

p. 25 "The theory of 'limited war', writes another military theoretician, Kissinger, must be based on the understanding of the fact that 'after our atomic monopoly came to an end, to force an unconditional surrender on the enemy at a price acceptable for us, had already become impossible.'

"Such a way of putting the question is very indicative. It testifies to the fact that not a few bourgeois politicians and military leaders are already convinced of the impossibility of defeating the governments of the socialist system and forcing a capitalist order on them. The appearance of the theory of 'limited war' to a certain degree is an admission by its authors that now there are no real forces which could restore capitalism in the Soviet Union and in the countries of the socialist camp. Voluntarily or involuntarily even the violent enemies of the communist system would have to agree with the correct conclusion made at the XXI Congress of the CPSU on the question of the full and final victory of socialism in the USSR.

"However, while many bourgeois military leaders have lost hope of finding a means of forcing the countries of the socialist camp to capitulate

late, nevertheless they still continue to count on the possibility of realizing their aggressive plans in relation to these countries, by waging local wars against them. The goal formulated by Kissinger speaks of this - to be prepared "to defeat the Soviet Union or China in local clashes."

- p. 27 "American and British military theoreticians vow and swear that all these rules will be directed so as not to let war escalate to total war and thus lessen the losses for the civilian population. Kissinger, for example, proposes not to make raids on towns located at a distance of more than 500 miles from the combat zone.

"The supporters of the theory of 'limited' wars have tried to assure in every possible way that the enemies of the USA will be forced to abide by these rules because their breaking will evoke a corresponding "repression" from the side of the ruling circles of the United States - an increase of the power of the nuclear weapons used by the Americans and an enlargement of the framework of its use.

"In the event of a 'limited nuclear war', states Kissinger, the armed forces of the Western powers, covered, like a shield, by strategic aviation, will begin to carry out 'dosed destruction of limited objectives'. In his view, the war would proceed about like this. The State Department would give the enemy some ultimatum. If they rejected it, American tactical aviation would subject a definite region to nuclear attack, which would be occupied by the ground troops of the USA. Then a new demand would be made. If they again declined, it would all start again. In such a way, state the American military theoreticians, war against the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic and other socialist countries, must proceed.

- p. 29 "Proceeding from the concept of 'limited' wars, many bourgeois military theoreticians came forth with various projects for some reconstruction of the military machines of Western powers. Kissinger proposed instead of the existing division of the Armed Forces of the USA into the army, air force and navy, to create two organizations: Strategic forces and tactical forces.

"Strategic forces, in his opinion, must include strategic aviation, army units designated for protection of overseas bases, and those formations of naval forces which were planned for use in total war. Tactical forces, Kissinger recommended would include units and formations of the army, air force and navy which would be needed for waging 'limited' war.

"These recommendations, however, evoked strong objections in the ranks of leading military figures. They stated that the proposals of Kissinger for organization would be too bulky and extremely expensive."

- p. 34 "Major maneuvers, carried out under the code name 'winter shield', were conducted in FRG in February, 1960. 65,000 American troops and two West German armored brigades took part in these maneuvers. According to the American press, these were 'maneuvers, embodying the basic concepts of Dr. Kissinger: small caliber nuclear weapons, limited region of combat operations, and the exclusion of industrial objectives and rear area air-fields from bombardment."

"In correspondence with the conclusions of all these exercises, the American command made some reorganizations in the structure of its army, which fitted the plans of 'limited' war. In the spring of 1958, the USA had created 'strategic army corps' or, as they were called 'STRAC.'"

- p. 48 "As a matter of fact, is it possible, for example, to assume that this or that country has taken upon itself the obligation to observe the rules which obviously pursue the goal of simplifying aggressive actions against it? Just take the proposal of Kissinger not to make raids on cities lying outside the 500-mile zone of the front lines. It is well known that the military strategists of the USA plan to conduct combat actions on the territory of other continents. Therefore, by following his proposal, Kissinger wants to create conditions in which they would have the possibility of bombing from their numerous overseas bases, almost all the centers of the probable enemy. At the same time the area of the USA would be completely safe from a retaliatory strike."
- p. 48 "The advocates of the theory of 'limited' wars, feeling the weakness of their position concerning the possibility of the adoption by the other side of the proposals of the American military for rules of waging wars, resorted to various dodges. They stated that a formal agreement to such rules might not be necessary. The very logic of things, they averred, would force the belligerent sides to hold to these rules. Kissinger, Osgood, and others stated, for example, that it was fully possible to have an unspoken agreement between countries not to use too powerful hydrogen bombs. They affirmed that supposedly it was possible to agree not to use 'dirty' bombs, which caused strong contamination of spaces by radioactive fallout, and substitute 'clean' bombs for them. All these arguments pursue only one goal - to create the impression of the possibility of 'humane' nuclear war, in the course of which military actions supposedly might be directed only against military objectives and the loss among the civilian population would be considerably lessened."
- p. 51 "To observe this or that limited ways and means of conducting war only as long as they remained favorable for them, and to swiftly reject these limitations when they ceased to answer to their interests, - this is the way the new concepts of the Kissingers and Osgoods look. It is no accident that when they start talking of putting their recommendations into practice, these military theoreticians begin to talk absolutely contrary to that which they affirmed in their own scientific works. It is known, for example, that the West German magazine, Der Spiegel, asked Kissinger, when he came to FRG in the beginning of 1959, the question of what would happen if 'limited' war, which certain circles of NATO countries wanted unleashed in connection with a conflict over West Berlin, failed. Kissinger without thinking gave a prepared answer: 'Give the Russians an ultimatum, and if necessary, conduct total war...'"

Marksizm-Leninizm o Voynе i Armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army) 2nd edition, Editors: Col. G.A.Fedorov, Col. N.Ya. Sushko, and Col. B.A. Belyi, Voenizdat, 1961.

- p. 280 "According to American calculations, in a successful enemy attack, fifty of the largest industrial centers of the USA would be fully destroyed 40 per cent of the population of the country and about 60 per cent of industry. (See. H. Kissinger, Yadernoye Oruzhiye i Vneshnaya Politika, Moscow, 1959, p 59.)"

Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny, Vol. 1, Editor: A.G. Mileykovskiy, Politizdat, 1962. (Int'l Relations after the Second World War) p. 658 "The basic research centers, the strongholds of 'real politics', in the USA are Chicago and Princeton Universities. The leading American theoreticians 'of the politics of force' are the major philosophers and sociologists R. Niebuhr, J. Burnheim, Professors H. Morgenthau and R. Osgood (Chicago), the eminent diplomat and historian G. Kennan, H. Kissinger (Princeton), the famous military commentator and publicist Hanson Baldwin (New York Times) and his less famous but no less militant relation Leland Baldwin (Professor of history at Pittsburgh University) and many others.

"The influence of 'real politicians' is felt in many works of British, French, Belgium and other bourgeois-internationalists. As concerns FRG, those preachers of 'the politics of force' a long time ago took up leading positions in the apparatus of 'psychological war' and in bourgeois science."

Voyennaya Strategiya, (Military Strategy) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, Editor, first edition, Voenizdat, 1962.

p. 72 "In December of 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a special report "The Development of Military Technology and Its Effect on the Strategy and Foreign Policy of the United States" prepared by the Johns Hopkins Washington Center and serving as an official document of Congress. In addition, in the United States books appeared by R. Osgood - Limited War, B. Brodie - Strategy in the Missile Age, General Maxwell Taylor - Unreliable Strategy [The Uncertain Trumpet], Henry A. Kissinger - The Necessity for Choice, a group of authors [Robert Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony] A Forward Strategy for America, and in Britain the book of Air Marshal Kingston-McCloughry - Defense, Policy and Strategy, and a number of others."

p.73 "The most timely, from the point of view of clarification of the present military strategy of the West, is the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the books of General Taylor - The Uncertain Trumpet, and of Professor Henry Kissinger - The Necessity for Choice.^{1*}

"^{1*}In 1961, Taylor and Kissinger were appointed special military and political advisers to President Kennedy, and almost all the proposals contained in their books have found or are finding practical realization: previously, Kissinger was consultant to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."

p.73 "An even more depressing evaluation of the United States position was given by Kissinger, who decisively rejects any illusions as to the invulnerability of the United States.

"In referring to the vast influence of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic on the course of world social development, he says bitterly that "the successes of Moscow and Peking will offer the same magnetic attraction as the accomplishments of Europe in the 19th Century. No economic aid can counteract the belief that the West is doomed."^{1*}

^{1*} Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 1961, p.7."

p.74 "Characteristically, in his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,

which appeared in the United States in 1957, Kissinger was still in favor of a strategy based on the threat of unlimited use of nuclear weapons, that is, the unleashing of a general nuclear war. However, the events of the last four years have forced him to arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions as to the necessity for choice, in his words, "between humiliation and general nuclear war."

p. 80 "Certain American military ideologists (Kissinger, for example) replace the expression 'preventive war' with the expression 'surprise (first) strike.' The distinction is purely formal, and pointless since the first strike can also herald the beginning of preventive war. No matter what this strike is called, its main aim is the maximum achievement of surprise."

p.313 "Henry Kissinger has something more definite to say apropos of this: '...a general war conducted with modern weapons will be decided by the operations of the armed forces which the enemy has at the beginning of the war. We can no longer count on a more or less long period of time in which to mobilize.'"

"I* H. Kissinger, Yadernoye Oruzhiye i Vneshnaya Politika, [Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy], Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, p 150."

p. 338 "Using destructive means of armed combat -- nuclear weapons and other devices for mass destruction -- the imperialists will attempt to liquidate the social structure in the countries of socialism, including total annihilation of entire socialist states. They do not hide their plans. For example, Henry Kissinger in his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, writes: 'The idea that victory in a war will be assured by annihilation of the industrial potential of the enemy and by undermining the morale of the civilian population is the basic principle of British as well as American strategic planning.'"

"I* H. Kissinger. Yadernoye Oruzhiye i Vneshnaya Politika, Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, p 373."

Ob Osnovnykh Zakonakh Khoda i Iskhoda Sovremennoy Voyny, (Basic Laws of the Course and Outcome of Modern War) Col. P.I. Trifonenkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Voenizdat, 1962.

p. 98 "It is well known that during the last 10-15 years, bourgeois military figures and writers have published many different books on military questions. Among them, a leading place is occupied by: The Second World War - W. Churchill, Crusade in Europe - D. Eisenhower, From Normandy to the Baltic - B. Montgomery, War Memoirs - C. De Gaulle, A Soldier's Story - O. Bradley, Recollections of a Soldier - G. Guderian, Conduct of War - E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy - H. Kissinger, Strategy - B.H. Liddell Hart, Military Doctrine of the USA, - D.O. Smith, Results of the Second World War and Fatal Decisions, - by a group of German generals who had served in Hitler's army, and others."

Voyennaya Strategiya, (Military Strategy) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, editor, second edition, Voenizdat, 1963.

p. 78 Same as first edition, p. 72, but with this book added: "J. Hitch - Military Economics in the Nuclear Age."

- p. 79 Same as first edition, p.73. "The most timely..."
- p. 80 Same as first edition, p.73. "An even more depressing..."
- p. 80 Same as first edition, p 74. "Characteristically,..."
- p. 86 "However, according to American press reports, in 1962 the successes of the imperialists in the field of reconnaissance of Soviet strategic rocket bases were more than modest. Thus, Kissinger wrote in the periodical Foreign Affairs for July 1962: '...that for the strategy of counterforce to remain successful to some degree, it is necessary to know the locations of the targets ahead of time. This is especially important with respect to rockets which cannot find objectives for a strike. Taking into account...the vastness of Soviet territory, our information of Soviet launch sites unavoidably has a fragmentary character.' In the future, he stresses, Soviet rockets will be more and more dispersed and well protected in special underground structures (shafts); a significant number of rockets will be mobile or be based at sea, which makes their discovery even more difficult."
- p. 90. Same as first edition, p. 80. "Certain American military..."
- p. 96. "Thus, Kissinger points out that 'limited nuclear war will automatically escalate into a general war because the losing side will continually commit new resources in order to restore the situation.'^{1*}
^{1*} The Foreign Affairs, July, 1962."
- p. 352 Same as first edition, p. 313. "Henry Kissinger has..."
- p. 379 Same as first edition, p. 338. "Using destructive..."
- Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny, Vol. 2, Editors: A.A. Lavrishchev and D.G. Tomashevsky, Politizdat, 1963.
- p. 99 "The 'open skies' plan would not help solve the task of preventing a surprise attack. On the contrary, its realization would be only playing into the hands of an aggressor. 'The greatest advantage from an 'open skies' agreement,' wrote J.P. Morray, 'would be gotten by the aggressor.' The reasonableness of this opinion was also admitted by the famous American military specialist H. Kissinger.^{1*}
^{1*} H.A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. N.Y. 1957.
 p. 218."
- p. 373 "'Our allies (in NATO) with the exception of England...' - complained the American military theoretician H. Kissinger, 'with horror think of the possibility of a new conflict arising... They try to minimize the reality of the danger threatening them...' ^{1*}
^{1*} H.A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p 273."
- Osnovnoy Vopros Sovremennosti (The Basic Question of Today) N.M. Nikol'sky, 'International Relations' Publishing House, Moscow, 1964.
- p. 48 Footnote: " 69. Not only M. Taylor, of course, come out with such criticism. Critics of past American strategy were widespread in the American press, it even became a sort of 'mode'. Even J. Kennedy, himself,

came to the White House with new ideas to a certain degree. Such military ideologists of American imperialism as H. Kissinger, R. Osgood, F. Miksche, J. Gavin, B. Brodie and others, came forth with proposals for new military-strategic concepts."

- p. 68 "In July, 1962, the famous military theoretician, H. Kissinger, came out with a concept worked out in detail analogous to tactical nuclear war. In an article, 'The Unsolved Problems of European Defense,'^{1*} he set forth a plan for rebuilding the organization of troops of NATO in Europe for waging tactical nuclear war, which, in his opinion, was the most suitable form of aggressive war for Western powers against the socialist countries. At the same time, just as in his earlier works,² Kissinger did not deny that 'limited nuclear war will automatically escalate into general war, because the losing side will keep putting new reserves into action.'³ Kissinger also considers that tactical nuclear war is a most risky way because it assumes the preventive use of the nuclear weapon by the Western powers. 'It is clear,' he wrote, 'that to make a basic stress on tactical nuclear defense means to stay on a riskier path, although more feasible. In this, the West must be first to use the nuclear weapon at an early stage of combat actions.'⁴

Again refer to what they

^{1*} See: Henry A. Kissinger, 'The Unsolved Problems of European Defense,' Foreign Affairs, 1962, July.

2. 'It is absolutely obvious that the possibility of general war lies in any limited war between the great powers.' (H. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, N.Y., 1960, p. 59).

3. Henry A. Kissinger, The Unsolved Problems, etc., p 520

4. Ibid., p 531.

- p. 269 Footnote. "44. See K. Knorr, The Military Potential of States, Klaus Knorr expresses the views of influential aggressive circles of the USA: he is a consultant of many official government organizations, including the National War College, the President's Commission on Questions of policy in relation to material reserves, the administration of foreign operations, and the European Economic Commission of the UN. The State Department often asks for the services of K. Knorr. The aggressive views of K. Knorr are propagandized both in actual books and also in a number of his speeches. In 1959, for example, at the Atlantic Congress taking place in London, K. Knorr, with another military ideologist of the USA, H. Kissinger, spoke with appeals for aggressive war."

Books Published After Khrushchev's Ouster

Problemy Revolyutsii v Voyennom Dele (Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs) Editor; Col. P.M. Derevyanko+ Voenizdat, 1965.

- p. 48 "On Soviet Military Doctrine" General Colonel N.A. Lomov, Professor.

"Even the superficial acquaintance with this theory [of local wars] in the works of its overseas authors (Osgood, Kissinger, Brodie, Taylor and others) shows that at its base lie the definite political goals of monopolistic capital. With the help of local, regional wars, imperialist circles are trying to realize their aggressive, reactionary plans. In this, they try to point out that such wars are safe for the people and even advantageous for the workers of capitalist states."

p. 51 "With a successful attack by the enemy on 50 major industrial centers of the USA," writes H. Kissinger, "40 per cent of our population, up to 50 per cent of the basic buildings and about 60 per cent of our industry will be completely destroyed."^{1*}

^{1*} . Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1959, p. 59."

p.129. "New Means of Fighting and Strategy" Colonel V.V. Larionov, Candidate of Military Sciences.

"One of the military ideologists of imperialism, H. Kissinger, writes: 'The idea that victory in war is secured by destroying the industry of a potential enemy and undermining the moral spirit of the civilian population is a basic principle of English and American strategic thought.'"

Programma KPCC o Zashchitye Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva (Program of the CPSU on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland) General Major K. Bochkaryev, Colonel I. Prusanov, and Colonel A. Babakov, Voenizdat, 1965.

countries

p. 60 "In recent years in capitalist/ there have appeared many books, brochures, articles in which, with cynical frankness and with pretensions of a scientific character, not only the unavoidability but even the desirability and expediency of nuclear war is substantiated. Such are the writings of the American military 'theoreticians' H. Kahn, H. Kissinger, M. Taylor, the British historian Seton-Watson, the French sociologist, R. Aron, and many others."

Marksizm-Leninizm o Voyne i Armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army) Eds: General Major N. Ya. Sushko and Col. S.A. Tyushkevich, Voenizdat, 1965. 4th

p. 54 "The militarists, sitting in the Pentagon, receive wide support from 'civilian militarists' such as Kahn, Kissinger, Wolshetter, Schelling, who persistently propagandize nuclear war as a means of tying the 'American system' on nations, that is, installing the world domination of American imperialism."

Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny, Vol. 3. Editors: D.Ye. Mel'nikov and D.G. Tomashevsky, Politizdat, 1965.

p. 43. "Such variants and their modifications have been tried in recent years by American military-political theoreticians, beginning with the theory of 'limited nuclear war' of the sort formulated in his time by H. Kissinger in the book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, and ending with the doctrine of 'the strategy of flexible response' proposed by General Maxwell Taylor which is now the official military-political doctrine of the USA. As for the details which distinguish one variant and modification of the doctrine of 'limited nuclear war' from the other, it can be said that in essence they boil down to this: in world thermo-nuclear war, the USA and its partners in aggressive blocs have no chance of victory at all, so it is necessary in practical policies and strategy to view such a war as the last means of struggle against a possible nuclear enemies. As a basis for continuing the policy 'from a position of

strength'; it is necessary to adopt a course of preparation and waging 'of limited wars', in which, along with conventional kinds of armaments, might be used, in extreme circumstances, nuclear weapons also, but tactical, and not strategic. In this, the doubtful calculation is made that 'limited' nuclear war with the use of tactical thermonuclear weapons, might be, with the help of foreign policy and diplomacy, held in a local framework and not allowed to escalate into world thermonuclear catastrophe."

- p. 308 "Kissinger wrote of this in an article 'The Nuclear Dilemma of NATO', 'If West Germany is seriously interested in receiving the nuclear weapon, then the 'multilateral forces' probably will turn out to be only an intermediate measure and possibly will be the easiest way for Germany to get the nuclear weapon.' I*

"I* The Reporter, March 28, 1963."

- p. 374 "'Our ability to carry out a massive retaliatory strike did not prevent the Korean war, nor the loss of the northern part of Indochina... not even the Suez crisis,' wrote the famous American military theoretician and sociologist, specializing in international questions, Henry Kissinger, Director of the special research center of the 'Rockefeller Fund', and worker in a number of other American scientific research organizations, occupied with foreign policy problems, in 1957.

"The doctrine of 'massive retaliation' threatened, as Kissinger explained, 'to paralyze the policy' of the United States and to 'deprive it of flexibility. Pointing out the power of modern weapons, he stressed that general war, obviously would be a most extreme means' and that its use was connected with 'extreme risk' for American ruling circles themselves. As for the allies of the USA, Kissinger admits that the reliance of the high American political and military command on 'massive retaliation' and on 'global atomic war' has evoked the deepest concern in countries tied to the United States with allied obligations."

- p 375 "Stressing that the cost of unleashing general nuclear war might be 'too great, because such a war might become our only answer to challenges thrown by the enemy' Kissinger proposed that the effectiveness of the American 'policy of strength' and American diplomacy might be increased by using 'limited' wars for American goals. The last he divided into four basic categories: 1) wars between 'second-rate governments' primarily in the East; 2) wars with the participation of one of the great powers against countries situated in a clearly less advantageous position; 3) military conflicts between a great power and a small country, escalating into a broader war; and 4) 'limited' war between great powers."

- p. 377 "'...The United States cannot allow itself another slump like the one which characterized the preceding decade-and-a-half,' noted H. Kissinger in 1961, 'Another 15 years of the weakening of our position in the world like the one we experienced after the end of the Second World War, would lead to where we would be in a position of 'fortress America' in a world in which we basically would have no importance... We are not omnipotent. We are no longer invincible.' I*

"I* H. Kissinger. The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign Policy. N.Y., 1961. p 1, 2."

p.527 "In January, 1962, in Delhi, Henry Kissinger, special adviser to the President of the USA on questions of foreign policy, was visiting. Journalists asked him why the USA did not offer India aid with arms in connection with military actions in Ladakh and the Northeast border region. Kissinger answered that US military aid was meant only for use in big wars and not in border conflicts."

Methodologicheskkiye Problemy Voennoy Teorii i Praktiki, (Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice) editors: Gen. Major N. Ya. Sushko and Lt. Colonel T.R. Kondratkov, Voenizdat, 1966.

p. 52 "When one part of the ideologists of imperialism try to justify and legalize thermonuclear war and speak out as open apologists of nuclear violence, another part recognizes the danger of thermonuclear war. Thus American professor H. Kissinger frankly points out that thermonuclear war might lead to the downfall of the social system, to the undermining of all social systems." But even these ideologists do not reject in principle, thermonuclear war but would like only to limit, to localize it. In their opinion, limited, local war with the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a less dangerous, for the imperialists, means of realizing predatory plans. Such wars, states the American professor-internationalist V. Kaufman, would protect imperialism from revolutionary and other shocks, which are the unavoidable results of big wars."

Problemy Voyny i Mira, (Problems of War and Peace) Editors: Ye.D.Modrzhinckaya, B.T. Grigoryan and T.R. Kondratkov. (Kondratkov is a Lieutenant Colonel but is not so identified in this book). "Mysl" Publishing House, 1967.

p.93 "Another part of the ideologists of imperialism, recognizing the danger of thermonuclear war, in principle do not reject it, but wish only to limit, to localize the sphere of use of the nuclear rocket weapon in the interests of politics. These ideologists would like to squeeze world thermonuclear war into a definite framework, desirable for them, set advisable borders for it, and turn it into a more advantageous and less destructive means of achieving aggressive political goals. This tendency is reflected in the theory of limited, local wars, in the creation of nuclear weapons of small caliber for use in such wars. Limited, local wars are seen as a less dangerous instrument for realizing predatory political plans. These wars, writes the American professor-internationalist V. Kaufman, 'protect us from revolutionary and other shocks, which are the unavoidable results of big wars.'"

"Limitation, according to the ideas of these bourgeois ideologists, must apply to the most diverse sides of war: its political goals, the use of nuclear combat means, geographical size, objectives of destruction, and the time of the taking place of military actions. They distinguish several kinds of limited, local wars: wars between little states, not touching the interests of big powers; wars between major Western capitalist countries and little countries with the non-interference of other states; Wars between great powers and little states; and, finally, limited wars between the great powers which do not escalate into a world thermonuclear melee."^{1*}

^{1*} See: H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1959, p. 202-209.

p. 244 "Unfortunately, the militarists first turned their attention to the possibilities of using the new theory [of games] for their own interests. One of its creators, Morgenshtern, busied himself with this. With similar attempts also came forth H. Kahn, T. Schelling, M. Halperin, H. Kissinger, B. Brodie, A. Wolstetter, K. Knorr, R. Osgood and D. Brennan. These attempts are especially dangerous because neither generals nor society in general is prepared to verify the scientific basis of the conclusions of Kahn and company, who are called in the USA 'the new civilian militarists.' Their conclusions are taken on faith because they trust the theory and they themselves come forth in the role of experts in this theory."

p. 258 "One of the methods is all the same 'the compelling flaw'. In its simplest form, this is the break in the channel of communications with the enemy after the transmission of the ultimatum. Another variant is imprudent conduct. In particular, H. Kissinger from Harvard University recommends the threatening of 'potentially unreasonable actions from our side.' This theme is worked out in special detail by H. Kahn. As an example he gives the game of 'chicken.' Its rules: two automobiles approach each other on a collision course. The one that turns is the 'chicken.' "This game," declares Kahn, 'is a useful analogy, because it brings out several important sides of international relations...An experienced player sits in the automobile drunk, throwing out the window an empty whiskey bottle, so that everyone will be convinced that he is drunk as a cobbler. He puts on heavy dark glasses so that it is clear that he can see nothing. Just as the auto picks up speed, he pulls off the steering wheel and throws it out the window.' The enemy can do nothing but give way.

p. 271. "The famous ideologist of American imperialism, H. Kissinger, gives a similar analogy of the characteristics of peaceful coexistence, who maintains that 'Soviet leaders view 'peaceful coexistence' ...as the best means to undermine existing international ties with the help of any actions short of general nuclear war.'^{1*}
^{1*} H. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p 211"

p. 432 "The idea of 'peace through the balance of fear' or through 'mutual deterrence' is being exploited by B. Brodie, T. Schelling, H. Kissinger, M. Halperin, J. Strachey, H. Bull, A. Buchan, L. Halle and R. Osgood."^{1*}
^{1*} H. Kissinger. The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign policy. New York, 1961."

(For Military-Strategy, third edition, see the next page, 11 (2))

The Periodical Press (from October, 1964)

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces) the fortnightly military-political journal of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. #17 September 1965

'On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War' Lt. Col. Ye. I. Ribkin, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences. p 50.

"However, in the social conscience of the capitalist world, ever greater dissemination is being given the view of radical changes in the nature of war; and that 'war has stopped being a continuation

see also here to p. 12

Voyennaya Strategiya, (Military Strategy) Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, editor. Third Edition. Voenizdat, 1968.

p.71 Same as first edition. Book added in second edition is omitted.

p.72 Same as first and second edition. "An even more depressing..." The paragraph on the Chinese People's Republic has been omitted.

p.72 Same as first and second editions. "Characteristically..."

p.77 This paragraph has some additions and omissions. It reads:

Compare p.6

"The military command of the United States intends to solve the reconnaissance problem primarily by launching a large number of special reconnaissance satellites. Thus, Kissinger wrote on the dependence of the 'counterforce' strategy on reconnaissance means, in the periodical Foreign Affairs, for July 1962, '...that for the strategy of counterforce to remain successful to some degree, it is necessary to know the locations of the targets ahead of time. This is especially important with respect to rockets which cannot find objectives for a strike.' In the future, he stresses, Soviet rockets will be more and more dispersed and well protected in special underground structures (shafts); a significant number of rockets will be mobile or be based at sea, which makes their discovery even more difficult."

p. 80 Same as first and second editions. "Certain American military..."

p.88 Same as second edition. "Thus Kissinger points out..."

p.348 Same as first and second edition. "Using destructive..."

(The quote on page 313 of first edition, [352 in second edition] beginning "Henry Kissinger has..." is omitted in the third edition.)

and weapon of politics.' Such an opinion is held by people of the most varied political leanings. Among them are also the staunch supporters of imperialism who recognize, nevertheless, the fatal nature of nuclear war and accept the policy of peaceful coexistence in one degree or another. The late President of the United States J. Kennedy, for example, inclined to their opinion. This opinion is held by the military theorists and ideologists Liddell Hart, H. Kissinger, M. Taylor, E. Kingston-McCloughry, R. Osgood. They, of course, do not deny the policy of militarism and are fighting for the preservation of nuclear weapons, although they fear the results of their use."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #18, September 1965;

'The Aggressive Essence of the Political Ideology of Imperialism' Lt. Colonel T.R. Kondratkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences p. 9.

p. 10 "Thus, the ideologists of NATO want to create the impression as if capitalism still had a future, that it might escape its downfall and therefore it must be defended by any means, including military. 'Future world war,' writes one of the most zealous ideologists of imperialism, H. Kissinger, 'will be waged not for the sake of this or that particular goal, for for the sake of the existing systems', that is in the interests of preserving the bourgeois system and securing the world rule of monopolistic capital. Thus the soldiers and sailors of NATO are charged with the obligation to be ready to spill blood and sacrifice themselves for the purposes of preserving a system of hired slavery."

p. 15 "The meaning of violence itself, the ideologists of imperialism reduce mainly to war. The chronological limits of armed violence endlessly expand, and spread to all the history of mankind, writing down all formations without exception. The militaristic conception of military violence as the basis of politics represents an ideological platform legalizing war with the use of the nuclear weapon. In the book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, the American professor-militarist H. Kissinger states that: 'already now foreign policy must be adapted to the position in which the nuclear weapon is 'conventional.' In the works of other bourgeois authors, the idea is pursued of the necessity of overcoming the fear of the nuclear weapon and to assert its right as an instrument of politics."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #1, January 1966;

'The Adventurism of the military-political Concepts of Imperialism' Lt. Colonel N. Ponomaryev, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences p. 42.

p.46 "While not rejecting the necessity for Western powers to continue to prepare for world nuclear rocket war, the doctrine of 'flexible response' at the same time envisaged the use of armed forces equipped both with nuclear and with conventional means of waging war, in any conflicts with which the imperialists might have to meet. Thus, a course was taken on the wider than previously use of military force for the aggressive policy of imperialist states. The military-theoretical expression of this policy, in particular is the theory of 'limited', 'local' wars. This theory justifies the unleashing of 'limited' or 'local' wars for the sake of preserving the colonial system, the strategic positions of imperialism in various parts of the world. Many printed works of bourgeois ideologists are

devoted to its basis. It is sufficient to name the books by H. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, Pierre Gallois, Balance of Fear, and the three volume work Politics in the Twentieth Century by H. Morgenthau."

- p. 47 "In recent times, the ideologists of imperialism have added to the doctrine of 'flexible response', the theory of 'escalation.' The idea of 'escalation' was introduced in 1961 by a former adviser of President Kennedy, H. Kissinger, in the book The Necessity for Choice. A more expanded version is given by H. Kahn, in the work On Escalation. Metaphors and General Picture, in which '44 steps' are envisaged of the course of war up a staircase - from 'an alleged crisis' as the author expresses it, to general, all-out 'spasmodic' war (when 'all buttons are pushed'.)

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #13 July 1966:

"Dangerous Concepts" A. Yefremov (A review of The Military Doctrines of NATO Countries, a collection of translated articles, Voyenizdat 1966) p.90.

- p. 92 "The articles in the collection contain quite a lot of material which testifies to the fact that squabbles in the Atlantic coalition have already come to a head and reasons are given for this. 'Contradictions are growing, unhappily states Mr. Kissinger, who has acquired fame in the West for his theory of 'limited wars', in one of his articles. Kissinger, by the way, expresses himself rather obscurely. Some organs of the bourgeois press speak of the reasons for the trouble in NATO with great certainty. The West German military magazine, Wehrkunde, for example, writes that it is caused by 'changes in the relationship of political forces between the United States and Western Europe, and also between the countries of Western Europe.'

- p. 93 "The USA has fastened their strategy, based on the American monopoly on the atomic cudgel, on their allies. They have tried to keep this monopoly even in recent years. And it is not for nothing that Kissinger proposes: 'The USA will keep control over the nuclear weapon, and the European countries of NATO will orient themselves toward conventional armed forces.' He and his colleagues are turning themselves inside out to 'make the nuclear hegemony of the USA acceptable for their allies.'

- p. 93 "The dissatisfaction with American diktat is more and more tangible in France. 'The imperative tone of the Americans has only intensified resistance. France, expressing the fear of European countries, has quite acutely aggravated the sharpness of the contradictions,' states Kissinger about the situation which has been created. These fears have grown even more after the USA, at the December session of the NATO Council came out with persistent demands for the allies to take an active part in the war in Vietnam. And this absolutely did not please the majority of members of the North Atlantic bloc."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #21 November 1966:

"The Export of Counterrevolution in the Policy of American Neocolonialism" Captain 3rd Rank V. Golubev p.80.

- p. 83 "The Strategy of the 'Big Cudgel'"

"In recent years in the USA, advocates of the strategy of the 'big cudgel' have become noticeably active. The aggressiveness of American

foreign policy has sharply grown. The monopolistic bourgeoisie of the United States has openly declared war on the national-liberation revolution. Under the guise of the strategy of 'limited' wars, the ruling circles of the USA are conducting a plundering policy of armed suppression of the movement of peoples in underdeveloped countries for their complete national and social liberation. The most zealous advocates of such a strategy are the not unknown politicians and ideologists of American imperialism R. McNamara, M. Taylor, M. Bundy, H. Kissinger and R. Osgood."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil #2 January 1967:

"Militarism - The Tool of Monopolistic Capital" Lt. Colonel A. Migolatyev, p.82.
p. 85 "Militaristic propaganda primarily praises war, justifies the arms race, broadly advertises the nuclear rocket might of the West, first of all, of the United States. In the USA the idea of militarism is advocated in the 'writings' of R. Strausz-Hupe, W. Kintner, H. Kahn, H. Kissinger, B. Brodie, M. Taylor, R. Osgood and many other ideologists of monopoly."

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #9 May 1967:

"The Path of British Diplomacy" V. Ryzhikov, Candidate of Juridical Sciences, p.79
p. 81 "Ally or Satellite?"

"However, in the United States itself in recent times, the statement often appears that England is more and more losing its value for them and that it is time to put a period on that 'special' relationship with it. 'In recent years,' writes the not unknown American military theoretician, Henry Kissinger, in the book Uneasy Partnership, 'many influential Americans have come to the conclusion that England is pretending to have an influence which does not correspond to her strength...They are against that which by any method singles out England.'"

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, #10 May 1967:

"Apology of the Aggressive Policy of American Imperialism" Colonel A. Bulatov, Candidate of Military Sciences, a book review, On Escalation; p 87.

p. 87 "It is becoming more and more difficult for the apologists of nuclear rocket war in the USA to openly follow a course for its preparation and unleashing. In order to mask their criminal goals, they try to place under a policy of atomic madness the theoretical base which would justify aggression and help fool the American people. Therefore how generous are the monopolists of the USA on financing various 'scientific' institutes, which are working out similar theories. In their number are the Hudson Institute which does research on the Pentagon's orders on problems of international relations and military strategy. Recently the dollar press has been widely advertising the theory of 'escalation' as a sort of new theoretical conception of the director of this Institute, Herman Kahn and published in book form as On Escalation. In the past Kahn worked closely with the 'Rand Corporation' - the Pentagon's brain trust - with the well-known military theoreticians H. Kissinger and Professor B. Brodie - authors of the notorious 'Plan for the Occupation of Russia'. Before the reviewed book, he published two works: On Thermonuclear War and Thinking About the Unthinkable, vainly trying to show in them that nuclear war for the USA was advantageous and not dangerous. The new book puts forth the same idea but in a more theoretical form."