

SECRET

December 9, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. EHRLICHMAN

What do you think about this in the
light of Lehman's memorandum?

Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET Attachment

MAY CONTAIN
CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL

MORI/CDF
C03338573

HAK:AMH:feg:12/9/69

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

HK
John - sent to you
29 November 1969
Lind
HK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN

FROM: J. F. LEHMAN *JFL*

SUBJECT: AMB. ROBERT MCCLINTOCK

1. AMB. McClintock's performance before the Symington Subcommittee was unobjectionable if the written transcript alone is used as a basis for judgment.
2. Amb. McClintock may be justly criticized for a general disregard for White House directives, and an overeagerness to please Sens. Symington and Fulbright, at the expense of the better interests of the Executive Branch. The following are some examples:

Conduct of the Interdepartmental Group

- The IG was set up on 22 Sept, in the White House, and McClintock was given clear instructions that he was to follow guidelines set by the White House.
- As the hearings progressed, and their seriousness became evident, McC disregarded one after another guideline in the face of ferocious browbeating from Symington and Fulbright - this despite specific protests from Mr. Mollenhoff and Mr. Lehman.
- As McC's conduct of the IG diverged further and further from White House directives he began neglecting to notify Mr. Lehman and Mr. Mollenhoff in time for them to attend; or if they attended, he failed to recognize them from the floor; and in several instances resorted to sarcasm and ridicule, eg asking Mollenhoff if he should be commenting on legal matters since he was a "journalist!"
- When told point blank that the White House Group directed that x be done, he invariably demurred saying that Alexis Johnson was his boss and he couldn't do anything unless Johnson told him to.
- When told point blank that Mr. Ehrlichman had specifically directed that the figures for Philcag not be released, he replied "Mr. Ehrlichman's writ does not run over here!" The figures were given to the Subcommittee and published.
- Without informing anyone in the White House, indeed going to some length to keep it secret, McC arranged a "deal" with Symington whereby State would not censor the Philippine testimony in return for Symington's delaying publication until after the Philippine elections.
- The White House Group had directed Mr. Lehman to attend the hearings as a member of the DoD team. McC told Symington who Lehman was, and asked him if he thought Lehman should attend. Symington refused to allow Lehman to attend.
- McC attempted to get State off the hook in the Laos hearings by attempting to have the DoD witness appear as a co-principal witness with Amb. Sullivan. He was thwarted only by explicit instructions from Mr. Ehrlichman to Alexis Johnson.
- Despite explicit instructions that the White House was not to be mentioned, McC told Symington that the White House, not State was holding up the Laos transcript. This resulted in an enraged call to Dr. Kissinger from Symington and "blew the cover."
- Despite repeated warnings not to mention the White House, McC caved under very heavy pressure from Fulbright and said for the record that he was acting under White House instructions. When pressed further he referred erroneously to instructions from the Attorney General and invoked Executive Privilege,

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

November 28, 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on the Republic of China (3), November 26, 1969

DISTRIBUTION:

S

U

J

S/S

EA

- Ambassador Green
- Ambassador McConaughy
- Ambassador Brown
- Mr. Moore

EA/ROC

- Mr. Shoesmith

EA/ACA

- Mr. Kreisberg

L

- Mr. Stevenson

L/EA

- Mr. Futterman

PM

- Mr. Spiers

PM/JW

- Mr. Wolf

S/PC

- Mr. Cargo

- Mr. Seligmann

H

- Ambassador Torbert

WH

- Mr. Ehrlichman

- Mr. Mollenhoff

NSC

- Mr. Lehman

DOD

- Mr. French

- Mr. Knaur

CIA

- [Redacted]

NSA

- Mr. Banner

25X1

Pursuant to arrangements made with White House concurrence by the Department with Senator Symington, Ambassador McConaughy appeared unaccompanied by other witnesses before

SECRET

2

the Subcommittee at 2:30 p.m. to testify in regard to sensitive intelligence matters in the understanding that a single copy of the transcript would be made and retained in the custody of the Department. It was further understood that a record would be returned to the Subcommittee containing those portions which might be made public.

Before the proceedings started, Senator Symington said he would undertake to sanitize the record of the previous two days to eliminate much of the material involved in one or two sharp exchanges that took place, particularly with Senator Fulbright. He said he would edit the record "as much in your favor as in ours." The Chairman remarked that he had known Senator Fulbright a good many years, but there were times when he was "very intense."

Ambassador McConaughy, in response to an initial question from Counsel about overflights of the Chinese mainland, proceeded to give a detailed description of activities bearing on this question and other sensitive matters. He assured Counsel that the US remained in control of any operations in which it had a hand. He also indicated that the Ambassador was informed in general/ⁱⁿ regard to all sensitive programs and received full reports on them, although basic policy decisions were made in Washington.

SECRET

3

Senator Symington expressed appreciation for the forthcoming remarks of the Ambassador. Senator Fulbright, who appeared quite intense, asked a number of questions intended to show that our actions in Taiwan led the Chinese Communists to feel that they were subject to US aggressive tactics. He again attempted to engage in a protracted discussion of Vietnam. Senator Symington interrupted to indicate the discussion was getting off course and that he expected ambassadors to support the Administration's policy. Senator Aiken also tried to divert the discussion by inquiring about oil deposits in China, leading to a comment by Senator Symington that the discovery of extensive oil deposits could solve much of China's political problems.

Returning to a subject discussed earlier in the proceedings, Counsel asked in what circumstances US aircraft on Taiwan would shoot down Chinese Communist aircraft in the Taiwan Strait. He did not, however, press for an answer, but indicated he wished to have the question on record in the event the Ambassador changed his mind and wished to provide a response.

The session ended at about 3:30 p.m.

S/PC:ALSeligmann:lm 11/28/69

SECRET