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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, July 26, 1976  
9:22 - 10:30 a.m.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: I want to talk about Silberman. I think he wants to stage another Moynihan. I didn't know there were any differences between him and the East European desk on the Toth case, except that we wanted to make representations quietly and he wanted to do it publicly. Quietly I thought was more likely to get results.

I talked to Silberman twice in Paris and he said he was reassured. But now he has really erupted. We had made 45 representations on Toth. Two months ago they said they would release him. That same day Silberman attacked Yugoslavia on the Toth case. He couldn't have known, but he shouldn't attack his host government without telling us. Now he has stories in the paper that the Department is soft on the East Europeans.

You know our policy on Yugoslavia: They are shits, but we may have a fight when Tito dies, and if we blacken them now, we will be in a poor public position to support them.

Scowcroft: I thought about sending him a cable saying he is hurting only the President.

The President: I like that, except I hate to have anything in writing.

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Scowcroft: Not without the Yugoslavians knowing.

The President: Let's just lie low and let it blow over.

Kissinger: I think that is best.

On the CSCE commission, I seriously doubt its constitutionality. My temporary appointment will be Monroe Leigh. The problem is we might have to testify in front of our subordinates. We could get someone from the outside, so we wouldn't be tied in so closely. There is a built-in potential of conflict with you.

Scowcroft: The other Departments plan to nominate substantive people.

The President: Could we find out?

Kissinger: I think it is an impossible situation. But if we appoint legal advisors, they could address only the legal aspects and it would avoid a policy confrontation.

The President: The other night Dobrynin came up and asked what my intentions were on SALT.

Kissinger: Did he take the initiative?

The President: Yes.

Kissinger: The sly bastard said you raised it. He asked me if he should report it. I said sure as long as he didn't say you promised an agreement -- only a good faith effort.

The Beirut evacuation is proceeding routinely. I don't see any problems. The Soviets are not making any overt action. I don't really see what they can realistically do.

I am seeing Botha this morning. If we can get the British going, we should have this package put together soon.

The President: Brent told you what Callaghan told me.

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Kissinger: Yes. One other problem is that Nyerere may be backing off. That is the key. If the blacks don't call off the guerrilla war, the scheme won't work. Because the guerrillas would have a much easier time against a black regime than against the present one.

The President: That is true. But how serious is it?

Kissinger: How can you tell with Africans? But if the blacks walk away from it, I think we have little choice but to back away and let nature take its course.

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE 25X1

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JULY 29, 1976

TO AMBASSADOR SILBERMAN 25X1

FROM BRENT SCORCHETT

1. I HAVE PASSED YOUR CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND ASKED THAT I SHOW IT TO HENRY. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE STATEMENT ABOUT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND HENRY AND DESIGNED FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES. I THINK YOU NEED HAVE NO CONCERNS ABOUT OUR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE.

2. ON A VERY PRIVATE PERSONAL NOTE, I FEEL I MUST SAY THAT WHATEVER THE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CURRENT PUBLIC FRACAS OVER IOIN, WITH ITS ETHNIC OVERTONES, IT IS DEFINITELY HURTING ONE PERSON-- THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

3. BAHN REGARDS.

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