

HAK Carson

## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

26768

March 16, 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (with SECRET/EXDIS attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

State Dept. review completed

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HHS*  
Samuel M. Hoskinson

MORI C05097246

HAK has seen

SUBJECT: Your Visit with Ambassador Jha--March 17

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Ambassador Jha is coming to see you at a particularly useful time. As you know, Mrs. Gandhi has just won an unexpected landslide victory in India's general election and will shortly be forming a new government free from many of the cross-cutting pressures that limited her freedom of action previously. After a brief hiatus during the election campaign, the dialogue between our governments, both here and in New Delhi, has been renewed in earnest (see attached cables on Jha's recent talk with Sisco and Ambassador Keating's conversation with Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul) and planning is again going forward on the annual Indo-U.S. bilateral talks that were delayed by the elections.

We understand that Ambassador Jha has at least two general topics on his mind:

--The general U.S. foreign policy orientation toward South Asia as expressed in the President's Foreign Policy message to Congress. (Some concern has been expressed in Delhi that the statement that the U.S. will do nothing to harm "legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area" means that the U.S. is advocating great power spheres of influence in South Asia.)

--He would like to continue the general discussion he says he had with you about a month ago on the state of our relations. (In a recent talk with Sisco, Jha made the point that if we seek to improve bilateral relations we must focus on their political rather than their economic content. Jha thought it would be highly useful if the U.S. could begin to recognize publicly India's role as a stabilizing factor in all of Asia, not just South Asia.)

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There are two additional topics that have come up in our recent dialogue with the Indians and which Jha might also raise:

--The Indians, as usual, are concerned about the situation in Southeast Asia and in particular about our policy on troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. They are not making any problems for us now, but there seem to be both some doubt of our motives and some genuine misunderstanding.

--The Ambassador had earlier mentioned that he would like to raise the question of PL-480 terms; especially the amount of proceeds from our PL-480 sales that are used for U.S. purposes. We understand, however, that the Indians now understand that our hands are tied by the law on this subject and he may not raise it.

You may wish to make the following points to Ambassador Jha:

1. As the President's message of congratulations to Mrs. Gandhi indicated we are impressed with her landslide victory which we see as both a personal triumph for her and as a demonstration of the vitality of India's system.

--You would be interested to hear the Ambassador's view on what new directions Mrs. Gandhi might take with her mandate.

--You may not want to say this, but you could say quietly that you have the genuine satisfaction here in Mrs. Gandhi's victory helping to dispel some of the persistent belief that we are working against her. This victory enhances the prospects for orderly evolution in India. How could we have a different interest?

2. There should be no misunderstanding concerning the South Asian section of the President's foreign policy message to Congress. The U.S. regards a free and independent South Asia, and especially India, as "important" to our interests in Asia and we intend to continue our aid to economic development. The U.S. seeks no

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condominium with the Soviets or others in South Asia. However, as in other areas, we do not seek an exclusive role; we recognize that others have a role to play too. But saying that we are prepared to pursue our interests alongside others is a far cry from creating spheres of influence. Quite the contrary: we do not feel anyone should have exclusive influence. (You may also wish to explain the political elements of the Nixon Doctrine--we look to strong regional leadership in achieving stability--which the Indians seem at times to overlook.)

3. Concerning our bilateral relations:

--You agree that it is important to focus on the political aspects of our relations. In the end, of course, we come back to the fact that aid and foreign trade play important supportive roles.

--We fully understand India's need for a balanced relationship between the U. S. and the USSR. This is in fact all that we seek and we would hope that Mrs. Gandhi's new independence from the radical left would contribute to the balancing process.

--We do recognize that India has an important role to fill in Asia even though it is true that we have not talked about it much in public. It is important, moreover, that the U. S. and India work together in Asia rather than at cross purposes.

4. You understand that there is some misunderstanding in New Delhi concerning our policy on Southeast Asia and would like to clarify this. [Explain the troop withdrawal program.]

5. FYI. In case Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the US comes up, she was asked about November 9-10 and said that was fine with her but she would prefer to wait until after election to confirm. Dwight Chapin has been asked to confirm those dates on the President's calendar before we go back to her.

Att: State 042327, 3/12/71  
New Delhi 03608, 3/14/71  
New Delhi 03611, 3/14/71

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# TELEGRAM

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SECRET 894

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
L. J. ...  
H. ...  
K. ...  
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PAGE 01 STATE 042327

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APPROVED BY: NEA MR SISCO  
NEA/INC MR SCHNEIDER  
NEA/PAF MR BAXTER  
NEA MR VAN HOLLEN  
S/S MR CURRAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

S E C R E T STATE 042327

EXDIS

SUBJECT: INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

1. AMBASSADOR L.K. JHA CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO MARCH 11 FOR WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. SCHNEIDER AND QUAINTON ALSO PRESENT. JHA'S PRINCIPAL INTEREST WAS CLARIFICATION OF POSSIBLE DATES FOR POSTPONED INDO-AMERICAN BILATERAL TALKS AND DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF TALKS AND OF OVERALL RELATIONS.

2. JHA ASKED WHETHER ANY PARTICULAR DATES SHOULD BE RULED OUT. SISCO REPLIED THAT END OF APRIL WOULD BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF SECRETARY'S TRIP TO ANKARA FOR CENTO MEETING. SISCO ALSO NOTED NATO MEETING IN JUNE. JHA SAID FORNSEC KAUL BEFORE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN THINKING IN TERMS LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL. JHA CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOOT FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, I.E., EITHER EARLY APRIL OR LATE MAY.

3. AS FAR AS AGENDA CONCERNED, SISCO SAID HE HOPED TALKS WOULD FOCUS ON BILATERAL PROBLEMS IN POSITIVE, FORWARD-LOOKING WAY. WE WOULD WANT TO LOOK AT SOME ECONOMIC ISSUES SUCH AS AID, AND

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PL-480, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY AT BROADER ISSUES DERIVING FROM CHANGES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, IN PARTICULAR IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN AND CHANGES IN OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA. WE HOPED FOR THROUGHGOING EVALUATION OF EVOLUTION OF OUR RESPECTIVE ROLES, PROJECTED AHEAD INTO POST-VIETNAM CONTEXT.

4. JHA SUGGESTED ONE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL WHICH MIGHT BE LOOKED INTO FURTHER WOULD BE FCN TREATY. SCHNEIDER INDICATED WE HAD CONSIDERED PROBLEM SEVERAL TIMES IN PAST, MOST RECENTLY IN 1966, AND HAD FOUND THAT PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE WAS INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM ABOUT INVESTMENT GUARANTEES. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO LOOK INTO MATTER FURTHER; THOUGH JHA CONCLUDED WE WOULD NOT WANT TO PRESS ISSUE TOO FAR IF IT IN FACT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE OR OTHER.

5. JHA THEN CONTINUED WITH WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS PERSONAL "FREEWHEELING." IN HIS VIEW, IF WE SEEK TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE FOCUS ON THEIR POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC CONTENT. PRIME MINISTER NOW FREE FROM PARLIAMENTARY PROBLEMS CREATED BY PAST RELIANCE ON CPI. WHILE INDIA DID NOT WANT TO DAMAGE RELATIONS WITH USSR, PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT WANT TO BE IN POSITION IN WHICH USSR CAN TAKE INDIA FOR GRANTED. THIS IS SELFISH INDIAN MOTIVE IN WANTING IMPROVE INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. QUESTION WAS HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. JHA NOTED THAT INDIA WAS STILL NEWLY-INDEPENDENT COUNTRY IN SEARCH OF STATUS AND PRESTIGE. IT WAS SENSITIVE TO WHAT OTHERS SAID. REFERENCES IN PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE TO "LEGITIMATE CHINESE INTERESTS" HAD CAUSED FLUTTER AND DISAPPOINTMENT IN MEA. JHA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL IF US COULD BEGIN IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO RECOGNIZE INDIA'S ROLE AS A STABILIZING FACTOR IN ALL OF ASIA, NOT JUST SOUTH ASIA. INDIA HAS MADE A SUCCESS OF ITS DEMOCRACY AND HAS GONE SOME WAY IN MAKING ECONOMIC PROGRESS. INDIA SOUGHT RECOGNITION THAT IT HAS WIDER RESPONSIBILITY IN THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD. INDIA ALSO NEEDS TO BE STRONG MILITARILY. CHINA HAS ACHIEVED ITS ASCENDENCY BY ITS MILITARY STRENGTH, AND US COMMITMENT SHOULD BE TO INDIA'S OVERALL POSITION AND STRENGTH IN SUB-CONTINENT.

6. JHA SAID ONE SPECIFIC PROBLEM BEDEVILLING OUR RELATIONS- KASHMIR. AFTER TWENTY YEARS UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT STATUS OF KASHMIR CAN BE CHANGED. WHAT WAS TO BE GAINED, HE ASKED, BY CONTINUING TO REFER TO KASHMIR AS DISPUTED TERRITORY. ONLY



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far left

RESULT WAS TO STRENGTHEN BHUTTO IN PAKISTAN. JHA NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. SHE WOULD GO FAR TO MEND RELATIONS, BUT COULD NOT CONCEDE ON KASHMIR. EVEN BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS WOULD NOW BE DIFFICULT.

7. JHA THEN TURNED CONVERSATION TO INTERNAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN SAYING THAT REAL DANGER WAS THAT IF YAHYA USES MILITARY STRENGTH TO DEAL WITH MUJIB ONLY BHASHANI WOULD BENEFIT. GUERRILLA WARFARE WOULD RESULT AND NAXALITES WOULD GAIN IN STRENGTH. INDIA HOPED BHUTTO AND MUJIB WOULD GET TOGETHER. BUT MORE IMPORTANT THAT YAHYA AND SHEIKH REACH AGREEMENT SINCE BHUTTO COULD NOT DISRUPT SETTLEMENT IF YAHYA HAS SUPPORT OF MUJIB.

8. IN REPLY, SISCO SAID HE WAS HIGHLY ATTRACTED BY IDEA OF FOCUSSING ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC ISSUES. FROM POINT OF VIEW OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS, IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE KIND OF STATEMENTS JHA DESIRED. KASHMIR ON THE OTHER HAND WAS SOME WAY DOWN THE ROAD AND WAS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. INDIAN ELECTIONS HAD IN GENERAL GIVEN US A NEW AND FRESH OPPORTUNITY SO THAT WE COULD LOOK AHEAD. SISCO NOTED US DIS-ENGAGEMENT FROM VIETNAM WOULD SOON BE TOTAL OR NEAR TOTAL. THIS IN TURN SHOULD HELP TO DISPELL INDIAN DOUBTS ABOUT OUR POLICY. SISCO NOTED THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH GOI COULD GIVE US CREDIT FOR OUR EFFORTS AND EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR WHAT WE HAVE DONE IN MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. SISCO THOUGHT WE MIGHT ALSO DEVELOP SPECIAL ON-GOING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AT UN TO HELP WORK OUT DIFFERENCES. THERE WERE MANY POSSIBILITIES ONCE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE CREATED. IN THIS CONTEXT FORM MAY BE AS IMPORTANT AS SUBSTANCE.

9. CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO MIDDLE EAST (REPORTED SEPTTEL).  
ROGERS

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CONFIDENTIAL (44)

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00  
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 EUR-20 AID-28  
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R 140651Z MAR 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7372  
INFO RUQVGM/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2840  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMCONSUL KARACHI  
AMCONSUL DACCA  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY  
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA  
AMCONSUL MADRAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 03608

1. DURING MARCH 13 CALL ON FONSEC T.N. KAUL TO DISCUSS  
SITUATION IN INDOCHINA, I NOTED THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS'  
POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES REGARDING THE CRISIS IN PAKISTAN  
SEEMED TO BE IN FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT. WE BOTH HOPED  
TO SEE A STABLE AND UNITED PAKISTAN. KAUL SAID THAT  
PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTION OF PAKISTAN CRISIS DEPENDED LARGELY  
ON WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP OF PRESIDENT YAHYA KAHN.  
KAUL FELT YAHYA WENT TOO FAR IN HIS EARLY STATEMENTS, AND  
THIS HAD "GOTTEN SHEIK MUJIB'S BACK UP." SHEIK, HE SAID,  
WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT NOT TO STAND BY HIS SIX POINTS, BUT THE  
GOI WAS ENCOURAGED THAT HE HAD NOT USED OCCASION OF HIS  
MARCH 7 SPEECH TO ANNOUNCE INDEPENDENCE FOR EAST PAKISTAN.  
GOI WORRIED, HE SAID, ABOUT STORIES OF LARGE NUMBERS OF  
TROOPS BEING TRANSPORTED FROM WEST PAKISTAN TO EAST WING.  
KAUL SAID IT WAS UP TO U.S. AND OTHER FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN  
TO SEEK WAYS TO RESOLVE CRISIS. FOR ITS PART, INDIA LOOKS  
FORWARD TO NORMALIZING ITS RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, BUT  
UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT WANT TO RISK EMBARRASSING  
GOP

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2. KAUL SAID THAT IT IS GOI UNDERSTANDING THAT WRIT OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION NOT RUNNING AT ALL IN MANY AREAS AND THAT PORT OF CHITTAGONG HAD BEEN CLOSED RECENTLY FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS LEADING TO A SHORTAGE OF KEROSENE AND FEW OTHER COMMODITIES. PORT CLOSURE, HE SAID, APPARENTLY WAS DUE TO TROOP REINFORCEMENTS.

3. I COMMENTED THAT U.S. AND INDIA WERE AMONG THE FEW WHO HAD NOT YET EVACUTATE PERSONNEL FROM EAST PAKISTAN. KAUL NOTED THAT SOVIETS AND CHICOMS HAD ALSO NOT WITHDRAWN AND SAID HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR PERSONNEL TO STAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM I AGREED AND COMMENDED OUR CONSUL GENERAL IN DACCA FOR HIS CAPABLE HANDLING OF DIFFICULT SITUATION.  
KEATING

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ACTION EA-20

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-13 CIAEL-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H#02

INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20

USIA-12 IO-13 AID-28 UPW-01 SAL-02 ACDA-19 RSR-01

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
USDEL FRANCE  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY  
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA  
RUMUDHYAMCONSUL HONG KONG 592  
RUSBAIRXAMCONSUL MADRAS 4724  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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SUBJ: INDOCHINA CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY

REF: (A) NEW DELHI 3587 (B) STATE 3805

I ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND EMBOFF. I CALLED ON FOREIGN SECRETARY KAUL MARCH 13 TO CONTINUE OUR CONVERSATION OF MARCH 11 (REF A). WITH KAUL WERE GONSALVES AND MENON,

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JOINT SECRETARIES, SOUTH ASIA AND AMERICAS DIVISIONS  
RESPECTIVELY.

2. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY NOTHING THAT WIRE SERVICE REPORTS  
OF U.S. EDITORIAL REACTION TO MRS. GANDHI'S ELECTORAL VICTORY  
HAD UNANIMOUSLY REFLECTED AMERICAN GRATIFICATION THAT PRIME  
MINISTER HAS BEEN GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING FIVE YEARS OF  
STABILITY AND PROGRESS TO INDIA.

3. KAUL THEN THANKED ME FOR SIGNING NON-PROJECT LOAN  
AGREEMENT THIS MORNING WHICH HE SAID HE FOUND BOTH GENEROUS  
AND ON GOOD TERMS. I TOLD HIM I HAD BEEN GRATIFIED BY  
T.G. PATEL'S STATEMENT AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY.

4. TURNING TO INDOCHINA, I RESPONDED TO QUESTION KAUL  
HAD POSED DURING EARLIER CONVERSATION, I.E., WHETHER IT  
WAS STILL U.S. POLICY TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS TROOPS FROM  
VIETNAM. I EXPLAINED BRIEFLY THE THRUST OF NIXON  
DOCTRINE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DREW UPON REF B TO  
EXPLAIN OUR POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL. I NOTED THAT:

(A) U.S. COMMITTED TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AS PART OF OVERALL  
SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE  
FORCES TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY;

(B) U.S. HAD PROPOSED 12 MONTHS AS TIMEFRAME WITHIN  
WHICH SUCH WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE COMPLETED; AND

(C) U.S. PROCEEDING WITH UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, RATE OF  
WHICH DETERMINED BY ABILITY SOUTH VIETNAM TO DEFEND ITSELF,  
LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY, AND PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS. I  
POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT HAS SAID HE WILL ANNOUNCE  
FURTHER REDUCTION OF FORCES IN APRIL, BUT ADDED THAT U.S.  
WILL RETAIN SOME FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS LONG AS HANOI  
CONTINUES TO HOLD AMERICAN POW'S. I SAID THAT GOI COULD  
HELP BY URGING NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RECONSIDER THEIR STAND  
ON POW'S.

5. KAUL HAD ALSO EARLIER RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER U.S.  
VIETNAMIZING WAR ON VIETNAMIZING PEACE. I NOTED THAT  
PRESIDENT HAD EXPLAINED THAT REDUCED U.S. MILITARY ROLE WILL  
LEAD TO REDUCED U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS. VIETNAMIZATION  
OF WAR THEREFORE WILL RESULT IN VIETNAMIZATION OF NEGOTIATIONS  
TO END WAR.

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6. TURNING TO LAOS, I TOLD KAUL THAT WE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS IN TALKS DURING CURRENT NORTH VIETNAMESE DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE. WE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT LAMSON 719 NEED NOT AFFECT TALKS SINCE PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HO CHI MINH TRAIL AREA BEYOND SCOPE OF LAOTIAN PARTIES TO CONFLICT.

7. I NEXT TOOK UP INDIAN REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY HIS STATEMENT THAT U.S. WILL DO NOTHING TO HARM "LEGITIMATE SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERESTS IN THE AREA", WHICH HAD CAUSED SOME TO FEEL THAT WE WERE ADVOCATING BIG POWER SPHERES OF INFLUENCE ON THE SUB-CONTINENT. I NOTED THAT GONSALVES HAD EXTENDED THIS FORMULATION AND HAD RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER IT U.S. AIM TO FORCE DRV TO ACCEPT CHINESE INTERVENTION. I AGAIN DREW ON DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE TO POINT OUT THAT (1) U.S. INTENDS TO CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; (2) SEEKS NO CONDOMINIUM WITH SOVIETS OR OTHERS ON SUB-CONTINENT; AND (3) HAS DEEP INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT SUB-CONTINENT DOES NOT BECOME FOCUS OF GREAT POWER CONFLICT. SIMILARLY, U.S. IN INDOCHINA SEEKS NO GREAT POWER ACCOMODATION AND HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED REGIONAL INITIATIVES FOR SOLUTION OF SEA PROBLEMS. CHINESE INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA WOULD BE DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THIS POSITION.

8. IN RESPONSE TO GOI EXPRESSION OF CONCERN THAT FIGHTING IN LAOS MIGHT BE EXTENDED INTO NORTH VIETNAM, I CITED PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT MARCH 4 PRESS CONFERENCE TO EFFECT THAT THERE WERENO SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ATTACKING NORTH, BUT 100,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE IN SOUTH AND THEY HAVE ALREADY KILLED OVER 200,000 SOUTH VIETNAMESE. PRESIDENT THIEU MUST, THEREFORE, CONSIDER MEASURES TO COUNTER THE ATTACK ON HIS COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH I NOTED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD NOT SPECULATED ON WHAT THOSE MEASURES MIGHT BE, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE NO U.S. GROUND FORCES IN LAOS, CAMBODIA OR NORTH VIETNAM EXCEPT ON OCCASIONS WHERE RESCUE OPERATIONS REQUIRED, AND SPELLED OUT PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON USE OF AIR POWER. I NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HAD CLEARLY STATED THAT THERE WAS NO PLAN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR U.S. AIR SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE OPERATION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

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9. ON CHOU VISIT TO HANOI, I DREW ON HONG KONG'S ASSESSMENTS TO POINT OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH VISIT BY SUCH HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION SIGNIFICANT, IT APPEARED CALCULATED TO DRAMATIZE PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR DRV WITHOUT INCREASING COMMITMENTS. I NOTED THAT CHOU'S STATEMENTS WERE NOTABLY CONFIDENT AND OPTIMISTIC. JOINT COMMUNIQUE JUST RELEASED DID NOT SEEM SIGNIFICANTLY TO CHANGE OUR EARLIER ASSESSMENT.

10. TURNING TO CAMBODIA, I GAVE KAUL DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT (STATE 39027) THAT PRESENT CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT NOW REPRESENTATIVE OF CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM AND THAT SIHANOUK HAD BEEN TOTALLY DISCREDITED. I POINTED OUT THAT KEATING

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ACTION: EA-20

INFO: OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-13 CIAEL00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02  
INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20  
USIA-12 IO-13 AID-28 UPW-01 SAL-02 ACDA-19 RSR-01

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R 140651Z MAR 71  
FMI AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 7376  
INFO: AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY VIETIANE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
USDEL FRANCE  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY  
RUSBTA/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 6065  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMCONSUL MADRAS  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMXPSSY BANGKOK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELHI 03611/2

SUBJ: INDOCHINA-CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG MAKING LITTLE HEADWAY  
BUILDING RELIABLE CAMBODIAN ORGANIZATION IN COUNTRYSIDE.  
I PASSED ON DEPARTMENT'S APPRAISAL OF MILITARY SITUATION IN  
CAMBODIA, REITERATED CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR

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GENEVA AGREEMENT AND WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND CONCLUDED BY SAYING WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GOI SPEAK OUT AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AGAINST NEUTRAL STATE OF CAMBODIA.

11. KAUL BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY SAYING HE BELIEVED IT WAS USEFUL TO US BOTH TO HAVE THESE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS AND ASSESSMENTS, EVEN THOUGH WE MIGHT HOLD DIFFERING VIEWS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS. HE WELCOMED STATEMENT THAT PRESIDENT INTENDED TO CONTINUE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM, BUT NOTED THAT THREE CONDITIONS MENTIONED WERE VARIABLES WHICH COULD HAVE MAJOR EFFECT ON PLANS OFR WITHDRAWAL. IT CONTINUED TO BE GOI VIEW, HE SAID, THAT SOLUTION LAY IN BORAD-BASED COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INITALLY WITHOUT PRG REPRESENTATION. AFTER COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMED PRG COULD PARTICIPATE AS MINORITY PARTY.

12. KAUL SAID SITUATION IS LAOS CONTINUED TO WORRY GOI, PARTICULARLY CHINESE REACTION. HE CLAIMED THAT 40,000 CHINESE TECHNICIANS WHO BEEN WITHDRAW FROM NORTH VIETNAM AFTER U.S. BOMBING HALT HAD NOW ALL RETURNED, AND HE NOTED THAT PRESENCE OF SENIOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ON CHOU DELEGATION HAD LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT GREATER MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS DISCUSSED. KAUL AGREED THAT CONTINUATION OF LAOS TALKS DIFFICULT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT SAID HE HOPED PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AFTER FIGHTING STOPPED. GOI WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO BRING TWO SIDES TOGETHER.

13. KAUL SAID HE COULD NOT FULLY SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT OF CAMBODIAN SITUATION. HE FOUND PRESENT GOVERNMENT NATIONALIST, BUT NOT NEUTRALIST. GOI MAINTAINING ITS CONTACTS WITH SIHANOUK AND HOPED TWO SIDES COULD GET TOGETHER. CONDEMNATION OF EITHER PARTY, HE SAID, WOULD NOT HELP.

14. KAUL EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT LACK OF PROGRESS IN PARIS TALKS. IT WAS THEIR INFORMATION THAT HANOI WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO MILITARY PRESSURE AND THAT RESUMPTION OF BOMBING WOULD ONLY MAKE POLITICAL SOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT. GOI REGRETTED RESUMPTION OF BOMBING.

15. KAUL AGREED THAT U.S. POW'S SHOULD NOT BE USED AS

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POLITICAL PAWNS AND SAID GOI WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE MATTER UP WITH DRV. HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT NUMBERS OF POW'S HELD AND GONSALVES NOTED THAT WE HAD RECENTLY PROVIDED GOI WITH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION WHICH THEY WERE USING IN FURTHER INQUIRIES WITH HANOI. HE SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE FURTHER INFORMATION FOR US.

16. IN RESPONSE TO MY EXPRESSION OF DOUBT THAT DRV AND PRG WOULD WELCOME FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE PRG AT OUTSET, KAUL SAID MADAME BINH HAD TOLD HIM CATEGORICALLY PRG WOULD AGREE TO THIS DURING HER VISIT TO DELHI AND THAT SUBSEQUENTLY HANOI HAD ALSO SAID IT WOULD WELCOMES SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. MADAME BINH HAD ALSO TOLD HIM NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD AGREED WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM ONCE U.S. WITHDREW AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMED. IN RESPONSE QUESTION, KAUL AFFIRMED THAT MADAME BINH HAD PRIVATELY ADMITTED PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WHEN I POINTED OUT IT UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT PRESIDENT THIEU TO ACCEPT COALITION GOVERNMENT OF HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS WHEN ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER, KAUL SAID FREE ELECTIONS IN ANY EVENT NOT POSSIBLE WITH FOREIGN TROOPS PRESENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, A POSITION WITH WHICH, HE SAID, SECRETARY ROGERS HAD AGREED.

17. GONSALVES NOTED THAT GOI CONTINUES TO BE UNCLEAR ABOUT U.S. POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL. IN MAY, 1969, HE SAID, U.S. WITHDRAWAL POSITION SEEMED BASED ON MUTUALITY. BY PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 7, 1970, SPEECH IT APPEARED THAT MUTUALITY DROPPED. NOW IN MARCH STATEMENTS, MUTUALITY WAS BACK IN U.S. POSITION HE SUMMED UP THAT GOI ONLY TRYING UNDERSTAND PRECISE CONDITIONS FOR TOTAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL.

18. KAUL CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT GOI APPRECIATED U.S. DESIRE PRESERVE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY OF INDOCHINESE STATES, INCLUDING REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. GOI, HE SAID, DID NOT WISH TO SEE CHICOM DOMINATION OF DRV NOR DID IT WANT TO SEE NORTH VIETNAMESE DOMINATION OVER SOUTH VIETNAM.

19. COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST WE HAVE HEARD THAT 40,000

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CHINESE HAVE RETURNED TO NORTH VIETNAM.  
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